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Abstract
This thesis is intended to provide a new interpretation of the social and 
political thought of Yen Fu (1854-1921). Yen Fu was the first person to introduce 
Western social and political ideas systematically into China, and consequently played 
a major role in furthering intellectual change in modem China.
The received interpretation of Yen Fu’s thought emphasizes the influence of 
social Darwinism on his preoccupation with state power and with China’s ability to 
survive an international struggle for existence. This established interpretation 
considers that Yen Fu deformed Western liberalism as a means to achieve state 
power.
This thesis argues that Yen Fu did not adopt social Darwinism to justify 
ruthless struggles within society or between different societies. Rather he drew from 
Darwinist thought the idea of a universal law of social evolution and concluded that 
China must change its traditional culture and system by following the model of the 
modem West.
This thesis presents Yen Fu as the pioneer of modem Chinese liberalism. It 
argues that Yen Fu’s ideas on liberty and democracy were influenced by both British 
liberalism and the Confucian tradition. At the core of his liberalism were proposals to 
define a sphere in which the individual can act freely without interference from the 
state or society, to establish the mle of law in order to prevent the tyrannical power of 
the state, and to limit state power both in the sphere of moral education and in the 
sphere of economic activities. He also appreciated democracy as a means of fulfilling 
the Confucian ideal of social harmony. However, his gradualist approach towards 
China’s democratic transition led to his criticism of democracy in his later years.
The arguments of this thesis are based on the extensive use of previously 
unexplored wiitings of Yen Fu.
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INTRODUCTION
In the late nineteenth century, the mainstream of Chinese thought experienced 
profound change unparalleled in the history of China since the time of Confucius. The 
only other period of intellectual change remotely comparable to the intellectual 
change of modem China was the introduction of Buddhism from India which 
catalyzed the emergence of Neo-Confucianism.* Yet the scale of intellectual change 
inspired by the introduction of Buddhism was less comprehensive than that of modem 
intellectual change. While the introduction of Buddhism greatly reshaped Chinese 
philosophy and religion, the change in modem China represented a comprehensive 
reexamination of every aspect of traditional ways of life - cultural, philosophical, 
social, and political alike. As Chang Hao stated, modem Chinese intellectuals did 
something they had not done since the axial age of the late Chou, namely, to 
reexamine the institutional foundation of the Chinese political order.'^
Behind the profound intellectual change in modem China stood one dominant
*0n the introduction of Buddhism into China, see E. Zurcher, The Buddhist 
Conquest o f China: the Spread and Adaptation o f Buddhism in Early Medieval 
China, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1972; Kenneth Ch'en, Buddhism in China: A Historical 
Survey, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964; on Buddhism as a stimulus to 
the emergence of Neo-Confucianism, see Carsun Chang, The Development o f Neo- 
Confucian Thought, New York: Bookman Associates, 1957, especially pp. 113-35.
^Chang Hao, Chinese Intellectuals in Crisis: Search for Order and Meaning (1890- 
1911), Berkeley: University of Califomia Press, 1987, p. 6. The notion 'Axial Age' 
was first used by the German Philosopher, Karl Jaspers, to refer to the first 
millennium B. C. when a revolution took place in the realm of ideas within several 
major civilizations. The most significant aspect of these revolutions was the 
emergence, conceptualization, and institutionalization of a basic tension between the 
transcendental and mundane orders. This notion has recently gained great popularity 
in the study of Ancient Chinese culture. See Benjamin Schwartz, Transcendence in 
Ancient China', Daedalus, Spring 1975, pp. 57-63; Benjamin Schwartz, The World o f  
Thought in Ancient China, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985; S.N. 
Eisenstadt ed.. The Origins and Diversity o f Axial Civilization, New York: State 
University of New York, 1986; Chang Hao, Some Reflections on the Problems of 
the Axial-Age Breakthrough in Relation to Classical Confucianism', in Ideas Across 
Cultures: Essays on Chinese Thought in Honour o f Benjamin 1. Schwartz, ed. Paul A. 
Cohen & Merle Goldman, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990, pp. 
17-31.
fact: 'the intrusion of Western civilization'/ Both the cultural challenge and the 
military threat posed by the Western intrusion undermined the stability and 
coherence of traditional culture', and thus brought about an intellectual crisis, or, as 
Lin Yu-sheng called it, the crisis of Chinese consciousness' in late nineteenth- and 
early twentieth-century China/
As early as the 1840s, in the wake of the Opium War (1840-2), Chinese 
intellectuals became aware of a certain inadequacy of traditional Confucian orthodoxy 
in responding effectively to the challenges imposed by the Western intrusion, and this 
awareness was intensified following the second Opium War (1857-60). However, it 
was not until China's disastrous defeat in the Sino-Japanese war in 1894 that Chinese 
intellectuals began to doubt the fundamentals of Confucianism and started to seek 
what Kuhn called a new paradigm' from Western thought.^ The generation of 
intellectuals that reached its intellectual maturity in the last decade of the nineteenth 
century and the first decade of twentieth century', as Benjamin Schwartz has noted, 
were the 'real transformers of values and bearers of new ideas from the West.'^
^Lin Yu-sheng, The Crisis o f Chinese Consciousness: Radical Anti-traditionalism 
in the May Fourth Era  ^Madison: the University of Wisconsin Press, 1979, p. 10.
'’ibid. The notion that the Western challenge to China since the 1840s represented 
not only a military threat' but also a cultural challenge' is discussed in Tu Wei-ming, 
Iconoclasm, Holistic Vision, and Patient Watchfulness: a Personal Reflection on the 
Modem Chinese Intellectual Quest', Daedalus^ Spring, 1987, pp. 77-8.
^Thomas S. Kuhn has argued that scientific inquiry does not proceed by the random 
accumulation of data but rather is organized in accordance with a paradigmatic theory 
that the scientific community takes for granted at any one time in formulating 
problems and selecting the means to resolve them. 'Scientific revolution' is a process 
in which the crisis' in scientific thought created by repeated challenges to the 
accepted paradigm is resolved by the emergence and acceptance of a new paradigm. 
(Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure o f Scientific Revolutions y second edition, Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1970, Chapter vii & viii.) For an example of 
applying Kuhn's conception in study of modem Chinese intellectual change, see Arif 
Dirlik, Revolution and History: the Origins o f Marxist Historiography in China, 
1919-1937y Berkeley: University of Califomia Press, 1978, pp. 5-13.
^Benjamin Schwartz, Introduction', in Reflections on the May Fourth Movement: 
A Symposium, ed. Schwartz, Cambridge, Mass.: East Asian Research Centre, Harvard 
University, 1972, pp. 2,4.
In this generation, Yen Fu (1854-1921) was a very important figure. Although 
he was not as politically influential as some of his contemporaries such as K'ang Yu- 
wei and Liang Ch'i-ch’ao, his influence on the intellectual development of modem 
China was no less significant than theirs. He was the first person who systematically 
introduced Western social and political ideas into China and thus he represented the 
beginning of continuous efforts by Chinese intellectuals to adopt foreign social and 
political theories as alternative paradigms to Confucianism. The particular questions 
he raised, and the specific methods he adopted to analyze those questions and answer 
them have had a profound and enduring influence on the direction and of the 
responses of modem Chinese intellectuals to China's crises.
Numerous studies have been published on Yen Fu’s ideas and their influence 
on modem Chinese thought.^ Among these works, Benjamin Schwartz's In Search o f  
Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West has been by far the most influential work 
both in the study of Yen Fu and in studies of modem Chinese intellectual history as a 
whole. It has been for a long time regarded as a 'classic work' in studies of modem 
Chinese intellectual history.®
In his work, Schwartz makes several important arguments conceming modem 
Chinese intellectual changes based on his analysis of Yen Fu. First he argues that 
modem Chinese intellectual discourse represents a radical discontinuity with 
traditional Chinese thought. Largely following Max Weber's analysis of Chinese 
religions, Schwartz believes that traditional Chinese culture lacks dynamism and the 
capacity to transform its society.’ Transformative thinking in modem Chinese
^Some Chinese studies include: Chou Chen-fu, Yen Fu ssu-hsiang shu-p'ing (A 
critical interpretation of Yen Fu's thought), Shanghai, Chung-hua, 1940; Wang Shih, 
Yen Fu chuan (Biography of Yen Fu), Shanghai, Jen-min, 1962; Commercial Press, 
ed. Lun Yen Fu and Yen yi ming-chu (On Yen Fu and his translations), Peking: 
Commercial Press, 1982; Westem studies include: Benjamin 1. Schwartz, In Search o f  
Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1964; James Reeve Pusey's China and Charles Darwin (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1983) also includes several chapters on Yen Fu.
®Thomas Metzger, Continuities between Modem and Premodem China: Some 
Neglected Methodological and Substantive Issues', in Paul A. Cohen & Merle 
Goldman ed., Ideas Across Cultures, p. 264.
’in his classic study of the Chinese religions, Weber maintained that Confucianism
intellectuals is a result of their acceptance of the European culture. The most 
important school of ideas to have provided modem Chinese intellectuals with 
transformative capacities, Schwartz asserts, is social Darwinism. Social Darwinism, 
according to Schwartz, shaped Yen Fu's thought and the entirety of modem Chinese 
thought in two ways. First, it shaped the moral goals of society for modem Chinese 
intellectuals by providing the intellectual impetus for the emergence of Chinese 
nationalism. According to this argument, traditional Chinese thought lacked 
nationalistic identification, and only had a form of cultural consciousness - an 
identification with universalistic moral goals and values. This explained why Chinese 
elites failed to reform the country vigorously and pursue wealth and power for the 
Chinese state in the face of foreign invasions during the late nineteenth century. For 
traditional Chinese elites, preservation of the Chinese way of life was more important 
than preservation of the Chinese state. Due to the introduction of social Darwinism, 
Chinese elites leamed that China was a 'nation state' rather than a culture.*® As cells 
of the organism known as China', Chinese individuals would have to treat the survival 
of the Chinese state as an organism as an ultimate goal.** Thus traditional Chinese 
culturalism' was transformed into modem nationalism.*^ This transformation was so
reduced tension with the world to an absolute minimum.... Completely absent in the 
Confucian ethic was any tension... between ethical demand and human 
shortcoming.'(Max Weber, The Religion o f Chinay translated by Hans H. Gerth, New 
York: the Free Press, 1964, pp. 227-8.) Thus, Weber asserted that Confucianism 
provided no leverage' with which to transform the social order. Confucianism, as 
Weber saw it, is a doctrine of 'adjustment to the outside, to the condition of the 
world', rather than a doctrine of transforming the world.(Ibid., p. 235.) It is generally 
been held that this Weberian theme formed the basis of Schwartz's analysis of Yen 
Fu. (Thomas Metzger, 'Max Weber's Analysis of the Confucian Tradition: a 
Critique',in The American Asian Review, vol 2, No. 1, Spring, 1984, p. 45; Guy S. 
Alitto, Introduction to Review Symposium: Thomas A. Metzger's Escape from 
Predicament, in Journal o f Asian Studies, vol. xxxix. No. 2, Febmary, 1980, p. 237.)
*®Benjamin Schwartz, In Search o f Wealth and Power, p. 56.
**Ibid., p. 57.
* I^bid., pp. 56-8. The sharp distinction between traditional Chinese culturalism and 
modem Chinese nationalism was first systematically stated by Joseph Levenson, 
Modem China and its Confucian Past: the Problem o f Intellectual Continuity (New 
York: Anchor Books, 1964). According to this distinction, the traditional Chinese
complete for the majority of Chinese elites, according to Schwartz, that the entire 
modem Chinese intellectual quest became an endless search for the 'wealth and 
power' of the Chinese state. This nationalistic obsession pushed Chinese intellectuals 
to embrace various Westem ideas in order to find an efficient way of achieving 
national power.
Social Darwinism not only shaped moral goals of society for Yen Fu, 
Schwartz further argued, but it also provided him with the means of fulfilling such a 
nationalistic goal. By Schwartz's interpretation, the basis of these means was the 
Promethean-Faustian ethos of European civilization'. The core of this ethos, Schwartz 
suggested, values the exaltation of human energy, glorifies the stmggle and conquest 
of extemal nature and the enormous growth of social and political powers within 
human society.*"*
The social Darwinian search for the wealth and power of the state as well as 
its stress on individual energy and dynamism, Schwartz argued, formed the nucleus of 
Yen Fu's thought and shaped his so-called liberal and democratic outlook. Unlike 
Westem liberals and democrats who, according to Schwartz, take liberty and 
democracy and the concept of the worth of persons within society' as ends in 
themselves,*^ Yen Fu took freedom and democracy as the means to elevating 
individual energy and ultimately promoting the wealth and power of the Chinese 
state.*® This deformation of the values of liberalism', Schwartz argued, was a prelude
self-image was culturalism', based on a common historical heritage and acceptance 
of shared beliefs, rather than nationalism, based on the modem concept of nation­
state. For a critique of the dichotomy between culturalism and nationalism, see James 
Townsend, Chinese Nationalism', The Australian Journal o f Chinese Affairs^ (No. 
27, January 1992, pp. 97-130).
*^ This is the basic theme of Schwartz's study of Yen Fu. His discussion of Yen Fu's 
ideas is undertaken within this framework. For a summary of this theme, see 
Benjamin Schwartz, In Search o f Wealth and Power^ especially Chapter xii. Some 
Implications', pp. 237-47.
*"*Ibid., pp. 238-9. 
*'lbid., p. 240. 
*®Ibid., p. 134.
to the inevitable failure of liberalism in modem C h i n a . A  fundamental 
incompatibility existed between the Chinese intellectuals' embrace of Westem 
liberalism and their aspiration for national salvation. There is always a possibility, 
Schwartz argued, that there are shorter roads than liberalism to the nationalistic end.** 
The 'positive authoritarianism' of the Soviet Union, according to Schwartz, proved to 
be one of these shorter roads'.*^
The influence of Schwartz's arguments in his study of Yen Fu has been 
enormous in Westem studies of modem Chinese history, particularly in intellectual 
history. As some students of Chinese history put it, across the last four decades, 
Schwartz became a major force in the field of Chinese studies, setting standards - 
above all in the area of intellectual history - that have been a guide and source of 
inspiration to students and scholars not only in the United States but world wide.'^° 
The theme of discontinuity between traditional and modem Chinese thought as 
articulated by Schwartz has been one of the most significant theories of modem 
Chinese intellectual history for several decades.^* Most of all, Schwartz's argument 
about the predominance of social Darwinism in modem Chinese thought, particularly 
his equation of the modem Chinese intellectual quest with a quest for the wealth and 
power of the Chinese nation-state and his dismissal of modem Chinese liberals as 
having failed to catch the essence of Westem liberal tradition, has greatly influenced 
studies of modem Chinese intellectual development.^
•'Ibid., p. 241.
**Ibid., p. 240.
*’lbid., pp. 240-1.
^®Paul A. Cohen & Merle Goldman, 'Introduction', in Ideas Across Cultures, ed. 
Cohen & Goldman, pp. 1-2.
^*0n the influence of the theme of discontinuity between traditional and modem 
Chinese thought on studies of modem Chinese history, see Paul A. Cohen, 
Discovering History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese 
Past, New York: Columbia University Press, 1984, pp. 57-78.
^^This argument can be seen in many studies on modem Chinese intellectual 
history such as, Paul A. Cohen, Between Tradition and Modernity: Wang T'ao and 
Reform in Late Ch’ing China, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987;
Recently, new work has emerged which casts doubt on some important themes 
in Schwartz’s interpretation of Yen Fu. Some students of traditional Chinese 
philosophy, notably de Bary and Tu Wei-ming, have challenged the Weberian theme 
of the stagnancy of Confucianism. They have argued that Confucianism, and Neo- 
Confucianism in particular, has a strong tendency to encourage innovation in the 
search for a good society, rather than simply following tradition.^^ The most eloquent 
statement of this claim has been made by Thomas Metzger.^ According to Metzger, 
there existed a strong sense of predicament in Neo-Confiicianism which was 
comparable to the pervasive tension that Weber found in the Puritan definition of the 
human condition: between the Neo-Confucian desire of bringing about changes in the 
social-political order to fulfil the Confucian moral goal and the inadequacy of the 
means available to them for attaining that goal. Modem Chinese transformative 
thought, Metzger argued, was derived from this sense of predicament of Neo- 
Confucianism. Modem Chinese intellectual change was a process in which 
intellectuals received from the West modem technology, new techniques of political 
participation and new forms of knowledge which provided the means by which 
intellectuals could realize their Neo-Confucian goals in society. Thus, Metzger 
argued, Chinese intellectuals finally found escape from their Confucian 
predicament.^^
In addition, numerous studies have directly or indirectly challenged
Hao Chang, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and Intellectual Transition in China, 1890-1907, 
Harvard University Press, 1971; Lin Yu-sheng, The Crisis o f Chinese Consciousness: 
Radical Anti-traditionalism in the May Fourth Era.
^^Wm. Theodore de Bary, 'introduction', in The Unfolding o f Neo-Confucianism, 
ed. de Bary et al.. New York: Columbia University Press, 1975, esp. pp. 1-2; de Bary, 
East Asian Civilization, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988; Tu Wei- 
ming, Confucian Thought: Selfhood as Creative Transformation, New York: State 
University of New York Press, 1985.
^''Thomas Metzger, Escape from Predicament: Neo-Confucianism and China's 
Political Culture, New York: Columbia University Press, 1977; 'Max Weber’s 
Analysis of the Confucian Tradition: a Critique', in The American Asian Review, vol. 
2, No. 1 (Spring, 1984), pp. 28-70.
25Metzger, Escape from Predicament, pp. 14-18.
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Schwartz's claim that the modem Chinese intellectual quest is reducible to a quest for 
the'wealth and power' of the Chinese state. Studies on the origins and developments 
of such ideologies and movements of modem China as socialism, communism and 
anarchism have demonstrated that the utopian quest for an ideal society has been an 
equally strong, if not stronger, motivation underlying the Chinese intellectuals' 
embrace of various Westem ideologies.^^ Thus some efforts have been made to 
redefine the nature of modem Chinese intellectual development. Chang Hao argues 
that the modem Chinese intellectual's quest is not limited to the spheres of political, 
social, or even broadly cultural, but is ethical and existential as well.^  ^ This 
multidimensional feature of modem Chinese intellectual quests is called by Thomas 
Metzger the 'modem Chinese intellectual problématique'. At its broadest, this 
problématique entails the reconstitution of both self and society in a discourse of 
modemity, which calls forth questions not only of social and political form, but 
ultimately, of the meaning and ends of individual existence.^* Vera Schwarcz argues 
the cases of two dimensions in modem Chinese intellectual development: the 
dimension of nationalism and the dimension of cultural criticism, or, as she puts it, 
'enlightenment'.^’
While these efforts at redefining the nature of modem Chinese intellectual
^®0n the relation of utopianism and the origin of socialism, see Martin Bemal, 
Chinese Socialism to 1907, London: Comell University Press, 1976; on utopianism 
and the emergence of communism in modem China, see, Frederic Wakeman, Jr., 
History and Will: Philosophical Perspectives o f Mao Tse-tung Thought, Berkeley: 
University of Califomia Press 1973; Maurice Meisner, Marxism, Maoism and 
Utopianism, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1982; on anarchism see, Arif 
Dirlik, Anarchism in the Chinese Revolution, Berkeley: University of Califomia 
Press, 1991.
^^Chang Hao, Chinese Intellectuals in Crisis: Search for Order and Meaning, 
'Introduction'.
^^Thomas Metzger, Developmental Criteria and Indigenously Conceived Options: 
A Normative Approach to China's Modemization in Recent Times', Issue and Studies, 
Febmary 1987, p. 72.
’^Vera Schwarcz, The Chinese Enlightenment: Intellectuals and the Legacy o f the 
May Fourth Movement o f 1919, Berkeley: University of Califomia Press, 1986, pp. 1-
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change are inspiring, one thing noticeably missing from these efforts is an analysis of 
the generation which has been often called the 'breakthrough generation', namely the 
generation of the 1890s and 1900s. With the exception of Hsiao Kung-chuan's study 
of K'ang Yu-wei which provided a balanced account of K'ang's inheritance of 
tradition and his debt to Westem ideas, K'ang's utopian vision of a modem China and 
a new world' as well as his nationalistic concem, no serious studies of the most 
prominent figures of the 1890s and 1900s have been advanced for decades.^® In the 
case of Yen Fu, there has been no reinterpretation of his thought since Schwartz's 
work almost three decades ago.^ *
The relevance of this breakthrough generation' for the reinterpretation of the 
nature of modem Chinese intellectual development is obvious. First, on the issue of 
whether modem Chinese intellectual discourse represents a break with traditional 
thought, this generation provides the best answer. While Metzger's argument that 
traditional Confucianism had transformative ideas is well supported by his 
sophisticated interpretation of Neo-Confucianism, his argument that modem Chinese 
intellectuals adopted Westem ideas as means of fulfilling Confucian ideals remains, 
by and large, hypothetical unless it is supported by studies of this generation. 
Secondly, on the issue of whether modem Chinese liberal thinkers were committed to 
some important Westem liberal values or distorted the essence of Westem liberalism, 
some important figures in this generation also provide the best cases to examine.
In this context, this thesis reexamines Yen Fu's thought focusing on Yen Fu's 
ideas on some important issues confronting modem Chinese intellectuals, particularly 
the issue of whether China should make fundamental changes, what kinds of changes 
should be sought and how these changes should proceed. Through exploring Yen Fu's 
ideas on these issues, it attempts to shed light on evolution of modem Chinese 
thought.
^°Hsiao Kung-chuan, A Modern China and a New World: K'ang Yu-wei, Reformer 
and Utopian, 1858-1927, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1975.
^^There have been some criticisms of certain ideas in Schwartz's study on Yen Fu, 
such as Hoyt Cleveland Tillman, Yen Fu's Utilitarianism in Chinese Perspective', in 
Paul A. Cohen & Merle Goldman ed.. Ideas Across Cultures, pp. 63-84, and some 
chapters in James Pusey's China and Charles Darwin.
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The argument of this thesis is intended to demonstrate, firstly, that Yen Fu's 
intellectual concerns were much greater than merely nationalistic concerns. Yen Fu 
accepted modem Westem social and political ideas not simply as effective means of 
achieving the wealth and power of the Chinese state, but as some universally valid 
ideas for addressing certain universal human concems. Yen Fu's appreciation of 
modem Westem civilization displayed some features of utopianism. This utopianism 
reflected the influence of the Confucian notion of an ideal society. Yet this Confucian 
ideal was dramatically transformed, through adopting Westem evolutionary theory of 
the nineteenth century, from the lost Golden Age of antiquity to a future stage of 
human progress.
Based on such a understanding, this thesis analyses Yen Fu's ideas on 
important social and political issues, such as liberty, democracy and revolution. It will 
show how Yen Fu, a man of deep Confucian background and considerable knowledge 
of modem Westem civilization, reflected the two different social and political 
traditions, and how these reflections shaped his views on social and political change 
in China. It will argue that Yen Fu's interpretation of Westem political ideas should 
not be understood simply as either total acceptance or distortion. Rather, it should be 
analyzed as a dialogue of two civilizations. Yen Fu considered both Westem ideas 
and traditional Chinese ideas as sharing some universal human desire to seek an ideal 
society. He was very much impressed by some fundamental aspects of modem 
Westem civilization and adopted them as a way of challenging traditional Chinese 
thinking. He simultaneously voiced his criticism of some aspects of Westem 
civilization largely from the viewpoint of Chinese tradition.
This thesis begins with a chapter on Yen Fu's life and works. As there have 
been already detailed accounts of Yen's life in previous studies, my description will 
be brief, except for that of Yen Fu's early life (1854-95). On Yen Fu's early life, 
particularly his knowledge of Westem social and political theories before he started to 
publish essays and articles in 1895, we now have more information than has been 
available which enables us to provide a more detailed account.
The main argument of this thesis is divided into two parts. The first part 
(Chapters II-IV) will explore Yen Fu's philosophical justification of change in China 
promoted by leaming from the West. It will start with examining Yen Fu's concem
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with Darwinism. As the influence of Darwinism has been a major subject of studies in 
modem Chinese intellectual history and the basis of Schwartz's analysis of Yen Fu, 
two chapters will be devoted to this topic. They will argue that the main debt of Yen 
Fu to Darwinism is not nationalism, as generally conceived, but a progressive and 
deterministic outlook. Chapter II will demonstrate that Yen Fu adopted Westem 
evolutionary theory as the most scientific method to unveil the universal law of social 
evolution, to understand China's current position on the universal evolutionary 
process, to indicate China's direction of change and to show mechanisms for 
achieving this change. Chapter III discusses Yen Fu's understanding of the Darwinian 
notion of 'stmggle for existence'. It will show that the conventional interpretation of 
Yen Fu's adoption of the notion of stmggle for existence as his foundation for the 
nationalistic search for wealth and power of the state is largely misleading. It will 
argue that Yen Fu's notion of the stmggle for existence demonstrates a universalistic 
concem for human progress, and for China to be recognized as an enlightened 
member of civilization.
In addition to Darwinism, Yen Fu also adopted utilitarianism in his argument 
for change. Chapter IV explores Yen Fu's utilitarian ideas. It will demonstrate that he 
adopted utilitarian ideas mainly from British utilitarians, and partly by revitalizing 
some ideas of Legalism. He accepted utilitarianism as a vehicle for rational thought 
which challenged the authority of Confucian tradition on the one hand and provided a 
basis for social, economic and political change on the other.
Part Two includes three chapters (Chapters V-VII). It explores Yen Fu's vision 
of China's social, economic and political reforms, as well as his ideas for obtaining 
those reforms. Unlike the first part of the thesis which focuses on challenging the 
received views. Part Two is by and large exploratoryTlhe study of Yen Fu in the West /  
has been long dominated by Schwartz's work which views Yen Fu's liberal and 
democratic ideas as simple adoptions of existing Westem ideas to enhance the wealth 
and power of the Chinese state. Consequently, no serious effort has been made to 
explore Yen Fu's intellectual enterprise in transplanting Westem liberal and 
democratic ideas and systems to the soil of China. By the same token. Yen Fu's 
criticism of the Chinese political tradition, as well as his interpretation of Westem 
liberal and democratic ideas and systems, have not been seriously analyzed. I will
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demonstrate that Yen Fu's ideas about China's social and political change contain 
many observations which will be of great interest to students of both Chinese history 
and Westem political theory.
Chapter V explores Yen Fu's ideas about liberty and law. It will demonstrate 
that Yen Fu accepted some basic ideas of nineteenth century British liberalism, 
including the idea of negative liberty, limited government, and the mle of law. Yet lie 
stopped short of embracing Westem individualism due to the influence of the 
Confucian emphasis on individual responsibility instead of individual rights. Chapter 
VI examines Yen Fu's views on democracy. It shows that Yen Fu derived democratic 
ideas both fiom modem Westem political thought and from some elements in 
traditional Chinese political thought. It presents Yen Fu's dilemma on the issue of 
democracy, where he is tom between the desirability of democracy and the conditions 
it requires. Chapter VII examines Yen Fu's political position in some of the most 
important political events of his time. It focuses on some political predicaments a 
moderate liberal will confront in a revolutionary era.
Finally, Chapter VIII concludes the thesis by summarising its main arguments 
and, more importantly, by exploring some general implications of this study for the 
studies of modem Chinese intellectual history as a whole.
The claim to originality for this thesis is based on two criteria. First, it makes 
extensive use of previously unexplored materials. Previous studies of Yen Fu, as 
represented by Schwartz's work, based their analysis largely on Yen Fu's translations 
as well as some collections of his writings published between the 1920s and the 
1950s.^  ^ Those collections, however, have only included about half of Yen Fu's 
writings. Recently, Yen Fu's biographer, Wang Shih, made an extraordinary effort to 
search for and collect Yen Fu's essays, letters and other writings from joumals, 
newspapers of Yen's time and other sources. The fruits of his efforts were published 
in 1986 as a five volume collection entitled Yen Fu chi (The collected works of Yen 
Fu), which represented a substantial enlargement of Yen Fu's writings over previous
^^The main collections of Yen Fu's writings published up to the 1950s include: 
Kung Shao-chin et al éd.. Yen Chi-tao shih-wen ch'ao (A collection of Yen Fu's 
essays and poetry), Shanghai, 1922; Yen Chi-tao hsien-sheng yi-chu (Posthumous 
works of Mr Yen Fu), Singapore: Nan-yang hsueh-hui, 1959.
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editions.”  There has not yet been any research done to explore these newly available 
materials. In addition, I have found some of Yen Fu's letters and published essays, 
including two essays published in English, which were not included in Wang Shih's 
collection.”
While Yen Fu's ideas included in these newly available materials are by and 
large in line with those found in previously available materials, they nevertheless 
provide additional information which will enrich or even alter some of our received 
understanding of Yen Fu. For instance, regarding Yen Fu's relation with Darwinism, 
we now know, through some newly available essays of Yen Fu on evolutionary 
theory, that Yen Fu's knowledge of nineteenth-century Westem evolutionary biology 
and social science was much broader and deeper than previously assumed. We also 
know, through his essays such as Ts it Tme that Might is Right?', 'On Hegel's 
Philosophy of Mind', and his criticism of nationalism, that Yen Fu's attitude towards 
social Darwinism as a moral and political doctrine was far more complicated than one 
of simple acceptance as indicated by Schwartz and others. Regarding Yen Fu's ideas 
of democratic transition and revolution, some newly available materials, particularly 
his several essays on constitutionalism during 1905 and 1906, and his criticism of the 
1911 Revolution, provide much needed information for reconstmcting Yen Fu's
^^Yen Fu chi (The collected works of Yen Fu), ed. Wang Shih, 5 vols., Peking: 
Chung-hua, 1986 (hereafter referred to as CYFW). By Wang Shih's estimate, various 
previous collections of Yen Fu's writings include around 560,000 words, and his 
collection added a further 500,000 words. (CYFW, vol. 5, pp. 1577-87)
” Writings in Chinese include: Yen Fu chih Hsia Tseng-yu' (Three letters to Hsia 
Tseng Yu), (1902, 1906, 1906), reprinted in Chung-kuo tse-hsueh (Chinese 
Philosophy), No. 6, 1981; Yu ch'iang-ch'uan wu kung-li tsu-yü hsin-yü?' (Is it true 
that might is right?), Chih-li chiao-yii tsa-chih (Chih-li Educational Review), vol. 2, 
No. 9, June 1906; 'Lun kuo-chia yü wei li-hsien tzu-chien yu k'e-hsing tzu yao-cheng' 
(Some feasible reform policies should be adopted before introducing 
constitutionalism), Chih-li chiao-yii tsa-chih (Chih-li Educational Review), vol. 1, 
No. 13 & 14, September & October 1906; 'Meng-te-ssu-chiu Fa-yi chih chih-na lun' 
(Montesquieu on China in his the Spirit o f the Laws', Cheng-yi tung-pao, Peking, vol. 
5, No. 13-15, August - September, 1906. Writings in English include: Two Letters to 
G. E. Morrison' (1911, 1912), in The Correspondence o f G. E. Morrison, ed. Lo, Hui- 
min, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976, vol. 1, pp. 652-7, 768-9; A 
Historical Account of Ancient Political Societies in China', The Chinese Social and 
Political Science Review, vol. 1, No. 4, (pp. 18-23), Peking, 1916.
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general ideas on democracy and revolution, an area somehow neglected by Schwartz’s 
work. These newly available materials also shed light on Yen Fu's complex attitude 
towards Chinese tradition.
The second and most important basis of originality for this thesis is the 
distinctive interpretation of Yen Fu's thought. While this new interpretation certainly 
benefits from the newly available materials, it is nevertheless mainly based on a 
theoretical reconstruction of Yen Fu's ideas. This reconstruction is made possible first 
by the methods I have adopted. This thesis is not intended to add another chapter to 
the intellectual biography of Yen Fu. Rather, it focuses on exploring Yen Fu's ideas 
on some fimdamental issues which confronted modem Chinese intellectuals. This 
method allows more scope for examining the inner logic of Yen Fu's thought without 
always tackling his practical activities. Secondly, this reconstruction of Yen Fu's 
thought is made possible by a conscious effort of avoiding overgeneralization. Rather 
than directly tackling hotly debated issues such as whether Yen Fu represented 
discontinuity with tradition or whether he distorted Westem liberal and democratic 
ideas, this thesis focuses primarily on how Yen Fu reflected traditional ideas and how 
he interpreted Westem liberal and democratic theories.
Through such a reconstmction of Yen Fu's thought, there emerges a 
drastically different picture of Yen Fu from that in Schwartz's work. My 
interpretation of Yen Fu's relation with Westem evolutionary theory, utilitarianism, 
and liberal democratic theory, my assessment of Yen Fu's relations with traditional 
Chinese thought, and my interpretation of the weakness of Yen Fu's liberal ideas 
contrast sharply with previous studies.
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Chapter I 
The Man and His Work
Yen Fu was bom in January 1854 into a well-to-do family in a village near the 
south coast of China.' A decade after the Opium War which opened China’s door to 
foreign trade and missionary influence, life went on as traditionally as before. This 
was clearly illustrated by Yen’s early education. He started school at seven years of 
age leaming the Confucian classics. The goal of this education was to give him the 
opportunity for a career as a civil servant to be achieved by performing well in 
examinations. Yen Fu’s father invited the best tutors he could afford for the boy’s 
education, including a renowned scholar in the province, Huang Shao-yen. Huang 
reportedly placed equal weight on Han and Sung leaming, the two main Confucian 
schools of the time. By the age of thirteen, according to one account Yen Fu had 
already acquired a solid knowledge of the classics.^
The death of Yen Fu's father in 1866 abmptly cut off the prospects of a 
continued education to become a civil servant. The family fortunes were suddenly 
reversed. Unable to pay the tuition fees for her son’s traditional education. Yen Fu’s 
mother reluctantly sent him off to a newly established school of 'Westem affairs’, the 
Foochow Shipyard School, which provided students with stipends and allowances.
The Foochow Shipyard School was one of the first Chinese schools involved 
in 'Westem leaming’, and part of the 'Self-strengthening’ movement.^ The school was
'Yen’s birth place was Yang-ch’i-hsiang in the Hou-kuan prefecture of Fukien 
province, near today’s Foochow city.
^For a detailed account of Yen Fu’s early life and his family, see Yen Chia-li (Yen 
Fu’s nephew), Yen Fu hsien-sheng chi-ch’i chia-t’ing’ (Mr. Yen Fu and his family’, in 
Fukien wen-shih tzu-liao) (Source materials on the culture and history of Fukien 
province). No. 5 (1981), pp. 78-91.
^The ' Self-strengthening’ movement was initiated by several powerful officials of 
the Ch’ing govemment in the wake of the Second Opium war (1858-1860). The main 
aim of the movement was to enhance the wealth and strength of the country by 
modemizing the military and developing industry. Under this aim, a series of 
programmes were launched including the establishment of several modem
18
founded in 1866 and the first school entrance examination was held in November of 
that year. Aware that there would not be a rush of students for such unorthodox 
education, the school 'proposed that substantial monthly allowances be offered as an 
inducement and that the work not be too difficult at first.’^  As expected, most 
applicants came from impoverished local families.^ The entrance examination was a 
composition on the topic of 'Life-long Filial Devotion to One's Parents'. Yen Fu's 
essay won him first place among the applicants and he was admitted, with dozens of 
others, to the school.
The school consisted of two parts, the School of Naval Architecture, where 
French language and French instruction prevailed, and the School of Navigation, 
where language and instruction were in English. Yen Fu spent the next five years in 
the English division of the school.® Besides the English language, he took courses 
such as arithmetic, geometry, algebra, analytic geometry, trigonometry, physics, 
mechanics, chemistry, geology, astronomy, and navigation. In addition, as part of the 
curriculum, he also spent time studying the Sacred Edict o f the Emperor o f K ’ang hsi, 
the Classic o f Filial Piety, as well as Chinese history.^
J. G. D., an otherwise unidentified visitor to the Foochow Shipyard School 
early in 1870 reported his observations of the school in the North-China Herald
govemment schools: the Peking, the Shanghai, and the Canton language schools 
{t'ung-wen kuan), and the Foochow Shipyard School. For a detailed account of those 
schools, see Knight Biggerstaff, The Earliest Modern Govemment Schools in China, 
Ithaca: Comell University Press, 1961.
"Knight Biggerstaff, op. cit, pp. 205-6.
^Pao Tsun-p'eng, Ch'ing-chi hai-chün chiao-yü chi-ch'i ying-hsiang' (Naval 
education and its Influences in the Ch'ing era), in Chung-kuo chin-tai-shih lun-chi 
(Selected essays on modem Chinese history), ed. Chung-kuo wen-hua fu-hsing wei- 
yuan-hui (the Committee for Chinese Culture Renaissance), Taipei: Commercial 
Press, vol. 8, 1985, p. 501.
®The English division was directed by James Carroll, an Englishman. Its general 
aim was to train officers to operate ships. (Knight Biggerstaff, The Earliest Modem 
Government Schools in China, p. 214.)
^Pao Tsun-p'eng, Ch'ing-chi hai-chün chiao-yü chi-ch'i ying-hsiang' (Naval 
education and its Influences in the Ch'ing era), p. 504.
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(April 21, 1870), an English language newspaper published in Shanghai. About the 
students in the English division, he wrote:
The pupils of first class, thirty in number, were submitted to an 
unpremeditated examination in mathematics, algebra, conic sections, 
dynamical laws, fluxions, hydrostatics, etc., and answered perfectly 
well, and with a readiness which was astonishing to us. We were 
informed that the young Chinese students studied the exact sciences so 
eagerly that the foreign superintendents had found it necessary to 
forbid that any student should prolong his studies after 10 or 11 o'clock 
at night. The young Chinese spoke correct and good English and the 
jargon and pidgin English is not to be heard.*
Yen Fu graduated with high honours in 1871. After several years at sea, he 
was sent to Britain for further naval studies with eleven other naval officers.’ This 
was the first time China had sent students to study in Europe.*® Yen and his 
colleagues arrived in Britain in May 1877. After a short stay in the Portsmouth naval 
base, he enrolled in the Royal Naval College, Greenwich on October 1877.** He 
graduated from the college in 1879 and returned to China in June 1879.
There is little information available about Yen Fu's student life in Britain 
other than some references in the diary of Kuo Sung-t'ao, the first Chinese
*Quoted by Knight Biggerstaff, The Earliest Modern Govemment Schools in 
China, pp. 214-15.
’On the history of dispatching Chinese naval students to Britain, see Wang Chia- 
chien, 'Ch'ing-mo hai-chün liu-ying hsueh-sheng ti p'ai-chien chi-ch'i ying-hsiang' 
(Sending naval students to Britain in the Late Ch'ing and its influences), in Chung- 
kuo chin-tai-shih lun-chi (Selected essays on modem Chinese history) vol. 8, pp. 450- 
62.
*®Several years previously (1872), China sent one hundred children to study in the 
United States.
**Archive records in the Royal Naval College, Greenwich refer to the 'payments of 
fees' by Yen Fu on November and December 1878 for a second session'.
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ambassador to Britain (1876-1878). Kuo kept close contact with the Chinese naval 
students, and had a special friendship with Yen Fu. According to Kuo's account, the 
subject of Yen Fu's study in the Royal Naval College was naval command. His 
curriculum included mechanics, chemistry, physics, mathematics, navigation, and 
current international military affairs, such as the German-French war and the Russian- 
Turkish war.*^  According to Kuo, Yen Fu was very impressed by the depth and 
richness of Westem science and technology,'^ by the physical strength of Westerners 
in contrast to the Chinese,"* and above all, by the social, economic and political ideas 
and systems of Britain. Yen seemed to have paid a great deal of attention to the 
general social, economic and political situation in Britain, and tried to understand the 
differences between Britain and China. He 'often spent whole days and nights 
discussing differences and similarities between Chinese and Westem thought and 
political institutions' with the Ambassador Kuo Sung-t'ao.*^ He visited the British law 
courts and remarked to Kuo that the reason why England and other countries of 
Europe are wealthy and strong is that impartial justice is daily extended. Here is the 
ultimate source.'*  ^By contrasting Britain with China, Yen Fu developed very critical 
attitudes towards the current Chinese situation. In a conversation with Kuo Sung-t'ao, 
Yen criticized the conservative attitudes of Chinese officials as demonstrated by their 
opposition to everything from the West, e.g. railways, ships and technology alike.'^ 
He also criticized arguments used by some Chinese scholar-officials to suggest that
'^Kuo Sung-t'ao, Kuo Sung-t'ao jih-chi (Diary of Kuo Sung-t'ao), 4 vols., ed. 
Hunan jen-min ch'u-pan-she, Changsha: jen-min, 1982, vol. 3, pp. 406-7. For a brief 
account of Kuo's mission in Britain and some translations from his diary, see J. D. 
Frodsham, The First Chinese Embassy to the West, the Journals o f Kuo Sung-t'ao, Liu 
Hsi-hungand Chang Te-yi, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974.
*^ Kuo Sung-t'ao, Kuo Sung-t'ao jih-chi (Diary of Kuo Sung-t'ao), vol. 3, p. 517.
"*Ibid., p. 407.
'^Wang Ch'ü-ch'ang, Yen Chi-tao nien-p'u (Chronological biography of Yen Fu), 
Shanghai, 1936, p. 7.
'"CYFW, vol. 4, p. 969.
'^Kuo Sung-t'ao, Kuo Sung-t'ao jih-chi (Diary of Kuo Sung-t'ao), vol. 3, p. 444.
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Westem science and culture originated in China.** He told Kuo that the Chinese 
people had to change their pattern of thinking before any real progress could be made 
in China. The most important change should be 'abolishing taboos'.*’
Yen Fu's earliest access to Westem social and political ideas was also during 
his two year in Britain. Among the Westem ideas which most impressed Yen Fu were 
perhaps those of Darwin and other evolutionists.^® At the time of his stay in Britain, 
Darwin's ideas roused great excitement in social and political studies. As Trevelyan 
noted, it was a time of active political, philosophical and religious speculations, 
carried on in an atmosphere of freedom, with the impact of Darwin and Huxley to 
stimulate it with new conceptions of the universe.'^* Herbert Spencer, whose name 
was often related to the application of Darwinist biology to social and political 
studies, as Leslie Paul has noted, became a household word.^  ^ While there are no 
records of Yen Fu's exposure to the works of Darwin and other evolutionary writers 
during his stay in Britain, there can be little doubt that Yen Fu at least became aware 
of Darwinism when he was in Britain. In his essay. The Root of Strength' 
(Yuan-ch'iangy 1895), Yen Fu described the popularity of Darwinism in the West:
After Darwin's The Origin o f Species came out, it was soon found in
**Ibid.
*’lbid.,p. 474.
^®Recent research has suggested that Yen Fu might have been exposed to 
Darwinism before his visit to Britain. As evidence, this study noted that Darwin's The 
Descent o f Man and Selection in Relation to Sex (1871) was reviewed in 1873 in 
Shen-pao, a newspaper published in Shanghai. In the same year. Sir Charles Lyell's 
Principles o f Geology^ which loomed large in the formation of evolutionary theories 
of Darwin and Spencer, was abridged and translated into Chinese. (Wang Tzu-chun 
and Chang Ping-lun, Ta-erh-wen hsueh-shuo tsai chung-kuo tsao-ch'i ti ch'uan-po yu 
ying-hsiang' [The earliest dissemination of Darwin's theory in China and its 
influences], in Chung-kuo tse-hsueh [Chinese Philosophy], No. 9,1983, pp. 365-8.)
*^G. M. Trevelyan, Introducing the Ideas and Beliefs of the Victorians', in Ideas 
and Beliefs o f the Victorians: a Historic Réévaluation o f the Victorian Age^ ed., 
Harman Grisewood, London: Sylvan Press, 1949, p. 18.
22Leslie Paul, The English Philosophers, London: Faber and Faber, 1962, p. 53.
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almost every home in Europe and America, and the scholarship, 
govemment and philosophy of the West all dramatically changed. ...
Every scholar became conversant with some ideas of Darwin and 
theorists used Darwinism as the basis for their arguments.^^
This statement probably drew on his own experience in England.
In addition to Darwinism, Yen Fu might have become familiar with the 
reputation and possibly the writings of Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill and other 
liberal thinkers. In his diary, Kuo Sung-t'ao recorded a conversation with Inoue 
Kaom, a Japanese financial officer visiting London:
When I asked him what foreign books he had read, he listed the books 
of Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill. His discussions about economic 
affairs contained many sound ideas. By comparison [with the 
Japanese], our Chinese knowledge of Westem leaming is more than 
ten thousand miles behind. What a shame it is!^ "*
Yen had a close friendship with Kuo and they often discussed differences 
between Westem and Chinese political thought and institutions. It seems likely that 
Kuo mentioned to Yen Fu his knowledge of Smith and Mill, whom Kuo knew were 
very significant in Westem thought.
Yen Fu retumed to China in 1879, initially to teach in the Foochow Shipyard 
School. He was invited in 1880 to the newly established Peiyang Naval Academy in 
Tientsin, first as dean (tsung chiao-hsi). He was promoted to superintendent (tsung- 
pan) in 1890. His decades in the naval academy (1880-1900) seemed not to have been 
happy. He was not satisfied with the policies of the Self-strengthening movement. 
From his experience in Britain, he realized that much broader reforms than simply the 
adoption of Westem military and industrial technology were needed to revitalize the 
country. He particularly saw a change in the thinking of intellectuals and the reform
""CYFW., vol. 1, p. 16.
"'‘Kuo Sung-t'ao, Kuo Sung-t'ao jih-chi ( Diary of Kuo Sung-t'ao), vol. 3, p. 169.
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of political institutions as essential for China’s progress/^ On a personal level, Yen 
felt that he was not given the proper position to use his abilities fu l lyPar t ly  due to 
his unorthodox education and to his radical social and political opinions, he never 
gained the trust of his patron, Li Hung-chang, then the governor-general of Chih-li.^  ^
Yen tried to enhance his career by taking the traditional examination several times, 
but he failed each time.
Besides his dissatisfaction with his position in the Peiyang Naval Academy of 
Tientsin, we know little about his activities there before 1895, the year when he began 
to publish essays and translations advocating reform. Yet one gets the impression that 
this was an important period in his intellectual development, particularly for 
broadening his knowledge of Westem social and political theories. He recorded 
reading Herbert Spencer's The Study o f Sociology in 1881.^* He recalled being 
impressed by the work and called it the best book he had ever read.^’ He reportedly 
acquired and began reading Adam Smith's The Wealth o f Nations in 1892.^ ® Several 
channels probably provided him with up-to-date information about major 
developments in Westem social theory. First, the majority of teachers in the naval 
academy were from Britain.^’ Yen Fu might have broadened his knowledge of 
Westem thought through contacts with those teachers. Secondly, some bookshops in 
China had begun to carry Westem language books. Yen Fu mentioned acquiring
^^Wang Chü-ch'ang, Yen Chi-tao nien-p’u (Chronological Biography of Yen Fu), p. 
10.
^^See Yen Fu's letters to his brother, Kuan-lan, in 1894 and 1896, CYFW, vol. 3, p. 
731.
""CYFW, vol. 2, pp. 181-3.
""CYFW, vol. l ,p.  161.
""Ibid.
"®Liu Chung-t'ao, 'Yen Fu fan-yi Yuan Fu tzu ching-kuo' (An account on Yen Fu's 
undertaking of translating The Wealth o f Nations), in Hua-tung shih-fa ta-hsueh 
hsueh-pao (The Joumal of Hua-tung Normal University), 1985, No. 4, pp. 94-6.
^'Chang Hsia et al éd., Ch'ing-mo hai-chün shih-liao (Source materials conceming 
the Chinese Navy in the late Ch'ing), Peking: hai-yang, 1982, p. 431.
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English books from the pien-fa bookshop in Shanghai/^ Thirdly, several magazines 
were published in China by foreign missionaries at the time, including the well 
known Wang-kuo Kung-pao (The Globe Magazine). Articles published in this 
magazine included general introductions to Western science, history, religion and 
social and political theory, as well as discussions of China's current affairs. Martin 
Bernal's suggestion that Yen Fu might have learned Western social and political 
theory from the magazine seems probable.^^
n
China's defeat in the Sino-Japanese war in 1894 was a turning point in Yen 
Fu's career. The defeat and the brutal treaty imposed by Japan on China startled the 
Chinese elites. The intellectual climate changed abruptly in the wake of defeat. 
Awareness of national crisis and the urgency of change became the dominant theme 
of public opinion.
Immediately after the war. Yen Fu published four important essays in Chih 
Pao in Tientsin: 'Lun shih-pien chih chi' (On the speed of world change) (February 4, 
1895), 'Yuan ch'iang' (The root of strength) (March 4-9, 1895), 'P'i Han' (In 
refutation of Han Yu) (March 13-14, 1895), and Chiu-wang chueh-lun' (On our 
salvation) (May 1-8,1895). These essays portrayed China's situation as one of serious 
crisis. They argued that China had to make fundamental changes both in culture and 
in institutions in order to survive in a new world in which only the fittest could 
survive. He also held that China must follow Western precedents.
To strengthen the arguments of the four essays. Yen Fu translated Thomas
32Yen Fu, 'Letter to Chang Yuan-chih', (1899), CYFW, vol. 3, p. 531.
^^Martin Bernal, Chinese Socialism to 1907, London: Cornell University Press, 
1976, p. 33.
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Huxley’s Evolution and Ethics into Chinese in the summer and autumn 1896.^ "* Yen's 
translation was less a translation than an abridged summary of the original. He 
omitted large parts of the original, and added many of his own words to the 
translation. He also added lengthy notes to express his own ideas. The translation was 
circulated among some friends before it was formally published in 1898.^^
The fundamental message Yen Fu wanted to convey by translating Huxley’s 
work was the idea of change. He claimed, following Huxley, that change was the law 
governing both the natural and the human worlds. He argued that China faced a 
perilous situation. China could either change fundamentally for the sake of progress, 
or perish as a people according to the law of evolution as elaborated by Darwin.
Yen Fu’s translation of Evolution and Ethics had a tremendous influence on 
Chinese elites. The urgency of national crisis, the possibility of perishing as a nation, 
and the necessity of radical change conveyed in Yen Fu’s translation expressed the 
general feeling of the country. The book went through more than thirty printings 
within ten years of its publication.^^ The book was welcomed by intellectuals and 
officials as providing a means for challenging the conservatives.^’ It was adopted by 
teachers in some primary and high schools as a textbook.^* One can hardly imagine 
another publication in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century China with more 
readers or greater influence. With the publication of Evolution and Ethics^ Yen Fu
^^Evolution and Ethics was originally a lecture delivered by Huxley at the 
University of Oxford in 1893 as the second of the annual lecture founded by G.J. 
Romanes. It was published in 1894, together with a 'Prolegomena’ by Huxley, under 
the title of Evolution and Ethics. See Huxley, Essays: Ethical and Political^ London: 
Macmillan, 1904.
^^The exact date of Yen Fu’s translation and publication of Evolution and Ethics 
has long been a subject of controversy. Wu Kuo-i’s recent article, 'T'ien-yen Lun 
Shaanhsi Wei-ching-pen t'an-yen (Examination of Shaanhsi Wei-ching edition of Yen 
Fu’s translation of Evolution and Ethics)^ provides a detailed account with 
considerable evidence on this matter. See, Tang-an yii li-shih (Archives and history). 
No. 3, 1990, Peking, pp. 43-50.
^^Wang Shih, Yen Fu Chuang (Biography of Yen Fu), p. 45. 
’^Ibid., p. 43.
^*Ibid., p. 44.
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became famous as 'the first person in China to master the Western leaming.'^^
In order to propagate his ideas of reform, Yen Fu joined with several of his 
friends to publish a newspaper, Kuo-wen Pao (National News Daily), in November 
1897 in Tientsin. The style of the paper imitated that of The Times of London - in 
addition to daily papers, there was a larger edition every ten days.^° Many of Yen Fu's 
important commentaries appeared in the paper as editorials. The paper became one 
of the most influential papers in northern China during the reform period'.*^ *
The intellectual outcry for reform in the wake of the Sino-Japanese war 
created a momentum for the reform movement of 1898. Beginning on June 11 1898, 
the young emperor of the Ch’ing, Kuang-hsu, issued a series of edicts, announcing a 
wide range of policies aimed at reform. In addition to reforms in military, industrial 
and commercial policies which, by and large, followed the trend of the Self­
strengthening movement, two important aspects of reform were novel. First, the 
emperor's decrees spelled out innovative measures in cultural and educational reform. 
The new measures included a radical revamping of the civil-service examination as 
well as the establishment of a modem university and various primary and secondary 
schools. Secondly, the emperor's decrees touched upon the matter of political reform, 
including the reform of government structure and a vague pledge to broaden the 
political base of government and to listen to the voice of the people'
Despite his energetic efforts at propagating ideas of reform and his reputation 
as the first person in China to master Western learning'. Yen Fu was nevertheless not 
an active participant in the reform movement of 1898. The only action he took 
relating to the reform movement was that he was once summoned by the emperor to 
the court to dispense advice. In response to the emperor. Yen wrote an essay entitled
^^K'ang Yu-wei, Yu Chang Chih-tung hsin' (Letter to Chang Chih-tung), in Chien 
Po-tsan et al. éd., Wu-hsu pien-fa (The reform of 1898), Shanghai, Shen-chou kuo- 
kuang she, 1953, vol. 2, p. 525.
""CYFW, vol. 2, p. 453.
"‘T'ang Chih-chün, Wu-hsu pien-fa shih (A History of the reform movement of 
1898), Peking: Jen-min, 1984, p. 218.
""Ibid., pp. 345-411.
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Ten Thousand Word Memorial to the Emperor' and published it in installments in the 
National News Daily in the early months of 1898.
Two reasons might be given to explain Yen Fu's somewhat passive role in the 
reform movement. On the one hand, as Schwartz has noted, Yen was by and large a 
man of ideas rather than a man of action."*^  On the other hand, as will be explored 
later, he was somehow critical of the policies of the reform movement in spite of his 
general sympathies with the course of reform.
Although not an activist himself. Yen Fu was dismayed by the conservative 
coup on September 1898 which cracked down on the reform movement, imprisoning 
the emperor and executing several reform activists. Within a short period after the 
coup of the conservatives. Yen composed several poems to express his sorrow about 
the six martyrs who were executed, his concern for the emperor, and his anger 
towards the conservatives."*  ^One poem reads:
To search for good government has become a crime.
To raise talented persons has caused the emperor suffering!
The skies over the capital seem to be covered with a pall of darkness.
No one can dispel my profound depression."*^
m
The conservative coup of 1898 was the last effort by the traditional 
conservatives in the court to block meaningful changes in China's social and political 
systems. Yet it was unable to stop the momentum of change begun by the reform
"*^ Benjamin Schwartz, In Search o f Wealth and Power, p. 81.
"*"*Yen Fu, 'Mourning for Lin Wan-chui' (CYFW, vol. 2, pp. 362-3); 'Ancient 
Spirit' (vol. 2, p. 363); Send off Chen Tai-yi Southward' (vol. 2, p. 363); 'Reflections 
on August 1898' (vol. 2, p. 414).
45CYFW, vol. 2, p. 414.
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movement of 1898. Two years later, shocked by the Allied pillage of Peking 
following the Boxer uprising, the conservatives in the court, who had crushed the 
reform movement of 1898, began to undertake far reaching reform themselves. The 
Confucian examination system was modified, and then abolished in 1905; modem 
schools purveying Westem-style learning were established nation-wide; modem 
armies were established; industry increasingly developed; and above all, the Ch’ing 
government undertook from the mid-1900s to create representative assemblies and to 
enact a constitution. All these seemed to suggest, as Mary Wright noted, that 'a  new 
society was in the making.'"*®
Nevertheless, for the increasingly radicalized intellectuals and masses, reform 
came too little and too late. The reform efforts of the Ch’ing court were not able to 
strengthen imperial mle and prevent a revolution as the Ch’ing government had 
hoped. They added to the growing revolutionary pressures in society both 'by the 
forces they set in motion and by the resistance they generated - resistance not to their 
goals but to the only means the imperial govemment had to achieve them.’"*^ The 
revolutionary movement which emerged in the early 1900s succeeded in 
overthrowing the mle of Ch’ing in 1911, ending the imperial system which had 
existed for several thousand years.
During the period from 1898 to 1911, Yen Fu had a very unstable personal 
life. Immediately following the conservative coup of 1898, came a period of 
repression and persecution. Despite his passive role in the reform movement. Yen was 
nevertheless put under great pressure for propagating Western ideas and advocating 
reform. Shortly after the coup, the National News Daily^ which Yen edited, was 
criticized by some conservative officials for propagating alien ideas. As the result, the 
paper was closed by the govemment in 1898."**
"*®Mary Clabaugh Wright, Introduction: the Rising Tide of Change’, in Mary 
Clabaugh Wright ed., China in Revolution: the First Phase, 1900-1913, New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1968, pp. 24-32.
"*%d., pp. 29-30.
"**T’ang Chih-chün, Yen Fu chuan’ (Biography of Yen Fu), in his Wu-hsu pien-fa 
jen-wu chuan-kao (Draft biographies of participants in the reform of 1898), Peking: 
Chung-hua, 1961, vol. 1, p. 197.
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During the Boxer attack on Tientsin, the Peiyang Naval Academy was 
severely damaged and was closed forever in 1900/’ In the midst of the rebels' attack, 
Yen Fu hastily fled Tientsin to Shanghai. During his short stay in Shanghai, he 
reportedly organized a society for the study of logic, and gave lectures.^® He was also 
elected as deputy speaker of the short-lived Shanghai Congress, but apparently was 
not much involved in the activities of the Congress.^*
Yen Fu returned to Tientsin in 1901 to be appointed superintendent of the 
K'ai-p'ing Mining Company, a newly established joint venture between Britain and 
China. He resigned the position shortly after the appointment, stating that he was not 
suited for business affairs.^^
Yen Fu spent the next few years (1902-1905) in Peking as superintendent of a 
newly-established translation bureau which was affiliated with the Metropolitan 
University (Ching-shih Ta-hsueh-t'ang), the predecessor of Peking University. He 
resigned the position in 1905 to be appointed as President of Fu-tan College in 
Shanghai for a short period. He was then invited to be superintendent of the Anhwei 
Higher Normal School, a position he held from 1905 to 1907. Frustration over the 
school's affairs and conflicts with local gentry brought his resignation in 1907.”  He 
then became Chief Reviser of the Committee for the Compilation of Technical Terms 
(ming-ci kuan chung-chuan) within the Ministry of Education, a position which he 
held until the revolution of 1911.
In the radically-changed political environment of the 1900s, Yen Fu held to 
what can be described as a 'middle-course'. On the one hand, he continued to criticize 
traditional culture and systems and advocate reforms through learning from the West.
’^Chang Hsia et al., éd., Ch'ing-mo hai-chün shih-liao (Source materials 
concerning the Chinese Navy in the late Ch'ing), p. 431.
^®Yen Fu, 'Letter to Ts'ao Tien-ch'iu' (1901), in CYFW, vol. 3, p. 566.
” Wang Shih, Yen Fu Chuang (Biography of Yen Fu), p. 93.
” Yen Fu, Letter to Chang Yuan-chi', (1901), in CYFW, vol. 3, p. 542.
” Yen Fu, 'Memorandum for resignation of Superintendent of Anhwei Higher 
Normal School', in Yen Chi-tao hsien-sheng yi-chu (Posthumous works of Mr Yen 
Fu), Singapore: Nan-yang hsueh-hui, 1959, pp. 134-9.
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On the other hand, he was increasingly critical of radicals, particularly 
revolutionaries, and regarded opposition to the growing revolutionary influence as 
one of his major tasks.
Yen Fu's middle-course was first clearly spelled out in his essay, 'Dialogue 
between Host and Guest', {chu-k'e p'ing-yU 1902). In this essay, he criticized 
traditional conservative thinking for its refusal to change by learning from the West. 
He also denounced radicals for their simplistic understanding of Western ideas and 
systems and for their reckless actions in pursuing a course of radical change. He 
illustrated his position by sympathizing with the aspirations for change of radicals on 
the one hand, and by agreeing with the conservative concern for stability on the other. 
For example, he wrote:
For a country to progress, both conservative and radical forces are 
needed, and neither conservative nor radical ideas should be totally 
dismissed. Without radical ideas, progress is impossible; without 
conseiwative ideas, stability cannot be maintained. Making progress 
and in the meantime maintaining stability is the key for a country to 
develop in an orderly manner.^ "*
To provide a theoretical ground for his middle-course political position. Yen 
Fu emphasized the importance of what he called scientific methods' in analyzing 
social and political issues. By scientific methods', he meant several distinct and yet 
related points. To begin with, he argued that political judgment must be based on 
reason, rather than emotion or abstract principle. The worst thing in politics was to 
make judgments based on a priori moral principles without providing evidence and 
logical argument, as often happened in the Chinese political tradition. Sound political 
judgment required a clear understanding of the past, the present and the future of 
Chinese society, and an understanding of the goals of China's change and the means 
of reaching the goals.^  ^All these required a new type of political study which applied
""CYFW, vol. l,p . 119.
""On Yen Fu's discussions of 'scientific methods' in studying politics, see his 
'Political Lectures' (1906), especially the first two lectures. (CYFW, vol. 5, pp. 1241-
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evolutionary, historical, comparative and empirical methods/^ Such a study could be 
found only in Western social and political sciences.
Yen Fu considered the fault of both traditional conservatives and newly 
emerged radicals to be their ignorance of scientific knowledge in studying society and 
politics. Conservatives did not understand progress as the inevitable law of social 
evolution, while the radicals did not understand evolution to be a gradual process. 
Both of them had little knowledge of how Western political systems worked.^^ Yen 
Fu used his personal experience to demonstrate how scientific knowledge could 
change one's perception of politics:
[Before I read Spencer's The Study o f Sociology^j I tended to express 
radical views. I began to realize my error after I had read Spencer's 
book. I found Spencer's book to contain essence of The Great 
Learning and The Doctrine o f the Mean, but in a more illustrative 
form. It demonstrates that investigating matters {ke-chih) with a 
sincere mind is the basis of good governing. When Spencer illustrates 
a doctrine, he never strikes too far or too short of the mark. To both 
conservatives and radicals in our country, his book is the best medicine 
for their problems.^*
Thus, Yen Fu concluded that in order to change China's social and political 
institutions, there must first be a change in the pattern of thinking. Chinese people, 
particularly the elites, must be enlightened by scientific knowledge as developed in 
the West before any real progress could be made in social and political reform. In his 
letter to Chang Yuan-ch'i in April 1899, Yen Fu expressed his idea clearly:
60.)
^"CYFW, vol. 5, p. 1251.
''CYFW, vol. 1, p. 123.
'"CYFW, vol. 1, p. 126.
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Since last autumn, I have closely followed the development of our 
national affairs and realized that little can be done. If people remain 
unenlightened, neither conservative nor reform policies will be 
successful. By contrast, if we have more people, particularly young 
people, who can really understand the situation of China and the West, 
then even if the govemment does nothing, or acts wrongly, our nation 
will not perish. At worst, it will revive after it declines for a short 
period. This is why I have given up all other things and pursue only 
the task of translation.^^
Yen Fu regarded translating important Western works into Chinese as the 
most direct way of enlightening the Chinese people. In a letter to Chang Yuan-chi 
dated April 5 1899, he wrote: T am now working extremely hard in translating books. 
...This is because I pity our people for their ignorance of modem knowledge. I swear 
to do my best [to enlighten them].'^ Yen was encouraged by the enormous success of 
his translation of Huxley's Evolution and Ethics. Shortly after its publication, he 
started a decade long venture in rendering some of what he believed to be the 
important Westem social, political, economical, and philosophical works into 
Chinese.
The works Yen Fu chose to translate largely fell into three categories. The 
first was that of Westem evolutionary social theories. Throughout his life. Yen 
demonstrated immense interest in nineteenth-century Westem evolutionary theories, 
and apparently read widely on biological evolution and social evolution. We find in 
his writings a sketch of the development of evolutionary biology and social science in 
the West. He discussed dozens of biologists who contributed to the development of 
evolutionary theory, such as de Lamarck, von Buck, Emest Haeckel, August 
Weismann, von Baer, Affed Russell Wallace, Robert Grant, Richard Owen, Thomas
' ’CYFW, vol. 3, p. 525. 
""Ibid., p. 527.
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Huxley and above all Charles Darwin.^* He also discussed Westem social scientists 
and historians who were, to various degrees, evolutionists, such as Henry Maine, 
August Comte and F. K. von Savigny/^ He even discussed some highly specialized 
anthropological and sociological works which he thought had applied evolutionary 
theories in studying societies, such as H. T. Buckle's A History o f Civilization in 
England (1857/\ Edward Westermarck's The History o f Human Marriage (1891), 
Johann J. Bachofen’s Mother's Rights (1861), James G. Frazer's The Golden Bough 
(1890).^
More than other evolutionists, Herbert Spencer figured large in Yen Fu's 
writing. After all, Spencer was 'the philosopher' of the whole movement of 
evolutionary, progressive social science of the late nineteenth century, and 'his name, 
more than any other, symbolized evolutionary social theory for the ordinary reader.'^  ^
Yen Fu read at least some volumes of Spencer's System o f Synthetic Philosophy.^ He 
expressed his wish several times to translate Spencer's entire System o f Synthetic 
Philosophy into Chinese, but wearied of the enormous task.^  ^ He finally decided to 
translate The Study o f Sociology first and hoped to translate some other works of 
Spencer later, which he did not do.^ * In addition to Spencer's work. Yen also spoke
"'CYFW., vol. 5, p. 1325.
“ CYFW., vol. 1, p. 147; vol. 2, p. 317; vol. 5, p. 1267.
“ CYFW, vol. 5, p. 1249.
“ CYFW., vol. 2, pp. 309-19.
“ j. W. Burrow, Evolution and Society: a Study in Victorian Social Theory, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966, p. xiv.
“ Yen stated that some of his comments on the process of biological evolution in 
his translation of Huxley's Evolution and Ethics were derived from Spencer's The 
Principles o f Biology (CYFW, vol. 5, p. 1350-3). Yen also mentioned reading 
Spencer's The Principles o f Ethics. (CYFW, vol. 5, p. 1325.) Some of Yen Fu's 
commentaries in his translation of Huxley's Evolution and Ethics apparently stemmed 
from Spencer's First Principles (CYFW, vol. 5, pp. 1327-8, Spencer, First Principles, 
pp. 307-396).
“ C'iTW, vol. 3, pp. 507, 527.
“ Yen started to translate the Spencer's work in 1898 and completed two chapters to
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highly of Edward Jenks' A History o f Politics, and translated it into Chinese.
Alongside his interest in evolutionary theory, Yen Fu had an interest in logic. 
This interest stemmed from his enthusiasm for scientific methods in analyzing society 
and politics. He complained that traditional Chinese knowledge lacked conceptual 
classification and logical consistency.®’ What passed for knowledge in China was only 
vague declaration without support of either evidence or logical argument.^® He was 
convinced that the introduction of Westem logic was essential to developing natural 
and social sciences in China. This belief motivated him to translate Mill's A System o f  
Logic into Chinese. He managed to translate the first half of Mill's work during the 
years from 1900 to 1902 and published it in 1905. He expressed his wish several 
times to complete the translation but failed to do so, and mentioned the difficulty of 
translating the work as one reason for his failure. Later, Yen chose a simpler book, 
W. S. Jevons' Logic, to translate into Chinese as a fulfilment of his wish to provide 
his readers with an introductory book on logic.^ *
Another major category of Yen Fu's translations was Westem liberal and 
democratic theories. Largely due to his experience in Britain, Yen developed a high 
opinion of Victorian Britain, showing great interest in works of what Hayek called the 
British liberal tradition.^^
The first major liberal work Yen Fu choose to translate was Adam Smith's
be published in The National News Daily where he was editor. The translation was 
intermpted by the Boxer uprising and by his translation of Mill's On Liberty. 
Immediately upon completing the translation of On Liberty, he resumed translation of 
Spencer's work in 1901 and finished the work during the next year. (CYFW, vol. 1, p. 
127.)
®’CYFW, vol. 5, p. 1251.
""Ibid.
William Stanley Jevons, Logic, New York: D. Appleton & Company, 1897; Yen 
Fu Ming-hsueh ch'ien-shuo (A translation of Jevons' Logic), 1908.
"^Hayek distinguished the English tradition of liberalism from the French one. The 
former was made explicit mainly by a group of Scottish moral philosophers led by 
David Hume, Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson, and some Frenchmen like Montesquieu, 
Benjamin Constant, and above all Tocqueville. (F. A. Hayek, The Constitution o f 
Liberty, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960, pp. 55-6.)
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Inquiry into the Nature and Causes o f the Wealth o f Nations He first mentioned 
Smith in 1895 in his essay 'The Root of Strength', referring to him as the intellectual 
fountainhead of Britain's economic prosperity. One year later, Yen Fu began to 
translate The Wealth o f Nations, and did not finish the work until 1901.^ ^
Even before he finally finished the translation of The Wealth o f Nations, Yen Fu 
began his translation of J. S. Mill's On Liberty in 1899. He finished the initial draft in 
1900, but the manuscript was lost during the Boxer Rebellion when Yen Fu was 
forced to flee Tientsin to Shanghai. He was pleased that the manuscript was finally 
found by a Westem fnend in 1903. He immediately published it with a few minor 
corrections and changes. He claimed that it was the Chinese people's good fortune 
that the manuscript of this masterpiece was found, and said that this fact demonstrated 
that heaven {t'ien) did not have the heart to prevent the Chinese people from 
becoming enlightened.’^
Another important work which Yen Fu translated was Montesquieu's The 
Spirit o f the Laws. Yen probably started the translation in 1900 and finished it in 
1909.’  ^Before Yen Fu finally finished his translation, another Chinese scholar, Chang 
Hsiang-wu, published in 1903 his translation of The Spirit o f the Laws from a 
Japanese edition.”  Yen Fu's translation was more widely read than Chang's, probably 
because Yen Fu's reputation as a master of Westem knowledge was greater.
To many of his translations. Yen Fu added thoughtful commentaries. These
” The edition of the Smith's work Yen Fu used is the one edited by James Edwin 
Thorold Rogers, second edition, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1880, vol. 1-2; see Yen Fu, 
Fa-yi (A translation of Montesquieu's The Spirit o f the Laws), vol. 1, p. 13.
’"‘Liu Chung-t'ao, Yen Fu fan-yi Yuan Fu tzu ching-kuo' (An account on Yen Fu's 
undertaking of translating The Wealth o f Nations), pp. 95-6.
” Yen Fu, Chun-chi ch'uan-chieh lun (A translation of Mill's On Liberty), p. viii.
Yen's translation was based upon Thomas Nugent's English edition. His 
introductory essay on Montesquieu's life was obviously based on the 'New Memoir of 
Montesquieu' in the 1894 edition, (see Montesquieu, The Spirit o f the Laws, translated 
by Thomas Nugent, and revised by J. V. Prichard, London, 1894.)
” Hsiung Yuen-tzu, Chung-kuo chin-tai min-chu ssu-hsiang shih (A history of 
democratic thought in modem China), Shanghai: jen-min, 1986, p. 309.
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commentaries, together with Yen Fu’s numerous essays published during this period, 
outlined Yen Fu's ideas on wide range of social and political issues.
IV
While Yen Fu’s translations and writings earned him great fame and prestige 
across China, his moderate political position found few followers in a revolutionary 
era. The Revolution of 1911 finally broke out which overthrew the Ch’ing 
govemment and ended the imperial rule which had existed in China for several 
millennia. Immediately after the revolution. Yen’s personal fortune improved. With 
his reputation as someone well-versed in Westem culture and systems, and by virtue 
of his personal relationship with the president of the republic. Yuan Shih-k’ai, Yen 
enjoyed considerable prestige in the years following the revolution. He was appointed 
by Yuan’s govemment as the president of Peking University in Febmary 1912, but 
differences over policy with the educational administration caused his resignation 
eight months later.^* He was then immediately appointed as an advisor to the Yuan 
Shih-k’ai administration. In 1914, after Yuan dissolved the elected parliament, Yen 
Fu was appointed a member of the Constitutional Conference (yueh-fa hui-yi) which 
was assigned the task of drafting a new constitution. Shortly after. Yuan appointed 
Yen Fu as a member of the National Council (tsai-cheng yuen), a temporary 
legislative body replacing the dissolved parliament.’’
Perhaps the most important political event in which Yen Fu participated 
during this period was Yuan Shih-k’ai’s restoration of the monarchy. Although Yen 
was reluctantly used by Yuan as a tool of personal ambition. Yen did share the belief
’*For a brief account of Yen’s presidency of Peking University, see Hsiao Ch’ao- 
jan, et al., Pei-ching-ta-hsueh hsiao-shih (A history of Peking University: 1898- 
1949), Shanghai: chiao-yü, 1981, pp. 26-30.
” 0n the Yuan Shih-k’ai presidency and his conflicts with the parliament, see 
Emest P. Young, 'Politics in the aftermath of Revolution: the Era of Yuan Shih-k’ai’, 
in The Cambridge History o f China, vol. 12, ed. John K. Fairbank, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp. 209-55.
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that a constitutional monarchy was more desirable than a republic for China at that 
time.
Following the failure of Yuan's effort to restore the monarchy, China entered 
'the era of warlords' during which political order collapsed completely and millions 
of people died from war and famine.*® It was also the period in which Yen's career 
was at its lowest ebb. As his disillusion with Chinese politics deepened and as his 
health deteriorated, he ceased almost all political activities, and rarely published. He 
still occasionally wrote letters to his closest friends bitterly criticizing warlords, 
revolutionaries and young radical students whom he held responsible for China's 
disastrous situation.
Once an optimistic reformer. Yen became extremely depressed in his later 
years. He stated that there was no hope for China to achieve a state of peace and order 
in a short time. He was afraid that it would take several decades in which millions of 
people would lose their lives before the killings stopped.** This thought disturbed him 
deeply. No personal or family joy could relieve the pain of watching the country's 
situation worsening daily. He wrote to a fnend in 1920:
I always sit in my apartment watching the sky or listening to rain. 
Sometimes I kill time by staring at the lake. I am now unable to read 
historical or philosophical works which I so enjoyed earlier. I do not 
like to talk current political affairs either. My heart is broken, only my 
body remains alive. My life has become useless!*^
In the new year's eve 1921, Yen wrote a poem to his children which reads:
Our country has deteriorated into a disastrous situation.
*®For a brief account of the warlord era, see James E. Sheridan, The Warlord Era: 
Politics and Militarism under the Peking Govemment, 1916-28', in John K. Fairbank 
ed.. The Cambridge History o f China, vol. 12, pp. 284-321.
**CYFW, vol. 3, p. 708.
*"CYFW, vol. 3, p. 714.
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When will it be saved?
Once signs of peace could be seen,
Just tell me when you hold a memorial ceremony for me.*^
Several months later, he died in his home town with his last words in his will 
to his children. Part of the will reads: 'Keep in mind that China will not perish and 
that our tradition may be reformed, but not abandoned.'^
One of the obvious questions concerning the study of Yen Fu's thought is 
whether it was consistent. The received view among Chinese scholars is that Yen Fu's 
ideas were radical in his early writings and conservative in his later years. In terms of 
culture, he later gave up his early position as an all-out Westemizer' and returned to 
Confucian tradition. Politically speaking he later abandoned his early liberal and 
democratic beliefs and became a reactionary.*^
As we have just shown, there is some truth in this assessment. When Yen Fu 
first published his four essays and the translation of Evolution and Ethics in 1895, he 
was certainly among the most radical intellectuals. He challenged the traditional 
establishment and advocated comprehensive reform through learning from the West. 
In his later years, he was counted amongst those conservative, even reactionary, 
intellectuals who vigorously criticized the fashionable ideas of radical reform or
*"CYFW, vol. 2, p. 411.
Yen Fu's Will', in CYFW, vol. 2, p. 360.
This assessment was first put forward by Chou Chen-fu. Chou divided Yen's 
thought into three periods: 1) from 1895 when he first published his four essays to 
1899 when he translated Mill's On Liberty, the period of all-out Westemizer'; 2) 
from 1899 to the revolution of 1911, when his thought featured a compromise 
between tradition and Westernisation; 3) after 1911 he became a reactionary 
traditionalist and abandoned almost all Westem ideas he had once believed. See Chou 
Chen-fu, Yen Fu ssu-hsiang shu-p'ing (A critical interpretation of Yen Fu's thought), 
Shang-hai, p'ing-ming, 1940, pp. 28, 205, 206. Chou's assessment is generally 
accepted by Chinese scholars.
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revolution.
This picture has more to do with the image of Yen Fu's political ideas in the 
minds of his contemporaries than changes in his own ideas. In the 1890s, the 
dominant intellectual tendency was traditional conservatism which stuck to tradition 
and opposed any change. At the turn of the century, Chinese society, especially public 
opinion, underwent a rapid shift. By the time Yen Fu died in 1921, the dominant 
tendency was anti-traditionism and enthusiasm for the most radical Westem political 
ideologies, such as Anarchism and Marxism. In the face of such rapid social changes. 
Yen Fu's own ideas underwent changes. Yet some of Yen Fu's basic ideas remained 
unchanged even in his later years.
Thus, in my reconstmction of Yen Fu's thought in the following chapters, I 
follow Schwartz's argument that there was 'a  persistence of underlying preoccupation 
and substantial inner coherence' of Yen Fu's thought.*  ^ Although I disagree with 
Schwartz's interpretation of the meaning of this 'inner coherence', I will generally 
treat Yen Fu's thought as a unified entity and explore its inner logic.
86Benjamin Schwartz, In Search o f Wealth and Power, p. 212.
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Part One
Tradition and Change
41
The primary issue confronting Yen Fu when he started to publish his writings 
and translations in 1895 was the issue of 'change' (pien). This issue had dominated 
political debates ever since China's humiliating defeat by the British in the Opium 
War in 1840, centring on whether or not, or to what extent, China should learn from 
the West to change its culture and institutions.
The main opposition to change came from what can be called traditional 
conservatism.* Its extreme form was to oppose anything from the West: railways, 
machinery and weaponry, not to mention social and political institutions.^ This 
conservative attitude stemmed from characteristics of a deeply rooted cultural 
orientation in traditional China. The first was the sacredness of Confucian orthodoxy. 
Confucianism was formally adopted as the official teaching of the Chinese empire in 
the second century B. C., and by the emergence of Neo-Confucianism in the twelfth 
century it gained absolute dominance in Chinese culture.^ From then on, 
Confucianism was upheld as an inviolate body of secular truth', and guidance for
'The term conservatism' has been used in the study of modem Chinese intellectual 
history to refer to two distinct political beliefs. Firstly, it refers to the belief held by 
traditional Chinese intellectual elites who refused change through learning from the 
West in the late nineteenth century, (e.g., Mary Clabaugh Wright, The Last Stand o f  
Chinese Conservatism: the Tmg-chih Restoration^ Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1957.) Secondly, it refers to various ideas in the early twentieth century which 
either preferred a gradualist approach to a revolutionary approach in social and 
political change, or expressed the desire of preserving some elements of tradition, 
(see, Charlotte Furth, ed. The Limit o f Change: Essays on Conservative Alternatives 
in Republican China, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976, esp. 
Benjamin Schwartz, Notes on Conservatism in General and in China in Particular', 
and Charlotte Furth, Culture and Politics in Modem Chinese Conservatism'.) In order 
to avoid confusion, 1 refer to the former as traditional conservatism' (this term was 
used by Michael Gasster, Chinese Intellectuals and the Revolution o f 1911, Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 1969, p. vii.) and the latter as conservatism.
^For an account of the traditional conservative opposition to leaming from the 
West, see Ch'uan Han-sheng, Ch'ing-mo fan-tui hsi-hua ti yen-lun' (Anti- 
Westemization views in the late Ch'ing period), in Chung-kuo wen-hua fu-hsing wei- 
yuan-hui (the Committee for Chinese Culture Renaissance), ed. Chung-kuo chin-tai 
shih lun-chi (Selected essays on modem Chinese history), Taipei: Commercial Press, 
vol. 19, 1985, pp. 127-72.
^James T.C. Liu, China Turning inward: Intellectual-Political Changes in the 
Early Twelfth Century, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988, p. 37.
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conducting governmental affairs, regulating the society at large, and the family, and 
cultivating individual lives/'* Thus any deviation from the Confucian orthodoxy, not 
to mention leaming from the West, was regarded as heresy and condemned. 'One of 
the most convenient ways to discredit one’s opponent', as Hsiao Kung-chuan 
observed, was to accuse him of affiliating with a "heterodox" school thus alienating 
himself from the "orthodox" school of thought, namely Confucianism.'^
Secondly, related to the sacred status of Confucianism, there was a deep 
rooted Sino-centric view among the elites. For millennia, the Chinese regarded 
themselves as the most civilized people and others as barbaric. The foundation of 
such a conviction was the belief that Chinese people followed high moral principles 
derived from Confucianism which was lacking in barbarous peoples. One of the most 
powerful and persistent arguments against leaming from the West in the half century 
following the Opium War was that it would lead to 'the barbarization of China' (yi-yi 
pien-hsia). For to the mainstream of Chinese intellectuals then, the West had only 
wealth and power and did not have the high morality the Chinese did.^
While this conservative attitude dominated intellectual thinking for a half 
century, there was nevertheless growing awareness among intellectuals that some 
kind of change was needed for China to cope with the new situations imposed by 
Westem intmsions. As early as the 1840s, intellectuals such as Kung Tzu-chen 
(1792-1841) and Wei Yuan (1794-1857) argued for changing policies according to 
changing circumstances. Wei Yuan in particular argued that no law can function 
effectively without change.' He advocated to leam the superior skills of the 
barbarians to combat the barbarians'.^ In the wake of the Second Opium War (1858-
"Ibid.
^Hsiao Kung-chuan, A Modern China and a New World: K'ang Yu-wei, A Reformer 
and Utopian, 1858-1927, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1975, p. 42.
^Yen Fu summarized this dominant traditionalist view of the West: they [Westem 
countries] have wealth and power, but we have benevolence and righteousness'. 
(CYFW, vol. 1, p. 46).
^For a discussion of the early advocacy of leaming from the West, see T'ang Chih- 
chün, Wu-hsu pien-fa shih (A History of the reform movement of 1898), Peking: Jen- 
min, 1984, pp. 35-46; Hao Yen-p'ing, Changing Chinese Views of Westem 
Relations, 1840-95', in Cambridge History o f China, vol. 11, ed. John K. Fairbank
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1860), the view that China was facing a greatly 'changed situation’ (pien-chu) and 
needed to have some changes became more widely shared among intellectuals.* Many 
intellectuals argued that the modernization of the military and the development of 
industry through science and technology from the West was necessary for China's 
survival. This belief motivated certain officials to start the 'Self-strengthening' 
program, an effort to modernize the economy and military by adopting Westem 
technology.
To justify Western-oriented change, reform minded intellectuals often felt 
obliged to camouflage their ideas in a variety of intellectual disguises designed to 
make the changes appear innocuous. Some argued that the civilization and technology 
which developed in the modem West in fact originated in China, and therefore 
leaming from the West was simply resuming the development of Chinese civilization 
and knowledge.’ Some distinguished substance' (t*i) and means' (yung) to argue that 
Westem science and technology could be adopted as a means' of preserving China's 
substance' - its traditional values, social stmcture and political institutions.
The most important argument for change before the 1890s, however, was 
based on the revival of a Legalist notion of wealth and strength' (Ju-ch'iang). This 
notion assumed that establishing a wealthy and powerful Chinese state was far more 
important than fulfilling any moral goals, particularly in the face of Westem threat." 
It appealed to a kind of nationalistic sentiment to argue that protecting China's 
national sovereignty' and expelling foreigners from China justified the adoption of
and Liu Kwang-ching, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980, pp. 145-53.
*Hao Yen-p'ing, Changing view of Westem Relations', in The Cambridge History 
o f China, vol. 11, p. 156.
’Wang Erh-ming, Wan-Ch'ing cheng-chih ssu-hsiang shih-lun (Historical essays on 
political thought in the Late Ch'ing period), Taipei: Hsueh-sheng, 1969, pp. 32-4.
*®Chang Hao, Intellectual Change and the Reform Movement, 1890—1898', in 
Cambridge History o f Modern China, vol. 11,p. 282.
"On various justifications for change, see Paul A. Cohen, Discovering History in 
China, American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past, New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1984, pp. 29-32.
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some Westem skills/^
While this nationalistic concern with the wealth and strength of the country 
did legitimize the Self-strengthening programs to some degree, it was nevertheless 
unable to shake the foundations of the traditional conservatism. Traditional 
conservatism did not pretend that by sticking to Confucianism China would enhance 
its wealth and power, yet it insisted that only by following Confucianism could China 
maintain moral superiority and social harmony. It insisted that raising the people’s 
morality was far more important than technology and weaponry in making a desirable 
society, and, in the long run, a strong country too. It cited numerous instances in the 
history of China when barbarous peoples invaded China and defeated China militarily 
yet ended by being assimilated into Chinese culture because China had the better 
civilization. In confronting this universalistic and moralistic argument, the argument 
concerning the wealth and power of the country lacked the moral force strong enough 
to challenge Confucianism and was always in a defensive position.
As a response to the inability of nationalistic arguments to challenge 
traditional conservatism, there emerged a new way of arguing for change in 1890s, 
particularly in the wake of the Sino-Japanese war. One of the features of this new 
trend was the development of the idea of progress. Intellectuals began to argue for 
change by referring to certain deterministic laws. K’ang Yu-wei and Yen Fu 
represented two approaches to this issue. K’ang Yu-wei justified change through a 
radical reinterpretation of Confucianism by following the tradition of the New Text
*^0n the emergence of nationalism, including the conception of sovereignty in the 
1860s and 1870s, see Hao Yen-p’ing, 'Changing view of Westem Relations’, op. cit., 
pp. 188-97.
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(chin-wen) school." The most important innovation of K'ang’s revisionist 
interpretation of Confucianism was that he found an idea of evolution implicit in 
Confucianism: the doctrine of 'the three ages’. In K'ang's interpretation of this 
doctrine, Confucius saw human history as inexorably developing from the age of 
disorder (chu-luan shih), through the age of approaching peace (sheng-p’ing shih), to 
the final age of universal peace {t'ai-pHng shih). As history progresses through the 
three ages, institutional changes must inevitably follow.*'*
In contrast to K'ang's Confucian revisionism. Yen Fu held a more radical 
position.*  ^ Yen Fu was the first in modem China who abandoned any attempt to 
camouflage an advocacy of Western-oriented change in intellectual disguise. He 
directly challenged the authority of the Chinese sages and cited modem Westem 
social and philosophical theories as sources of authority in his argument for change.
*^ The New Text school was a once dominant school in Confucian interpretation 
during the West Han period (206-8 A.D.). After the fourth and fifth centuries A.D., 
however, it was eclipsed by the Old Text school of Confucianism which subsequently 
dominated Confucian interpretation. The resurgence of the New Text school in the 
late Ch'ing period can be traced in late eighteenth century and reached its peak in the 
thought of K'ang Yu-wei, an energetic advocate of reform in the 1890s. (For a brief 
discussion of the New Text school, see T'ang Chih-chün, Wu-hsu pien-fa shih (A 
History of the reform movement of 1898), pp. 35-6; Frederic Wakeman, Jr., History 
and Will: Philosophical Perspectives o f Mao Tse-tung's Thought, Berkeley: 
University of Califomia Press, 1973, pp. 101-36.
*'*0n K'ang Yu-wei's evolutionary ideas, see Hsu Kuan-san, K'ang Nan-hai ti san- 
shih chin-hua shih-kuan (K'ang Yu-wei's evolutionary ideas of the Three Ages), in 
Chou Yang-shan & et al, ed. Wan-Ch'ing ssu-hsiang (The late Ch'ing thought), 
Taipei: Shih-pao wen-hua, 1980, pp. 535-75; also T'ang Chih-chün, Wu-hsu pien-fa 
shih (A History of the reform movement of 1898), pp. 55-127.
*^K'ang was called Confucian revisionist' by Hsiao Kung-chuan, A Modem China 
and a New World: K'ang Yu-wei, Reformer and Utopian, 1858-1927, Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 1975, p. 125.
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Chapter H 
In Search of Laws of Social Evolution
Yen Fu's argument for change was based first and foremost on his 
interpretation of nineteenth-century Westem evolutionary ideas, ideas which might 
loosely be grouped under the rubric of Darwinism. Yen Fu was the first to introduce 
Darwinism systematically into Chinese thought, and by doing so played a significant 
role in China's intellectual transition at the turn of the century.
The influence of Darwinism as a factor in Yen Fu's thought has been 
generally acknowledged by existing studies. The nature of this influence, however, 
invites further discussion. Two weaknesses can be discerned in the studies of 
Darwinist influences on Yen Fu and on modem Chinese thought as a whole. The first 
is the confusing usage of the term social Darwinism'. Secondly, related to this 
terminological confusion, there h ^  been misinterpretations of the role of Darwinism ^  
in Yen Fu's thought and in modem Chinese thought generally.
The term 'social Darwinism' has taken an exceptionally wide range of 
meanings in studies of modem Chinese intellectual history. To take just a few 
examples, social Darwinism has been used to characterize the efforts of Chinese 
intellectuals in seeking a scientific explanation of the workings of politics and 
society',* to describe the views of Chinese intellectuals that adaptation to the times 
was a necessity of historical evolution',^ to identify with the theory of social 
evolution,^ and above all to mean ideas of glorifying stmggles within or without a 
society."*
‘Mary Backus Rankin, Early Chinese Revolutionaries: Radical Intellectuals in 
Shanghai and Chekiang, 1902-1911, Cambridge, Mass.; Harvard University Press, 
1971, p. 20.
^Charlotte Furth, Culture and Politics in Modem Chinese Conservatism', in The 
Limit o f Change: Essays on Conservative Alternatives in Republican China, ed. 
Charlotte Furth, p. 25.
^Jerome B. Grieder, Intellectuals and the State in Modem China, New York: the 
Free Press, 1981, pp. 245-6; Michael Gasster, Chinese Intellectuals and the 
Revolution o f 1911, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969, pp. 61-2.
"‘Benjamin Schwartz, In Search o f Wealth and Power, esp., pp. 45-7, 54-8; Chang
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There is less difficulty in using the term 'social Darwinism’ in such an 
inclusive manner, so long as one accepts the variants of social Darwinism' as James 
Reeve Pusey has done/ Yet in most studies of modem Chinese intellectual history, 
particularly in Schwartz's study of Yen Fu, this sort of distinction is lacking. On the 
one hand. Yen Fu's ideas related to those of Darwin or Spencer - ranging from ideas 
of social evolution, social organism, determinism and the idea of straggle - are 
discussed by Schwartz under the rubric of social Darwinism. On the other hand, he 
persistently equated social Darwinism with doctrines glorifying straggle. 
Consequently, Schwartz interpreted Yen Fu's subscription to Darwinism almost 
exclusively in terms of Yen's energetic quest for China's state power in order to win 
the international straggle for existence.^
To analyze the influence of Darwinism on Yen Fu in a more precise manner, 
we need to clarify first the terms Darwinism' and social Darwinism'. In biology, 
Darwinism is comparatively easily understood to refer to evolution - the idea that 
species change with the passage of time, and more importantly, that the controlling 
and determining mechanism of biological evolution is natural selection' or the 
preservation of the favoured races in the straggle for life'.  ^ There has been 
considerably less agreement on the use of the term social Darwinism'. Two broad 
implications of Darwinism have been applied to social studies. First, the development 
of Darwinian biology gave an impetus to the emergence of evolutionary sociology
Hao, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and Intellectual Transition in China, 1890-1907, Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971, esp., pp. 168-77.
I^n his criticism of Schwartz's view of Yen Fu as a Social Darwinist, Pusey 
distinguishes two kinds of Social Darwinism: the ethic of ruthless, uncharitable selfi 
interest' and the attempts of explaining society in Darwinian terms'. He argues that 
Yen Fu was a Social Darwinist only in the latter sense, and not in the former one. 
(James Reeve Pusey, China and Charles Darwin, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1983, pp. 159-60.)
*For a summary of this argument, see Benjamin Schwartz, In Search o f Wealth and 
Power, esp. chapter xii 'Some Implications' (pp. 237-47).
^Charles Darwin, The Origin o f Species, (first edition, 1859), London: Penguin 
Books, 1968.
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and anthropology in the late nineteenth century. The ideas of social evolution and 
social organism fashionable in social science in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century were significantly influenced by Darwinian biology. Nevertheless, scholars 
are usually wary of labelling those ideas as social Darwinist. As Bannister has argued, 
the ideas of social evolution and social organism have their origins in ancient Greek 
thought and many social scientists still adopt them in interpreting social development. 
He therefore suggested that we distinguish 'social organism' and evolutionism' from 
social Darwinism*
The second implication of Darwinism for social and political studies was to 
apply the Daiivinian notion of natural selection' to the evolution of human society/ 
This view holds social evolution to depend upon the operation of the law of natural 
selection of favourable heritable variants'.This implication of Darwinism is what is 
generally meant by the term social Darwinism'. The fundamental characteristic of 
social Darwinism is, to use David Hume's concepts, that it derives value from fact. 
That is to say, the various sorts of social Darwinism all contain or presuppose an 
attempt to deduce normative prescriptions from premises containing only statements 
of neutral and uncommitted fact'." Most studies on the influence of social Darwinism 
in Westem nations use social Darwinism' in this manner. In Social Darwinism in 
American Thought, Richard Hofstadter identified two phases in American social 
Darwinism: 1) a significant initial stage when social Darwinism was utilized to justify 
laissez faire economic policy; 2) a less important later stage when group stmggles
*Robert Bannister, Social Darwinism - Science and Myth in Anglo-American Social 
Thought, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1979, p. 7.
’James Allen Rogers, Darwinism and Social Darwinism', Journal o f the History o f  
Ideas, vol. xxxiii, (1972), p. 265; Linda L. Clark, Social Darwinism in France, 
University of Alabama Press, 1984, p. 1; C. H. Waddington, the Human 
Evolutionary System', in Michael Banton ed., Darwinism and the Study o f Society, 
London: Tavistock Publications, p. 63.
*®R.J. Halliday, Social Darwinism: a Definition', Victorian Studies, No. 4, (1971), 
p. 389.
"Antony G.N. Flew. The Philosophical Implications of Darwinism', in Darwin, 
Marx and Freud, ed. Arthur Caplan and Bmce Jennings, London: Plenium Press, 
1984, p. 121.
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among races or nations were portrayed in Darwinian terms/^ Similarly, Gertrude 
Himmelfarb observed that social Darwinism became 'a portmanteau of nationalism, 
imperialism, militarism, and dictatorship'/^ Hans-Gunter Zamartlik argued that social 
Darwinism was of crucial significance for the origins of Hitler's racism and 
militarism/"* Greta Jones described how social Darwinism was used to justify 
imperialism in nineteenth-century Britain/^
The significance of distinguishing the two kinds of Darwinism for the 
examination of Yen Fu's interpretation of Darwinism is obvious. It allows us to 
explore Yen Fu's ideas in a more specific manner, and to avoid some confusions as 
mentioned above. Based on such a distinction, we will be able to treat two aspects of 
Yen Fu's Darwinism separately: his search for the law of social evolution and his 
conception of the struggle for existence. Although, as we will see later, these two 
aspects have certain connections, they nevertheless played distinctive roles in Yen 
Fu's thought.
The present chapter and the following one will be devoted to analyzing these 
two aspects of Yen Fu's conception of Darwinism. The present chapter focuses on 
Yen Fu's conception of evolution, progress and social organism which he found in 
Darwinism. To avoid confusion, these ideas will not be discussed under the rubric 
'social Darwinism', but rather will be simply termed ideas of evolution, social 
organism, etc. I will show that these ideas played a far more important role than 
hitherto understood in the transition of the traditional Chinese outlook to the 
progressive and deterministic world view that characterizes modem Chinese thought. 
The next chapter will be devoted to analyzing Yen Fu's conception of the struggle for
‘^ Richard Hofstadter, Social Darwinism in American Thought^ revised edition, 
Boston: Beacon Press, 1955.
‘^ Gertmde Himmelfarb, Darwin and Darwinian Revolution^ New York: Doubleday 
and Co., 1959, pp. 416-8.
*"*H-G Zamartlik, 'Social Darwinism in Germany Seen as a Historical Problem', in 
Hajo Holbom, Republic to Reich, the Making o f the Nazi Revolution^ translated from 
German by Ralph Manheim, New York: Pantheon Books, 1972, pp. 436-73.
*^Greta Jones, Social Darwinism and English Thought^ Sussex: the Harvester Press, 
1980.
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existence and natural selection. It will show how Yen Fu used social Darwinism to 
argue for changes, despite his distaste of social Darwinism as a moral and political 
theory.
Yen Fu opened his first published essay, 'On the Speed of World Change', as 
follows:
How fast is the world now changing! There has never been such a pace 
of change since the Ch'in dynasty (221 BC-208 BC). Changes in the 
world - no one knows from whence they come. For want of a better 
name, we call it destiny (yun-hui). Once destiny is set, not even a sage 
has any power over it. For even a sage is an entity within destiny and 
this being so, he obviously cannot change its course!*^
The concept of destiny' (yun-hui) explored here was borrowed from the 
philosophy of Shao Yung (1011-77), a Neo-Confucian philosopher. The core of 
Shao's philosophy, as shown by Anne D. Birdwhistell, was his description of natural 
and social phenomena as manifestations of a single cosmic reality .Shao portrayed 
natural changes and social changes as following an identical process which evolved 
from what he called cycle (yuan)^ epoch (hui)  ^ revolution (yun)  ^ and generation 
(shih)}^ In the late Ch'ing period, particularly after the 1860s, Shao Yung's 
conception of yun-hui was widely used to suggest that the greatly changed situation
*^CYFW, vol. 1, p. 1. The English translation is from James Pusey, China and 
Charles Darwin, p. 51.
*^ Anne D. Birdwhistell, Transition to Neo-Confucianism: Shao Yung on Knowledge 
and Symbols o f Reality, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989, p. 95.
18Ibid., p. 138.
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(pien-chu) China faced was somehow related to cosmic change.’’
Yen Fu used Shao Yung's conception of yun-hui in the same manner as his 
intellectual predecessors. By such a conception, he suggested that the human world, 
like the natural world, is governed by universally applicable laws. Those laws are 
independent of human consciousness. Men, including 'sages', could do nothing to 
change these laws. All they could do was to understand and follow them.
While Yen Fu credited Shao Yung for recognizing the existence of universally 
applicable laws, he nevertheless did not believe that Shao Yung, or other Chinese 
sages, had discovered these laws. Only in the modem West, Yen Fu stated, great 
progress had been made in uncovering laws governing the natural and human worlds. 
In the last hundred years. Yen noted, scientists had found that the fundamental law 
governing the cosmic reality was the law of universal change and evolution. This law 
was first discovered by biologists. Some great biologists, such as de Lamarck, von 
Buck, von Baer, Alfred Russell Wallace, Robert Grant, Richard Owen and Thomas 
Huxley, had demonstrated that living things change from homogeneity to 
heterogeneity. The creator produced only one basic element and pushed it into motion 
with great force. The countless beings now in existence were the result of that motion, 
rather than the result of the creator's direct actions.^® Charles Darwin, Yen Fu stated, 
further developed evolutionary biology not only by demonstrating that species change 
with the passage of time, but more importantly by discovering that the controlling 
mechanism of biological evolution is natural selection', the preservation of favoured 
races in the stmggle for existence.^’
Western scientists had also found that man himself was the result of an 
evolutionary process. Yen Fu wrote:
The greatest progress science made in the nineteenth century is the 
theory that human beings, instead of being creatures of God as held by
’’Wang Erh-ming, Wan-Ch'ing cheng-chih ssu-hsiang shih-lun (Historical essays 
on political thought in the Late Ch'ing period), pp. 406-14,437.
%YFW., vol. 5, p. 1325.
"’CYFW., vol. 2, p. 309.
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the ancients...are one phase of the evolution of living things....Darwin's 
The Descent o f Manf^ Haeckel's The Evolution o f Man^  ^ and Huxley's 
Evidences as to Man's Place in Natur^^ all illustrate that the ape was 
an ancestor of man.^^
Moreover, Yen Fu noted that Western scientists had discovered that human 
society was subject to the same law of evolution. This discovery, he believed, was 
made by Herbert Spencer. Yen Fu spoke highly of Spencer and portrayed him as the 
founder of sociology, for which Yen used the term ch'un-hsuehy which literally meant 
the science of the group. In his introduction to his translation of Spencer's The Study 
o f Sociology y Yen Fu told his readers, in authoritative tones:
What is sociology? It is the science of applying scientific methods to 
investigate changes in society, and to predict its future.... Spencer was 
a prominent thinker in Britain. He spent his entire life in exploring the 
secrets of evolution, and of applying evolutionary theory to the study 
of society (min-ch'un). He did not finish his System o f Synthetic 
Philosophy until his seventies. The ideas in this work are so abstruse 
that few scholars are able to comprehend their essence. He therefore 
wrote The Study o f Sociology as an introduction to his whole synthetic 
philosophy.^®
Spencer has been often misrepresented as having crudely applied Darwinism
^^Charles Darwin, The Descent o f  Man and Selection in Relation to Sex, 2 volumes, 
London: John Murray, second ed. 1874.
^^Emest Haeckel, The Evolution o f Man, a Popular Exposition o f  the Principle 
Points o f Human Ontogeny and Phylogeny, New York, 1879.
'^‘T.H.Huxley, Evidence as to Man's Place in Nature, London: Williams & 
Norgate, 1863.
2'CYFW, vol. 5, p. 1345.
"®CYFW, vol. 1, p. 123.
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to the study of soc ie tyYen Fu, however, was well aware that the development of 
Spencer's evolutionary theory was independent of Darwin's/^ Yen stated that 
Spencer's idea of evolution 'actually appeared before The Origin o f Species\ and 
Darwin in fact drew on some of Spencer's ideas in forming his own theories/^
The most important contribution of Spencer, Yen Fu wrote, was his 
development of a synthetic philosophy. It demonstrated the unity of all sciences not 
only in the sense that the basic logical methods were the same in all fields of 
scientific inquiry, but also in the sense that the basic processes in all the realms of 
being were essentially identical: evolution was the universally applicable law 
governing the inorganic world, the organic world, and the super-organic, i.e. human 
world. Yen Fu was very much impressed by Spencer's grandiose synthetic 
philosophy:
Based on the idea of evolution, Spencer explained the unity of the 
development of heaven, earth, human beings, physics, psychology and 
biology. His theory is even more penetrating and profound [than 
Darwin's]. The first book of his synthetic philosophy utilised the 
essential principles of physics in order to set up his general theory of 
evolution.^® The second book used evolutionary theory to explain 
biology.^* The third used evolutionary theory to illustrate 
psychology.^^ The fourth used evolutionary theory to expound
^^For a brief account of this misinterpretation of Spencer, see J.D.Y. Peel, Herbert 
Spencer: the Evolution o f a Sociologist^ London: Heinemann, 1971, p. 131; J. W. 
Burrow, Evolution and Society: A Study in Victorian Social Theory, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1966, p. 183.
^*CYFW., vol. 1, p. 16; vol.2, p. 309; vol.5, p. 1325.
""CYFW., vol. 1, p. 16.
^®Herbert Spencer, First Principles, 1862.
 ^^ Herbert Spencer, The Principle o f Biology, vol. i, 1864, vol. ii, 1867.
^^Herbert Spencer, The Principles o f Psychology, vol. i, 1870; vol. ii, 1872.
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sociology/^ The last book investigated the origins of morality and 
explained inherent laws of politics and education. It ended with the 
general rules of preserving and developing a race.^ '*
This universal law of evolution discovered by Spencer, Yen Fu believed, was 
largely absent in traditional Chinese thought with the exception of the I  Ching?^ Yen 
Fu discovered two ideas in the I  Ching that were related to aspects of Spencer’s 
evolutionary theory. First, the idea of change as the permanent phenomenon of nature 
as found in the /  Ching was basically identical with Spencer's idea of universal 
evolution. Secondly and more importantly, the mechanisms of universal change in 
Spencer and in the /  Ching were regarded by Yen Fu as identical. For Spencer, 
evolution is the process of increasing differentiation (that is to say specialization of 
function) and integration, by which he meant mutual interdependence of structurally 
differentiated parts and co-ordination of their functions.^® For the /  Ching, the basic 
pattern of change is union and separation, or closing and opening {hsi a n d B o t h  
Spencer and the /  Ching, for Yen Fu, perceived the 'ten thousand things’ to have 
emerged out of the womb of the 'Unknowable’. These things then moved by 
follovring a definite pattern which Yen described as follows:
^^Herbert Spencer, The Principles o f Sociology, three volumes (1877, 1893, 1896).
^"CYFW, vol. 5, p. 1325.
^'C'iTW., vol. 5, p. 1320.
^^Spencer defines evolution as follows: 'Evolution is an integration of matter and 
concomitant dissipation of motion; during which the matter passes from an indefinite, 
incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity; and during which the 
retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation.’ (Herbert Spencer, First 
Principles, p. 396.)
^^According to the /  Ching, all changes are the result of movement of two primal 
forces in the universe: the virile, called the Yang (the active element, the male) and 
the passive, called the Yin (the negative element, the female). The basic pattern of 
change is union and separation, or closing and opening (hsi and pH). Following such a 
pattern, when things grow to their maximum, they must then contract to their 
minimum. When they contract to their minimum, they must then begin to expand 
towards their maximum.
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There is contraction, and matter is drawn together. There is dispersion, 
and force is released. In the beginning there is the Simple. It changes 
and turns into the variegated and mixed.^*
The comparison of the I  Ching with Spencer’s evolutionary formula, however, 
did not lead Yen Fu to overvalue the Chinese classics and belittle the importance of 
Western evolutionary theory. On the contrary, he dismissed the intellectual tendency 
which 'quoted some similar expression from Chinese classics and then declared 
Western knowledge had little novelty'.^’ He emphasised that although the Chinese 
classics contained ideas comparable to certain constituents of modem Western science 
and philosophy, on the whole, these ideas were rather simplistic, crude, not 
systematic and with many mistakes'."*® Moreover, although our ancestors made a 
beginning [in science], the descendants failed to continue their work; the ancestors 
made great contributions; the descendants failed to develop their essential 
components.'"**
Regarding the idea of change, the primary reason why Yen Fu acknowledged 
Spencer's idea of evolution, rather than simply repeating similar ideas in /  Ching was 
that the idea of progress in Spencer's theories met Yen Fu's intellectual needs.
The idea of progress is important in modem Westem thought. Particularly 
during the period of 1750-1900, the idea of progress reached its zenith in the 
Westem mind in popular as well as scholarly circles. From being one of the important 
ideas in the West it became the dominant idea.'^  ^Two intellectual movements were 
instrumental for the popularization of the idea of progress. The first was the European
^*CYFW., vol. 5, p. 1320. The English translation follows Schwartz, p. 52. 
^"CYFW., vol. I, p. 52.
"*®Ibid.
"“CYFW., vol. 5, p. 1320.
"*^ Robert Nisbet, History o f the Idea o f Progress, New York: Basic Books, 1980, p.
171.
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Enlightenment movement of the eighteenth century. Secondly, and more importantly, 
evolutionary theory in the nineteenth century greatly strengthened the force of the 
idea of progress by portraying universal development as a process of progressive 
evolution. In the later period, 'the ablest and most influential development of the 
argument from evolution to progress was the work of Spencer.’'*^
Spencer's idea of progress is closely related to his notion of differentiation in the 
process of evolution. The whole organic evolution of Spencer must be seen as a long 
process of change in which homogeneity' is replaced everywhere by 'heterogeneity'. 
This change inevitably means progress and perfection. Spencer expressed the idea 
clearly:
From the earliest traceable cosmical change down to the latest results 
of civilization, we shall find that the transformation of the 
homogeneous into heterogeneous, is that in which progress essentially 
consists."*'*
In fact Spencer often uses the terms of evolution', progress' and 
development' interchangeably. For him, evolution is not, as for Darwin, a neutral 
conception, compatible either with optimism or with pessimism. Rather it means 
change for the better. Applying to the social realm, this translates into evolution or 
progress from a monolithic, static, and repressive type of social organization to a 
diversified, plural, and individualistic type of social organization. Spencer 
demonstrated that the process of social evolution is a continuous differentiation of 
social institutions, and, at a psychological level, a development of altruistic natures in 
men, until the end-state of history is reached - a heterogeneous society in which men 
will rejoice in being highly and subtly dependent on one another, will be morally 
capable of this independence and will find no discrepancy between it and the free
"*%id.,p. 336.
'*"*Herbert Spencer, 'Progress: Its Law and Cause', quoted from Leslie Sklair The 
Sociology o f Progress, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970, p. 65.
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fulfilment of their own natures.''*^
Spencer’s message appealed to Yen Fu. Following Spencer, he simply defined 
evolution as progress:
Evolution means continual progress.... In the past hundred years, this 
idea has spread widely and been combined with the ideas of equality 
and freedom. Therefore, in all human affairs on the five continents, 
there is striving for newness, rather than pursuit of the ways of the 
past."*^
With Spencer’s idea of progress in mind. Yen Fu criticised two ideas in ancient 
Chinese philosophy: the idea of regression and the idea of cyclical movement in the 
following terms:
The greatest and most irreconcilable difference between Chinese and 
Westem thinking is that the Chinese love the past and neglect the 
present, while the Westerners strive in the present to surpass the past.
The Chinese believe that to revolve from order to disorder, from 
ascension to decline, is the natural way of heaven and human affairs;
The Westerners believe in the ultimate principle of all learning and 
government, in infinite, daily progress, in advance that will not sink 
into decline, in order that will not revert to disorder."*^
Yen Fu did not indicate explicitly which schools of ancient Chinese philosophy 
were guilty of advocating the ideas of cycles or regression. From his writings, 
however, we can infer that Taoism was the most likely target for his criticism of the 
idea of regression. Yen Fu once compared some Taoist ideas with Rousseau’s belief
'’^ J.D.Y.Peel, Herbert Spencer: the Evolution o f a Sociologist, London: Heinemann, 
1971, p. 153.
""CYFW., vol. 5, p. 1241.
'‘^ CYFW., vol. 1, p. 1. The English translation follows James Pusey, op. cit., p. 51.
58
that the progress of science and the arts might lead to the regression of people’s 
morality/* The idea of cyclical change, criticised by Yen Fu, was expressed in the I  
Ching in the maxim that things will develop in the opposite direction once they have 
once reached a climax {p'i-chi t'ai-lai and wu-chipi-fan). Yen Fu suggested that this 
idea would lead to the conclusion that the fortune of human society would be from 
prosperity to decline, that the way of heaven follows a cycle, and that countries would 
alternatively be strong and then weak/'*’ Yen Fu also had Mencius in mind when he 
criticised the belief that society will evolve from order to disorder. Several years later, 
another reformist thinker, Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, while advocating the idea of progress, 
criticised Mencius explicitly for having mistakenly identified spiral change with 
cyclical change.^®
Yen Fu’s strong belief in progress also stimulated criticism of Huxley’s pessimism 
in the translation and commentary that he wrote to Huxley’s Evolution and Ethics. In 
Evolution and Ethics, Huxley expressed suspicion of the idea of progress. He 
disagreed with the fashionable Victorian belief that Darwin’s theory provided a 
scientific sanction for the idea of inevitable progress.^' He stated:
The word 'evolution’, now generally applied to the cosmic process, has 
had a singular history, and is used in various senses. Taken in popular 
signification it means progressive development, that is, gradual change 
from a condition of relative uniformity to one of relative complexity; 
but its connotation has been widened to include the phenomena of 
retrogressive metamorphosis, that is, of progress from a condition of 
relative complexity to one of relative uniformity.^^
"*CYFW., vol. 2, p. 333. 
"’CYFW., vol. 1, p. 29.
^®Chang Hao, Liang Ch%ch'ao and Intellectual Transition in China, 1890-1907, p.
172.
^*Cyril Bibby, T.H. Huxley: Scientist, Humanist and Educator, London: C.A. 
Watters and Co., 1959, p. 49.
52'T.H. Huxley, Evolution and Ethics, p. 23.
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In defense of Spencer's idea of progress, Yen Fu criticised Huxley's 
pessimistic perspective. His antipathy to Huxley's disparagement of the idea of 
progress was clearly expressed when he commented on Huxley's opinions on 
perfection. Huxley told his audiences in 'The Romanes Lecture' (1893):
We also knew modem speculative optimism, with its perfectibility of 
the species, reign of peace, and lion and lamb transformation scenes; 
but one does not hear so much of it as one did forty years ago; indeed,
I imagine it is to be met with more commonly at the table of the 
healthy and wealthy, than in the congregations of the wise. The 
majority of us, I apprehend, profess neither pessimism nor optimism.
We hold that the world is neither so good, nor so bad, as it conceivably 
might be.^ ^
In his commentary following the translated text of this paragraph. Yen Fu 
judged Huxley's assessment to be rather superficial. He accused Huxley of trying to 
ingratiate himself with certain shallow scholars by striking an empty compromise 
between optimism and pessimism. '^* It was mainly because of this that Yen Fu 
labelled the chapter as the worst' one in Huxley's work.^  ^He denounced Huxley for 
trying to repudiate Spencer without having studied Spencer's arguments.^® Yen Fu 
clearly took up his position on Spencer's side:
Spencer believes that provided society follows the course of evolution 
it will improve and eventually progress towards perfection, rather than
''Ibid., p. 49.
'"CYFW., vol. 5, p. 1391.
"Ibid., p. 1392. 
"Ibid.
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deteriorate. This is a very solid argument and hard to repudiate.^^
Behind Yen Fu's impassioned defense of Spencer's idea of progressive 
evolution and his criticism of various ideas of retrogression and cyclical change lay 
his ultimate political concerns. He was interested in the idea of progressive evolution 
primarily because he found its normative implications could be used to argue for 
change and reform in China. Yen Fu was surely fascinated by grandiose schemes of 
universal change and evolution which Spencer and other evolutionists described. He 
was apparently even more fascinated by its normative implications for human actions. 
Based on the idea of evolution, Yen Fu advanced a formula which reversed the 
doctrine of Tung Chung-shu: heaven changes, earth changes, and therefore the way of 
man {tao), which should follow heaven and earth, must also change.^* No single set of 
political institutions, social customs and legal systems can apply to all societies and 
all ages. Vaiious social and political systems, including those developed by the 
Chinese sages, were designed only to cope with certain concrete situations. When the 
situation changed, the systems had to be changed accordingly. The problem of China, 
Yen Fu wrote, lay in people not understanding the necessity of changing outdated 
systems.^’ If this mentality did not change, he warned, China would never be able to 
make progress.^ Chinese people had to understand. Yen Fu argued, that change was 
not only a necessity required by the universal law, but also the instrument for 
attaining progress. So long as China followed the universal law of evolution to 
change its traditional system. Yen stated, it would definitely move towards perfection. 
He often quoted a Han historian, Ssu-ma Ch'ien, to express his belief: 'When 
difficulties are faced, change is the way to solve them; change will lead to permanent
""Ibid.
"*Tung Chung-shu (c.l79-c.l04 B.C.) had an influential notion which reads: The 
t'ien (heaven, nature) does not change, the tao (the way of man) thus does not 
change'.
""CYFW, vol. 1, p. 63.
^Quoted from Wang Chü-ch'ang, Yen Chi-tao nien-p'u (Chronological Biography 
of Yen Fu), Shanghai, 1936, p. 29.
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progress.*^ *
n
The route by which Yen Fu argued for fundamental changes through 
evolutionary theory was unusual for China's late Ch'ing period, but the sense of crisis 
and the idea of change were not novel in his time. From the 1860s, many Chinese 
intellectuals began to understand the great 'changed situation' {pien-chu) which China 
faced. The central questions which concerned them were about the nature of the new 
situation, what it meant for China, and how China could change in the face of this 
new situation. As Chang Hao put it, a crisis of consciousness', namely, a crisis of 
order' emerged in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.^  ^ It was to address 
this crisis of consciousness that Yen Fu embraced the theories of social evolution 
which he found in Spencer and other British evolutionary thinkers. These theories 
provided Yen Fu with a framework for understanding China's current place in 
historical development and the direction which Chinese reform should follow.
In answering the question of why so many Victorians conceived the major task of 
social science to be the study of social evolution, J.W. Burrow related the shape of 
evolutionary social science closely with the need to explain alien peoples and, above 
all, what were considered to be primitive societies. According to Burrow, the 
difficulties faced by utilitarianism in explaining non-rational' conduct, particularly 
the conduct of alien peoples, produced the intellectual climate of rejection...of a 
model of society as a set of rational, calculated relationships entered into for the sake 
of the advantages they confer' and a climate in favour of sociological investigation'.^^ 
The specific attraction of evolutionary social theories, as Burrow suggests, was that 
they offered a way of reformulating the essential unity of mankind, while avoiding 
the current objections to the older theories of human nature everywhere being
61Ibid.
^^Chang Hao, Chinese Intellectuals in Crisis, Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1987, p. 6.
^ J^.W. Bunow, Evolution and Society, p. 2.
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essentially the same.’^
The particular attraction of evolutionary social science to Yen Fu was that it 
provided him with a 'scientific framework’ for understanding the nature of his society 
and its relation to others. As early as 1895, Yen Fu stated that the Westem invaders 
China faced in the nineteenth century differed from the previous invaders in China’s 
history. The earlier invaders, despite their military strength, were less developed than 
China was at the time of the various invasions. In consequence, although they invaded 
China, they were ultimately forced to adopt Chinese civilization.*^  ^ By contrast. 
Westerners, wrote Yen Fu, were superior not only in terms of their military strength 
but also in their social and political systems as well as their cultures.^ It was not until 
his translation of Spencer’s The Study o f Sociology, however, that Yen Fu began to 
grasp the difference between China and the West in terms of different stages of social 
evolution.^^
Spencer’s account of social evolution had several dimensions. First, as discussed 
above, social evolution implied society evolved in a progressive movement towards 
perfection. Secondly, he characterized the general pattern of social evolution as a 
unilinear scheme of social development through different stages. These stages were 
discussed by Spencer under the terms 'military society’ (or militant’ as Spencer 
usually said) and industrial society’. The distinction between military society and 
industrial society, as Peel suggests, had become a commonplace in societal contrasts 
since the mid-eighteenth century.^* It was used by various spokesmen of 
industrialism, from Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson to August Comte and Saint- 
Simon to present the industrial revolution as their own cultural victory over a military 
aristocracy.^’ Spencer’s peculiarity was that he took a two-stage characterization of
^Ibid., p. 98.
^'CYFW., vol. l,pp. 10-11.
^Ibid.,p. 11.
^^Yen Fu started the translation in 1897 and published it in 1903.
J.D.Y. Peel, Herbert Spencer: the Evolution o f a Sociologist, p. 192. 
’^Ibid., pp. 192-8.
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recent history and turned it into a pattern for general social evolution.'^® In so doing, 
Spencer was able to present the history of social development as a process passing 
through traditional military society to advanced industrial society.
It should be pointed out that the primary aim of Spencer's military-industrial 
dichotomy was not to shed light on the law underlying the development of human 
society. Although Spencer was of course concerned with developmental stages, the 
point was to express his worry about so-called 're-barbarization'.^‘ Spencer believed 
that early Victorian Britain, evincing an aura of prosperity, free trade and 
international goodwill, seemed to have reached the threshold of the 'industrial stage'; 
the Britain of the 1890s, 'jingoistic, militaristic, ingloriously scampering after 
colonies, seemed to be lapsing into its pristine barbarism'.^^ Because of the a priori 
character of Spencer's distinction between military and industrial stages, his notions 
of the characteristics of primitive societies were not, on the whole, based on 
ethnographic evidence, but were largely derived from middle-class views of the 
behaviour of groups - their contemporaries, the newly urbanised working class and 
the landed aristocracy - which they felt were incompatible with industry.'^^
Yen Fu had high regard for Spencer's contribution to the studies of social 
evolution. He spoke highly of The Study o f Sociology for it employed scientific 
investigation to examine the change of human society in order to understand the past 
and predict the future.'^ "* From Spencer, Yen Fu came to understand human history as 
a universal, unilinear scheme of social development through different stages. Every 
society evolves and progresses toward perfection by advancing from a primitive and 
'inferior' period towards a superior' period. This universal pattern of social evolution 
was understood by Yen Fu as having two implications. On the one hand, the
"®Ibid., p. 198.
^*For a brief discussion of Spencer's idea of rebarbarization', see David Wiltshire, 
The Social and Political Thought o f Herbert Spencer^ Oxford University Press, 1978, 
pp. 343-7.
""Ibid., p. 243.
J.D.Y. Peel, Herbert Spencer: the Evolution o f a Sociologist^ p. 198.
74Yen Fu: Introduction' to the translation of The Study o f Sociology, p. vii.
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development of each society can best be historically understood by viewing it as 
passing through different evolutionary stages. On the other hand, from a comparative 
standpoint, different races, societies and nations existing contemporaneously could 
also be divided into different stages of social evolution.
Yen Fu, however, did not adopt Spencer's classification of social evolutionary 
stages. Nowhere in his writings and translations did Yen Fu mention Spencer's 
distinction between military and industrial societies. This is anomalous given Yen 
Fu's enormous indebtedness to Spencer's evolutionary theory. Schwartz suggests that 
Yen Fu was not impressed by the military-industrial dichotomy because he was 
preoccupied with the power of the state and did not share Spencer's condemnation of 
military society.I  suspect that Yen Fu was unaware of the dichotomy. In Yen Fu's 
writings or translations, no evidence suggests that he had ever read Spencer's The 
Principles o f Sociology in which the dichotomy of military and industrial societies is 
discussed.^* The Study o f Sociology^ with which Yen Fu was most familiar, did not 
use the terms 'military' and industrial' societies but rather made the more general 
distinction between primitive', uncivilized' societies and 'modem', civilized' 
societies.^  ^Yen Fu was probably not impressed by this distinction because he thought 
it irrelevant to his understanding of the differences between China and the West. Yen 
Fu rejected any suggestion that the Chinese people were uncivilized, asserting that 
China was a civilized nation, rather than an uncivilized one.'^* At the same time. Yen 
Fu also could not conceive that China belonged to the same civilized' nations as the
^^Benjamin Schwartz, In Search o f Wealth and Power^ p. 74.
^^Although Yen Fu appreciated Spencer's synthetic philosophy and mentioned all 
volumes of it, his actual reading seems to be limited. Some commentary notes in his 
translation of Evolution and Ethics are apparently abridged quotations from First 
Principles (CYFW., vol. 5, pp. 1327-8) and The Principles o f Biology (CYFW., vol. 
5, pp. 1350-1). He probably also read The Principles o f Ethics (CYFW., vol. 5, p. 
1325). These works of Spencer, however, do not include his discussion of the 
military-industrial dichotomy.
^^Herbert Spencer, The Study o f Sociology y New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1899, 
pp. 53, 55.
""CYFW., vol. 1, p. 105.
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West because this view might undermine his argument that China should reform itself 
based on learning from the West.
To be sure, although the terms, 'military society’ and industrial society', are 
not used in The Study o f Sociology^ one does find in this book the same concerns 
which are contained in Spencer's distinction between military and industrial societies. 
In particular, Spencer's criticism of Westem colonialism and its barbarous treatments 
of backward peoples in the name of patriotism which appears in The Study o f  
Sociology is along the same line as his general denouncement of militarism. As we 
will see later. Yen Fu's criticism of nationalism and militarism in early-twentieth- 
century China was influenced by ideas found in The Study o f Sociology. Yet with 
regard to Yen Fu's intellectual quest for understanding China's current position in the 
human evolutionary process, Spencer's normative discussions provided little for him. 
What he gleaned from Spencer was the basic notion of universal, unilinear social 
evolution through different stages. With this new paradigm in hand. Yen Fu sought a 
more relevant evolutionary theory to satisfy his intellectual needs.
Yen Fu probably considered various conceptions of social evolutionary stages 
in the West before he finally embraced Edward Jenks' theory. He certainly knew of 
Adam Smith's division of human society into four broad social and economic types 
when he translated The Wealth o f Nations: the stages of hunting, pasture, agriculture, 
and commerce.^’ Nevertheless, Edward Jenks's A History o f Politics appealed to him 
more. Yen began to translate Jenks' work in 1903, three years after its original 
publication, and published the translation in 1904.
Edward Jenks (1861-1934), was a law professor at University of London, and 
the author of several widely read law books.*® He did not, however, play any 
significant role in the history of social and political thought. His A History o f Politics 
was not an innovative work, but rather, as Jenks himself remarked later in his preface 
to The State and the Nation, an expanded version of A History o f Politics, written to
^®Adam Smith, The Wealth o f Nations, Bk V, chapter i, part i, ed. R.H. Campbell & 
AS. Skinner, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976, vol. 2, pp. 689-708.
*®Such as An Outline o f English Local Government, London: Methnen and Co., 
1894; A Short History o f English Law, London: Methnen and Co., 1912; The Book o f  
English Law, London: John Murray, 1928.
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popularize evolutionary social science among the mass of the population. Jenks 
believed that the study of social and political problems...is no longer a matter 
exclusively for experts', and there is a real demand for a popular statement, in simple 
terms, of the main lines of social and political evolution.'**
The main theme of A History o f Politics reiterated the views of universal, 
unilinear social evolution of Spencer and many other Westem social scientists of the 
late nineteenth century. As Jenks himself declared later, 'this book is avowedly 
written on evolutionary lines, that is, in the belief that universe is governed by law.'*  ^
In his book, Jenks described the development of human history as passing from 
savage (totemistic) society to patriarchal society and finally to the state (political) 
society. Savage society, the earliest stage of social evolution according to Jenks, was 
a society with low productive means, totemic group organisation, communal marriage 
and simple law and institutions.*^ The second stage, patriarchal society, could be 
divided into two periods, tribal and clannish, but with some common characteristics: 
personal, rather than territorial union', exclusive religion', communal, instead of 
individual character' and lack of competition.*^ Modem political society, referred to 
by Jenks as the final stage of social development', was exemplified by Britain, 
France and other Westem countries.*  ^ The main characteristics of this society 
included a territorial union, universal religion, individual rights, an advanced legal 
system and political representation.**
Jenks drew ideas from various important anthropological works of his time in 
outlining his scheme of social evolution. Lewis H. Morgan's Ancient Society loomed 
large in his periodization of human history into three stages, and particularly, in his
**Edward Jenks, The State and the Nation, New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1919, p.
V.
*^Edward Jenks, The State and the Nation, p. 19.
*^Edward Jenks, A History o f Politics, New York: Dutton & Co., 1900, Chapter 11. 
* l^bid.. Chapter 111.
*^Edward Jenks, The State and the Nation, p. 121.
**Edward Jenks, A History o f Politics, Chapter Vlll-Xlll.
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analysis of savage society.*  ^ As is well known, a most remarkable episode in the 
reception and subsequent history of Morgan's Ancient Society was its adoption as 
Marxist classic. Based upon Ancient Society^ Frederick Engels wrote The Origin o f 
the Family, Private Property and the State in 1884 to explore the materialistic 
conception of history.** There is no mention of Engels' name in Jenks' book, yet one 
finds striking similarities between Jenks' ideas and those of Engels. In addition to 
their division of social evolution into three main epochs - for Jenks, savage, 
patriarchy and political, for Engels, savage, barbarism and civilization - which by and 
large accorded with Morgan, one finds almost identical materialistic conceptions of 
history quite uncharacteristic of Morgan's work.*’ As did Engels, Jenks singled out 
the domestication of animals as 'the great discovery which made patriarchal society 
possible and inevitable'.’® Like Engels, Jenks identified the use of iron in agriculture 
as the most important driving force in the emergence of industry which was in turn 
instrumental in the transition from patriarchal society to modem political society.’*
We do not know when Yen Fu first became acquainted with Jenks' A History 
o f Politics^ but it was probably shortly after its publication. Although, as Yen Fu 
remarked, the direct aim of his translation was to repudiate Sun Yat-sen's nationalist
*^Lewis H. Morgan in his Ancient Society (originally published in 1877, 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964) envisioned human history as 
consisting of three major ethnical periods - savagery, barbarism, and civilization. 
Morgan's work was among a short list of useful authorities' at the end of Jenks' A 
History o f Politics.
**Frederick Engels, The Origin o f the Family, Private Property and the State, 
Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1978.
*’Bemard Bailyn holds that the prominent notion in Morgan's Ancient Society is 
the idealist interpretation of cultural development as comparing his materialistic 
interpretation of history'. See Bernard Bailyn, Introduction' to Ancient Society, p. 
xxxii.
’®Edward Jenks, A History o f Politics, p. 22; for Engels' similar remarks, see The 
Origin o f the Family, Private Property and the State, p. 26.
’‘Edward Jenks, A History o f Politics, pp. 62-9; for Engels' similar remarks, see op 
cit., p. 28.
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revolution as the behaviour of a 'patriarchal society'/^ there are deeper motives 
underlying his embrace of Jenks' ideas. Yen Fu found in this little book a sketchy but 
general outline of the law of historical evolution which did provide him with a 
framework for understanding the evolutionary level of China. Yen Fu wrote to one of 
his friends in 1905:
Thank you for reading my translations. My recent translation of A 
History o f Politics has been published by the Commercial Press. By 
reading this book, you can clearly understand why our nation has not 
progressed.^^
Yen Fu was impressed by Jenks’ general description of social evolution as a 
unilinear process passing through three different stages. He remarked that the ideas 
of the origin and development of societies presented in A History o f Politics are 
irrefutable truth.’’'* The human race, Yen Fu wrote in his introduction to A History o f  
Politics^ passes through certain stages of growth as the individual passes through 
infancy, youth, maturity and old age’.’  ^ In examining the stages of evolution of all 
human societies we find that they all invariably begin in the totemistic stage, pass 
through a patiiarchal stage, and develop into a state stage.’’^
Edward Jenks made no mention of China in A History o f PoliticSy although he 
sampled various societies ranging from ancient Greek and Roman, to Indian and
’^Yen Fu’s direct motive for translating Jenks’ A History o f Politics was, according 
to his own statement, to criticize the anti-Manchu revolution fostered by Sun Yat-sen 
and his followers as representing a reactionary revival of one of the most patriarchal 
features of Chinese society - clan or tribal exclusivism. The next chapter contains a 
more detailed discussion of this view.
” CYFW., vol. 3, p. 568.
’'’CYFW., vol. 5, p. 1245.
’^Yen Fu, She-hui t'ung-ch'uan (A translation of Edward Jenks’ A History o f  
Politics), p. ix.
96Ibid.
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Islamic societies and natives in Australia and North America in his time.^  ^China was 
neglected because, Yen Fu suggested, 'Jenks was not familiar with China.’^ * Yen 
corrected the omission. China's social development followed the same law of social 
evolution that Jenks had discovered, he argued. The totemistic stage existed in ancient 
China and this could be evidenced. Yen Fu suggested, by references in some Chinese 
classics to the ming tribe as the tribe of snake and pan-ku as the tribe of dog.^  ^The 
Chinese society at that time was comparable with some contemporary societies, such 
as those of the Northern American Indians, Australian natives, as well as some ethnic 
minorities in China.’®® China entered into the patriarchal stage preceding the West. 
'Our most reliable records show that during the period from Tang and Yu until Chou 
(around 2,000 B.C-221 B.C.) - a space of over 2000 years - we had already reached a 
feudal stage, and so-called patriarchal society had already achieved its full 
development.'’®’ Later when things had reached the limits of their actualization, 
another change began. With the rise of the unified Ch'in empire (221-208 B.C.) under 
the leadership of Chin Shih Huang-ti, society began the process of transition from a 
patriarchal stage to a political stage. However, there has been another two thousand 
years since Ch'in. With different dynasties and repeated circles of order and disorder, 
the habits, customs, and thought patterns of the Chinese people have remained 
patriarchal.'’®^ China's advance toward political society was frozen by a vicious circle 
of dynastic succession.
Yen Fu compared the developmental patterns of China and the West: For
’^Jenks later mentioned China as a patriarchal society' practising ancestor 
worship' in his The State and the Nation^ p. 61.
^*Yen Fu, She-hui t'ung-ch'uan (A translation of Edward Jenks' A History o f  
Politics), p. 15.
’’Ibid., pp. 3-4.
’®®Ibid.,pp. 3, 9.
’®’lbid., p. ix. The English translation follows Schwartz, In Search o f Wealth and 
Power, p. 178.
’®^ Yen Fu, She-hui t'ung-ch'uan (A translation of Edward Jenks' A History o f 
Politics), p. X.
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them, the beginning was slow and the end was fast. For us, the beginning was fast yet 
the end has been slow.'*®^  While the West experienced a relatively slow development 
in its earlier stages, the pace of development during the last two hundred years was 
breathtaking. Countries like Britain and France, Yen Fu wrote, had already reached 
the highest stage of social evolution, the political s t a g e .T h e  development of China, 
however, was unusual. After four millennia of patriarchal society, 'China now is still 
undergoing the transition from patriarchal society to political society with, generally 
speaking, a seventy per cent patriarchal element and a thirty per cent political 
element.’*®^
Yen Fu’s understanding of Chinese history as a unilinear evolutionary process 
passing through different stages marked a radical departure from traditional Chinese 
historical thought. Traditional Chinese historical studies were closely linked to 
Confucian moral and political ideas. Confucianism regarded politics as a function of 
the virtues of political leaders; 'the evaluation of the performance of past leaders in 
order to provide present and future leaders with precedents from which to extract 
political and moral lessons was, therefore, a central function of history.’'^  Since the 
performance of political leaders was viewed by Confucianism as a matter of success 
or failure of morality, Confucianism had no need to search for historical explanation 
within the inner workings of history'.*®^  As a consequence, while Chinese historians 
achieved high standards in recording historical events, they generally stopped short of
‘®^ Ibid., p. ix. The English translation follows Benjamin Schwartz, In Search o f  
Wealth and Power, p. 178.
*°^ Yen Fu, She-hui t'ung-ch'uan (A translation of Edward Jenks’ A History o f  
Politics), p. ix.
105CYFW, vol. l ,p. 151.
^^Arif Dirlik, Revolution and History: the Origins o f Marxist Historiography in 
China, 1919-1937, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978, p. 7.
'"'Ibid., p. 8.
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'binding events together in a causal nexus and treating them as connected wholes'.*®*
This need of a comprehensive explanation of historical events in traditional 
Chinese historiography was increasingly felt by Chinese intellectuals in the late 
nineteenth century as China faced serious national crises. Widespread frustration with 
Confucian historiography generated a crisis in Chinese historical consciousness'.*®’ 
Ironically, the very nature of Confucian historiography, particularly its strong moral 
and political orientation, permitted the perception of national crises to be immediately 
converted into a sense of crisis in historical consciousness. For Chinese intellectuals, 
history was neither a mere pastime nor a scholarly enterprise; it was both functional 
and practical.'**® Chinese intellectuals had always viewed historical investigation as a 
means of finding solutions to current problems. Yet in the late nineteenth century, 
more and more intellectuals found that Confucian historiography could no longer 
provide guidance for solving China's problems. They wanted uigently a 
comprehensive explanation of China's past, the nature of her present crises, and most 
importantly, the direction of her future development.
Yen Fu's adoption and embellishment of Jenks' interpretation of historical 
evolution was the earliest in a series of efforts by Chinese intellectuals to respond to 
the crisis in historical consciousness by introducing what Kuhn calls paradigm 
theory' from Westem social science. Jenks' analysis of the universal law of historical 
evolution provided Yen Fu with a framework through which to understand China's 
past, present and, most importantly, future. With this framework. Yen Fu was able to 
provide the needed explanation for the nature of China's crises. He demonstrated that 
the fundamental cause underlying China's weakness in comparison with the West was 
China's plodding pace in social evolution. China had failed to complete the transition 
from patriarchal society to modem society, as the West had done. All of the 
differences between China and the West, Yen Fu suggested, could be understood in
*®*E. G. Pulleyblank, Chinese Historical Criticism', in W. G. Beasley and E. G. 
Pulleyblank ed.. Historians o f China and Japan, Oxford University Press, 1971, p. 
152.
*®^ Arif Dirlik, History and Politics, p. 4.
**®Ibid., p. 4.
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terms of different social evolutionary stages. In the West, individual freedom, 
democracy, division of power, wealth and strength were the outcomes of a higher 
degree of social evolution. By the same token, China's despotic political system, lack 
of individual freedom, poverty, and military weakness were all the consequences of a 
patriarchal society. He concluded that 'China's difficulties are caused by the old 
patriarchal tradition.'"*
Following such an analysis. Yen Fu addressed the central issue of his time - 
the issue of the direction of China's change. Evolutionary theory offered him a new 
and more scientific' argument for learning from the West. He showed that human 
development everywhere follows a universally deterministic process, rendering a 
historical mandate for every society to follow the process. He also showed that the 
West had already reached a higher stage in human evolution than China had. 
Therefore the issue of learning from the West, for Yen Fu, was not an issue of China 
vs. the West, but an issue of tradition vs modernity. The West represented the future 
in the social evolution of mankind. Learning from the West was not only something 
desirable, but a historical imperative.
m
In Yen Fu's recounting and embellishment of the evolutionary theories of 
Spencer, Jenks and others, one aspect of his ideas differs strikingly from theirs. That 
was Yen Fu's highly volunWstic interpretation of evolutionary theory. As we have 
shown, the entire enterprise of Yen Fu's adoption and propagation of Westem 
evolutionary theories was directed at advocating change. He never hesitated to draw 
prescriptive conclusions directly from the predominantly descriptive evolutionary 
theories of Westem thinkers. He could easily have tumed the idea that everything 
changes to an argument that China ought to change; he could have argued that China 
ought to transform into a modem political society simply because the political society 
is the highest stage of human evolution. Evolutionary theory in Yen Fu was more 
than a theory of the law goveming the natural and human world, but a demand for
111CYFW., vol. 1, p. 151.
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action and heuristic instruction for action.
To be sure, the evolutionary theories of Spencer and Jenks carried normative 
implications. The very notion of 'progress’ indicated evolution to be not only a 
process of change, but a change incorporating improvement. Nevertheless, the 
normative implications of the evolutionary theories of Spencer and Jenks were more 
an optimistic belief in human progress than an immediate demand for action. There 
was a strong deterministic theme underlying their evolutionary theories. As Peel has 
shown, Spencer’s understanding of evolution bore the stamp of Calvinist determinism 
which, though not identical with, nevertheless had the potential of leading to 
fatalism."^ This potential was demonstrated by Spencer’s American disciple 
Youmans, who on being asked what could be done to alleviate social evils, replied:
Nothing! You and I can do nothing at all. It’s all a matter of evolution.
We can only wait for evolution. Perhaps in four or five thousand years 
evolution may have carried men beyond this state of things. But we 
can do nothing."^
Similar deterministic ideas were also found in Jenks’ discussion of the 
universal law of evolution:
Man is bom into a universe which he is powerless to alter, governed 
(though he does not know it) by laws which he does not understand; 
and yet he is dependent on this unalterable, mysterious universe - that 
we call his environment - for his very existence."^
This fatalistic theme in the evolutionary theories of Spencer and Jenks may 
have tended to a belief, as John Stuart Mill suggested, that certain causes absolutely
J.D.Y. Peel, Herbert Spencer: the Evolution o f a Sociologist, p. 103. 
"^Quoted from J.D.Y. Peel, op. cit., p. 102.
114Edward Jenks, The State and the Nation, p. 2.
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control human destiny. 'Not only that whatever is about to happen will be the 
infallible result of the causes which produce i t , ... but moreover that there is no use in 
struggling against it; that it will happen, however we may strive to prevent it.’"^
This attitude of non-action, waiting for 'destiny' to reveal its determination 
was exactly what Yen Fu opposed vigorously. The reason for Yen Fu's acceptance of 
Western evolutionary theories, as the foregoing suggests, was to argue for changes in 
China and to illuminate the direction of the changes. In the face of China's national 
crises. Yen Fu wanted immediate action.
Yen Fu's emphasis on man's action was nowhere more evident than in his 
translation of and commentaries on Huxley's Evolution and Ethics. Yen Fu's motive 
in translating Huxley's work has been a subject of controversy. Schwartz was puzzled 
that Yen Fu translated the work which has so little in tune with his basic message'. 
Schwartz perceived Yen's interest in Darwinism to be mainly in the social Darwinian 
motto of survival of the fittest'. Huxley's work, however, represented an attack on the 
ethic of social Darwinism. Thus Schwartz suggested that Yen Fu's translation of 
Huxley's Evolution and Ethics did not arise from agreement with Huxley's ideas in 
the book, but that the very anti-Spencerian animus of Huxley provides Yen Fu with 
an excellent opportunity for defending the views of Spencer.'"*^
Schwartz's interpretation has been challenged by James Reeve Pusey. In his 
recent study, China and Charles Darwin^ Pusey argued that Yen Fu's translation of 
Huxley's Evolution and Ethics stemmed from his interests in some ideas of the work 
itself. Yen Fu found Huxley's ideas appealing, Pusey suggested, because they gave a 
call for action - much more clearly than Spencer.'"^ As Pusey observed. Yen Fu drew 
parallels between Huxley's ideas and Confucian ideas of action, and between 
Spencer's and the Taoist ideas of no-action. He favoured Huxley's Confucian ideas of
"^J. S. Mill, A System o f Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive^ eighth edition, 
London: Harper & Brothers Publication, 1904, Bk VI, 11:3, p. 584.
"^Benjamin Schwartz, In Search o f Wealth and Power, pp. 102-3.
117iJames Reeve Pusey, China and Charles Darwin, p. 159.
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action' over 'Spencer's Taoist ideas of non-action'."*
Yen Fu's own statement supports Pusey's argument. In his introduction to the 
translation of Evolution and Ethics, Yen Fu spells out clearly his purpose in 
translating of Huxley's book:
Huxley's book was intended to remedy the weakness of Spencer's idea 
of non-action. Some of his views are very similar to those found in our 
classics. Those ideas are particularly useful in our course of 
strengthening and preserving our nation. I therefore translated this 
book last summer."’
Yet Pusey seemed to be unaware of the differences between the Huxley vs. 
Spencer controversy and the Confucian vs. Taoist controversy. He thus failed to see 
that Yen Fu's venture was more than a simple adoption of Huxley's idea against 
Spencer's. It represented Yen's effort to address some fundamental issues in 
traditional Chinese philosophy.
As has been known, the primary concern of the Huxley-Spencer debate was 
with the relationship between moral and natural principles, an issue which also 
occupied a significant place in Western moral philosophy. Huxley was dissatisfied 
with Spencer's evolutionary theory because he considered Spencer to have applied 
evolutionary theory, a natural principle in Huxley's view, to moral issues. Huxley 
thought Spencer's fervent belief in laissez-faire to be a simplistic application of 
biological concepts to social ethics. For Huxley, ethical principles and natural 
principles were far from mutually compatible. In Evolution and Ethics, he showed 
how social development was advanced through the ideas of justice, law and ethical 
obligation. He agreed that ethical ideas were the outcome of evolution, but denied 
that the natural evolutionary process dictated mankind's ethical system. Decrying the 
fanatical individualism of our time which attempts to apply the analogy of cosmic 
nature to society', he argued that the ethical progress of society depends not on
"*Ibid.,pp. 169-73. 
" ’CYFW., vol. 5, p. 1321.
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imitating the cosmic progress, but on combating it.*^ °
In Yen Fu's interpretation of the Huxley vs. Spencer controversy, the issue in 
question was no longer about relationship between moral principles and natural 
principles, rather it was about relationship between human endeavour and 
determinism. This is evident from the terms Yen used in translating Huxley's original 
text. Yen Fu translated the English term 'ethics' as the way of man' {Jen-tao), or 
sometimes as the way of ruling' (Chih-tao), and he translated evolution' as fien-yen, 
the cosmic process' as t ’ien-hsing and the way of nature' as fien-tao. He then 
explained the Huxley vs. Spencer controversy by the categories of classical Chinese 
philosophy: man's relationship to fien (nature).
The issue of man's relationship to t'ien was the most important and most 
confusing issue in traditional Chinese philosophy. As Yen Fu noted, t'ien had been 
used to express a wide range of meanings in traditional Chinese philosophy:
The Chinese term t'ien is what logic calls an ambiguous term. This 
ambiguity hinders logical thinking and causes many controversies. It 
means 1) 'God' in its spiritual sense, 2) universe' in its material sense,
3) 'nature' which is independent of human consciousness and has its 
own logic of casual relations, and 4) fate'. ... Thus when we speak of 
t'ien-yi (the spirit of Heaven), t'ien is used in its first meaning as 
mentioned above; when we speak of t'ien-yen (evolution), t'ien is used 
in its third meaning.'^*
In his discussion of evolutionary theory. Yen Fu generally used t'ien to refer 
to nature' as an objective existence independent of man's consciousness, but also to 
imply a quasi-personal all-powerful force which governs the natural world and human 
world.
Yen Fu discerned three general views on the issue of man's relation to t'ien in
*^ ®T. H. Huxley, Evolution and Ethics, p. 51.
*^ ‘Yen Fu, Ch'un-hsueh yi-yen (A translation of Herbert Spencer's The Study o f  
Sociology), p. 345.
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traditional Chinese philosophy, represented by orthodox Confucianism, Taôism and a 
particular school of Confucianism represented by Hsun-tzu (fl. 298-238 B.C.).
Among these three schools of thought. Yen Fu was highly critical of orthodox 
Confucianism, Neo-Confucianism in particular, for its failure to distinguish the way 
of t'ien from the way of man. Yen's subscription to Spencer's ideas of evolution was 
aimed to show the existence of objective laws independent of man's will. Yen Fu 
often compared Spencer's ideas to some ideas found in Taoism because he perceived 
that they all treated nature as being independent of man's consciousness and tried to 
understand the laws of nature objectively. Yen Fu frequently testified that he was 
very fond of Taoism because it was similar to modem Western evolutionary theory. 
As one of his close friends, Hsia Tseng-you, noticed, 'Lao-Tzu's work was written 
2,400 years ago, and my friend Yen Fu has found it similar to ideas expressed by 
Darwin, Spencer, and Montesquieu.'*^^
Yen Fu, however, was not entirely satisfied with Spencer's, or Taoist, 
philosophy. He perceived both Spencer and Taoism to be guilty of advocating man's 
non-action. Both theories for Yen advocated that the way of man should follow the 
way of t'ien  ^ according to which man could and should do nothing to confront t'ien. 
He frequently associated Spencer's laissez-faire doctrine with the Taoist doctrine of 
non-action. He wrote, when Spencer discusses social affairs, his fundamental idea is 
to let things proceed naturally and to reduce human endeavour to a merely subsidiary 
role. This is just like Huang-Lao's doctrine of non-action.'*^
This dissatisfaction directly motivated Yen Fu's turn to another Confucian 
school, the school represented by Hsun Tzu. Hsun Tzu's views of t'ien showed 
significant Taoist influence in the sense that he accepted the Taoist distinction 
between that which t'ien does and that which man does.*^  ^ Yet Hsun Tzu departed
*""CYFW, vol. 3, p. 608; vol. 4, pp. 1077,1082,1085,1087,1093-4.
*^ ^Hsia Tseng-yu, Hou-kuan Yen-shih p'ing-tien Lao-tzu hsü' (Preface to Lao Tzu 
annotated by Yen Fu', in CYFW., vol. 4, p. 1100.
*24c y f w , vol. 5, p. 1334. Huang-ti and Lao-tzu are regarded as the originators of 
Taoism.
*^ ^Hsun Tzu wrote that nature operates with constant regularity. It does not exist 
for the sake of (sage-emperor) Yao nor does it cease to exist because of (wicked king)
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radically from Taoism by arguing that man should and could use his knowledge of the 
way of t ’ien to control t'ien for the benefit of man. He wrote:
Instead regarding t'ien as great and admiring it,
Why not foster it as a thing and regulate it?
Instead obeying t'ien and singing praise to it.
Why not control t'ien's mandate and use it?
Instead of letting things multiply by themselves.
Why not exercise your ability to transform (and increase) them?
Instead of admiring how things come into being.
Why not do something to bring them to full development?*^^
In his translation of Evolution and Ethics^ particularly in his original 
manuscript of the translation. Yen Fu referred to Hsun Tzu in numerous contexts. 
Although he did not quote the above prose of Hsun Tzu's, he did quote similar 
remarks from t'ien-lun (On Nature) of Liu Yu-hsi (772-842 A.D.), a follower of Hsun 
Tzu, and linked Liu's idea to Huxley's notion of ethical principle as against natural 
principle:
Chieh.'(Hsun Tzu, 'T'ien-lun' (On Nature), in A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy^ 
ed. Chan Wing-tsit, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963, p. 116.)
*^ ^Chan Wing-tsit, op. cit., p. 122. Chan translated Hsun Tzu's t'ien into Heaven'. 
It seems to me here t'ien means mainly nature. Therefore I leave the term t'ien 
untranslated.
*^ I^n his original manuscript of the translation of Evolution and Ethics, Yen Fu 
frequently cited ideas in various Chinese classics to convey Huxley's ideas. Later, 
Yen Fu's mentor and friend Wu Ju-lun suggested that as a translation, direct citation 
from Chinese sources should be avoided. Following Wu's advice. Yen removed all 
but a few direct references to Chinese thinkers or works from the text of the 
translation when it was published. Yet texts of the translation remained largely intact. 
Yen Fu's original manuscript also appears in CYFW., vol. 5, pp. 1410-76.
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In his t’ien-lun, Liu Meng-te (Liu Yu-hsi) wrote: 'Every form of being 
has limits in its capacity. T’ien is the greatest being and man is the 
most developed animal. Something t ’ien can do is not for man to do, 
but something man can do is not for t ’ien to do either. Man makes 
success by combining his capacity with t ’ien’s capacity. ...While the 
capacity of t’ien is to produce myriad things in the universe, the 
capacity of man is to regulate those things.' This view is exactly 
identical to Huxley's idea that the cosmic process is natural, while 
regulating this process is man's duty.*^ *
This interpretation of Huxley's ideas in the framework of Hsun Tzu's 
argument for man's active role in controlling natural processes was a rule rather than 
an exception in Yen Fu's translation of Huxley's Evolution and Ethics. A few 
examples are given below to illustrate how Yen Fu transformed Huxley into Hsun 
Tzu.
In his Evolution o f Ethics, Huxley, with Herbert Spencer in mind, told his 
audience:
The fanatical individualism of our time attempts to apply the analogy 
of cosmic nature to society. Once more we have a misapplication of 
the stoical injunction to follow nature.... Let us understand, once and 
for all, that the ethical progress of society depends, not on imitating the 
cosmic process, still less in running away from it, but in combating 
it.... The history of civilization details the steps by which men have 
succeeded in building up an artificial world within the cosmos.
Yen Fu's translation, however, differed considerably from the original. The 
translation explains that someone' insisted on following the cosmic process, because 
he failed to realize that human action (jen-ch’i) is totally different from the natural
'""CYFW., vol. 5, pp. 1472-3.
'"’T. H. Huxley, Evolution and Ethics, p. 51.
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process (t’ien-hsing). 'If  we hope to achieve success in social and political affairs', 
Yen Fu continued, 'we should not follow the cosmic process, nor should we run away 
from it; rather, we should fight it in order to achieve control over it.'*^ ® He related this 
idea to practical matters:
The reason why European countries are wealthy and strong is because 
they combat the cosmic process (t'ien-hsing) and therefore control 
nature (wan-wu) for human use.... History shows that the doctrine of 
combating the cosmic process for achieving success is irrefutable.*^*
Another paragraph of Huxley was also reshaped by Yen Fu in the same fashion. In 
his Evolution and Ethics^ Huxley regarded nature as a jungle and society as a garden.
Not only is the state of nature hostile to the state of art of the garden, 
but the principle of the horticultural process, by which the latter is 
created and maintained, is antithetic to that of the cosmic process. The 
characteristic feature of the latter is the intense and unceasing 
computation of the struggle for existence. The characteristic of the 
former is the elimination of the struggle, by the removal of the 
conditions which give rise to it.*^ ^
In his translation. Yen Fu again emphasised the importance of human action. The 
natural process (t'ien-hsing) and human action (jen-ch’i) are often antithetic rather 
than complementary. Success in human action relies on combating the cosmic 
process.’*”
Nevertheless, Yen Fu did not consider Huxley's criticism of Spencer to be
*^ ®C'iTW, vol. 5, p. 1396. 
*” lbid.,p. 1396.
*” T.H. Huxley, Evolution and Ethics^ p. 26. 
*” CYFW, vol. 5, p. 1335.
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total refutation of Spencer's evolutionary ideas, but rather, a complement to Spencer's 
ideas. The ideas of Spencer and that of Huxley, for Yen Fu, were two sides of one 
coin. On the one hand, the way of nature differs from the way of man and Spencer's 
theory represented the most advanced efforts of scientifically investigating nature and 
understanding its laws. On the other hand, the purpose of understanding laws of 
nature was to control natural process based on our knowledge of nature, as 
exemplified by Huxley's work. Applied to China, Spencer's theory illuminated what 
we were now in terms of social evolution, while Huxley showed what should be 
immediately done to change China according to the law of evolution.
Wu Ju-lun, Yen's mentor and author of the preface to Yen Fu's Chinese 
translation of Evolution and Ethics, remarked on Yen Fu's position:
Huxley completely changed the previous theory by claiming that 
nature must not be given free reign, but that man must resist nature.
Man must resist nature, using his naturally endowed abilities to the 
full, and ever renewing his efforts so that his country might exist 
forever and his race never suffer decline. This is what is called 
struggling for victory over nature. Yet man's struggle with nature, and 
man's victory over nature are both the result of the working of nature.
Thus it is that natural process (t'ien-hsing) and human endeavour 
(Jen-chih) are part and parcel of evolution.
IV
Some scholars have suggested that there may have been a contradiction 
between Yen Fu's commitment to determinism on the one hand and his ardent belief 
in the human capacity to control the objective social law on the other. Yen Fu did 
not acknowledge this possibility. He was probably unaware of this contradiction
134CYFW., vol. 5, p. 1317. This English translation follows James Pusey, China 
and Charles Darwin, p. 172.
James Pusey, China and Charles Darwin, pp. 52-3.
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because of his highly idealistic interpretation of the law underlining human society. 
Unlike Jenks and Engels, Yen Fu’s interpretation of social evolution contained few 
elements which could be identified as materialistic. The foundation for his idealistic 
interpretation of human society and human evolution was his peculiar interpretation 
of Spencer’s theory of social organism.
The organic analogy for society was basic to Spencer’s evolutionary sociology. 
The phrase 'social evolution’ is only meaningful if biological, human and social 
development are seen to constitute stages in one broad evolutionary continuum, 
subject to the same immutable laws and impelled by the same natural forces. The 
major theme of Spencer’s theory of social organism is that society is a growth and 
not a manufacture’.*^*’ In exploring society as a living organism, Spencer drew up long 
lists of similarities and differences between society and a living organism. The main 
similarities are; a) both commence as small aggregates and increase in mass; b) both 
develop a more complex structure as they grow, c) the functionally distinct parts 
become more interdependent; and d) the life of both is independent of and longer than 
the life of any of their units.*^ ^
Yen Fu understood Spencer’s theory of social organism through reading The Study 
o f Sociology The Study o f Sociology provided Yen Fu with tremendous intellectual 
inspiration. Among them, Spencer’s organic analogy for society appealed to Yen Fu 
deeply. The theory of social organism which compares and traces an analogy 
between a society and a biological organism’. Yen Fu asserted, was originated by 
Spencer’.*^  ^ Such a theory would shed new light on the understanding of human 
society. Yen Fu wrote:
When a society is formed, in terms of its structure and functions, in
*^^Herbert Spencer, The Principles o f Sociology, vol. iii, p. 321.
*^ J^.D.Y. Peel, Herbert Spencer: the Evolution o f a Sociologist, p. 178.
*^ *Yen Fu Ch'un-hsueh yi-yen (A translation of Herbert Spencer’s The Study o f  
Sociology), p. xi.
‘^ ’CYFW., vol. 2, p. 314.
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terms of its capacities, it does not differ from a biological entity. While 
differing in magnitude, there is a correspondence of organs and 
functions. Knowing the principles of sustaining the life of my own 
person, I can also know the principles of survival of the social group. 
Knowing what makes for long life in the individual, I know what 
maintains the strong pulse of a country.*^ ®
Schwartz suggested that the main idea Yen Fu drew from Spencer's social 
organism was the 'notion of China as a society-nation rather than a culture'.*'** 'What 
Yen Fu finds essentially in Spencer is the most graphic possible image of the nation- 
society, as conceived of in the purest nationalism.' 'As a cell of the organism known 
as China, the duty of the Chinese individual is not to any set of fixed, universal values 
or fixed beliefs. It is above all a commitment to the survival and growth of the social 
organism of which he is a part.'*'*^
This argument of Schwartz overlooked some peculiar characteristics of Spencer's 
theory of social organism and misinterpreted Yen Fu's debt to Spencer's theory of 
social organism. Schwartz's argument follows from the truism that the organic 
analogy for society implies collectivist political theory and holistic methods of 
analysis, while societal mechanisms sustain individualism and atomism. Yet as some 
recent studies of Spencer have shown, Spencer's theory of social organism contained 
certain peculiar characteristics which distinguished it from that of other theorists of 
social organism who arrived at a collectivist stance from the metaphor of the social 
organism.*'*  ^ According to these arguments, the organicist position usually involved 
five distinct but interrelated ideas: a) society is a whole entity; b) the whole is more 
than the sum of the parts; c) the whole determines the nature of the parts; d) the parts
*40c y fW., vol. 1, p. 17.
*'**Benjamin Schwartz, In Search o f Wealth and Power, p. 56.
142Ibid., p. 57.
*'*^Particularly J.D.Y. Peel, Herbert Spencer: the Evolution o f a Sociologist, and 
David Wiltshire, The Social and Political Thought o f Herbert Spencer, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1978.
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cannot be understood if considered in isolation from the whole; e) the parts are 
dynamically interrelated or interdependent.These characteristics necessarily lead to 
collectivism as evidenced in thinkers such as Hegel and English neo-idealists F.H. 
Bradley, A.E. Taylor, and J. McTaggart.^^  ^ Spencer’s theory of social organism, 
however, differed from such organic political theory insofar as Spencer greatly 
appreciated the individual. On the one hand, Spencer insisted that 'the society exists 
for the benefit of its members; not its members for the benefit of the society....The 
claims of the body politic are nothing in themselves, and become something only in 
so far as they embody the claims of its component individuals.'*'*® On the other hand, 
Spencer believed that social institutions can be explained by reference to the 
characters of the constituent individuals. In both biological organism and social 
organization, Spencer claimed, given the nature of the units...the nature of the 
aggregate they form is predetermined.’*'*^ Walter M. Simon noticed that Spencer 
placed an unusually heavy emphasis, obviously, on the elements of an organism at the 
expense of the organism as such.’*'** Because of this characteristic of Spencer’s social 
organism, 'there are no serious difficulties over his [Spencer’s] combination of the 
organic analogy with political individualism.’*'*’
Yen Fu was well aware of the individualistic tenet in Spencer’s theory of 
social organism. As we will show later in much detail. Yen Fu was impressed by 
Spencer’s distinction between social organism and biological organism and adopted 
this distinction to argue that the aim of a society should be the happiness of the 
individual. The acceptance of this idea partially leads Yen Fu to limit the degree to
*'*'*D.C. Phillips, 'Organism in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries’, 
Journal o f the History o f Ideas, vol. xxxi. No. 3 (July-September, 1970), p. 413.
*'*'lbid., pp. 414-20.
*'*®Herbert Spencer, The Principles o f Sociology, vol. i, (first ed., 1876), reprinted 
by Otto Zeller: Osnabruck, 1966, pp. 449-50.
*'*^ Herbert Spencer, The Study o f Sociology, p. 44.
*'**Walter M. Simon, Spencer and the "Social Organism’’’, Journal o f the History o f  
Ideas, vol. xxi. No. 2 (April-June, 1960), p. 290.
*'*’J.D.Y. Peel, Herbert Spencer: the Evolution o f a Sociologist, p. 185.
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which an authoritarian government should infringe on the individual.*^®
An aspect of Spencer’s theory of social organism which influenced Yen Fu 
most was Spencer's analysis of the individual as a component of the social organism. 
This provided Yen Fu with a new framework for understanding the structure and 
development of society. As mentioned above, Spencer believed that social institutions 
were to be explained by reference to the characters of the individuals who comprised 
them. This view was explained in The Study o f Sociology. Taking examples from 
chemistry, physics, biology and society, Spencer asserted that 'the character of the 
aggregate is determined by the character of the units.’*^* He continued:
Given the structures and consequent instincts of the individuals as we 
find them, and the community they form will inevitably present certain 
traits; and no community having such traits can be formed out of 
individuals having other structures and instincts.
Therefore, Spencer held that the key to understanding the different tribes and 
nations, past and present’ lay in the analysis of the individuals composing them.*^  ^He 
claimed:
Among societies of all orders and sizes, from the smallest and the 
rudest up to the largest and most civilized, it has to ascertain what 
traits there are in common, determined by the common traits of human 
beings; what less-general traits, distinguishing certain groups of 
societies, result from traits distinguishing certain races of men; and 
what peculiarities in each society are traceable to the peculiarities of its
*^ ®Yen Fu’s argument for individual self-interest based on Spencer’s theory of social 
organism will be discussed in the next chapter.
*^*Herbert Spencer, The Study o f Sociology, p. 43. 
*%id., p. 45.
‘^ 'Ibid.
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members. In every case it has for its subject-matter the growth, 
development, structure, and functions of the social aggregate, as 
brought about by the mutual actions of individuals whose natures are 
partly like those of all men, partly like those of kindred races, partly 
distinctive.’^ "*
Yen Fu was impressed by the ideas in The Study o f Sociology. He thought 
Spencer's theory a remarkable confirmation of the essence of Chinese thought 
expounded in such ancient classics as The Great L e a rn in g .In his essay. The Root 
of Strength' {yuan-ch'iang) in 1895, he introduced Spencer to Chinese readers as 
follows:
Spencer...utilized evolutionary theory to explain human relations and 
civilizations, and calls his theory 'the science of society' {ch'un- 
hsueh)....His main ideas are surprisingly similar to those found in The 
Great Leamingy namely the ideas of relating sincerity of the will, 
rectification of mind, cultivation of the personal life and regulation of 
family with national order and world peace. While the ideas in The 
Great Learning are yet to be fully elaborated and illuminated, 
Spencer's theory by contrast is exceptionally profound, sophisticated, 
encyclopedic and abundant. He investigates every matter by applying 
scientific principles and drawing empirical evidence to discover the 
primary elements of the matter, and then to indicate its inevitable 
direction. ... Spencer paid particular attention to analyzing the reasons 
underlying the weakness or strength of various countries as well as 
their moral characters. ... [He points out that] what is called society is 
simply an aggregate of individuals. Without understanding the
’'"•ibid., p. 47.
^^ ^The Great Learning is an important Confucian classic. Chu Hsi assessed it as one 
of the Four Classics' (alongside the Analects y Mencius y and The Doctrine o f the 
Mean) for containing the essence of Confucianism. Yen Fu's comparison of Spencer's 
work to The Great Learning is found in CYFW., vol. 1, pp. 6,126.
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elements, it is impossible to understand their aggregation 156
For Yen Fu, the primary idea of The Great Learning - that social order 
follows from self-cultivated individuals - is close to Spencer's idea that individual 
character determines the character of the collectivity. Both Spencer and the Chinese 
classics showed the basis of a country's strength to lie in its people's characters. In his 
postscript to his translation of Spencer's book. Yen Fu wrote:
Generally speaking, everything can be understood in terms of an 
aggregate and its parts. The aggregate can be called total (tu-tuo) and 
translated as ch’uan-t% the part can be a called unit (yu-ni) and 
translated as tan-wei. A writing brush is total; its hair is a unit. A bowl 
of rice is total; a grain of rice is a unit. A country is total, an individual 
is a unit. Societal changes, without exception, all depend on the 
characters of the individuals involved.
In his essay, 'The Root of Strength', Yen Fu analyzed the causes underlying 
China's backwardness and weakness. He quoted the following paragraph of Spencer's 
The Study o f Sociology, without acknowledgement:
Out of bricks, well burnt, hard, and sharp-angled, lying in a heap by 
his side, the bricklayer builds, even without mortar, a wall of some 
height that has considerable stability. With bricks made of bad 
materials, irregularly burnt, warped, cracked, and many of them 
broken, he cannot build a dry wall of the same height and stability.
The dockyard-labourer, piling cannon-shot, is totally unable to make 
these spherical masses stand at all as the bricks stand. ...Putting which 
several facts together, and asking what is the most general truth they
156CYFW., vol. 1, p. 6.
*^ ^Yen Fu, Ch'un-hsueh yi-yen (A translation of Herbert Spencer's The Study o f  
Sociology), p. xi.
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imply, we see it to be this—that the character of the aggregate is 
determined by the characters of the units.
Yen Fu then argued that the fundamental difference between China’s weakness 
and the West’s strength originated not primarily from differences in weapons and 
technology, even economic or political systems, but rather from different levels of 
individual character. Individual character was the foundation {pen) of a society; the 
social order and economic and political systems of society are secondary effects 
{mo). The economic prosperity and democratic systems of the West were largely the 
result of the higher development of their people’s characters.*^’ It would be 
impossible. Yen maintained, for a nation like Britain to have a despotic ruler and 
corrupt officials because the people’s character would prevent such a thing from 
happening.*®® It would also be unlikely that a nation such as Russia could have an 
enlightened political system, upright officials and a modem economy, because the 
people’s character was undeveloped.*®*
Spencer did not define individual character by any specific properties. His 
primary aim was to raise the issue of relations between individual character and the 
character of society in order to argue that 'there must be a Social Science expressing 
the relations between the two, with as much definiteness as the natures of the 
phenomena permit.’*®^ In contrast to Spencer, Yen Fu gave individual character a 
definite meaning. He defined individual character in terms of the level of an 
individual’s moral, intellectual and physical development, particularly moral and 
intellectual development. It is possible that Yen Fu borrowed this triad from Huxley, 
but this triad is much in line with the trend of Confucian ideas, particularly that of
158CYFW, vol. 1, p. 18; Spencer, The Study o f Sociology ^ p. 43. 
*"’CYFW., vol. 4, pp. 874, 885.
*®®Ibid., p. 893.
*®*CYFW., vol. 2, pp. 498-9.
*®^ Herbert Spencer, The Study o f Sociology, p. 47.
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The Great L e a r n i n g Confucianism emphasises that the country's peace and 
prosperity depends, to a great degree, on the moral perfection of both the rulers and 
the masses. The possession of knowledge is a necessary condition for moral 
perfection. This is most clearly expressed in The Great Learning:
The Ancients who wished to manifest their clear character to the world 
would first bring order to their states. Those who wished to bring order 
to their states would first regulate their families. Those who wished to 
regulate their families would first cultivate their personal lives. Those 
who wished to cultivate their personal lives would first rectify their 
minds. Those who wished to rectify their minds would first make their 
wills sincere. Those who wished to make their wills sincere would first 
extend their knowledge. The extension of knowledge consists in the 
investigation of things.’^
Confucians often analogously linked people's intellectual and moral characters 
to social order as roots to a tree, oil to a lamp, water to a fish, fields to a farmer. 
Preservation or loss of a nation, for a Confucian, depended upon the depth or 
shallowness of the people's virtue, not upon military strength or w eakness.Y en Fu 
used almost the same analogy as traditional Confucians to describe the essence of the 
Western theory of government:
Western political thinkers all regard good government and policies as
‘^ ^Schwartz suggests that this notion of Yen Fu is derived from Spencer's 'famous 
triad of physical, intellectual and moral energies'.(Schwartz, p. 59) However, he does 
not indicate where Spencer discusses this famous triad'. This triad does not appear in 
The Study o f Sociology, with which Yen Fu was most familiar. In his Evolution and 
Ethics, Huxley used this triad by saying that man, physical, intellectual, and moral is 
much a part of nature', (p. 25)
'^Chan Wing-tsit, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, p. 86.
Jerome Grieder, Intellectuals and the State in Modern China, New York: the 
Free Press, 1981, pp. 26-7.
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plants and the people's moral and intellectual level as the soil. When 
people's moral and intellectual capacities have advanced, ...good 
government and policies will naturally emerge; and once they emerge, 
they will not decay. In contrast, [without the advancement of people's 
moral intellectual abilities] even good government and policies will 
not last long, they will deteriorate just as the sweet orange of the South 
degenerates into the sour orange of the North.*^
The moral and intellectual capacities of the Chinese people. Yen Fu claimed, 
was far behind that of the West.*^  ^The primary reason for this. Yen Fu argued, was to 
be found in Chinese culture. 'Our country which has four thousand year-old 
civilization and ninety thousand miles of good land has deteriorated into a backward 
country. It has been all caused by our culture!'*^* The only way of revitalizing the 
Chinese nation was to renovate the people by revitalising the culture.
To revitalise Chinese culture, the first and foremost task for Yen Fu was to 
adopt the 'essence' of modem Western culture which he once defined as 
scientifically seeking tmth in its knowledge and transforming politics from private 
business into public business.'*^  ^These two components of modem Westem culture 
were later articulated by the May Fourth intellectuals as science and democracy'. The 
fundamental flaws of Chinese culture, and of Confucianism in particular, when 
compared to modem Westem culture, were that Chinese culture did not develop 
empirical science in studies of the natural and human world, and that Chinese culture 
did not develop liberal and democratic ideas as did the modem West. These flaws 
could only be corrected by drawing upon modem Westem culture.
Yen Fu introduced Westem ideas with an eye to correcting China's flawed 
culture. On the one hand, his critique of the traditional educational system, his
‘^ C'iTW., vol. 5, p. 1339. 
‘"'CYFW., vol. 1, pp. 18-9. 
‘""CYFW., vol. l,p . 53. 
‘"^ c y fW., vol. 1, p. 2.
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critique of traditional philosophy and science, his enthusiasm for introducing Westem 
logic, 'scientific' sociology, economics and political theory all aimed at advancing the 
scientific knowledge and the intellectual quality of the Chinese people. Yen's nick­
name, the old man of curing ignorance' (yu-yu lao-Jen), symbolized his devotion to 
the advancement of the people's intellect. On the other hand, his advocacy of liberal 
and democratic reform was closely related to efforts at advancing the people's sense 
of citizenship - the individual possesses certain freedoms and rights in society while 
he shares in the responsibilities of the community.
In addition to introducing Westem knowledge. Yen Fu saw the need to 
reinterpret or renovate elements of traditional Chinese culture. Unlike the later 
generation of radical intellectuals associated with the May Fourth movement. Yen Fu 
had considerable confidence in the vitality of traditional culture. As he put it in one of 
his commentary notes to Jenks' A History o f Politics, although Chinese culture after 
its four thousand years of development had clearly demonstrated an inability to 
nurture the advanced moral and intellectual character of the people, it nevertheless 
has a huge potential for nurturing a great country, and will not perish.'*^ ® Even in his 
most radical essay denouncing traditional culture, 'On Our Salvation' in 1895, Yen Fu 
insisted that some important elements in traditional culture are valuable and should be 
reinterpreted as a part of the new culture which he advocated. This new interpretation, 
however, was to be undertaken using scientific methods as developed in the modem 
West. To understand the essence of our sages' ideas', he wrote, one has to master 
Westem learning first. Through using Westem knowledge to examine the essence of 
our sages' ideas, one will become convinced of the veracity of the essence of our 
sages' ideas.'*^ *
As did many intellectuals who followed him. Yen Fu aimed to combine the 
essence' of modem Westem culture and the good' elements of traditional Chinese 
culture in order to find an ideal formula for culture to guide the renewal of the people, 
and ultimately to guide the reformation of society. This notion of an ideal culture for 
cultural guidance, as Thomas Metzger has observed, was deeply rooted in the Chinese
nocYFW., vol. 4, p. 933. 
'"'CYFW., vol. l,p . 49.
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cultural tradition. Chinese intellectuals tended to lump social, economic, and political 
issues together as a cultural issue. They pursued 'the right formula of cultural change', 
and sought a single, correct philosophy for guiding human action.*^^
This highly idealistic and culturalistic interpretation of social structure and 
social development of Yen Fu, as opposed to the materialistic interpretation of history 
found in Jenks, was important in Yen Fu's thought for several reasons. First, it 
provided a theoretical foundation for his reconciliation of determinism and 
voluntarism. He understood destiny (Yun-hui) in terms of the idea that certain results 
will follow from given causes. Thus, given a certain level of intellectual and moral 
development of individuals in a society, other aspects of the society were also be 
determined. Without significant changes in the causes - individual character, the other 
aspects of a society would not change. The level of individual intellectual and moral 
development, however, was not totally beyond the control of human beings as it was 
within the sphere of individual endeavour. As both Spencer and Confucianism 
showed, man is capable of unlimited perfect ion.By trying to improve themselves 
morally and intellectually through a correct cultural formula, individuals could 
thereby change a society.
Secondly, the idea of the improvement of the individual's moral and intellectual 
faculties as the foundation of a nation's improvement led Yen Fu to advocate gradual, 
piecemeal reform rather than radical and violent change. It formed the foundation of 
Yen Fu's political conservatism as will be shown later. Yen Fu was convinced that 
good government could not be achieved by simply shaping public policies. Good 
government could only be possible when people's character was improved 
substantially. Their character could not be improved overnight. As Yen Fu often 
quoted from Spencer's The Study o f Sociology: human nature is indefinitely
*^^Thomas Metzger, 'Continuities between Modem and Promodem China: Some 
Neglected Methodological and Substantive Issues', in Ideas across Cultures^ ed. Paul 
A. Cohen & Merle Goldman, pp. 263-92.
^^^CYFW, vol. 1, p. 181; Weber perceived the conception of man's unlimited 
potential of perfection as one of the fundamental features of Confucianism. (Max 
Weber, The Religion o f China, p. 228)
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modifiable, but no modification of it can be brought about rap id ly .Thus ,  for Yen 
Fu, any attempt of changing a society through revolution could be destructive, or at 
best, in vain. He quoted this paragraph of Spencer’s The Study o f Sociology on several 
occasions:
Again and again for three generations has France been showing to the 
world how impossible it is essentially to change the type of a social 
structure by any rearrangement wrought out through a revolution. 
However great the transformation may for a time seem, the original 
thing re-appears in disguise. ... It needs but to recall the truth 
exemplified some chapters back, that the properties of the aggregate 
are determined by the properties of its units, to see at once that so long 
as the characters remain substantially unchanged in the political 
organisation which has slowly been evolved by them.^^ ^
We have shown Yen Fu’s ideas of social evolution, progress, and social 
organism which he adopted from Darwinism and interpreted by referring to various 
ideas in the Chinese cultural tradition. As Pusey has observed, the manner of Yen Fu’s 
interpretations of 'Western classics’, like Sung philosopher Lu Hsiang-shan’s 
interpretation of Confucian classics, was to treat classics as footnotes to his own 
i d e a s . I n  so doing. Yen Fu was able to combine various ideas from different 
Westem thinkers as well as Chinese classics to formulate a synthesis of his own. The 
primary aim of this synthesis was to reveal the laws which determined the destiny of a 
society, and illustrate the direction and process of China’s changes accordingly. He 
showed that human society evolves from a lower stage to a higher stage. He 
demonstrated that the West had already reached the highest stage of human evolution. 
He displayed an immense confidence in the capacity of man to change society.
^^ '‘Herbert Spencer, The Study o f Sociology, p. 108.
*^^Herbert Spencer, The Study o f Sociology, p. I l l ;  CYFW, vol. 2, p. 308; vol.3, p. 
610.
176James Reeve Pusey, China and Charles Darwin, p. 159.
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Finally he showed that the key for social change was to renew individuals through 
renewal culture. These ideas were to have an enduring influence on the succeeding 
development of Chinese thought.
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Chapter m
Social Darwinism, Nationalism and Universalism
In addition to arguing for change by appealing to the law of social evolution 
as found in Darwinism, Yen Fu also argued for change by the idea of the struggle for 
existence and natural selection, ideas we have defined as social Darwinism. One of 
the most influential notion in Yen Fu’s dissemination of Darwinist ideas was the 
notion of'the survival of the fittest' (shih-che sheng-ts'un).
In Schwartz's study. Yen Fu' acceptance of the idea of the struggle for 
existence was interpreted as the main catalyst for Yen's obsession with the wealth and 
power of the state - à necessary means in the international struggle for existence.* 
Schwartz perceived Yen's intellectual quest to be reducible to a search for China's 
national power - an end which justified any means.^ In this sense, Schwartz 
suggested. Yen Fu was committed to social Darwinism and to the ethic implicit in 
social Darwinism'.^
Recently, there has been some revisionist interpretations of Yen Fu's 
acceptance of the idea of natural selection. In his China and Charles Darwin, James 
Pusey argues that Yen Fu did not accept the ethic implicit in social Darwinism' - the 
ethic of ruthless, uncharitable self-interest that Huxley so abhorred'. Instead, Yen Fu 
adopted only the rhetoric of social Darwinism as a fair warning' to argue for change."* 
Even Schwartz, himself, while upholding that Yen Fu was preoccupied with national 
power, nevertheless avoided the use of the ethic of social Darwinism' lately. Instead, 
he stated that Yen Fu only used the language of social Darwinism'.^
Yet this revisionist interpretation has raised more questions than it answered.
*Benjamin Schwartz, In Search o f Wealth and Power, pp. 237-8.
^For a summary of this argument, see Benjamin Schwartz, op. cit., esp. chapter xii 
Some Implications' (pp. 237-47).
^Ibid.,p. 111.
"•James Pusey, China and Charles Darwin, pp. 159-60, 75.
^Benjamin Schwartz, 'Themes in Intellectual History: May Fourth and after', in The 
Cambridge History o f China, vol. 12, p. 410.
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What is meant by 'the language' or 'rhetoric' of social Darwinism? Does it mean that 
Yen Fu believed that the world was a battlefield in which only the fittest would 
survive, but that he morally deplored such reality? If so, how did the language of 
social Darwinism serve his argument for change based on learning from the West?
In this chapter, I will offer a new interpretation. I will show that the social 
Darwinist notion of natural selection functioned in Yen Fu not merely as a fair 
warning'. Rather, it carried a normative implication. However, this normative 
implication was less nationalistic than universalistic. Unquestionably, one of Yen's 
persistent concerns was China's survival as a nation. Yet he saw the survival of China 
not simply as an issue of whether China could enhance its wealth and power, but as 
an issue of whether China could enter the mainstream of the historical evolution of 
mankind. In this sense. Yen Fu's acceptance of the social Darwinian doctrine of the 
struggle for existence and natural selection was part of his universalistic, deterministic 
and evolutionary vision of human development which we have explored in the last 
chapter.
Several factors probably contributed to Schwartz's and Pusey's failure to 
attend to this universalistic aspect of Yen Fu's views on social Darwinism. First, their 
interpretations of Yen Fu's views on social Darwinism were based heavily on Yen 
Fu's translation of Huxley's Evolution and Ethics^ as well as his four essays in 1895, 
which Schwartz treated as a sort of prolegomenon' to the whole of Yen Fu's thought.^ 
They paid little attention to Yen Fu's numerous essays criticising the rising tide of 
nationalism and the ethic of social Darwinism in the 1900s, and particularly after the 
outbreak of the First World War. Secondly, in their analyses of Yen Fu's 
interpretation of social Darwinism, they misinterpreted some critical Chinese terms, 
such as those for struggle' and 'fittest' and therefore missed their moralist 
connotations.
Thus the following discussion will, firstly, reexamine the meaning of Yen Fu's 
acceptance of the social Darwinian doctrine of the struggle for existence' in his 
writings and translations between 1895 and 1898. Secondly, it will examine Yen Fu's 
criticism of nationalism as well his repudiation of the doctrine of might-as-right in his
^Benjamin Schwartz, In Search o f Wealth and Power, p. 43.
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writings in the 1900s. Thirdly, it will show how Yen Fu's faith in universalistic 
morality led to his disillusion with the modem West after the outbreak of the First 
World War.
Yen Fu's acceptance of the social Darwinian doctrine of 'the struggle for 
existence' was primarily found in his four important essays of 1895 and his translation 
of Huxley's Evolution and Ethics. The years immediately following the Sino-Japanese 
war were critical to the protracted debate begun in the 1840s about whether China 
should fundamentally change its culture and institutions by learning from the West. 
Yen Fu's writings and translations during this period were focused on addressing the 
issue of change. On the one hand, as we have shown, he argued that change was the 
universal law and instrument of progress. On the other hand, he sternly warned his 
countrymen that failure to undertake fundamental changes would lead to the end of 
both China as an independent nation and the Chinese as a people. This grave 
possibility was revealed by a Darwinian law which governed both the natural and 
human worlds. According to this law.
Living things struggle among themselves in order to survive. Tien 
selects among them and preserves the fittest species.^ It is his 
[Darwin's] view that humans and living things are bom within a given 
space and together feed on the environment and on the benefits of 
t'ien. They come into conflict with each other. Peoples and living 
things stmggle for survival. At first, species stmggle with species; then 
as men gradually progress, there is a stmggle between one social group 
and another. The weak invariably become the prey of the strong, and 
the stupid invariably become subservient to the clever.*
^The ideograph t'ien is again very ambiguous. It basically means nature', but also 
implies a quasi-personal almighty force which govems the natural world and human 
world.
*CYFW., vol. 1, p. 16, the English translation follows Schwartz, In Search o f
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Darwin's idea carries two messages for Yen Fu: the idea of the struggle for 
existence, and the idea of natural selection (or to use Yen Fu's phrase, tHen's 
selection). In his notion of the struggle for existence. Yen Fu tried to convey the idea 
that the world was not a benevolent place, but a battlefield. In both the natural world 
and the human world, he suggested, t'ien produced enormous numbers of creatures 
and human beings, yet offered limited means for their survival. He pointed out that by 
Darwin's calculation a couple of elephants, the least prolific of animals, would 
reproduce nineteen millions in 740 years.’ In the human world, according to Thomas 
Malthus, population increased in geometric progression while material production 
increased only in arithmetic progression.*® Consequently, wrote Yen Fu, 'there are far 
too many creatures existing in the world, and only a small portion of them will be 
able to survive.'** They therefore engage in endless struggles (cheng) to obtain the 
necessary yet scarce means for sustaining their own survival.*^
Yen Fu's notion of struggle' was a highly confusing one. It contained at least 
two implications. First, as has been generally understood, he meant by struggle' 
conflict or contest between species or peoples in which the stronger emerged as the 
surviving winner, the weak as the loser doomed to perish. As Yen Fu stated clearly, 
every species strives hard to preserve its race through vicious war with others. The 
weak will perish while the strong will survive.'*^
Another implication of Yen Fu's notion of struggle' meant less a conflict or 
contest between species and more an endeavour by a species or a people to be fitter'.
Wealth and Power^ pp. 45-6.
’CYFW., vol. 5, pp. 1329-30; for Darwin's description of reproduction of the 
elephant, see Charles Darwin, The Origin o f Species, London: Penguin Books, 1968, 
pp. 118-9.
*®CYFW., vol. 5, p. 1329.
**Ibid.
*"lbid., p. 1331.
*'lbid., p. 1323.
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'Fitter' in both natural and human worlds meant, as Yen Fu learned from Huxley, 
those creatures which are best adapted to the conditions which at any period 
obtain.'*  ^Yen Fu spelled out the meaning of this notion clearly in his essay 'The Root 
of Strength':
Those which have the capacity for maintaining self-existence and 
having descendants are those which are strong, swift, clever, and 
thereby best adapted to the external environment at any period. ... If a 
species which is accustomed to leisure is put in an environment where 
it has to labour, or if a species which is accustomed to live in 
mountains is forced to live in marshlands, it will not be able to 
reproduce and the species will naturally perish. This is what the 
struggle for existence means.
In this latter sense, as Yen Fu remarked, the struggle for existence does not 
mean to kill others by tooth and claw'.'® 'Struggle without contest between species is 
the ultimate form of struggle.''^
The struggle to be 'fitter' for Yen Fu was closely related to the notion of 
natural selection for which Yen Fu used t'ien's selection. To be fitter'. Yen Fu 
suggested, meant to be selected by t'ien as its favourite' {t'ien chih suo-hou)}^ Yen 
Fu considered t'ien much as an omnipotent regulator of natural and human worlds as 
in Confucianism. Unlike Confucianism, however, the Darwinian t'ien was understood 
as not caring much about peace and harmony, but about progress. Unlike the 
Confucian t'ien which is benevolent (protecting the virtuous and rewarding the
'"'Thomas Huxley, Evolution and Ethics^ p. 23; Yen Fu's translation is found in 
CYFW., vol. 5, p. 1324.
'^CYFW., vol. 1, pp. 5-6.
'®Ibid.
'"CYFW., vol. 5, p. 1324.
'*Ibid.
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virtuous without eliminating the virtueless*’), Darwinian t'ien is merciless. The sole 
purpose of Darwinian t'ien is to promote progress in the natural and human worlds. 
To that purpose, it mercilessly eliminates the unfit. In his commentary on Lao Tzu, 
Yen Fu repeatedly emphasised one idea of Lao Tzu, suggesting it as similar to the 
essence of Darwin's doctrine: 'Heaven and earth are not benevolent, they treat a 
thousand things simply as a dog or a pig; Sages are not benevolent, they treat human 
beings as dogs and pigs.'^ ® In his essay titled 'On Preserving Our Race' in 1898, Yen 
Fu even went so far as to argue that, according to Darwinian principles, the most 
important fimction of t'ien is to destroy rather than to create. He wrote:
It has been a classic Chinese notion that the way of t'ien is to create.
We Chinese have never been able to understand why the creator 
creates thousands upon thousands of things. ...Now we have learned 
the opposite: t'ien likes to destroy. Only because it likes to destroy, it 
has to create. The reason for creation is to prepare the objects to 
destroy.^’
Such an interpretation of the Darwinian notion of the struggle for existence 
and natural selection enabled Yen Fu to demonstrate how progressive evolution in the 
natural and human world occurs. For Yen Fu 'fitter' always meant good' (yw), and 
unfitted' meant bad {lueh). Every creature and human being struggles to be fitter. 
'T'ien selects those best fitted to survive'.^  ^ T'ien's selection is an interminable 
process. 'After it selects some creatures to survive, it will again command those 
survivors to contend, and then it selects again. By this interminable process of
*’The most insightful study of the notion of t'ien in Confucianism is found in 
Robert Eno, The Confucian Creation o f Heaven, State University of New York Press, 
1990.
^®C'iTW., vol. 4, p. 1077.
"'CYFW., vol. 1, pp. 86-7.
""C'iTW., vol. 5, p. 1324.
lOI
contention and selection, change occurs.'^^
Yen Fu's image of endless struggle in the natural and human worlds contrasts 
with the Confucian perception of natural order and human order. One of the 
fundamental beliefs of Confucianism, as Weber saw it, was the 'optimistic conception 
of cosmic harmony'. "^* For Confucianists, both in the natural world and in the human 
world.
Harmony is the basic state and the underlying structure or reality 
whereas conflict does not have roots in reality, but rather represents an 
order of unnatural imbalance or disorder of no lasting significance.^^
By portraying struggle as a universal phenomenon and mechanism for 
progress in the human and natural worlds. Yen Fu diverges significantly from this 
Confucian perception of the world. He is one of the earliest modem Chinese 
intellectuals to see human conflict and stmggle as a positive element in human 
progress.^®
As Pusey observes, the main emphasis in Yen Fu's adoption of the Darwinian 
notion of struggle was not stmggle within a society, but stmggle between different
""Ibid.
"'‘Max Weber, The Religion o f China, tr. by Hans H. Gerth, New York: The Free 
Press, 1964, p. 28.
"^Ch'eng Chung-ying, New Dimensions o f Confucian and Neo-Confucian 
Philosophy, New York: State University of New York Press, 1991, p. 188.
"^Donald J. Munro perceives the replacement of the notion of harmony with 
conflicts and stmggle as one of the most significant departures from the tradition in 
modem Chinese thought, (see his. The Concept o f Man in Early China, Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1969, pp. 160-2.) Glorification of stmggle reached its peak 
later in communist ideology, particularly in the thought of Mao Tse-tung. Mao 
viewed both intrasocietal stmggles, such as class stmggle, and intersocietal stmggle, 
such as anti-imperialist stmggles, as an engine of progress. (For Mao's notions of 
conflict' and 'stmggle', see John Bryan Starr, Continuing the Revolution: the 
Political Thought o f Mao, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979, esp. Chapter 
One: On Conflict', pp. 3-45.)
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societies or nations/^ Far from viewing intrasocietal struggle as the engine of social 
progress, Yen Fu's vision of an ideal society, as we will see later, was shaped, perhaps 
unconsciously, by the Confucian ideal of a harmonious society. He interpreted 
Western liberal and democratic systems as a means of achieving a harmonious 
society.^*
The primary point Yen Fu wanted to make with the Darwinian notion of the 
struggle for existence was that the world was a battlefield between different nations. 
His own phrase was, 'the world today is similar to our Spring and Autumn and 
Warring States period, yet has much intensive competition between different 
nations.'^’
However, Yen Fu was not the first person in modem China to portray the 
modem world as a battlefield of stmggle. Before Darwin's name became known in 
China or in the West, Chinese intellectuals had already perceived a world dominated 
by stmggles in which strength inevitably overpowered weakness. This law was 
understood through the experience of China and other weak countries in dealing with 
the Westem powers.^ ® By the 1860s, the idea that the modem world was a battlefield 
comparable to China's early Warring States period had become widely shared among 
intellectuals. As a famous intellectual in the Self-strengthening movement, Wang 
T'ao, put it (around 1873-1874): The general situation in Europe today is no different 
from that which prevailed in earlier times in the Spring and Autumn and Warring 
states period.'^* This understanding partially motivated the Self-strengthening
^^James Pusey, China and Charles Darwin^ p. 64.
^*0n Yen Fu's adoption of Westem liberal and democratic systems as the means of 
achieving social harmony, see chapter v and vi of this thesis.
’^CYFW., vol. 2, p. 261. The period of Spring and Autumn (722-481 B.C.) and 
Warring States (480-221 B.C.) were the periods before China became a unified 
empire when various states fought with each other to gain domination. Some Chinese 
scholars liked to compare modem world order with this period in Chinese history.
^®James Pusey, China and Charles Darwin, pp. 5-7.
‘^Paul A. Cohen, Between Tradition and Modernity: Wang T'ao and Reform in the 
Late Ch'ing China, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987, p. 93.
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movement of the 1860s.^^
Yen Fu excelled over his predecessors by first 'scientifically' proving their 
arguments and giving theoretical expression to the vague ideas of many intellectuals. 
Secondly and more importantly, Yen Fu emphasized that the struggle for existence 
and natural selection were universal laws which none could escape. He ridiculed both 
the Ch'ing government's 'closed door' policy which preceded the 1840s and its 
subsequent efforts to drive foreigners out of China. These represented attempts to 
isolate itself and avoid the struggle for existence.^^ The leaders had not understood, 
Yen Fu charged, that the universal phenomenon of the struggle for existence is 
determined by t'ien  ^ not by man. 'Once the workings of heaven and earth have 
started, no one can stop them. Those officials in their selfishness may try to stop 
them, but no one has ever succeeded.I f  a nation or race tries to isolate itself from 
competition, it will achieve nothing and on the contrary hinder its own progress. As 
geologists had discovered. Yen Fu wrote, the plants and animals in Australia were all 
one stage behind those in other continents due to its geographical isolation. They 
would all be eliminated when the door of Australia opened to competition from other 
continents.^^
The powerful force of fien. Yen Fu suggested, had been already demonstrated 
by recent history. There were several great races on the earth: the yellow, the white, 
the brown, the black and the red. The red had already been eliminated and the black 
race had become slaves.^  ^ The reason why the yellow will be eliminated later than 
the black, red and brown is not because it has intellect to match the White race. It is 
only because the yellow race occupies a larger geographic territory and has a bigger
^^James Pusey, China and Charles Darwin, p. 6.
” CYFW., vol. 1, p. 3.
'^‘Ibid.; part of the translation is from James Pusey, China and Charles Darwin, p. 
56.
^^C'iTW., vol. l,p. 81.
""Ibid., pp. 21-2.
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population. Therefore it takes time for it to be eliminated.'^^
In the face of this danger of elimination, there was no choice but for China to 
change. China could either change herself or be forcibly changed by other powers.^* 
As China had not yet been exterminated, and 'the sovereign power of China has not 
yet been completely lost'. Yen Fu argued, it is still possible to renovate our country if 
we strive to do so'.^  ^If China failed to take this last opportunity, then the Chinese as a 
people would be exterminated. This did not necessarily mean that all Chinese would 
be killed, but it at least meant enslavement by other peoples.
They will be the sovereign; we will be the subjects; they will be the 
strong; we will be the weak; while we plant, they will own the fruits; 
while we work, they will enjoy leisure time.... They will look down 
upon us as a lower people, and they will regard our race as 
undeserving of autonomy. They will, therefore, bind us and enslave 
us."*)
To be enslaved. Yen Fu argued, is no better than dying. 'People know that 
there are times when to live is worse than to die, to survive is worse than to perish. 
The worth of life depends entirely on whether one has honour and dignity or 
humiliation and disrespect, or in other words, whether one has freedom.Honour, 
dignity and freedom are important both to the individual and to the nation. For the 
individual, freedom is esteemed. For the nation, independence is esteemed.*"  ^ That 
China might not be able to survive as an independent country was Yen's gravest 
nightmare. The period in which Yen Fu began his writing and translating was a
""Ibid., p. 87.
"'Ibid., p. 50.
"'C'iTW., vol. 3, p. 541. 
""CYFW., vol. 1, p. 23. 
"'Ibid.
""Ibid., p. 17.
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critical one in modem Chinese history. In the wake of China’s defeat by Japan in the 
1894-1895 war, China faced the serious threat of 'partition of the country’.^  ^ In a 
letter to Wu Ju-Lun in 1897, Yen Fu analyzed this threat of partition’ China faced, 
and he expressed his feelings: 'How sad it is! How sad it is! Whenever this thought 
occurs to me in my dream, I always awaken and weep.’"*^
The only way for China to survive. Yen Fu argued, was to strive to become 
fitter. He here called upon strong voluntary efforts. His notion that one can become fit 
is closer to Lamarck’s ideas than to Darwin’s. For Lamarck, hereditary changes 
occurred through the organism’s efforts to adapt itself to changed conditions in its 
environment. By contrast, Darwin did not offer a species the possibility of the 
'struggle’ for its own survival. 'Natural selection’ in Darwin’s term operated through a 
random and fortuitous process over which an individual species has no control.'*^
What did Yen Fu mean by referring to a fit’ country? The conventional view 
is that a fit’ country meant one possessing wealth and power and thereby the strength 
to overpower those less wealthy and powerful. But this interpretation is simply too 
narrow to cover all of Yen Fu's concerns. A fit country, as a fit species, meant for 
Yen Fu a country which could best adapt to new conditions. Although during this 
period between 1895 and 1898 Yen Fu had not yet developed a full-fledged 
evolutionary theory, his idea of progressive evolution was already evident. According 
to this idea, adaptation to new conditions was closely related to the process of social 
evolution. A powerful force, t'ien in Yen Fu’s terminology, endlessly pushed the 
human world towards perfection through the process of progressive evolution. At any 
stage of evolution, only those countries or races which could step into a higher level 
of evolution survived, and those which failed would inevitably perish. As Yen Fu 
indicated, the lower the race is, the more difficult for it to survive. This is not only
'•^ For a brief description of the threatened partition of China’ after 1895, see 
Immanuel C.Y. Hsu, 'Later Ch’ing Foreign Relations (1866-1905)’, in The Cambridge 
History o f China, vol. 11,pp. 109-15.
""C'n^W., vol. 3, p. 521.
'‘^ For a brief discussion of the differences between Lamarckism and Darwinism 
both in biology and in its social application, see Greta Jones, Social Darwinism in 
English Thought, Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1980, esp. chapter v.
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true in the natural world, but also true in the human world. We have seen this in the 
perishing of natives in North America and Australia.*^^
Yen Fu’s very peculiar interpretation of the Darwinian notion of 'fitter' 
stemmed from his effort to smuggle moralism, imbedded in the Confucian notion of 
t'ien, into his Darwinist argument. As James Pusey has observed, the fundamental 
difference between the Confucian notion of t'ien and the Darwinian notion of nature 
is that in Confucianism t'ien blessed the righteous rather than the strong while in 
Westem social Darwinism nature blessed only the strong with survival. A 
fundamental conviction of Confucianism is that right is might, that virtue worked' 
while the ethics of social Darwinism was a doctrine of holding that might is right.^  ^
On this critical issue. Yen Fu sided with Confucianism rather than social Darwinism. 
He believed that a people was judged by t'ien as fit or unfit based on the characters, 
values, and intellectual development of its people. The strength of a country lay less 
in its wealth and military power than in its superior moral and intellectual 
development. In this regard, his criticism of Japan is illustrative. In his essay, 
'Whence Strength: A Sequel' in 1895, he commented on the external and internal 
policies of Japan. He praised Japanese efforts over previous decades in learning from 
the West, but asserted that Japan had only learned the superficial aspects of the West, 
rather than its substance. He wrote:
The ambition of Japan is great, but the way it pursues it is extremely 
wrong.... Japan has undertaken reform for several decades. Although 
they don't lack competent reformist leaders, the ruling groups on the 
whole have failed to nurture harmony among her people and bring the 
foundation' {pen) of the country to a high level. They choose rather to 
use force to try to conquer the world {t'ien-hsia). ... If the abundance 
of goods as well as the wealth and strength of a country can be 
achieved by such an anti-historical and radical means without 
destroying the country, what are Darwin's and Spencer's books worth?
""CYFW, vol. 5, p. 1331.
James Pusey, China and Charles Darwin, p. 65.
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Many Chinese like to accuse the Japanese of having only learned the 
superficial aspect of the West: can we say that this is a harsh 
judgment? The book huang-shih-kung chi states: 'The person who 
pursues expansion of his lands will eventually fail, and the person who 
pursues expansion of moral virtue will gain strength; the person who 
keeps only what belongs to him will have security; the person who 
claims the belongings of others is only ruthless. The policies of 
ruthless robbers might be successful in a short run, but are eventually 
disastrous.' The Japanese have not realized their own impoverishment 
due to their military exploits. They have continually used military 
force to exploit neighbours for their wealth. This is the behaviour of a 
robber. What kind of Westem learning has so lamentably brought up 
such a disciple? If we teach our people only the superficial aspect of 
Westem teaming, this will be like giving an evil person or reckless 
youth a powerful weapon, enabling him to rob in the market or kill the 
elderly. This is a suicidal policy.'**
It is interesting to note here that Yen Fu twice used the phrase the superficial 
aspect (hsing-hsia) of Westem teaming', and suggested these aspects are not present 
in the books of Darwin and Spencer. The phrase hsing-hsia [or hsing-erh-hsia] and its 
opposite, hsing-erh-shang, are two important conceptions in Confucian philosophy.'*’ 
Yen Fu's use of these phrases parallels his frequent use of the phrases: pen 
(foundational) and mo (functional) to identify two aspects of Westem teaming: its 
fundamental, or moral and spiritual aspect, and its functional, or material aspect. If a 
nation pursues only its material aspect, namely wealth and power, and uses power to 
seek unrighteous material gains, it has only understood the superficial aspect of 
Westem teaming and neglected its spiritual and moral aspect.
Yen Fu used the dichotomy of a barbarous way and a civilized way to express
'**C'iTW., vol. 1, pp. 38-9.
'*’These two phrases first appeared in /  Ching: 'What is hsing-erh-shang is called 
the way {tao) and what is hsing-erh-hsia is called means {ch'i).'
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a similar idea. In 1897, after German troops occupied Ch'iao-ch’ou Bay on the east 
coast of China, he denounced the 'barbarous way' of Germany: 'The Germans used 
religious conflict as a pretext for suddenly seizing Ch'iao-ch’ou Bay. This not only 
means that they treat us in a barbarous way, but means that they treat themselves in a 
barbarous way.'^ ® This barbarous way' meant what Huxley called the ape's and 
tiger's methods in the struggle for existence.'^^ International competition. Yen Fu 
argued, should follow the 'civilized way':
The so-called civilized people of the civilized nations are such that: 
although they have power, they do not humiliate others by it. Although 
they have force, they do not take belongings from others. When 
something happens, they consider human feelings and follow Heavenly 
principles (tHen-li) before making decisions. They do not impose any 
tyranny on others which they would not like others to impose on 
themselves. ... If human beings treat each other in such a way, we call 
it justice (kung-li). If nations deal with each other in such a way, 
international law (Kung-fa) is honoured. If we discuss human affairs 
and international affairs by following such distinctions, and take them 
as our criterion for right and wrong, we call it just discussion 
(kung-lun).^^
Yen Fu wished to convince his readers that although the world was a 
battlefield of the struggle for existence, only those countries which followed the 
civilized way in their struggle would survive. Those countries which followed the 
barbarous way in competition would eventually perish. He supplied a ready example 
to support his argument. He noted that Spain had once been a powerful country, but
vol. 1, p. 173.
‘^Thomas Huxley, The ape and tigers methods for the struggle for existence are 
not reconcilable with sound ethical principle.' (Thomas Huxley, Evolution and Ethics, 
p. 40).
52CYFW., vol. 1, p. 55.
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had recently declined. The reason for its decline was its engagement in the slave 
trade, incurring punishment from t'ien.^  ^ By contrast, Britain exemplified the most 
fit' nation which both possessed wealth and power and followed the civilized way.
Yen Fu had an extraordinary high regard for Victorian Britain, an admiration 
probably matched only by that of a later liberal, Hu Shih, in his admiration of 
America. Except for occasional criticism of British policies such as its opium trade in 
China, Yen Fu wrote very uncritically of Britain. In his essay 'On the Root of 
Strength', while criticizing Japan for its aggressive policies. Yen Fu praised Britain as 
a nation in which people are honest, fair, sober, and hard working. They follow the 
principle of justice {kung-li) in preserving the existence and prosperity of their 
country.'^ "* He even contrasted Britain with Spain in the treatment of black slaves in 
order to highlight the civilized character of British policy. He recalled the 
Ambassador Kuo Sung-t'ao's comment on the abolition of slavery in Britain: 'We 
have witnessed the abolition of the slave system in Britain, and we now know that 
this nation will enjoy its status as a strong nation for some time to come.'^^
n
The universalistic implication in Yen Fu's notion of being 'fit' during the 
period of 1895 and 1898 became stronger after 1898. In his writings of the 1900s, he 
noticeably retreated from the nationalistic rhetoric of the later 1890s and more 
prominently located his notion of being 'fit' in the framework of social evolution.
This shift in Yen Fu's position was by and large a response to changes in the 
political and intellectual climate, particularly to the emergence of nationalist 
ideologies and movements around the turn of the century. Nationalism, as some 
recent studies have argued, was not an entirely modem phenomenon in China and had 
deep historical roots.^  ^Mitigating this interpretation of early nationalism is the point
"CYFW., vol. 4, p. 872. 
"CYFW., vol. 1, p. 38.
"CYFW., vol. 4, p. 962.
^^The prevailing view in Westem studies of Chinese nationalism, as presented by
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that orthodox Confucianism was characterized by a universalistic tendency which 
followed from its pursuit of moral goals, rather than by any particular goals 
concerning China per se. Nevertheless, given China's long history of dealing with, 
often conflicting with, many different tribes and communities, a sense of Chinese 
political self-consciousness also developed in Chinese culture/^ Under the pressure of 
external crises, arguments concerning the welfare and security of China per se would 
be heard over universalistic moral ideals, as demonstrated by early Sung proto- 
nationalism'/^
During the second half of the nineteenth century, as China faced serious 
external threats, there was a resurgence of nationalist sentiment, particularly in the 
wake of the Sino-Japanese war. At this juncture (1895-98), Yen Fu's propagation of 
the social Darwinian doctrine of the struggle for existence and natural selection 
contributed greatly to the process of the development of modem Chinese nationalism. 
These ideas greatly strengthened the sense of crisis that had existed among the literati 
from several decades earlier. After the publication of Yen Fu's essays in 1895 and 
particularly after his translation of Huxley' Evolution and Ethics, the intellectuals' 
sense of crisis was compounded by the nightmare of being eliminated, as predicted by
Joseph Levenson and Benjamin Schwartz, holds that Chinese nationalism is a modem 
phenomenon, an import from the West. (Joseph Levenson, Conjucian China and Its 
Modern Fate: a Trilogy, Berkeley: University of Califomia Press, 1958; Benjamin 
Schwartz, In Search o f Wealth and Power.) This view has been challenged by some 
recent studies. Hoyt Tillman's 'Proto-Nationalism in Twelfth-Century China? The 
Case Study of Ch'en Liang', {Harvard Journal o f Asiatic Studies, No. 39, 1979, pp. 
403-428), and Rolf Trauzettel's Sung Patriotism as a First Step toward Chinese 
Nationalism' (in Crisis and Prosperity in Sung China, ed. John Haeger, University of 
Arizona Press, 1975, pp. 199-213) have argued that the emergence of Chinese 
nationalism could be traced as early as the Sung dynasty (960-1297). James 
Townsend's Chinese Nationalism' {The Australian Journal o f Chinese Affairs, No. 
27, January 1992, pp. 97-130) also argued that the Chinese nation and Chinese 
nationalist sentiments have existed for centuries.
^^ On the co-existence of culturalism' and nationalism' in traditional China, see 
James Townsend, 'Chinese Nationalism'.
^*Hoyt Tillman, 'Proto-Nationalism in Twelfth-Century China? The Case Study of 
Ch'en Liang'; Rolf Trauzettel, Sung Patriotism as a First Step toward Chinese 
Nationalism'.
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Darwin. 'To become the fit' became the slogan of the day, and it even became popular 
in the selection of personal names.^  ^Hu Shih, a renowned liberal intellectual of the 
early twentieth century, recalled the influence of Yen Fu's introduction of social 
Darwinism to the Chinese public:
Within a few years of its publication Evolution and Ethics gained 
widespread popularity throughout the country, and even became 
reading matter for middle-school students. Very few who read the 
book could understand [the significance of] Huxley's contribution to 
scientific and intellectual history. What they did understand was the 
significance of such phrases as the advanced are victorious and the 
backward perish' (yu-sheng lueh-pai) as they applied to international 
politics....Within a few years these ideas spread like a prairie fire, 
setting ablaze the hearts and blood of many young people. Technical 
terms like elimination' {t'ao-t'ai) and natural selection' {t'ien-tse) 
became common in journalistic prose, and slogans on the lips of 
patriotic young heroes.^
Yen Fu watched the resurgence of nationalism with mixed feelings. To be 
sure, he was a nationalist when the word is used in a broad sense. Nationalism of the 
early-twentieth-century China, as Mary C. Wright wrote, appeared in three different, 
though sometimes related spheres. First, it called for action not only to halt but to roll 
back the tide of imperialism; secondly, it demanded the organization of a modem 
centralized nation-state, capable both of forcing back the imperialists and of 
forwarding the country's new aspirations in political, social, economic, and cultural 
life; thirdly, nationalism meant overthrowing the Manchu dynasty.*^ * By Wright's
’^Jerome B. Grieder, Hu Shih and the Chinese Renaissance: Liberalism in the 
Chinese Revolution, 1917-1937, Cambridge: Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970, 
p. 27.
^Quoted from Jerome B. Grieder, op. cit., p. 26. I have made a minor change in 
Grieder's translation.
‘^Mary C. Wright ed., China in Revolution: the First Phase, 1900-1913, New
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classification, Yen Fu was a nationalist in the sense that he was concerned with the 
survival of China as a nation through the process of nation-building. Beyond this, 
Yen Fu never committed himself to nationalism as an ideology of either anti- 
foreignism or anti-Manchuism. On the contrary, he was one of the few leading 
intellectuals around the turn of the century who realized the danger of nationalism 
becoming an ideology of anti-foreignism or anti-Manchuism and rejected it openly.
Yen Fu's criticism of revolutionary anti-Manchuism has been noted both by 
Schwartz and Pusey. Both interpreted his criticism of anti-Manchuism to stem from a 
genuine nationalistic concern to pull all Chinese together, whether Manchu or Han 
Chinese, in order to fight foreign powers.^ This explanation does not fully account 
for the strength of Yen Fu's opposition to the emerging anti-foreignism.
Anti-foreignism, as Liao Kuang-sheng has shown, emerged in the second half 
of the nineteenth century among the Chinese people 'as a result of the failure of 
modernization, and in opposition to military aggression, economic exploitation and 
political repression by Westem powers and Japan.'^  ^The 1900s saw the surge of anti- 
foreignism both in the propaganda of radical revolutionaries and in popular 
movements such as the Boxer Rebellion, the movement to reclaim China's railway 
and mining rights, and the movement to boycott American goods.^ The primary goal 
of anti-foreignism was to drive out foreigners and foreign influences from China.
Yen Fu was one of the few, if any, leading intellectuals who openly 
denounced various anti-foreign movements and ideologies. Yen was hostile to the 
Boxer Rebellion of 1900 which he characterized as stupid, absurd, emotional, 
tyrannical' and 'barbarous'.®  ^ He opposed the movement to reclaim railway and
Haven: Yale University Press, 1968, pp. 3-4.
^^Benjamin Schwartz, In Search o f Wealth and Power, pp. 183-5; James Pusey, 
China and Charles Darwin, pp. 326-7.
^^Liao Kuang-sheng, Anti-foreignism and Modernization in China, 1860-1980, 
New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984, p. 9.
""Ibid., p. 50.
"'CYFW., vol. l,p . 119.
113
mining rights from foreign powers in the 1900s, a widespread popular movement of 
resistance to the waves of concessions in China's railways and mining industries to 
foreign powers which occurred in the wake of the Sino-Japanese war.^ He also took a 
very unpopular position of opposing the boycott of American goods in 1905, a mass 
movement which protested against the United States' discriminatory law against the 
Chinese.^^
Some of Yen Fu's criticisms of anti-foreign movements were focused more on 
their means than goals. For instance, he was sympathetic to the grievances of the 
organizers of the boycott against American goods. He himself criticized the American 
policy of discrimination against the Chinese. However, he was concerned that 
organizing a nationwide mass movement might aggravate xenophobia, which would 
jeopardize Sino-American relations and impede China's efforts at modernization.®*
Yen Fu's criticism of the anti-foreign argument indicated a strong 
universalistic tendency. He perceived China's conflicts with the West not simply as a 
struggle between different nations, but as a struggle between an advanced civilization 
and a backward one. He argued that the only way for China to survive was to become 
civilized and modernized itself, rather than to drive foreigners out of the country.
In a letter to the editors of Wai-chiao pao (The journal of diplomacy) in 1902, 
Yen Fu introduced a distinction between barbarous anti-foreignism and civilized anti- 
foreignism. The essence of barbarous anti-foreignism, he suggested, was isolating
®®For an account of the movement to reclaim China's railway and mining rights, see 
Lee En-han, China's Quest for Railway Autonomy, 1904-191f  Singapore: Singapore 
University Press, 1977, pp. 13-24; for Yen Fu's criticism of the movement, see his 
' lu-kuang-yf (On railway and mining rights), in Wai-chiao pao (The journal of 
diplomacy), March 1902, see CYFW., vol. 1, pp. 104-14.
®^ The boycott was triggered by the renewal of 'the Chinese Restriction Act' by the 
United State government in 1904, which included harsh discriminatory measures 
against Chinese immigration and travel to the United States. As the Ch'ing 
government was too weak to do anything, Chinese businessmen, students and above 
all the news media mobilized a popular movement in boycotting American goods as a 
means of protest. (For a discussion of the law and the responses of the Chinese 
government and public, see Chang Chun-wu, Chung-mei kung-yUeh fen-ch'ao 
[China's boycott against American goods, 1905-1906], Taipei, 1966, pp. 1-56.)
®*CYFW., vol. 3, p. 568.
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China from international competition. This primitive sentiment offered nothing to 
benefit China or the world. Yen’s preferred civilized anti-foreignism was not anti- 
foreign at all. It simply meant reforming China by following the lead of Westem 
civilization, and gaining for China equal status with the Westem powers through 
modemization and progress. He wrote:
The weakness of our country since the Tao-kuang and T’ung-chih 
period (1840-1860) has been almost entirely caused by our intemal 
problems. Therefore, it is senseless for us to now advocate anti- 
foreignism in an attempt to escape intemational competition. Instead 
of stirring up anti-foreignism, we would be better off following the 
progress of civilization. If we become civilized, we should be able to 
survive in intemational competition without ever letting anti-foreign 
talk cross our lips. By contrast, if we pursue the course of anti- 
foreignism instead of developing our civilization, we would not only 
be unable to achieve equality with foreign powers, but also create 
enormous obstacles for the development of our civilization.^’
Several years later. Yen Fu dropped the notion of 'barbarous anti-foreignism' 
and used nationalism’ and patriotism’ instead. His later more direct criticism of 
nationalism and patriotism emerged in connection with his translations of Spencer’s 
The Study o f Sociology and Jenks’ A History o f Politics.
Spencer’s name has long been associated with social Darwinist doctrine of the 
stmggle for existence because his idea of individualism was based on the law of 
natural selection. Nevertheless, Spencer never attempted to apply the principle of 
natural selection to intemational competition. On the contrary, he strongly opposed 
colonial expansion and military conflicts which some social Darwinists regarded as 
necessary for human evolution.^® One of the chapters of his The Study o f Sociology 
was devoted to criticising what he called the bias of patriotism’. He argued that in
"’Ibid., p. 558.
^®J.D. Y. Peel, Herbert Spencer: the Evolution o f a Sociologist^ pp. 232-7.
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order to develop a scientific sociology, one must overcome various biases, which he 
discussed under the titles of 'the educational bias', the bias of patriotism', the class 
bias', the political bias', and 'the theological bias'. Spencer's bias of patriotism was 
the sentiment of loyalty to 'our country, right or wrong'.^* 'Patriotism', Spencer 
argued, is nationally that which egoism is individually - has, in fact, the same root; 
and along with kindred benefits brings kindred evils.'^  ^About the possible evils and 
benefits of egoism and patriotism, Spencer wrote:
Self-regard in excess produces two classes of evils: by promoting 
undue assertion of personal claims it breeds aggression and 
antagonism; and by creating undue estimation of personal powers it 
excites futile efforts that end in catastrophes. Deficient self-regard 
produces two possible classes of evils: by not asserting personal 
claims, it invites aggression, so fostering selfishness in others; and by 
not adequately valuing personal powers it causes a falling short of 
attainable benefits. Similarly with patriotism. From too much, there 
result national aggressiveness and national vanity. Along with too 
little, there goes an insufficient tendency to maintain national claims, 
leading to trespasses by other nations; and there goes an undervaluing 
of national capacities and institutions, which is discouraging to effort 
and progress.^^
Between these two evils, Spencer's primary concern was the excess of 
patriotism. As with his criticism of militarism, Spencer took to task patriotic 
sentiments in Westem nations as responsible for their biased understanding of other 
races, other religions, and above all their unjust treatment of other races, such as the
^^Herbert Spencer, The Study o f Sociology, p. 185. 
""Ibid., pp. 185-6.
""Ibid., pp. 186-7.
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'treatment of the North American Indians by our own race'. Spencer then stated:
See, then, how the bias of patriotism indirectly produces erroneous 
views of the effects of an institution. Blinded by national self-love to 
the badness of our conduct towards inferior races, while remembering 
what there is of good in our conduct; forgetting how well these inferior 
races have usually behaved to us, and remembering only their 
misbehaviour, which we refrain from tracing to its cause in our own 
transgressions; we over-value our own natures as compared with 
theirs.^^
Yen Fu seems to have been impressed by Spencer's criticism of patriotism. In 
the preface to his translation of The Study o f Sociology^ he expressed his agreement 
with Spencer in the following poem:
Man lived in groups originally.
Groups developed into nations.
Self-assertion caused disrespect of others.
The excess of self-love led to acts of robbery;
Insufficient self-assertion leads to cowardice.
It is also out of balance;
Only with sincerity and without bias.
Can one have fair judgments.^^
Yen Fu's explicit denunciation of nationalism and patriotism was probably 
stimulated by Spencer's idea. In one of his letters to a friend in 1906, Yen Fu wrote, 
'what is called patriotism {ai-kuo chu-i) is a word associated with nationalism {min-
""Ibid., pp. 187-93.
""Ibid., p. 193.
"^Yen Fu, Ch'un-hsueh yi-yen (A translation of Herbert Spencer's The Study o f  
Sociology), p. 3.
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tsu chu-i). It is not regarded by Westem sages as the highest moral ideal.’^  ^Yen Fu's 
Westem sages very likely included Spencer. Nevertheless, Edward Jenks’ A History o f  
Politics, more than Spencer's work, provided Yen Fu with weapons for attacking 
nationalism directly. From Jenks, Yen Fu gained the idea of associating nationalism 
with the patriarchal stage in social evolution.
It seems ironic that Yen Fu found an anti-nationalist weapon in Jenks' work. 
Jenks, like so many later writers on the issues of nationhood and nationalism, 
regarded the emergence of the nation-state and nationalism as a modem phenomenon. 
Nowhere in his A History o f Politics did Jenks criticize this recent development, but 
he discussed nationalism positively in contrast to what he called 'exclusive religion' in 
patriarchal society. One of the important differences between patriarchal society and 
the modem nation, according to Jenks, was their different types of identities and 
underlying religious ideas. The patriarchal community, Jenks argued, was built on the 
basis of kinship, namely, blood relationships,^* and therefore demonstrated a 
characteristic of racial exclusiveness. 'No one can be regarded as a full member of the 
tribe unless he is the lawful child of a full tribesm an.T he modem nation, by 
contrast, was essentially territorial in character'.*® Whosoever lived, nay, whosoever 
happened to be,' within the dominions of a nation was the subject of the mler of the 
nation and bound to obey the laws of the land.** Therefore, the mler of a nation was 
often anxious to throw open the country to foreign adventurers, whether merchants, 
ecclesiastics or teachers, believing that his fame and wealth would thereby be 
increased.'*^ Underlying the territorial union of the modem nation, Jenks suggested, 
was a new type of religion, the chief characteristic of which was universality'.
^^Yen Fu, 'A Letter to Hsia Cheng-you', in Chung-kuo tse-hsueh (Chinese 
Philosophy), No. 6 (1981), pp. 341-2.
^*Bdward Jenks, A History o f Politics, p. 16.
""Ibid., p. 33.
*®Ibid., p. 77.
**Ibid.
*"lbid., p. 78.
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contrasting sharply with the exclusiveness of patriarchal religion.*^
Yen Fu was impressed by Jenks' criticism of patriarchal identity, but he 
apparently did not fully understand Jenks' distinction between identity in patriarchal 
community and that in the modem nation. Rather, he regarded Jenks' criticism of the 
exclusive religion of patriarchal society as a general criticism of any kind of exclusive 
religion whether based on race or on nationality. With this, he adopted Jenks' ideas to 
argue against nationalism.
Yen Fu identified two types of nationalism existent in China, anti-foreignism 
and anti-Manchuism, both of which were manifestations of a patriarchal society. He 
wrote in one of the commentary notes to his translation of A History o f Politics:
All political factions in China today, though differing by their 
conseiwative or radical views, share a common belief in nationalism 
(min-tsu chu-i). They advocate group unity (he-ch'un), anti-foreignism 
or anti-Manchuism, yet rarely mention political society or individual 
self-assertion.^ What is called nationalism has existed in our race for a 
long time. We do not need to import it from abroad. It manifests itself 
whenever we have a crisis situation. Is nationalism sufficient for 
strengthening our race? I definitely do not think so.*^
Yen Fu argued that China should learn from new ideas rather than from old 
practices of the West. He suggested that nationalism was a phenomenon only existent 
in patriarchal society and often related to despotic government.*^ He wrote:
Nationalism is an authentic characteristic of patriarchal society. If we
*"lbid.
*^ The phrase 'political state' is used by Jenks to characterize modem society. See 
the last chapter for a detailed discussion.
*^ Yen Fu, She-hui t'ung-ch'uan (A translation of Jenks' A History o f Politics), p. 
108.
86CYFW., vol. I, p. 148.
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uphold nationalism before the people of the five continents in the 
modem age, how could they come to have a high opinion of our 
people? If a nation is able to renovate its people to a state of 
excellence, it is hard to imagine it being eliminated, even without any 
armour of nationalism. By contrast, if the people of a nation do not 
have a higher characters and yet possess nationalism, nationalism, like 
mercantilist economics (shang-tsmg tzu chi-hsueh), will bring them 
harm rather than benefit.*^
Yen Fu’s criticism of nationalism stirred a furious reaction from nationalist 
revolutionaries. Immediately after he published his translation of Jenks' A History o f  
Politics, some prominent figures in the revolutionary camp such as Wang Ching-wei, 
Hu Han-min and Chang Ping-lin, rose to repudiate Yen Fu's views on nationalism.** 
While their repudiations concentrated on Yen Fu's criticism of anti-Manchuism, they 
nevertheless also touched on the issue of nationalism in its broadest sense.
The most unkind criticism of Yen Fu's views came from Chang Ping-lin. 
While Chang did not dispute the validity of Jenks' general account of historical 
evolution through stages, he nevertheless repudiated Yen Fu's association of 
nationalism with patriarchal society. He went on to denounce Yen Fu's classification 
of Chinese society by the category of patriarchal society. Nationalism, Chang argued, 
was a political phenomenon which could exist in savage, patriarchal and political 
societies alike.*’ It had nothing to do with patriarchal society and everything to do
*"lbid.
**Wang Ching-wei, 'Min-tsu ti kuo-min' (A nationalistic citizenry), Min-pao, No. 1 
(Nov. 26, 1905); Hu Han-min, 'Shu Hou-kuan Yen-shih tsui-chin cheng-chien' (The 
most recent political views of Yen Fu), Min-pao, No. 2 (January 22, 1906); Chang 
Ping-lin, 'She-hui t'ung-ch'uan shang-tui' (Critical review of A History o f Politics), 
Min-pao, No. 12, (March 6, 1907).
*’Chang Ping-lin, 'She-hui t'ung-ch'iian shang-tui' (Critical review of A History o f  
Politics), in Chang Nan & Wang Jen-chih ed., Hsin-hai ko-ming ch'ien shih-nien 
chien shih-lun hsuan-chi (Selections from opinions expressed in periodicals and 
newspapers during the decade before the 1911 Revolution), Peking: San-lien 1963, 
vol. 2, No. 2, p. 656.
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with external pressures. Historically, Chang argued, the Chinese tended to accept 
foreign cultures or people rather than demonstrate cultural exclusiveness.’® When 
Buddhism entered China in the Han dynasty, he indicated, the Chinese people 
embraced it without demonstrating any sentiments of exclusivity. Even in the initial 
period of Christian missionary activity, the Chinese people welcomed Christianity 
jubilantly, just as plants welcome rain after a long period of drought.’* The Chinese 
people demonstrated nationalist sentiments only when they faced threat from foreign 
forces. Since the late nineteenth century, Chang argued, the Westem powers had 
demonstrated their intention to take Chinese land and enslave Chinese people. It was 
only natural that the Chinese people developed sentiments of anti-foreignism. 
'Supposing those people in what are called modem political societies face such a 
situation,' asked Chang, would they give up the fight?’’^  In fact, Chang maintained, 
nationalism was much stronger in Westem societies than in China. There had been a 
string of independence movements in Europe since the nineteenth century, such as in 
Germany, Ireland, Hungary etc. There was discrimination against the red and black 
races in America. Even socialists in Europe did not consider the yellow peoples 
capable of benefiting from the socialist system.’  ^The Westem nations not only had 
nationalism, Chang charged, they even had totemic symbols such as their national 
flags. They too were in a patriarchal stage, or worse still, in a savage stage.’"* Saying 
this, Chang launched a personal attack against Yen Fu and his pro-Westem position:
There are many people in our country who respect Yen Fu greatly and 
therefore some politicians have used his theory to fool our people. 
Perhaps people do not know about Yen Fu. When he was young he 
went abroad and studied in the West where he was so overwhelmed
’®Ibid., p. 652.
’*Ibid., p. 653.
’'Ibid., pp. 652-3.
’"Ibid., p. 657.
’"Ibid., pp. 657-8.
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and impressed by their races that he came to see yellow men as base 
and vile like badgers from the same mound, whether Manchu or Han/^
Chang's position very much reflected the popular nationalistic sentiment of the 
Chinese elites which motivated various anti-foreign movements. At the core of this 
sentiment was deep resentment of the Westem powers for their aggressive actions in 
China. It rejected Yen Fu's and a few other reformers' view that the West was 
somehow more civilized than China and deemed the West to be using its greater 
power to selfish and immoral ends. Opinions about the West like Chang's were 
ironically reinforced by Yen Fu's efforts in propagating the social Darwinian notion 
of the straggle for existence and natural selection. Many proponents of anti- 
foreignism simply ignored the moralistic and universalistic aspect of Yen Fu's 
interpretation of social Darwinism, and took social Darwinism for free licence in the 
ruthless struggle for existence. As Hu Han-min indicated, it was Yen Fu who told his 
readers that we had to fight for survival. Hu wrote:
After the appearance of Yen Fu's book, the ideas of the struggle for 
existence and natural selection were clarified in people's minds. 
Consequently the consensus changed. It is fair to say that those who 
advocated group unity, anti-foreignism, and anti-Manchuism were 
stimulated by the trend of events of the time; it is also true that Yen 
made a significant contribution to this process.**®
Yen Fu did become aware of the potential contradiction between his 
description of the world as a Darwinian battlefield and his assertion that Western
**^ Ibid., p. 648. The English translation is from James Pusey, China and Charles 
Darwin, p. 329 (translation revised).
**®Hu Han-min, Shu Hou-kuan Yen-shih tsui-chin cheng-chien' (The most recent 
political views of Yen Fu), in Chang Nan & Wang Jen-chih ed., Hsin-hai ko-ming 
ch'ien shih-nien chien shih-lun hsuan-chi (Selections from opinions expressed in 
periodicals and newspapers during the decade before the 1911 Revolution), Peking: 
San-lien, 1963, vol. 2, No. 1, p. 146.
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nations were in a higher stage of social evolution. To ease this theoretical difficulty, 
he began in the mid-1900s to retreat from his previous position. He began to portray 
the modem world less as a battlefield than as a progressive collectivity in which the 
West was in the lead. This view became apparent in his speech of 1906 entitled Ts it 
True that Might is Right?’’  ^ He started his speech by identifying the prevalent 
misunderstanding of Darwinist ideas in China:
I have learned that the concept of 'might-as-right' has gained 
popularity in our intellectual discussions. There have been popular 
expressions such as 'moralism is anachronism' and international laws 
are empty words.'’*...If these are merely expressions of our feelings of 
frustration, they are allowable. However, to take these assertions as 
maxims to guide our actions will lead to great danger. In so employing 
them, our civilization will deteriorate, and there will be increased 
centrifugal force and declining centripetal force in our society. 
Nothing can be more dangerous to our society than this.”
To repudiate this maxim of 'might-as-right' as normative principle. Yen Fu 
appealed to moral ideals in classical Chinese philosophy. He remarked that since the 
three dynasties of antiquity, Chinese sages had never accepted power politics 
(ch’iang-ch'uan) to be morally righteous. Important classics such as the /  Ching and 
Ch'un-ch'iu (The Spring and Autumn Annals) subordinated the use of force to the 
principle of justice {kung-li).
’^Yen Fu, Yu ch'iang-ch'üan wu kung-li tsu-yû hsin-yû?' (Is it true that might is 
right?), Chih-li chiao-yU tsa-chih, June, 22, 1906, reprinted in Tang-an yü li-shih 
(Archives and history), Peking, 1990, No. 3.
’*Yen Fu might have referred here to Liang Ch'i-ch'ao's statement that might is 
right in a Darwinian world. For Liang's idea of might as right, see Chang Hao, Liang 
Ch'i-ch'ao and Intellectual Transition in China, 1890-1907  ^ Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1971, pp. 193-6.
” Yen Fu, 'Yu ch'iang-ch'üan wu kung-li tsu-yü hsin-yü?' (Is it true that might is 
right?), p. 6.
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This position was even more clearly spelled out by Mencius. Bom in 
the time of Warring States to witness the prevalence of power politics 
and the decay of heavenly principles, Mencius still revered the wang 
tao (governance by benevolence) and denounced pa tao (governance 
by force).... He demonstrated that justice is the fundamental principle 
which will eternally apply to human world and showed the use of force 
to be effective only under the sanction of the principle of justice.*”®
The maxim of might-as-right, Yen Fu suggested, originated in Europe, and 
was traceable to ancient Greek philosophy. As recorded in Plato's Republic, 
Thrasymachus, in his debate with Socrates on the issue of justice, made the assertion 
that 'what is expedient for the strongest is just'.*”* Yen Fu then noted that Socrates 
invalidated this assertion of Thrasymachus through his famous dialectical method.*”^  
In a historical book by Brudachis, it was recorded that the King of Bmno claimed that 
the law of the strong ruling the weak is both the law of the human world since the 
antiquity and the law governing the world of all living creatures'.*”^  Many Westem 
political theorists since ancient times held that the state is the work of violent 
domination. It is based on the right of the stronger.'*”^
Yen Fu argued that this old principle' of might-as-right was opposed to the 
spirit of modem politics. To apply such a principle would create a world in which 
each fights the other. In such a world, no country, even the stronger, could feel safe
*”**Ibid.
*”*Ibid., this quotation was originally in English.
*”^ Ibid., on the debate between Socrates and Thrasymachus, see Plato's Republic, 
Book I, 338 & 340, translated by G.M.A. Gmbe, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Co., 1974, pp. 12-5.
*”^ Yen Fu, Yu ch'iang-ch'üan wu kung-li tsu-yü hsin-yü?' (Is it tme that might is 
right?), p. 7.
*”^ Ibid., this quotation is originally in English.
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since today's strong country might become tomorrow's weak country.*®^  Moreover, 
the application of such a principle would fundamentally undermine the moral fabric 
of society - the condition of its very existence. Yen Fu wrote:
Power politics is fundamentally opposed to the idea of freedom. ... If 
the principle of power politics were put into practice, then the five 
ethical relationships (wu-lung) would be destroyed. After this, the 
bond between a son and his father would not be built upon father's 
kindness and son's filial piety, but upon father's strength; the bond 
between the ruler and the ruled would not be built upon the ruler's 
benevolence and people's respect, but upon the ruler's strength; the 
bond between husband and wife would not be love, but the strength of 
each side. Thus, all human ethical relationships will be replaced by the 
relationship between master and slave. In conclusion, in a world of 
power politics, there will be no free men, and men will all become 
slaves. There will be no justice and no law. ... If power is regarded as 
the source of justice and law, there will never be a free humanity.'®^
This is why. Yen Fu argued, the principle of might-as-right was never put into 
practice by any great nations in the world. Historically, according to Yen Fu, no 
country which had followed the principle of power alone had lasted long. The 
fundamental reason underlining the strength of the great powers through history was 
in the force of justice rather than of military strength. Even in warfare, military 
strength is only effective for a short time. Tn deciding the outcome of war, military 
strength only carries secondary importance to the cause (ming-hao) for which the war 
is fought.'*®^  The cause of the war is essential {fi) and military strength is functional
*®'lbid., p. 7. 
‘®^ Ibid.
*®^ The phrase ming-hao literally means name'. Yen Fu's usage of this phrase was 
derived from the concept of cheng-ming (rectification of names) in Confucian 
philosophy. Like Plato, Confucius believed that everything has an 'ideal form' which 
differs from actual forms. It is essential in achieving an ideal society to organize
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(yung). Following the principle of justice with the assistance of strength is the key to 
success.*®*
By the same token, Yen Fu suggested that China’s humiliation at the hands of 
Western powers should be interpreted less as a demonstration of China's military 
weakness, than as a manifestation of the backward nature of Chinese ideas and 
systems. For Yen Fu, the Western victory over China 'was not only a victory of the 
stronger over the weaker, but the enlightened over the ignorant, and the virtuous over 
the unworthy.'*®’ The human world was bound to advance towards the enlightened 
and the virtuous. China's refusal to follow such a trend would only hinder the
progress of humanity. Therefore, the Western nations were absolved of guilt in
bringing China to a civilized course by invading China. In this event, China should 
not complain too much of the unjust nature of the world order. He wrote:
Human beings over the five continents are now moving towards great 
harmony {ta-t'ung). Nations in Europe and Asia are like village 
neighbours. Supposing there is a village of about ten families in which 
most families try hard to keep their yards and front lanes clean and 
educate their children well. There are one or two families, however, 
which are proud of their long family tradition, contemptuous of others 
and reluctant to make progress. The collapse of their house or 
courtyard walls block the roads of the village, and their ill-educated 
children fight with others. In response to this situation, the progressive 
families meet together and decide, 'we cannot tolerate this situation
any more, and we should govern these families ourselves for the
happiness of all people in the village.' After action follows this 
decision, those one or two delinquent families complain bitterly, 
saying, 'What a world of might-as-right!' They do not understand that
everything by referring the ideal form.
*®*Yen Fu, Yu ch'iang-ch'üan wu kung-li tsu-yû hsin-yü?' (Is it true that might is 
right?), p. 7.
*®’lbid.
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for everyone in the village, the decision follows the principle of 
justice.
Yen Fu's remarks here clearly demonstrate the universalistic feature of his 
thought. Without abandoning his concern for China's survival, he shows a concern for 
China's survival which goes far beyond nationalism in its general sense. He envisions 
a modem world composed of enlightened, virtuous nations, including a renovated 
China. In this sense, he is comparable to K'ang Yu-wei, a contemporary. The 
fundamental concern for both Yen and K'ang, to use Hsiao Kung-chuan's phrase, was 
'a modem world and a new China'."*
A similar idea of Yen Fu was also found in his essay, 'Hegel's Philosophy of 
Mind' published in July 1906.*" The essay was a general review of The Philosophy o f  
Mindy the third part of Hegel's The Encyclopedia o f the Philosophical Science''^ In 
his Philosophy o f Mindy Hegel traced the gradual evolution of mind, stage by stage, as 
a process from subjective mind, through objective mind to absolute mind.**'* The first 
phase in its evolution is subjective mind. Its content is the human mind viewed 
subjectively as the mind of the individual subject. In the second stage, mind proceeds 
out of itself into othemess to become objective mind. It creates institutions of law, 
morality and the state. These institutions are objective. They are the objectification of 
man's universal self, man's reason, of what one man has in common with all 
humanity, and of the universal spirit of man. In the third stage, mind develops into
**°Ibid., p. 8.
***Hsiao Kung-chuan, A Modern China and a New World: K'ang Yu-wei, Reformer, 
and Utopian, 1858-1927y Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1975.
** '^Hegel's Philosophy of Mind' is the original English title of the essay. See 
CYFW, vol. 1, pp. 210-8.
**^Hegel's The Encyclopedia includes three parts: the first is The LogiCy sometimes 
referred as 'Lesser Logic'; the second is The Philosophy ofNaturey and the third. The 
Philosophy o f Mind.
**'*Hegel, The Philosophy o f M in d y  tr. by William Wallace, Oxford: the Clarendon 
Press, 1894, pp. 8-9. Wallace was the earliest English translator of the Hegel's work.
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absolute mind. This is the human spirit in its manifestations in art, religion and 
philosophy."^
Yen Fu mentioned that he read Hegel's work and wrote the essay in the 
summer of 1906."^ At the same time, he also read an English translation of Immanuel 
Kant's Critique o f Pure Reason^ and wrote many marginal notes in the book.*" He 
apparently developed an interest in German idealistic philosophy for a short period in 
1906, a sort of diversion which was uncommon in his intellectual career.
Yen Fu was interested in Hegel's discussion of the three stages of the 
development of mind, because he saw it supportive of his universalistic ideal as well 
as his effort to discredit nationalistic sentiments. Hegel's theory of the development of 
mind was for Yen Fu in line with modem evolutionary theory since Hegel described 
the human mind as bound to a process of progressive evolution. Hegel's subjective 
mind, according to Yen Fu, was 'the mind of the individual'. It was the state of mind 
existing in barbarous people or children before education. The main feature of 
subjective mind was one's untrammelled freedom. 'Barbarous people as well as 
children followed their material desires blindly like animals. They therefore engaged 
in stmggle with each other in order to achieve self-assertion.'*** Later, as man became 
enlightened, he understood the existence of other men who were equal to himself. He 
then recognized that he is not a unique person in possessing the ideal, freedom or the 
notion of the God - the three things identical in nature. Rather, these properties are 
possessed by the whole of humanity as gifts of God....Thus, based on his own
**^ W. T. Stace, The Philosophy o f Hegel, New York: Dover Publications, 1955 
edition, pp. 321-4.
**6cyfw., vol. 1, p. 218; Yen Fu mentioned that since he could not read Germany 
he read an English translation of The Philosophy o f Mind. The only English 
translation available at the time was William Wallace tr., HegeVs Philosophy o f Mind.
** l^mmanuel Kant, Critique o f Pure Reason (translated into English by J.M.D. 
Meiklejohn, rev. ed.. New York; The Colonial Press, 1900.) is among the small 
number of Yen Fu's books now preserved in the library of Nanking University, China. 
We found many of Yen Fu's marginal notes in the book which also indicated that he 
read the book in June 1906.
***CYFW., vol. l,p.210.
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aspiration for freedom, he will come to understand other people’s aspirations for 
freedom. He will regard freedom of the others as the boundary, the legal limit of his 
own freedom.’"^ In so doing. Yen Fu continued, 'man's mind will be transformed 
from a mind of animal-like self-assertion to a mind of loving humanity and 
community. This is what Hegel called the transition from subjective mind to objective 
mind and absolute mind.'‘^ ®
It should be added that Yen Fu never distinguished objective mind and 
absolute mind. He perceived Hegel’s objective and absolute minds to be what 
Confucians called universal mind (tao-hsin), or the soul of heaven and earth found in 
Chang Tsai, a Neo-Confucian philosopher.^^* Universal mind was not a negation of 
subjective mind, but an expansion of subjective mind.
Whatever the theoretical implications of Yen Fu’s interpretation of Hegel’s 
notions of subjective, objective and absolute minds on his views on the relationship 
between individual freedom, self-interest and universal morality. Yen’s main concern 
was the relationship between nationalist spirit and universal value. The subjective 
mind in the international arena was basically a concern for the survival of a nation. 'A 
nation’, wrote Yen Fu, is a community based on common language, religion, custom, 
and morality’. A s  an individual is entitled to be concerned for his own freedom, a 
nation is also justified to be concerned for its survival. The only way for a nation to 
survive is to uphold universalistic moral principles rather than appeal to military 
strength. Yen Fu wrote that Hegel confirmed that the ultimate basis for a nation’s 
strength was in its people’s character. The people’s character is determined by the 
ideas upon which a nation is built. In this sense, the rise or decline of empires or 
nations in history should not be interpreted as victory or defeat of empires or nations 
themselves, but as the victory or defeat of certain ideas. 'Struggle between nations, in
**"lbid., pp. 210-1. 
*'®Ibid.
*2*Ibid.,p.211. 
'""Ibid., p. 214.
123Ibid.
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the last analysis, is nothing but struggle between ideas.' Only fit nations which uphold 
advanced ideas survive.
Yen Fu's interpretation of Hegel's philosophy of mind in terms of the 
Darwinian notion of struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest sheds light on 
his general understanding of Darwinism. In the course of this interpretation more than 
anywhere else, Yen Fu stated clearly what he meant by Darwinian principles. He 
wrote:
People now understand the great difference between wars before the 
eighteenth century and those after. Wars in ancient time were often 
caused by the selfish interests of a few rulers. Those rulers mobilized 
people to engage in bloody killings. Today's wars are normally fought 
over greater causes. In essence, wars in modem times are wars 
between two doctrines to decide which is superior. We know that 
every nation or peoples progresses towards the absolute spirit. The 
winner of a war must be the one whose doctrine is closer to absolute 
spirit than that of the loser. ...The winner is the one assisted by t'ien 
and the loser is the one abandoned by tHen. Therefore, to know 
whether a country is strong, inquire what doctrine it holds to. In other 
words, we have to examine the moral and intellectual development of 
its people. If we do not understand this,... and pursue the course of 
anti-foreignism and regard foreigners as barbarous and ourselves as 
civilized, we lower ourselves to be at the level of the Boxer rebels, or 
at best, at the level of Chinese students in J a p a n . T h e  methods of 
those two groups are formulas for destroying our country....Hegel said,
'a nation's decline or demise is determined by Divine Reprisals'. 
...People in the five continents compete in progressing toward 
absolute spirit. It is often the case that some nations progress faster
‘""Ibid., p. 215-6.
‘"^Yen Fu here referred to radical intellectuals. At the time, most Chinese students 
in Japan were actively involved in revolutionary movements.
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than others. In such a case, those nations become leaders of world 
civilization and become respected by other nations. This was the case 
of ancient Egypt, Syria, Greece, Rome and France. ...Those advanced 
nations became the leaders and vanguard in progressing toward 
objective mind and absolute minds of every other nations.
Yen Fu's universalistic idea expressed here was not unique in the reform 
generation of the 1890s. It could also be seen in thinkers such as K'ang Yu-wei, T'an 
Ssu-t'ung and to a lesser degree, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao.*^  ^These intellectuals shared some 
views which were apparently paradoxical: they were nationalistic politically, and yet 
held almost iconoclastic attitudes towards the heritage of the Chinese past; they were 
culturally 'pro-Westem' during a period of Western imperialist encroachments on 
China .These  paradoxes have been interpreted as evidence of their acceptance of 
the ethic of social Darwinism. For instance, Schwartz suggested that Yen Fu's lack of 
anti-Western sentiments stemmed from his recognition of might being right. Tt is 
entirely inevitable that those states which are fit should struggle among themselves 
for predominance. China must itself bear the heavy onus for its failure to adapt.'*^  ^
From our preceding discussions, it is clear that Schwartz's interpretation neglects the 
fundamental reason underlying Yen Fu's criticism of Chinese tradition and his esteem 
for the modem West: Yen Fu sincerely believed that the West was better than China 
in almost every aspect. His perception of the West combined a genuine sense of 
discovery with his own utopian projections. 'The "West" in this sense' as Furth noted, 
served not only as a "real" model of civilized alternatives, but also as a repository for
‘""CYFW., vol. 1, p. 216.
‘""For a brief yet insightful observation of the reform generation' of 1890s, see 
Charlotte Furth, Intellectual Change: from the Reform Movement to the May Fourth 
Movement, 1895 - 1920', in Cambridge History o f China, vol. 12, ed. John K. 
Fairbank, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, esp. pp. 323-47.
‘"®lbid., pp. 346-7.
‘"’Benjamin Schwartz, In Search o f Wealth and Power, p. 89.
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ideal images projected out of the historical imagination of the Chinese themselves.'*^®
m
Yen Fu's much idealized portrayal of the modem West planted the seeds of his 
disillusionment with Western models after the outbreak of the First World War. As 
Schwartz noted about Yen Fu's later years, particularly those after the outbreak of the 
First World War, Yen began to voice disapproval of the Western models which he 
earlier had so energetically advocated. The reason for Yen Fu's change of heart, 
Schwartz suggested, was that Yen Fu was impressed by initial German victories over 
the Allies and judged from Germany's enormous power the existence of a shorter path 
to achieving the power of the state than the path of democracy.*^*
Although this interpretation fits into Schwartz's overall argument, it 
misrepresents Yen Fu's own position. The real reason behind Yen Fu's shift of 
position was his general disillusionment with Western nations as offering the best 
model for human progress in the wake of the First World War.
Yen Fu was initially dismayed by the outbreak of the war. In one of his 
earliest discussions of the war, dated September 24, 1914, he called it an 'extremely 
unfortunate' event. He blamed Germany's aggressive policy for the start of the war:
Since 1870, the German Federation has made enormous progress 
unmatched by any other nation. Not only has its military strength 
advanced greatly, but its people's livelihood and its culture, such as in 
medicine, commerce, agriculture, philosophy, physics and other 
aspects of education, have all progressed enormously. It is unfortunate 
that such a people is ruled by an arrogant king who uses his people 
rashly to engage in a war against several great powers. The political 
doctrine which the German ruler holds has many faults and is not
*"®Ibid., p. 340.
*^*Benjamin Schwartz, In Search o f Wealth and Power, pp. 231-6.
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shared by most of humanity. 132
The German ruler’s political doctrine Yen Fu referred to was the ethic of 
social Darwinism. In a letter to Hsiung Chung-ju, a disciple of his, several months 
later, Yen Fu made this clear:
Germany in the West and Japan in the East, like the Ch’in dynasty of 
ancient China, know only power, and have no belief in righteousness 
and justice. Some militarists in Germany, using the idea of evolution, 
advocated 'war as the necessary means for human evolution’. They 
therefore feel free to kill and destroy. This doctrine appears absolutely 
fallacious if judged by the real [evolutionary] theory. ...If Heaven or 
God exists, such a nation is doomed to be condemned. If human nature 
is good, such a doctrine is bound to disappear before long.*^ ^
Yen Fu believed that the Germans distorted the real meaning of Darwinism to 
justify their aggression. After the outbreak of war, many Chinese conservatives saw 
the war as the inevitable result of the Darwinist principle. Yen Fu strongly dissented. 
He wrote:
As far as evolutionary theory is concerned, the doctrines of Darwin 
and others differ from the evolutionary ideas of present day Germany.
The idea that war is the best means of evolutionary progress is quite 
opposed to Darwin's original meaning....It is unfair to repudiate 
Darwin’s and Huxley’s ideas based on examples [of the interpretation 
of evolution in Germany].* '^*
""CYFW., vol. 3, p. 616. 
"'Ibid., p. 622.
""Ibid., p. 623.
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Nevertheless, Yen Fu conceded that some elements in Darwinist doctrine itself 
might be responsible for the current ruthlessness in human struggles. He wrote in 
1915:
Since the appearance of the doctrine of the struggle for existence and 
natural selection', all races on the earth have regarded self-preservation 
and expansion as their ultimate goals. As a consequence, all material 
and scientific achievements over the last two or three hundred years 
have been turned into the means of genocide. Doctrines of Yao, Sung,
Duke Chou and Confucius not only do not work any more, but the 
doctrines of Lao Tzu, Jesus and Mohammed can hardly reduce the 
suffering of humanity. Oh! My God! How can the way of human 
beings become so brutal now?*^ ^
Nevertheless, Yen still insisted that the essential part of Darwinism, namely 
progressive human evolution through enhancing people's moral and intellectual 
characters, still held valid. In a song he composed for a school in 1917, he wrote, 
't'ien wants to push humanity into a universal harmonious world. Competing nations 
are judged as superior (yu) or inferior (lueh) according to their people's virtues.'*^ ® 
The tone of this remark is not much different from the basic meaning of his notion of 
struggle to be fit in his early writings.
The war in Europe affected less Yen Fu's faith in the law of social evolution 
than his faith in the Western nations as the apogee of the evolutionary potential of 
humanity. He had spent almost his entire intellectual career advocating China's 
transformation based on the Western model. Now he began to doubt whether the 
West really represented the future of humanity. In his letter to Hsiung Chung-ju of 
1918, he wrote: 'having witnessed ... the four year bloody war in Europe which 
surpassed previous wars in human history, I feel that the three hundred years of 
evolution of Western civilization has only brought it to a state of bloody killing in
*^^CYFW., vol. 2, p. 348. 
'""CYFW., vol. 3, p. 689.
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shameless pursuit of self-interest/"^
Yen Fu's disillusionment with the West stemmed from his realization that 
Western civilization as a whole overemphasized nationalism and patriotism and 
worshipped force as the means of solving human conflict. This disillusionment with 
Western civilization motivated his réévaluation of Confucianism. In a letter dated 
April 26, 1917 he wrote: T have studied various philosophies throughout my life. As 
I approach seventy years of age, I have come to the realization that the most enduring 
and flawless philosophy is Confucianism. Confucian classics are the most valuable 
treasures. We need to use modem means to explore and develop the ideas in those 
treasures.'"*
Yen Fu came to cherish Confucian universalism against Western devotion to 
nationalism and patriotism. In an essay written in English in 1916, Yen Fu quoted the 
Sung philosopher Chang Tsai to elaborate the universalistic concern of Confucianism:
His [a Confucian's] business, in a word, as it was stated by a great 
Confucian scholar in the Sung dynasty (about the 12th century A.D.)
Chang Tsai, is 'to represent the Soul of the whole Creation, to set up a 
standard for human lives, and to establish a moving equilibrium for the 
coming eternity.'"^
He praised the high moral ideals of Confucianism:
These great teachers of the old are no Materialists. They look upon the 
world with generous sympathy, accomplishing themselves with much 
excellence, and entertaining many good hopes. There was an 
honourable display of those qualities which make life better worth
""Ibid., p. 692. 
"*Ibid., p. 668.
"^Yen Fu, A Historical Account of Ancient Political Societies in China', in The 
Chinese Social and Political Science Review, Peking, vol. I, No. 4 (December 1916), 
p. 19.
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having, and they were sincerely earnest in making the world better 
worth living in for those who were to come after them.*'*®
Yen Fu believed that the value of universalism and the evils of nationalism 
and patriotism had also been understood by many Westerners thanks to the shock of 
the war. He related the following story several times to his readers. A nurse in the 
British army, named Miss Cavell, offered medical care to a captured enemy soldier 
who was wounded. Because the captured soldier later escaped. Miss Cavell was 
sentenced to death by a British Army court. She left the following words before she 
was shot: 'Patriotism is worthless as a morality. It derives from selfishness, rather 
than from the Soul of the whole Creation.'*'** Yen Fu concluded:
In the past, when I heard traditional scholars saying that there would 
be one day when Confucianism would prevail amongst humanity, I 
thought they were talking nonsense. Now, we witness people in the 
West arriving at a similar view. There have been more and more 
scholars in the West who involve themselves in studying our culture.
...This indicates clearly the direction in the evolution of humanity.*'*^
Yen Fu was not alone in considering the war evidence of the moral 
bankruptcy of modem Western civilization. There was a profound change in the 
intellectual climate following the war. In a sense, the war generated another crisis in 
modem Chinese intellectual development. It severely undermined a sense of certainty 
about the direction of China's reform among intellectuals in the generation of 1890s 
and 1900s. A belief that the West did not represent the future of humanity became 
increasingly strong.
In response to this situation. Yen Fu and some veteran reformers wished to
*'®Ibid.
*'**CYFW., vol. 2, p. 404; vol. 4, p. 690.
*42c y fW., vol. 3, p. 690.
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revive Confucianism. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao's writings during and after the war provided 
the most notable example of this thinking. Liang, a former radical reformer and 
ardent student of Western culture, published his influential A Record of Impressions 
of Travels in Europe' in 1919. In this work, Liang described the devastating 
consequence of the war on European nations. Like Yen Fu, he attributed the war to 
the lack of spiritual ideals in a materialistic Western civilization. He considered only 
Chinese culture, which he called a 'spiritual civilization', able to rescue humanity 
from the dominance of Western civilization. With familiar Confucian idealism, he 
wrote:
Our people constitute one fourth of the world's population: we should 
assume one fourth of the responsibility for the happiness of mankind 
as a whole. If we do not meet this responsibility, then we will not be 
able to face our ancestors, nor our contemporaries, nor, in fact, 
ourselves. Our beloved youth! Attention! Forward march! On the other 
shore of the great sea are millions of men bewailing the bankruptcy of 
material civilization and crying out most piteously for help, waiting for 
us to come to their salvation!
After decades of the spread of the ideas of evolution and progress, and after 
decades of discrediting Confucianism, the endorsement of a return to Confucianism 
of Yen Fu and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao fell on deaf ears in the Chinese intellectual world. It 
is ironic that after two decades Yen Fu returned to the same position he vigorously 
denounced when he began to write in 1895. He returned the view that the West had 
only wealth and power and did not follow high moral principles as the Chinese did. 
He and his reformist contemporaries successfully fulfilled two great tasks in modem 
Chinese intellectual history: they first discredited traditional Confucianism and then 
discredited modem Westem civilization. They left their intellectual successors with
'^‘^ Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, 'Ou-yu hsin-ying lu'(A Record of Impressions of Travels in 
Europe), in his Yin-ping-shih ho-chi, (Collected Works of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao), vol. 
xxiii, pp. 35-38; the English translation is from Jerome B. Grieder, Hu Shih and the 
Chinese Renaissance, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970, p. 135.
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the task of finding a model which was superior to both traditional Chinese culture and 
modem Westem culture. In this cultural vacuum in the wake of the First World War, 
Chinese intellectuals tumed to leftist ideologies - Marxism, anarchism and various 
socialisms.
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Chapter IV
The Principle of Utility and the Principle of Righteousness
I have shown how Yen Fu justified social and political changes by appealing 
to a universalistic vision of human evolution, and how this vision contained moralistic 
and utopian ideas. By doing so, I by no means suggest that Yen Fu was an unrealistic 
utopian. As Charlotte Furth has noted, in comparison to his contemporaries, such as 
K'ang Yu-wei and T'an Shih-t'ung, Yen Fu was more pragmatic and secular.' One of 
the most obvious, and indeed often quoted, evidence^of Yen's pragmatism is his 
notion that the wealth and strength (fu-ch'iang) of the country instead of traditional 
Confucian moral principles should be regarded as a basis of China's social and 
political policies.
Yen Fu's pragmatic and secular perspective has been interpreted as stemming 
from social Darwinism. It has been argued, most forcefully by Schwartz, that social 
Darwinism led to Yen Fu's preoccupation with national power, and to the rational 
social and economic policies which would enhance national power.^
There are two problems with this assessment. First, as I have shown in great 
detail, the influence of Darwinism was instrumental more to Yen's universalistic and 
utopian vision than to his nationalistic ideas. Secondly, the link between Yen's 
nationalism and his pragmatism and secular perspectives is hardly sustainable. 
Nationalism does not necessarily lead to social and political reform based on a goal of 
enhancing the wealth and strength of the nation. As demonstrated by modern Chinese 
history, nationalism can also lead in other directions. The nationalism displayed in the 
Boxer Movement of 1900 led to a purely anti-foreign struggle, rather than to efforts 
aimed at reforming social and political policies to achieve greater wealth and strength. 
The nationalism displayed by revolutionaries of the 1900s led to the anti-Manchu 
revolution rather than to the pragmatic reconstruction of China's social and political 
systems to enrich and strengthen the country.
r
A
'Charlotte Furth, Intellectual Change: from the Reform Movement to the May 
Fourth Movement, 1895-1920', in Cambridge History o f China, vol. 12, p. 328.
^Benjamin Schwartz, In Search o f Wealth and Power, esp., pp. 237-47.
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In the case of Yen Fu's concern for the wealth and strength of the nation, 
nationalism may be regarded as a stimulus for his advocacy of fundamental social and 
political changes. The nature of these changes, however, went far beyond nationalism. 
In a sense. Yen Fu's secular and pragmatic perspective reflected the beginning of a 
transition in modem China, a transition characterized by the loss of sacredness of the 
traditional value system and the emergence of rationalism in social and political 
thinking.^
A better understanding of this transition may be obtained if we analyze Yen 
Fu's utilitarian ideas. As we shall see, utilitarianism played a greater role in his 
thought than has been realized thus far. His critique of traditional Confucian moral 
philosophy, his criticism of radical thinking, and above all his pragmatic political 
ideas will be more clearly understood within the framework of his utilitarianism.
This chapter, therefore, provides an account of Yen Fu's utilitarian ideas. It 
will analyze Yen Fu's criticism of Confucian moral philosophy by his appeal to 
utilitarian principles. It will trace the origin of Yen's utilitarian ideas both from some 
ideas in traditional Chinese thought and from the influence of British utilitarianism in 
the nineteenth century. It will then discuss the role of utilitarianism in Yen Fu's 
thought. Finally, it will explore certain theoretical dilemmas in Yen Fu's commitment 
to utilitarianism.
Throughout Yen Fu's writings and translations, one persistent topic was his 
criticism of the traditionalism inherent in Confucianism. He made a great effort to 
address the questions of why Chinese culture, and Confucianism in particular, lacked 
ideas of progress and innovation, and how these ideas might be introduced into it.
Yen Fu might have read Tocqueville's comment on China in Democracy in 
America which he possessed in his personal library:
^By rationalism, I mainly refer to Max Weber's instrumental rationalism. I will 
briefly discuss this conception later in this chapter.
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The Chinese, in following the track of their forefathers, had forgotten 
the reasons by which the latter had been guided. They still used the 
formula, without asking for its meaning, they retained the instrument, 
but they no longer possessed the art of altering or renewing it. The 
Chinese, then, had lost the power of change; for them to improve was 
impossible. They were compelled, at all times and in all points, to 
imitate their predecessors, lest they should stray into utter darkness, by 
deviating for an instant from the path already laid down for them.^
Nevertheless, even before Yen Fu acquired the Tocqueville's book in the mid- 
1900s, he had already made similar indictments of Chinese culture. In one of his 
essays in 1895, 'On Our Salvation' (Chiu-wang chueh-lun), he made a violent assault 
on the Chinese intellectual tradition. He was extremely critical of the traditionalistic 
and formalistic features of Chinese culture, particularly as it was demonstrated by the 
civil examination system. The entire system. Yen Fu charged, had become a purely 
formalistic practice and lost its substance completely. So-called education became no 
more than memorizing teachings of Confucian sages. The end of education for 
everyone was to attain an official career by passing the civil examination. From an 
early age, students were forced to read Confucian classics which they could hardly 
understand. Some of them would later passed the civil examination through their 
capacity to memorize the classics. After they became officials, they knew nothing but 
Confucian teachings and they therefore would manage everything according to these 
teachings.^ Chinese education, in Yen Fu's view, became something completely 
'useless' (wu-yung) and fhiitless (wu-shih).^ It shackled man's intellectual 
development, ruined man's morality and created a worthless intellectual class.
How could Chinese education have become such a worthless thing? Why did 
the Chinese tend to follow tradition rather than to attempt innovation? Yen Fu
'‘Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, translated by Philips Bradley, New 
York: Alfred a Knopf, 1945, vol. ii, p. 55.
'C'iTW, vol. l,pp. 40-1. 
% d ., p. 44.
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suggested that the root of this system of thought could be traced to some fundamental 
features of Confucian moral philosophy. Most importantly, the Confucian emphasis 
on pursuing absolute moral goals regardless of practical consequences tended to lead 
toward a traditionalist orientation. 'The greatest peril of our intellectual thinking', 
Yen asserted, is pursuing high principles and ignoring practicality, advocating moral 
integrity and neglecting the real dangers.'^
Before we analyze Yen Fu's criticism of Confucianism, it might be helpful if 
we outline briefly the Confucian philosophy which he criticized. The foundation of 
Confucian moral philosophy is the distinction between righteousness iyi) and profit 
(/().* Righteousness is the a priori moral imperative and is contrasted with principles 
which involve the calculation of consequences. This doctrine constituted the basis of 
both personal morality and government policies.
There had been a long development within Confucianism before the 
distinction between righteousness and profit became rigid and the basis of the 
dominant moral doctrine. Righteousness was one of the most important concepts in 
the moral philosophy of Confucius.’ It was, for Confucius, a moral imperative, a 
priorii independent of material interest and the calculation of consequences. Yet, as 
Hsiao Kung-ch'uan indicated, Confucius did not completely disapprove of 
considerations of profit (//). There was, in the moral philosophy of Confucius, 
according to Schwartz, a deep tension between a concept of personal morality based 
on purity of motive and intent and a concern with good sociopolitical "results" 
achieved by a statesman of great talent but little personal virtue.'" Confucius' sanction
"Ibid., p. 43.
means right' or proper' and is often translated as righteousness'. Li means 
profit', utility' or interest'. In the following discussions, I will use these three 
English translations interchangeably.
’D. C. Lau, 'Introduction' to his English translation of Confucius' The Analects, 
London: Penguin Books, 1979, p. 27.
'"Ibid., p. 234.
"Benjamin Schwartz, The World o f Thought in Ancient China, Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1985, p. 110.
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of the policies of Kuan Chung (683-642 B.C.), a statesman of Ch'i, not on the basis of 
his virtue or his motives, but on the basis of the results of his policies as benefiting 
the common people reveals the existence of a utilitarian element in his moral 
philosophy.*^ It is therefore not surprising that some late Confucians could appeal to 
the authority of Confucius in arguing for utilitarian principles.*^
The idea of the distinction between righteousness and profit reached the 
turning point in Mencius (BC 3717-289?). In his writings, righteousness 'becomes a 
dominating principle of virtue’.*"* In debates with Mo Tzu, his utilitarian rival, 
Mencius sharply distinguished the commitment to righteousness from the pursuit of 
profit. It is essential’, for Mencius, that you do a thing because it is benevolent, 
because it is right, not like Mohists and Yangists on a calculation of benefit and 
harm.’*^ The touchstone of moral or immoral behaviour, for Mencius, was the 
commitment to righteousness as a motive of action, rather than any consideration of 
consequence. If people pursued their own interests in a utilitarian manner, there 
would be endless conflicts in human society. A good society 'can be achieved only if 
we assume a human capacity for acting in terms of benevolence {jen) and 
righteousness (yi) as ends in themselves.’*®
Starting from Mencius, Confucians usually shied away from speaking of 
profit. This could be clearly seen in Tung Chung Shu’s (179-104 B.C.) famous 
remark: follow righteousness without pursuing utility; illumine the way without 
calculating the successes’.*^  Nevertheless, it was not until the emergence of Neo-
*^Confucius, The Analects, Bk XIV, 16 & 17, trans. D. C. Lau, pp. 126-7.
*^ For instance, some Confucians in the Sung period appealed to the authority of 
Confucius to justify utilitarian principles. See Hoyt Cleveland Tillman, Utilitarian 
Confucianism: Ch'en Liang's Challenge to Chu Hsi, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1982.
*"*Ch’eng Chung-ying, 'On Yi as a Universal Principle of Specific Application in 
Confucian Morality’, in his New Dimensions o f Confucian and Neo-Confucian 
Philosophy, New York: State University of New York Press, 1991, p. 237.
*^A.C. Graham, Disputers o f the Tao, La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1989, p. 114.
*®Benjamin Schwartz, The World o f Thought in Ancient China, p. 262.
*^Quoted from Chan Wing-tsit, ed. A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy,
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Confucianism that the distinction between righteousness and profit became a 
dominant doctrine of intellectual as well as political thinking.
The emergence of Neo-Confucianism in the eleventh century revived 
Confucianism as the dominant force in the Chinese intellectual world after its decay 
for centuries under challenges from Buddhism and Taoism. While Neo-Confucianism 
gave Confucianism a new complexion by developing metaphysics and cosmology, it, 
however, was responsible for what James Liu has characterized as the transition to the 
'inward-looking* in Chinese culture.** One illustration of this 'inward-looking* 
tendency was that the distinction between righteousness and profit became even more 
rigid. The preoccupation of Neo-Confucian philosophy was with the question of how 
the Confucian gentleman cultivates himself. It paid little attention to 'such practical 
problems as peasants, village life, townspeople, religious practices, social conditions, 
and the art of government*.*’ Two major schools of Neo-Confucianism, the school of 
Ch*eng I (1033-1107 A.D) and Chu Hsi (1130-1200 A.D.) and the school of Lu 
Hsiang-shan (1139-1193 A.D.) and Wang Yang-ming (1472-1529), while disagreeing 
on many important philosophical issues, nevertheless upheld Mencius* distinction 
between righteousness and profit as the basis of moral and political philosophy. This 
was particularly so for the Ch*eng-Chu school, which gained dominance over the 
Chinese intellectual world until the late nineteenth century. This school held that 
moral behaviour is that which follows the Heavenly principle {t’ien-li) rather than any 
consideration of practical consequences.^® This is particularly important when 
people*s desires and interests conflict with the Heavenly principle. Under such
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963, p. 275.
**In his study of the intellectual and political changes in the Sung, James Liu has 
argued that a fundamental cultural and political transformation occurred during the 
eleventh and twelfth centuries. The Chinese cultural pattern, once dynamic and out- 
reaching, 'settled into a stable, internally reinforcing and therefore rigid one*. Chinese 
culture lost interest in innovation or renovation, and began to look backward and 
inward. (James T.C. Liu, China Turning inward: Intellectual-Political Changes in the 
Early Twelfth Century, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988, p. vii.)
*’James Liu, China Turning inward, p. 152.
^®Chan Wing-tsit, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, p. 592.
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circumstances, it is morally important to 'pursue the heavenly principle and deny 
human desires'. Failure to do so will lead human beings to degenerate and become 
like animals.^* It was from this viewpoint that Chu Hsi criticized Ch'en Liang (1143- 
1194), his utilitarian contemporary, for being unable to distinguish between ethical 
principles and situational advantage.'^^
In moral and political spheres, Chinese thought was dominated, without 
serious theoretical challenge, by the Confucian principle of righteousness until the 
late nineteenth century. The main concerns of Chinese elites were the moral 
achievements of both the individual and the state. The goal of the individual was self- 
cultivation and sagehood. The goal of the state was to maintain harmony rather than 
the material well-being of the country. Yen Fu once characterized the dominant 
conservative thought in his time as follows:
For those conservatives, our classical teachings were not concerned 
with practical knowledge of managing a society, but concerned only 
with propriety (Li)}^ The previous kings ran the Kingdom not by 
practical knowledge, but by following propriety. As Confucius says.
If a man is able to govern a state by observing the propriety and 
showing deference, what difficulties will he have in public life? If he 
is unable to govern a state by observing the propriety and showing 
deference, what good are propriety to him.'^ "* The three dynasties of 
antiquity did not concern such things as wealth and strength of the
‘^Li Tse-hou, Lun sung-min li-hsueh' (On Neo-Confucianism), in his Chung-kuo 
ku-tai ssu-hsiang shih-lun (Essays on the history of the ancient Chinese philosophy), 
Peking: Commercial Press, 1985, p. 236.
^^Hoyt Cleveland Tillman, Utilitarian Confucianism: Ch'en Liang's Challenge to 
ChuHsUi^. 133.
^^Li means rite, propriety or norm. 1 capitalize it in order to distinguish it from li as 
referring to profit, interest, utility. Those two words have an identical English 
pronunciation yet different characters in Chinese.
'^*The English translation of Yen Fu's quotation of Confucius is from The Analects^ 
trans. D. C. Lau, Bk IV, 13, p. 74.
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country....Put benevolence {jen) and righteousness (yi) first, and profit 
(//) second and then we will not need to strive to create wealth and our 
country will have a solid moral basis. ... Only in a time when the 
countiy's fortune is decaying and high principles (tao) cannot persuade 
people, will vulgar and self-publicizing people campaign for 'wealth 
and strength'. ... They seem to pursue the country's interests, but the 
harm they inflict is even greater.^^
It is interesting that Yen Fu here discussed the principle of righteousness and 
the principle of propriety in an almost identical tone. Students of Chinese philosophy 
now understand that these two principles were distinct from each other: the former 
required one to follow certain absolute moral principles, and the latter to follow 
tradition or certain established rules. As some recent studies have argued, the essence 
of Confucian morality was to pursue righteousness, rather than to follow tradition. In 
the course of pursuing righteousness and fulfilling sagehood, Confucianism did not 
prevent innovation in new conditions from age to age. The person's construal of 
righteousness 'cannot be solely a matter of applying some externally derived 
norm...but must rather exercise his own judgment creatively in response to the 
uniqueness of his situation.'^^ As something to be realized for oneself, sagehood was 
less of a defined concept than an experience subject to varying interpretations.'^’
However, Yen Fu's failure to distinguish the principle of righteousness from 
the principle of propriety was not because he was unaware of the difference between 
the two, but because he thought that there were connections between them. Yen 
thought that since both the principle of righteousness and the principle of propriety 
stood in opposition to the use of practical knowledge in managing a society, there was
"'CYFW, vol. l.pp. 116-7.
"^David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames, Thinking through Confucius, New York: State 
University of New York Press, 1987, p. 95.
"’Theodore de Bary, Sagehood as a Secular and Spiritual Ideal in Tokugawa Neo- 
Confucianism', in de Bary and Irene Bloom ed.. Principle and Practicality: Essays in 
Neo-Confucianism and Practical Learning, New York: Columbia University Press, 
1979, p. 128.
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a possibility that the principle of righteousness, if it was pushed to the extreme, could 
be transformed into the principle of propriety. In an essay written in English, Yen 
expressed this idea more clearly:
In China, until very late, the form of government which had worked 
satisfactorily while remaining outside the general stream of world 
politics, proved incapable of readjustment to novel conditions, and 
became an anachronism more and more discredited as time went on.
The great drawback of old Chinese political thought is that it never
dared to pronounce bravely that the art of government - like the art of
medicine or that of navigation, whose main point is to save the life of a 
patient, to guide a vessel safely through a storm - and morals are two 
separate things. Undoubtedly, the welfare of a nation greatly depends 
on moral character of its members greatly; but when living at a time 
when the old political order is collapsing and new problems both in 
State and Society are rising with dazzling rapidity, when we endeavour 
to interpret the logical meaning of events, to forecast the inevitable 
issues, and to formulate the rules which are now taking shape among 
the fresh forming conditions of national life, you cannot come to a 
sound conclusion with politics intermixed inextricably with Ethics or 
Moral Philosophy.^*
Yen Fu’s statement here is clear: the primary drawback of 'old' Chinese 
political thought was it never dared to pronounce bravely’ that the aim of politics was 
not to follow any a priori moral principles, but to enhance the welfare of a nation’.
Thus the Chinese politicians dared not face reality and make decisions according to
their understanding of reality. They could only, to use Tocqueville’s phrase, 'follow 
the track of their forefathers’ without asking for its meaning’.
To understand Yen Fu’s diagnosis of the root of traditionalist thought in
^*Yen Fu, A Historical Account of Ancient Political Societies in China’, in The 
Chinese Social and Political Science Review, vol. 1, No. 4 (December, 1916), pp. 22- 
3.
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China, it would be helpful if we refer to Max Weber's classification of human actions. 
In his contrast between traditional society and modem society, Weber drew up a 
classification of social actions as his starting point. He classified various human 
actions into four types: 1) rational action in relation to a goal, or instrumental 
rationality; 2) rational action in relation to a value, or value rationality; 3) emotional 
action; 4) traditional action. Weber characterizes the modem West as dominated by 
actions of instrumental rationality.^^
If we adopt Weber's classification. Yen Fu seemed to suggest that 
Confucianism originally was not of a traditionalist character. He, however, disliked 
the emphasis on value rationality rather than instrumental rationality in Confucian 
ethics. If moral principles became totally independent of any consideration of 
consequences and calculation of profit, these principles would prevent creative 
thinking and would simply confirm traditional, preconceived dogmas, thus leading to 
traditionalism.^®
It was on these grounds that Yen Fu criticized orthodox Confucianism. He 
rarely criticized Confucius himself for being guilty of advocating high moral
^^Max Weber, Economy and Society y vol. 1, ed., by Guenther Roth & Claus 
Wittich, Berkeley: University of Califomia Press, 1978, pp. 24-5. Weber's 
classification has been widely cited in studies of Chinese thought. There is a widely 
shared belief that 'the Confucian ethic did not contribute to that process of 
instrumental rationalization that fundamentally transformed the West and, by 
extension, the world at large.' (Tu Wei-ming, Confucian Thought: Sagehood as 
Creative Transformation, New York: State University of New York Press, 1985, p. 
10; similar remarks are also found in Chang Hao, 'Wan-ch'ing ssu-hsiang fa-chan 
shih-lun' [Development of the Late Ch'ing thought], in Chou Yang-shan & et al éd., 
Wan-Ch'ing ssu-hsiang [The Late Ch'ing thought], Taipei: Shih-pao wen-hua, 1980, 
p. 24.) However, there has been less agreement on whether Confacian ethics point to 
value rationality or traditionality. (see David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames, Thinking 
through Confucius, p. 95.)
®^In generalizing Yen Fu's link of a priori moral philosophy with traditionalistic 
tendency, I have benefitted from reading John C. Harsanyi, 'Morality and the Theory 
of Rational Behaviour'(in Amartya Sen & Bemard Williams ed.. Utilitarianism and 
beyond, Cambridge University Press, 1982). Harsanyi argued that intuitionist moral 
philosophy will inevitably lead to the uncritical acceptance of existing social 
practices' because intuitionist moral philosophy claims to discover the basic moral 
rules by direct intuition which made any rational evaluation of such moral rules both 
impossible and unnecessary', (p. 40)
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principles regardless of reality. This reflected a general assumption in the Chinese 
intellectual world in the late imperial period that Confucius himself did not treat 
righteousness and profit as completely incompatible. Yen Fu held Mencius 
responsible for separating righteousness from profit. He quoted Mencius as saying 
that 'all one needs is benevolence and righteousness. Why speak of profit?'^* He also 
denounced Tung Chung-shu for his remark that one should 'follow righteousness 
without pursuing utility; illumine the way without calculating the successes'
Nevertheless, the main target of Yen Fu's criticism was Neo-Confucianism 
which was the state orthodoxy in late imperial China. Just as James Liu identifies the 
Southern Sung (1127-1279 A.D.) as the crucial period for China turning inward, so 
did Yen Fu regard the Southern Sung as the turning point for the Chinese 
intellectual's attitude towards practical thinking. He complained that since the 
Southern Sung, Chinese thought had not made any progress. Various Confucian 
schools since the Southern Sung, such as Sung Learning and Han Learning, were all 
'useless' in Yen Fu's view. Such learning. Yen charged, indulged in empty talk about 
self-cultivation, human nature and moral principles, and did nothing to promote the 
wealth and strength of the country
Among Neo-Confucian thinkers, as Tillman has observed, Chu Hsi loomed 
large on Yen Fu's horizons, for the philosophy of Chu was the cornerstone of state 
orthodoxy in Yen's time.^ '* In his essay 'On Our Salvation' in 1895, which included 
his most radical denunciation of traditional Chinese learning. Yen denounced Chu Hsi 
repeatedly for pursuing useless doctrines.^^ In his commentary notes on Wang An- 
shih (1021-1086), a Sung reformer. Yen defended Wang's policies against the 
criticism of Chu Hsi. Commenting on Chu's charge that Wang pursued wealth and
‘^Yen Fu, Yuan-fu (A translation of Adam Smith's The Wealth o f Nations)^ vol. 1, 
p. 91.
'"Ibid.
"CYFW, vol. 1, p. 44.
"Hoyt Tillman, 'Yen Fu's Utilitarianism in Chinese Perspective', in Paul A. Cohen 
& Merle Goldman ed.. Ideas Across Cultures, p. 65.
"C'iTW, vol.l, pp. 43,44.
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military strength only/ Yen angrily asked:
To manage a nation after the three dynasties of antiquity, if you do not 
put wealth and strength first, which should be put first? In a time when 
the people's livelihood is in difficulty and the country is faced with the 
danger of perishing, yet you still talk about morality and custom, high 
principle it might be, but is it practical?^^
Yen Fu was also highly critical of the Lu-Wang school of idealism, another 
major school of Neo-Confucianism. He accused Lu Hsiang-shan and Wang yang- 
ming of putting too much stress on Mencius' 'spontaneously moral knowing' (Hang 
chih)?^ As a consequence. Yen remarked, Lu-Wang regarded moral principles as 
some imperatives stemming from universal human consciousness. The dangers of 
their doctrines for intellectual thinking as well for the country were enormous.^* The 
influence of the Lu-Wang philosophy, according to Yen Fu, gave the intellectual 
perspectives of Chinese elites both their high sense of self-esteem and their neglect of 
reality^’ They lived under illusions that China was a rich and powerful country and 
that foreigners were all barbarians without bothering to test these illusions in reality 
This framework was responsible both for the Ming dynasty perishing and for the 
weakness of the Ch'ing dynasty.'**
""CYFW, vol. 4, p. 1152. 
""CYFW, vol. 1, p. 45. 
^*Ibid., pp. 44-5.
39iIbid., p. 45. 
""Ibid.
"*Ibid.
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nAs Yen Fu identified the failure to consider consequences in Confucian moral 
philosophy as the main deficiency of Confucian traditionalism, it follows that he 
would find utilitarianism attractive. To use Tocqueville’s phrase, Yen Fu saw the 
power of change’ in utilitarianism.
There have been disputes on whether, in forming his utilitarian ideas. Yen Fu 
was influenced by some schools of thought in traditional China, particularly some 
rivals of Confucianism. In the study by Schwartz, Yen Fu’s criticisms of orthodox 
Confucian moral principle were interpreted largely as derived from the social 
Darwinism of Spencer, or, British utilitarianism in the framework of social 
Darwinism. He saw little or no connection between Yen Fu’s utilitarian ideas and 
traditional Chinese thought."*^  This assessment of Schwartz, however, has been 
recently questioned by Hoyt Tillman. In his critique of Schwartz’s account of the 
origins of Yen Fu’s utilitarianism, Tillman raised the issue of the 'continuity in the 
Chinese utilitarian problématique’.^  ^ He found that there were recurring utilitarian 
ideas in the history of Chinese thought, from Mo Tzu, Ch’eng Liang to Yen Fu. He 
suggested that Mo Tzu and Ch’eng Liang might have exerted some influence on Yen 
Fu’s utilitarian thinking."*"* Although Tillman did not provide any concrete evidence 
for his speculations, the issue he raised merits careful study.
There were recurring challenges to the Confucian principle of righteousness in 
the history of Chinese thought. In the classic period, two main rivals of 
Confucianism, Mohism and Legalism, developed certain utilitarian principles to 
contest Confucian moral principles.
Mohism was the earliest philosophical school to challenge the Confucian 
moral principle of righteousness. Mo Tzu (4807-390? B.C.), the founder of Mohism, 
laid down three tests by which a doctrine was to be judged: its origin, its validity.
"*^ Benjamin Schwartz, In Search o f Wealth and Power, pp. 122-9. 
"*^ Hoyt Tillman, Yen Fu’s Utilitarianism in Chinese Perspective’, p. 83. 
"*"*Ibid.
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and its applicability'/^ By 'origin', Mo Tzu referred to 'the deeds of the sage kings of 
antiquity'; by 'validity', he referred to the evidence of the eyes and ears of the 
people'; by applicability', he referred to 'whether, when the theory is put into practice 
in the administration, it brings benefit to the state and the people/'*  ^To elaborate his 
third test. Mo Tzu further pointed out:
It is the business of the benevolent man to seek to promote what is 
beneficial to the world, to eliminate what is harmful, and to provide a 
model for the world. What benefits men he will carry out; what does 
not benefit men he will leave alone."*^
This third test certainly touched the essence of utilitarianism."** Yet there are 
reasons for hesitating to call Mo Tzu a utilitarian. First, as Dennis M. Ahem has 
argued, the principle of utility in Mo Tzu was only one of the important criteria, 
rather than the final criterion, in determining the rightness of actions. This kind of 
utilitarianism was called by Ahem utilitarianism in the weak sense' in contrast with 
utilitarianism in the strong sense' in the modem West."*’ Secondly, utilitarianism in 
Mo Tzu was more often than not treated as a secondary principle in serving higher 
moral goals. The benefit or harm which Mo Tzu utilized to judge the rightness of 
actions usually did not refer to the agent of actions, but to the majority of people who 
made up mankind. To pursue benefit in Mo Tzu's sense always meant to benefit 
mankind even at the expense of the interest of the actor. As Graham has observed.
"*^ B. Watson translated. Mo Tzu: Basic Writings  ^New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1963, p. 117.
"*"lbid., pp. 117-8.
"*%d., p. 110.
"**Fung Yu-lan, A History o f Chinese Philosophy, vol. 1, trans. into English by D. 
Bodde, second ed., Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952, p. 87; A.C.Graham, 
Disputers o f the Tao, pp. 39-41.
"*’Dennis M. Ahem, 'Is Mo Tzu a Utilitarian?' Journal o f Chinese Philosophy, vol. 
3, No. 2 (March, 1976), pp. 185-93.
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'Mohist calculations of benefit and harm are on behalf of all, guided by the principle 
of 'Concern for Everyone' {chien-ai)'^^ Concern for Everyone' was defined by Mo 
Tzu almost in terms of Kant's principle of treating all men as ends in themselves.'^* 
Mo Tzu never treats li [benefit] as the satisfaction of desire or as pleasure or 
happiness'. In this sense, 'Mo Tzu's ethical structure is much closer to that of 
Confucius than it is to that of either Bentham or Mill.'^^
Despite the ambiguous features of Mohist utilitarianism, some Chinese 
thinkers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century did rediscover the value of 
utilitarianism in Mohism when they advocated utilitarianism in criticizing Confucian 
moral principles.^^ One notable example was Liang Ch'i-ch'ao who regarded Mohism 
as perfect utilitarianism'.^"* In the case of Yen Fu, however, the influence of Mohist 
utilitarianism was hardly visible. Surprisingly, while Yen Fu left many comments on 
Confucianism, Taoism, Legalism and other Chinese philosophical schools, he did not 
write anything of any length on Mohism. He only mentioned Mohism on a few 
occasions in which Mohism was referred to as socialism',^^ and 'altruism'.^® One 
possible explanation for the lack of influence of Mohist utilitarianism on Yen Fu is 
that Yen Fu regarded Mo Tzu largely as a moralist who advocated altruism' and 
socialism' and therefore did not count him as utilitarian.
From Yen Fu's writings, it is clear that the influence of Legalism on the 
formation of his utilitarian ideas was significant. Legalism was one of the most
^®A.C. Graham, Disputers o f the Tao, p. 41.
^'Benjamin Schwartz, The World o f Thought in Ancient China, p. 146.
^^Chad Hansen, 'Mo Tzu: Language Utilitarianism', Journal o f  Chinese 
Philosophy, vol. 16, No. 3/4 (Sept.-Dec., 1989, p. esp., pp. 356-70.
^^ On the revival of interest in classical Mohism in the late Ch'ing, see Chang Hao, 
Chinese Intellectuals in Crisis: Search for Order and Meaning (I890-I9II), 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987, pp. 9-10.
"^*Chang Hao, Liang Ch’i-ch'ao and Intellectual Transition in China: 1890-1907, 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971, p. 209.
''CYFW, vol. 1, p. 126.
^^Yen Fu, A Historical Account of Ancient Political Societies in China', p. 20.
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important schools of social and political thought in Chinese intellectual history. It 
reached intellectual maturity during the fourth and third centuries B. C., when 'as the 
intensifying stmggle between the states approached its final crisis, rulers were hardly 
pretending any longer to listen to the moralizing of Confucians and Mohists, they 
preferred more practical teachers of statecraft.'^^ As Ch’eng Chung-ying has observed, 
there is a genuine antagonism between Legalism and Confucianism, in virtue of their 
basic orientations and philosophical convictions'.^* The basic feature of Legalism, in 
contrast to Confucianism, is that it rejected any traditional or moral considerations in 
the making of social and political policy. The authority of the ancient kings and the 
virtues of benevolence and righteousness had no place in Legalist thought. The only 
basis of social and political policies, for Legalism, was their utility. As Han Fei Tzu 
expressed clearly, enlightened kings understand reality and eliminate useless 
[policies]. They never talk about righteousness and benevolence and never listen to 
so-called scholars.’^  ^The perspective for judging utility for the Legalists was largely 
that of the rulers. The primary concerns of the Legalist theorists were to find effective 
means for rulers to control bureaucracy and people, and to enhance the wealth and 
strength (fu-ch'iang) of the state and therefore to survive the furious competition of 
the other states during the period of the Warring States.^
The influence of Legalism on intellectual and political developments in China 
was enormous. One of the striking phenomena of Chinese intellectual development
 ^A.C. Graham, Disputers o f the Tao  ^ p. 267. Most prominent figures in the 
Legalist school, except for its great synthesizer, Han Fei-tzu (7-233 B.C.), were 
famous ministers in certain of the states, which included Kuan Chung (7-645 B.C.), 
chief minister in Ch’i, Shang Yang (7-338 B.C.), chief minister of Ch’in, and Shen 
Pu-hai (7-337 B.C.), chief minister in Han.
*^Ch’eng Chung-ying, Legalism versus Confucianism: a Philosophical Appraisal’, 
in his New Dimensions o f Confucianism and Neo-Confucian Philosophy, p. 312.
^^Han Fei Tzu, Han Fei Tzu ch'i-shih (The completed works of Han Fei Tzu), ed. 
by Ch’en Ch’i-yu, Peking: Chung-hua, 1958, p. 20.
^For an account of the Legalist political ideas, see Vitaly A. Rubin, 'The Theory 
and Practice of a Totalitarian State: Shang Yang and Legalism’, in his Individual and 
State in Ancient China: Essays on Four Chinese Philosophers^ trans. Steven I. 
Levine, New York: Columbia University Press, 1976.
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was, as Graham observed, 'its success in integrating diverse tendencies so that they 
become socially cohesive'/^ This phenomenon was exemplified most clearly in the 
co-existence of Confucianism and Legalism in the development of Chinese political 
ideas and practices. While Confucian moralism and humanism generally dominated 
Chinese political ideas for millennia. Legalist rationalism provided for the rulers a 
rational statecraft with the techniques to organize an empire of unprecedented size'.“  
Particularly whenever there were external or internal crises. Legalist rationalism 
always formed the theoretical basis for advocating social and political reforms based 
on the achievement of wealth and military strength in the state. Notably, the reform 
movement led by Wang An-shih (1021-1086) and utilitarian ideas represented by 
Ch'en Liang and others in the Sung period when China faced serious external and 
internal crises can be regarded as 'semi-Legalistic' in nature, to use Metzger's term.^  ^
China's modernization efforts in the second half of the nineteenth century 
were largely driven by the revival of the Legalist emphasis on wealth and strength'.^ 
As early as the 1840s, Wei Yuan expressed a belief in that wealth and strength as not 
only inevitable but also desirable and wholly valid ideals for government'.®  ^ He put 
greater emphasis on economic and military development rather than on the 
achievement of moral goals. The 'Self-strengthening' movement during the 1860s and
A.C. Graham, Disputers o f the Tao, p. 6.
®^ Both Benjamin Schwartz and A. C. Graham have suggested that the Legalist 
tendency of pursuing the wealth and strength rather than moral ideals entailed 
elements of modem rationalism and behavioursim. The dynamic goal-oriented 
nature' embodied in Legalism, they argued, is indeed almost rationalistic in the 
Weberian sense of instrumental rationalism'. (Benjamin Schwartz, The World o f  
Thought in Ancient China, pp. 328, 347; AC. Graham, Disputers o f the Tao, p. 269.)
®^Thomas Metzger, Escape from Predicament, p. 52. For discussions of the 
emergence of Sung utilitarianism, see Hoyt Tillman, Utilitarian Confucianism: Ch'en 
Liang's Challenge to Chu Hsi.
®^ Chang Hao, The Intellectual Context of Reform', in Paul A. Cohen & John E. 
Schrecker ed.. Reform in Nineteenth-Century China, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1976, pp. 145-6.
®^ Peter M. Mitchell, The Limits of Reformism: Wei Yuan's Reaction to Western 
Intmsion', in Modern Asian Studies, vol. 6, No. 2, (1972), p. 179.
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1870s was undertaken in the name of the wealth and strength of the nation.^
Yen Fu's concern with the wealth and strength of the country, to a great 
degree, was the continuation of this Legalist tradition. In fact. Yen frequently 
acknowledged the intellectual link between his ideas and Legalism. He found a great 
similarity between Legalism and modem Western utilitarianism in the sphere of 
public decision-making. Both Legalism and Western utilitarianism, for Yen Fu, 
would base their social and political policies on the achievement of wealth and 
strength of a country rather than on a priori moral principles.®  ^ In his Political 
Lectures', he wrote:
In the past, whenever a society was to have some change, there would 
always be persons either in high administration or among the literati to 
advocate that actions of the state should aim at protecting the people's 
interest. They would challenge patriarchal customs and religion. Those 
people were bound to be bitterly hated by conservatives and even to be 
executed as in the case of Lord Shang in the Chin Dynasty. This is not 
only the case in China, but also in the West. In the West, the advocates 
of such a doctrine are called utilitarianists.®* Utilitarianism can be 
translated into Chinese as the kung-li doctrine. No matter how much 
people dislike this doctrine, there are times, however, when the 
principles of a country have to be changed for the country to survive in 
the face of various crises, when a country faces strong challenges from 
outside and serious riots inside, when people's lives are in danger and a 
countiy faces the threat of being partitioned or overtaken,... a country 
has to achieve wealth and strength to survive. It is a great obstacle to a 
country's wealth and strength to bind people with patriarchal customs
®®Kuo Ting-yee & Liu Kwang-ching, 'Self-strengthening: the Pursuit of Western 
Technology', in Cambridge History o f Chinas vol. 11, ed., by John K. Fairbank & Liu 
Kwang-ching, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980, pp. 491-2.
®"CYFW, vol. l ,p. 117.
®*The English word utilitarianists' was used by Yen Fu originally.
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and religion/’
While Yen Fu furiously denounced orthodox Confucianism as 'useless' and 
'impractical', he praised Legalism as useful in a time of external and internal crises:
If we speak of saving China from crises, only the doctrines of Sheng 
[Sheng Pu-hai] and Han [Han Fei-tzu] may be applicable....As seen 
from the history of both China and foreign countries, are there any 
achievements of a strong country not due to the adoption of Legalism?
Kuan [Kuan Chun] and Shang [Shang Yang] certainly belonged to 
outstanding Legalists. Other statesmen [who were successful], such as 
Chao She, Wu Ch'i, Wang Mang, Chu-ke Liang, the Hsuan Emperor 
of the Han and T'ai-tsung of the Tang all had certain knowledge of 
Legalism and followed its doctrines. Those rulers who lost or 
weakened their states, were, by and large, all good Confucians.^®
Yen Fu held in high opinion some reform efforts in Chinese history which 
were Legalist in nature. He regarded Shang Yang and Wang Mang as important 
reformers. He particularly praised Wang An-shih's reform as having achieved greater 
success than those of Shang Yang and Wang Mang.^* In his commentary notes to 
Wang Ching-Jçung shih (Selected poems of Wang An-shih), Yen noted that the most 
important event in the history of China which scholars should understand thoroughly 
was the reform initiated by Wang An-shih.^^ He called Wang the leader of 'the great 
reforming party' which endeavoured to solve several burning political problems of 
that time'.^  ^He praised the aim of Wang's reform in terms of benefiting the state and
®’CYFW, vol. 5, p. 1265.
"®Ibid., vol. 3, p. 620.
"'Ibid., vol. 4, p. 1150.
""Ibid.
"^Yen Fu, 'A Historical Account of Ancient Political Societies in China', p. 22.
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people. He showed great antipathy to the orthodox Confhcianists' criticisms of 
Wang's reform, and repudiated them as biased.^ "*
m
It should be noted, however, that Yen Fu's utilitarian ideas went beyond the 
Legalist notion of the wealth and strength of the state. He drew significantly from 
modem Western utilitarian ideas and, to a great extent, transformed the nature of 
Legalist rationalism.
The influence of Western utilitarianism on Yen Fu came mainly from some 
British utilitarians. In comparison to his knowledge of Western evolutionary ideas. 
Yen Fu's knowledge of Western utilitarianism was limited indeed. Nevertheless, he 
did have a general awareness of the antithesis between two main rivals in modem 
moral philosophy: utilitarianism and intuitionism and was cognizant of the basic ideas 
and arguments of utilitarianism.^^ He mentioned Jeremy Bentham as an important 
philosopher in the utilitarian school and was impressed by Bentham's 'honourable 
intention' of pursuing the greatest happiness of the greatest number'.^^ He understood 
Bentham as an economic liberal who opposed the interference of government in 
controlling interest rates. Bentham was also regarded as the first jurist to write a 
specialized treatise on intemational law,’  ^ and believed in the cognoscibility of 
laws'.^* In the early 1900s, Bentham's name and ideas were introduced into the 
Chinese intellectual world by some Chinese exiles and students in Japan. Liang Ch'i- 
ch'ao, an important figure in the reform movement of 1898, who took refuge in Japan 
afterwards, wrote an influential essay on Bentham's utilitarian doctrine and adopted
""Ibid.
"^Yen Fu, Yuan-fu (A Translation of Adam Smith's The Wealth o f Nations), vol.l, 
pp. 5, 12.
""Ibid, vol. 2, p. 347.
""Yen Fu, Fa-yi (A translation of Montesquieu's The Spirit o f the Laws), vol. I, Bk 
l ,p.  7.
"*CYFW, vol. 2, p. 328.
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some of Bentham’s ideas in repudiating the Confucian principle of righteousness/^ 
Although Yen Fu did not write anything substantial about Bentham, some of his 
discussions of utilitarian principles, as will be shown, bore resemblance to Bentham's 
ideas. It seems likely that he read some works of Bentham, or at least some secondary 
commentary on him.
Yen Fu drew utilitarian ideas from Mill’s On Liberty and A System o f Logic 
when he rendered these works into Chinese. As I will show later, his utilitarian 
justification of liberty and democracy reflected the influence of Mill.
The most important influence on the formation of Yen Fu’s utilitarian ideas, 
however, came from Adam Smith’s The Wealth o f Nations which Yen also translated 
into Chinese. This may sound unusual given that Smith’s moral philosophy was not 
utilitarian, to the extent that he believed that he could explain all the judgments which 
we should normally call moral by reference to the various operations of sympathy.*® 
Yen Fu was aware of this facet of Smith’s moral philosophy.** Yet the principle of 
utility did play a role in Smith’s theory. The whole system of Smith’s economic theory 
can not be understood without reference to the principle of utility. Smith’s hypothesis 
of the self-interested individual as well as his justification of the free market by the 
famous theory of 'the invisible hand’ were in accordance with some basic assumptions 
of the principle of utility.*  ^This utilitarian element in Smith impressed Yen Fu very 
much. In fact, one of the reasons behind Yen Fu’s translation of The Wealth o f  
Nations^ according to Yen’s friend and mentor Wu Ju-lun, was his belief that it was a
’^Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, 'Lo-li chu-i t’ai-tou Pien-hsin chih hsueh-shuo’ (The doctrine of 
Bentham, the master of utilitarianism), in his Yin-ping-shih ho-chU (Collected Works 
of Liang Ch’i-ch’ao), vol. v, Shanghai, 1932, pp. 30-47. For Liang’s views on 
Bentham and utilitarianism generally, see Chang Hao, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and 
Intellectual transition in China, pp. 206-14.
*®T.D. Campbell, Adam Smith's Science o f Morals, London: Allen & Unwin, 1971, 
p. 89.
**CYFW, vol. 5, p. 1347.
*^There has been disagreement on whether the principle of sympathy in Smith’s 
moral philosophy is compatible with that of utility in his economic theory. See, D. 
Winch, Adam Smith's Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978, p. 10.
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book which discussed li (utility). Yen Fu realized that 'unless we make every effort to 
change our mental habit of shunning all talk of //,...our wealth will remain under­
developed....If li is taboo, there can be no science of economics.'*^
One of the most important ideas Yen Fu learned from the British utilitarians 
was the consequentialist principle which is regarded by Anthony Quinton as the core 
of utilitarianism.^ Like the British utilitarians, Yen Fu held that the approval or 
disapproval of an action should be based on consideration of the consequences of the 
action rather than on whether the action is intrinsically good or bad. For Yen, no 
action is intrinsically righteous. Only those actions which benefit the actors can be 
properly called righteous. Based on this idea. Yen Fu repudiated the sharp separation 
between righteousness and profit in Confucian moral philosophy. He wrote in one of 
his commentaries in the translation of The Wealth o f  Nations:
The cleavage between righteousness and profit {yi-li) has been most 
detrimental to the advance of civilization. Mencius states. All one 
needs is benevolence and righteousness (jen-i). Why speak of profit.'
Tung Chung-Shu asserts, act righteously and do not scheme to 
advance your interests. Follow the principles {tao) and do not calculate 
profit.' The ancient teachings of both East and West all draw a sharp 
line between righteousness and profit. Their intentions were most 
sublime but their understanding of human civilization and principles 
were superficial. In consequence, their doctrines always brought harm 
to genuine benevolence and righteousness.*^
Moreover, like the British utilitarians, Bentham in particular. Yen Fu 
interpreted the notion of li (profit or utility) in terms of pleasure for an actor. He
*^Wu Ju-Lun, Hsu' (Preface) to Yen Fu's Yuan-fu (A Translation of Adam Smith's 
The Wealth o f Nations), p. 2.
*^Anthony Quinton, Utilitarian Ethics, London: Macmillan, 1973, p. 1.
*^Yen Fu, Yuan-fu (A Translation of Adam Smith's The Wealth o f Nations), vol. 1, 
p. 77.
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argued that human nature (jen-tad) prefers pleasure to pain. Without exception, man 
always thought that 'happiness is good, pain is evil'.*® 'No matter how the world will 
change, man always strives to avoid pain and pursue pleasure'.*^ A moral judgment of 
the good or evil of an action, therefore, should be based on whether that action brings 
pleasure to the party concerned. He wrote:
Somebody may ask: should the way of man (jen-tad) follow the 
principle of pleasure (le) or pain or the principle of good or evil?
My answer is that it should follow the principle of pleasure or pain.
The good or evil of an act is determined by the extent to which it 
brings pleasure or pain. ...All human behaviour aims at the pursuit of 
pleasure and the avoidance of pain. It is very clear that only those 
things which bring pleasure can be properly called good. In conclusion 
the good and evil of an act is determined by the extent of pleasure or 
pain it produces.**
This idea of Yen Fu is strikingly similar to Bentham's famous statement about 
utilitarianism:
By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or 
disapproves of every action whatever according to the tendency which 
it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party 
whose interest is in question: or, what is the same thing in other words, 
to promote or to oppose that happiness.*’
*®C'iTW, vol. 5, p. 1359. 
*'lbid., p. 1355.
**CYFW, vol. 5, p. 1359.
*’Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles o f Morals and Legislation^ 
ed., J. H. Bums & H. L. A. Hart, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970, chp. 1:2, pp. 11-2.
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It should be noted, however, that there were significant differences between 
Yen Fu's principle of utility {li) and Bentham's principle of utility. Those differences 
were involved in the issues of, first, whether the principle of utility should be applied 
to all spheres of human action or only a proportion of human action, and secondly, 
whether the principle of utility is the ultimate basis for moral judgment, or is only one 
of the bases for moral judgment.
The principle of utility in Bentham is applied to 'every action whatsoever' - 
not only of every action of a private individual, but of every measure of 
government.'^® In other words, Bentham's utilitarianism, and Western utilitarianism 
generally, functions on the one hand as a theory of personal morality, and on the other 
hand as a theory of public choice, or of criteria applicable to social and political 
decisions.’* The principle of utility in Yen Fu, by contrast, hardly played any 
significant role in his views on personal morality. It applied primarily to the area of 
public choice, namely social and political decisions. As we will show shortly. Yen 
Fu's views on personal morality were by and large shaped by Confucianism. Indeed, 
he did not demonstrate any profound interest in developing a new personal morality. 
His primary concern was focused on the issue of how China as a country, or the 
Chinese as a people, should reform their culture and institutions in order to build a 
strong, prosperous and well regulated country. One of the most often used phrase 
which exemplified his concern was the Legalist phrase, the wealth and strength' of 
China.
Yet, one should not simply identify Yen Fu's notion of wealth and strength 
with that of Legalism. While Legalists advocated wealth and strength as the basis of 
governmental policies, they were primarily concerned with the necessity of 
strengthening the power of the state, or more accurately, the rulers. They had little 
concern with the welfare of the people at large. As we will show later. Yen Fu was 
highly critical of Legalism for its treatment of the interests of the rulers as the end of 
politics. When Yen Fu used the phrase wealth and strength, he was concerned not
’®Ibid.
’*Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams ed.. Utilitarianism and beyond. Introduction', 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982, p. 1.
162
only with the strength of the Chinese nation, but more importantly, with the welfare 
of the people. 'Wealth and strength', as Yen stated clearly, is simply to benefit all 
people in the country'.’  ^ To benefit all people. Yen Fu wrote, is to achieve the 
greatest happiness of the greatest number as remarked by the British philosopher 
Bentham'.’  ^ Schwartz seemed to be unaware of this difference when he interpreted 
Yen Fu's notion of wealth and strength largely as manifestations of his nationalism 
and emphasis on state power.’"*
Another difference between Yen Fu's principle of utility and that of Bentham 
is on the issue of whether the principle of utility is the ultimate principle for moral 
judgment. For Bentham, and for Western utilitarians generally, the principle of utility 
was, either directly or indirectly, the highest principle on which the rightness of acts, 
policies, decisions, and choices was based.’  ^ Yen Fu, by contrast, was far from 
consistent on this matter. Sometimes, he appeared to regard the principle of utility as 
the basis on which the rightness of acts should be judged. As we have quoted above, 
he expressed clearly that the good or evil of an act is determined by the extent to 
which it brings pleasure or pain' to the actor. In this sense, he was close to the 
position of act utilitarianism'. However, in many other cases. Yen Fu criticized the
’"CYFW, vol. 1, p. 27.
’'CYFW, vol. 4, p. 885.
’"‘Maurice Meisner is one of the earliest scholars to advise the difference between 
the traditional usage of the phrase wealth and power' and its usage in some modem 
writers. See his, Li Ta-chao and the Origins o f Chinese Marxism, Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1967, pp. 8-9.
’ I^ use either directly or indirectly' with in mind the difference between act 
utilitarianism' and 'mle utilitarianism'. Bentham's utilitarianism has been generally 
regarded as a form of act utilitarianism' which holds that an act is right if its 
consequences are at least as good as those of any other alternative. 'Rule 
utilitarianism', by contrast, holds that an act is right if it con^fms to a mle the general 
following of which would have (or has) good consequences. For a discussion of those 
two forms of utilitarianism, see J.J.C. Smart, A Outline of a System of Utilitarian 
Ethics', in J.J.C. Smart & Bernard William, ed. Utilitarianism: for and against, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973, pp. 4-9. See also Paul Kelly, 
Utilitarianism and Distributive Justice: Jeremy Bentham and the Civil Law, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1990.
163
notion that 'morality is nothing but a matter of self-interest and the pursuit of profit'.’® 
Yen's favourite notion was that 'the combination of righteousness and profit' (yi-he-li) 
should be the basis for moral judgments.’^
However, Yen Fu was never able to spell out clearly what he meant by a 
combination of righteousness and profit'. There were at least two implications in his 
use of the phrase. On the one hand, he implied that moral, social and political 
principles should not be derived from some a priori moral imperatives. Instead, they 
should be based on the people's experience that following such principles had good 
consequences. Moreover, these principles should be continually tested and revised 
according to the consequential principle. On the other hand. Yen Fu seemed to 
suggest that an act should be judged by a dual criterion: the principle of righteousness 
and the principle of utility. As we will show shortly. Yen Fu did not completely 
abandoned the Confucian notion that there were some moral principles which were 
imperative and should be followed.
In treating the principle of utility as only one of the important criteria in 
judging the rightness of an act. Yen Fu reminded us of the utilitarianism of Mohism 
which has been called utilitarianism in the weak sense'. Nevertheless, utilitarianism 
in Yen Fu played a much stronger role than in Mohism. Although the principle of 
utility was not always the ultimate principle for social and political judgments in Yen 
Fu, it was not a secondary principle in serving higher moral goals either. Unlike 
Mohists, Yen Fu clearly interpreted the principle of utility as the satisfaction of 
people's pleasure or happiness. Yen Fu might not treat the satisfaction of the people's 
desires for happiness as the only criterion for judging the rightness of an act, he 
nevertheless treated it as a necessary criterion for such a judgment.
’®C'iTW, vol. 1, pp. 100-1.
’"CYFW, vol. 4, pp. 858-9; vol. 5, p. 1359.
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IV
Granted all these inconsistencies, the principle of utility did play a significant 
role in Yen Fu’s thought. It was accepted as a critical principle in challenging the 
authority of orthodox Confucianism; it formed one of the bases of his criticism of 
radicalism; it underlay his proposals for China's social and political reforms; and 
above all, it underlay his sanction of the individual’s pursuit of self-interest.
As indicated before, Confucianism had long been upheld 'as an inviolate body 
of secular truth’ similar to religion. The sacredness of Confucianism led the Chinese 
elites to shy away from innovation. One of the important objectives of Yen Fu’s 
whole intellectual effort was to destroy the sacredness of Confucianism and to 
introduce rational thinking into Chinese thought. Utilitarianism, more than any other 
theory which Yen Fu and his contemporaries adopted from the West, including 
evolutionary theory, undermined the very foundation of the sacredness of 
Confucianism. Although, as we have just shown. Yen Fu did not always treat the 
principle of utility as the highest principle in judging the rightness of an act, he at 
least treated it as a necessary criterion for moral judgment. This was sufficient to 
bring Confucianism to a test of the consequentialist principle. Confucianism could no 
longer be taken for granted as moral truth. It had to be judged, as any other moral and 
political doctrine, by the consequences which the devotion to it might bring to the 
parties concerned. If it can not produce happiness, it has to be desecrated, no matter 
how noble it seems to be. As Yen Fu declared boldly to develop our nation and 
civilization, we have to wipe out all useless principles and utterly change our 
society.’’* It is a great obstacle to a nation’s wealth and strength to bind people with 
patriarchal customs and religion.’”
The role of utilitarianism in Yen Fu’s challenge of the authority of 
Confucianism bears similarity to the role played by utilitarianism in some other non- 
European countries in the nineteenth century when those countries underwent a 
transition from being traditional societies to modem ones. In Japan in the late
” CYFW, vol.5, p. 1265. 
” lbid.
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nineteenth century, as Sandra Davis observed, utilitarianism was regarded as an 
effective weapon in challenging Confucianism and as a foundation for the new order 
to be built. 'Utilitarianism... offered a modem, rational justification for political and 
social change.'*®® In India, Spain and Latin America, utilitarianism was introduced as 
a secular and modernizing ideology' to which liberals appealed for legitimation in 
their conflict with the force of conservatism.*®*
In addition to depriving Confucianism of sacredness, utilitarianism also 
provided Yen Fu with weapons for combating the radicalism of his time. Radicalism 
emerged strongly in the beginning of this century in China. One of the fundamental 
characteristics of radicalism was its enthusiastic embrace of certain principles 
imported from the West, such as freedom, equality, democracy, without either 
understanding their meanings, or considering the consequences of putting them into 
practice in China. As we will show later. Yen Fu's criticism of radicalism was partly 
based on the consequentialist principle. Yen Fu persistently charged radicals of being 
guilty of basing their political doctrines on a priori moral principles. For instance, he 
criticized K'ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao's radical reform plans as being 
concerned only with the rightness of their actions and ignoring the consequences they 
will bring about. Yen wrote:
In the matter of political change, there is great complicity. It is often 
the case that something seems to be right, but its consequences are bad; 
something is praised by the people, but it will cause harm to them. 
Therefore, a person with foresight and sagacity is able to understand 
the difficulty of politics and to avoid reckless actions. ... K'ang and 
Liang, on the contrary, only saw one side of the matter and acted 
recklessly.*®^
*®®Sandra T. W. Davis, Intellectual Change and Political Development in Early 
Modem Japan, London: Associated University Press, 1980, p. 16.
*®*John Dinwiddy, Bentham, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989, p. 116.
*®"CYFW, vol. 3, pp. 631-2.
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Yen Fu’s own proposals for cultural, social, economic and political reforms, to 
a great degree, were based on the principle of utility. As we will show in greater 
detail later. Yen’s arguments for individual liberty, a ffee-market economy, 
democracy, and gradualism were largely utilitarian. One of the most striking features 
in Yen Fu’s discussions of China’s social, economic and political reforms was his 
rejection of dogmatism. He insisted that one should not base his political arguments 
on a priori principles, either from Confucianism or from the modem West. 
Utilitarianism underlay Yen’s pragmatism.
Secondly, Yen Fu’s appreciation of modem Westem science and technology, 
and his advocacy of educational reform were based on the principle of utility. The 
primary charge Yen Fu made against traditional Chinese education was that the 
content of the education was 'useless’ and 'impractical’.*®^ He held that the Confucian 
emphasis on moral improvement and perfection rather than on material benefit was 
responsible for China’s underdevelopment of science and technology. 'What the 
ancient Chinese called leaming’, wrote Yen Fu, is nothing beyond Politics, Ethics, 
Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics, Literature and some Fine Arts’.*®^ 'Nature was never 
scientifically studied in this country; on the contrary, they rather despised it and 
considered it unworthy for the leaming of a great man who had nobler aspirations in 
perfecting himself and improving mankind. In my humble opinion this is one of the 
very causes of China’s present weakness.’*®^ Based on this understanding. Yen Fu 
advocated educational reforms. He was one of the pioneers who argued against the 
traditional examination system, the core of the traditional educational system. He 
advocated changes in the content of education. In his early writings, he argued that all 
traditional leaming should be abolished, at least for the time being, and should be 
replaced by Westem leaming.*®^  He showed great enthusiasm for Westem science and 
technology. He was also eager to introduce Westem social, economic and political
*®'CYFW, vol. 1, pp. 43-4.
*®^ Yen Fu, A Historical Account of Ancient Political Societies in China’, p. 18. 
*®'lbid.
*®"C'iTW, vol. 1, p. 44.
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sciences into China. Those natural and social sciences, he believed, were necessary 
for developing a wealthy and strong modem China.
Utilitarianism was accepted by Yen Fu not only to effect social, political and 
educational reforms, but also to justify the satisfaction of individual self-interest. This 
facet of Yen Fu's thought has not been fully accounted by studies thus far.
The individual's interest was largely neglected in Confucianism. Confucianism 
put primary emphasis on kung (public) rather than ssu (individual's interest). The 
pursuit of the individual's interest was equated with selfishness in Confucianism. 
What Confucianism emphasized was an individual's obligations rather than his rights 
and prerogatives in relation to society. As Y.P. Mei describes, 'Do not ask what 
society can do for you, ask what you can do for society.'*®^  In Confucianism, the 
social obligations and responsibilities of an individual are not chains and burdens to 
be escaped from, or to be borne and suffered. On the contrary, it is in the fulfilment 
of these social responsibilities that an individual realizes his complete personal 
fulfilment. In order to fulfil his social responsibilities, according to Confucianism, the 
individual must always remember the importance of self-inspection (tzu-hsing) and 
make sure his behaviour is always in accordance with high principles, rather than 
with self-interest.
Historically, there were some challenges to this Confucian position from time 
to time. Li Chih (1527-1602), a radical critic of Confucianism, had suggested that the 
individual's pursuit of self-interest (jjw) was in accordance with human nature and 
was the ultimate source of public interest (kung)}^^ Kung Tzu-chen (1792-1841) also 
sought to liberate the self by asserting that public interest {kung) and private interest
®^^ Mei, Y. P., The Status of the Individual in Chinese Social Thought and 
Practice', in Charles Alexander Moore ed.. The Chinese Mind, Honolulu: University 
of Hawaii Press, 1967, p. 327.
*®*Hsiao Kung-chuan, Chung-kuo cheng-chi ssu-hsiang shih (A history of Chinese 
political thought), vol. 2, Taipei: Lien-ching, 1982, p. 608.
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(ssu) mutually sustain each other.’*®’ Nevertheless, this dissenting voice on the whole 
remained very feeble until the end of the nineteenth century when, under the 
influence of Westem ideas, more intellectuals began to put stress on individual’s 
interest. Yen Fu was one of the earliest and the most vocal scholars in challenging the 
essence of Confucian moral doctrine and sanctioning the individual’s pursuit of 
self-interest.
Yen Fu’s arguments for individual self-interest were based on two grounds. 
First, like Bentham, Yen held that the nature of man is to love himself more than 
others or his community. He tended to repeat one paragraph from Huxley’s Evolution 
and Ethics:
With their enormous differences in natural endowment, men agree in 
one thing, and that is their innate desire to enjoy the pleasures and to 
escape the pains of life; and in short, to do nothing but that which it 
pleases them to do, without the least reference to the welfare of the 
society into which they are bom.**®
Yen Fu argued that a sound morality should only follow from this perspective. 
Individual self-interest is the essential element of an individual’s happiness and should 
be regarded as his right. This right of self-interest cannot be sacrificed to fulfil certain 
abstract obligations.
So-called obligations are contrasted with rights. Man should have his 
own rights. Because he enjoys his rights, he therefore has social 
obligations to fulfil. Obligations imposed on an individual without
*®’Quoted from Frederic Wakeman, Jr., History and Will, Berkeley: University of 
Califomia Press, 1973, p. 113.
**®Huxley, Evolution and Ethics, p. 31; for Yen Fu’s translation, see, CYFW, vol. 5, 
p. 1345; for his similar remark, also, pp. 1349,1355.
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accompanying rights, are not obligations at all. That is slavery.*”
Yen Fu was particularly against obligations imposed on individuals by 
government in the name of the interests of the society or state. He stated clearly that 
government has no right to force an individual to sacrifice his own interests for 
society. On this point, it is interesting to note Yen Fu's comment on Spencer's theory 
of social organism and Rousseau's theory of the general will. By adopting Spencer's 
theory of social organism which differs from many other theories of social organism, 
as we have shown above, he argued that an individual's interest must be regarded as 
the ultimate end of the collective interest. After comparing the similarities between 
society and a biological organism. Yen Fu indicated one important difference:
In the biological organism, only the organism itself has consciousness. 
Numerous cells or units are composed of one conscious organism. In 
the social organism, by contrast, the unit itself has consciousness.
Every man has the feeling of happiness or pain, has sense perception, 
and has his nervous system as controlling organ....State or society as 
an organism has no consciousness itself. Its consciousness can be only 
an assemblage of the consciousness of the component individuals. The 
so-called interests of state or society are nothing but the interests of the 
people. For a biological organism, it is necessary, sometimes, to cut 
off its limbs and give up some organs in order to preserve the 
organism. In so doing, the pain of limbs and organs will be less 
important.... Human society, however, does not have this particular 
physical body....The so-called state is only an abstract thing, not an 
actual body worthy of the sacrifice of the constituent people. 
Examining all historical facts from antiquity to the present, [advocacy 
of individual sacrifice for the state] can only result in the destruction of 
the rights and happiness of thousands of people just to preserve one
*”Yen Fu, Fa-yi (A translation of Montesquieu's The Spirit o f  the Laws) y vol. 2, Bk 
XXII, p. 29.
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family’s [the emperor's] rights and happiness. This family then uses 
people's taxes and rents to enjoy a luxurious and privileged life. Such a 
doctrine is not worth preserving."^
Yen Fu spelled out clearly that the idea of an individual sacrificing his own 
interest for state or society was outdated. According to his account, ancient Greek 
philosophy, Roman Law, as well as traditional Chinese philosophy held that the state 
is more important than an individual, and that an individual should serve the state and 
live for the sake of the s t a t e . T h e  modem Westem theory which Yen Fu admired 
held an entirely different view:
Society is established to serve individuals' interests. The individual 
does not exist for the sake of society. If individuals cannot have their 
interests fulfilled in society, society has no reason to exist.'"
Yen Fu criticized Rousseau's idea of the general will because, he believed, this 
idea encouraged an individual's sacrifice of his self-interest for the sake of the 
community. 'The most extreme view of emphasizing the public interest', he 
remarked, is found in Rousseau's theory of the social contract'. According to Yen Fu, 
Rousseau regarded the state as the representative of the collective interests of 
individuals, and therefore, considered it an individual's duty to sacrifice his interest 
for the sake of the state. He denounced this idea strongly. For him, it could not be 
justified that an individual should serve the community at the expense of his own 
interest, except if the individual himself decided to do so voluntarily. He wrote:
It is against human nature and reason that the mler of a country asks an 
individual to sacrifice his property or life to serve the security of the
'"CYFW., vol. 2, pp. 314-5. 
'"CYFW., vol. 2, p. 315.
114Ibid.
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nation. Whenever this idea is adopted, the ruler will pretend to secure 
the people’s interests in pursuing his interest, and the ordinary people 
will have no way of protecting themselves."^
He further argued for the individual’s self-interest by pointing out that an 
individual pursuing his interest will advance the interests of the whole. This is 
directly drawn from Adam Smith’s argument. From Smith, Yen Fu learned that social 
benefit and economic order are the result of the self-interested actions of individuals 
rather than the consequence of some formal plan. Yen Fu had certainly read Smith’s 
famous remark on the 'invisible hand’ when he translated The Wealth o f Nations:
As every individual, therefore, endeavours as much as he can both to 
employ his capital in the support of domesti^ industry, and so to direct r 
that industry that its produce may be of the greatest value; every 
individual necessarily labours to render the annual revenue of the 
society as great as he can. He generally, indeed, neither intends to 
promote the publick interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it.
By preferring the support of domestick to that of foreign industry, he 
intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a 
manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his 
own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible 
hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. ... By 
pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of society more 
effectually than when he really intends to promote it."^
This argument appealed to Yen Fu. He praised Smith repeatedly for his idea 
of the invisible hand:*"
**^ Yen Fu, Fa-yi (A translation of Montesquieu’s The Spirit o f the Laws), vol. 2, Bk 
XXVI, p. 22.
**^ Adam Smith, The Wealth o f Nations, IV.ii.9, vol. 1, p. 456.
**^ Yen Fu’s praise of Smith’s invisible hand theory can be seen in CYFW, vol. 5, 
pp. 1347, 1359, 1395; Yuan-fu (A Translation of Adam Smith’s The Wealth o f
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The wealth and strength of Europe in recent times are regarded as the 
result of economics. The principal figure in economics is Adam Smith.
Smith's greatest principle is that the greatest interest lies in people’s 
mutual interest. It is not in an individual's self-interest to harm others.
It is also not right to benefit others by harming oneself. Neither is it 
right to benefit an individual by harming society."*
Yen Fu was convinced that an individual’s pursuit of his self-interest was 
essential for the development of a society. Like Smith, he also believed in the natural 
harmony of the individual’s interest with the social interest. The purpose of wealth 
and strength is no more than benefiting people. However, to benefit people, it must 
begin with people’s pursuing their own interests.’" ’
VI
It should be said, however, that Yen Fu had many misgivings about 
utilitarianism. First, Yen Fu’s embrace of utilitarianism was mainly in the area of 
collective action. He hardly ever treated utilitarianism as a philosophy of personal 
morality. Even in his justification of individual self-interest on utilitarian grounds, his 
main aim was not to formulate a principle of personal morality, but to formulate a 
socio-political policy in the area relating to individual interests. Like Liang Ch’i- 
ch’ao, his contemporary, he seemed to distinguish private morality from public
Nations), vol. 2, pp. 481, 536.
"*CYFW, vol.5, p. 1349.
" ’CYFW, vol. 1, p. 14.
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morality.'^® From the viewpoint of socio-political policy, the individual should be 
encouraged to pursue his own self-interest. However, for the individual with moral 
decency, he should not pursue his interests only. He has to follow certain moral rules. 
The essence of those moral rules was still the Confucian principle of righteousness.
This feature of Yen Fu’s thought can be clearly seen in his discussion of 
enlightened self-interest. When Yen Fu justified individual self-interest, he 
emphasized that it should be what he called 'enlightened self-interest'. He 
acknowledged that this idea was derived from Smith:
Smith always mentions that, while the world is full of shallow men 
and ignorant men, there are no genuine small men’ (hsiao Jen). The 
small man’ presumably sees only his own interest. However, if we 
assume that he discerns his long-term, real interests, how does he 
differ in his behaviour from that of the virtuous man? For instance, if 
someone’s moral sense is so weak that he ... steals gold in the morning 
and is caught in the evening, he will lose his self-interest. If this is 
called man’s self-interest, then what is harming oneself? The principles 
of evolution do not regard the self-interest of the short-sighted and 
ignorant as true self-interest and do not treat narrowly abnegating 
self-righteousness or extravagant and excessive righteousness’ as true 
righteousness.'^*
To be sure, the notion enlightened self-interest’ here is similar to the same 
notion in Westem utilitarianism. Westem utilitarians generally did not favour blind 
selfishness, and encouraged enlightened self-interest. Yet, there is a subtle difference 
between Yen Fu’s enlightened self-interest and the Westem utilitarianism. For the 
latter, enlightened’ means that the individual, enlightened by reason, understands his
*%n Liang’s distinction of public morality and private morality, see Chang Hao, 
Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and Intellectual Transition in China, 1890-1907, pp. 149-54.
'^'Yen Fu, Yuan-fu (A Translation of Adam Smith’s The Wealth o f Nations), vol. 1, 
pp. 76-7.
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long-term interests. When Yen Fu talked about 'enlightened self-interest’, however, 
he meant more than an individual's long term interests. He stated that an individual’s 
self-interest, by following a correct principle, was enlightened self-interest.*^ By 
correct principle, he had righteousness’ in mind. He continued to regard 
righteousness’ as the relevant criteria in the judgement of individual behaviour.
Yen Fu did not see any conflict between an individual’s long-term self-interest 
and the requirement of the principle of righteousness. On the contrary, he emphasized 
that an individual could achieve his self-interest only by following righteousness. He 
claimed that it is as clear as a burning flame that without righteousness there can be 
no utility and without following the way {tad) no profit.’*^  ^He wrote:
Almost all the ancient doctrines, both in the West and the East, regard 
profit and reason {tao-i) as incompatible.... As people are enlightened, 
they know that they can not achieve profit without understanding 
reason and they can not fulfil self-interest without following 
righteousness. There is nothing wrong with profit. The essential issue 
is by what principle to achieve it.*^ '*
Yen Fu's connection of enlightened self-interest with righteousness led him to 
put greater stress on human moral perfection than Western utilitarians did. He 
regarded individual moral improvement as one of the most important conditions for a 
good society. He complained bitterly that Confucian education did not pay sufficient 
attention to the mass of the popula t ion.By distinguishing gentlemen (chun~tzu) 
from small men (hsiao-Jen)^ he claimed, Confucianism in fact brought two different 
moralities to society. The gentlemen often claimed to follow righteousness regardless
*"^CYFW, vol. 5, p. 1395.
*^ ^Yen Fu, Yuan-fu (A Translation of Adam Smith’s The Wealth o f Nations), vol. 1, 
pp. 76-7.
*""CYFW, vol.5, p. 1395.
125/'CYFW, vol. 4, p. 1233.
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of practical consequences. The masses, in contrast, had no hope of becoming 
gentlemen and had little moral sense other than pursuing blind self-interest. They 
'only understand benefiting themselves by harming others and do not understand that 
it is in the greatest interest to achieve mutual benefits by harming nobody'.*^ ® He 
hoped to educate the people to pursue a kind of self-interest which benefitted both the 
individual and society as a whole.
Even in the sphere of social and political policies. Yen Fu was not completely 
satisfied with utilitarianism. While he appreciated the rational and critical features of 
utilitarianism, he was nevertheless afraid that applying the principle of utility to every 
aspect of collective action might lead to disastrous consequences for human society. 
He expressed two major concerns regarding utilitarianism as a moral philosophy for 
collective action.
First, he was concerned that the unrestrained pursuit of the interest of one 
collectivity might harm the interest of another collectivity. With respect to national 
policies, utilitarianism primarily meant for him to judge policies in terms of 
enhancing or reducing the wealth and strength of the nation. The wealth and strength 
of a nation, however, could be used wrongly to harm other nations. As we have 
shown before. Yen Fu was highly critical of any policy of pursuing the national 
interest by harming others. He saw the unchecked pursuit of the national interest 
regardless of principles of justice and righteousness as the evil cause of the First 
World War.*^  ^ While Yen Fu was reluctant to criticize responsibility of Darwinism 
for the aggressive policies of Germany in the war, he was nevertheless outspoken in 
criticizing utilitarian principles as responsible for Germany's behaviour. He 
characterized the policy of Germany as pursuing its own interests only and 
disregarding the principle of j u s t i c e ' . ' I f  they see some benefits, they will pursue 
them regardless of righteousness.'*^’ In his later years. Yen criticized Western
126CYFW, vol.l, pp. 30-1. 
*""CYFW, vol. 3, p. 623. 
*^ *Ibid., vol. 1, p. 56. 
*"’lbid.
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civilization on the whole as being only concerned with 'utility’ and thereby having 
brought great harm to h u m a n i t y H e  then reasserted the Confucian position that one 
should have a universal mind rather than a selfish mind."^
Secondly, Yen Fu was concerned with the issue of the faith’ of the people. 
Ironically, the concern that the people’s faith might be undermined by introducing 
Western ideas and systems was one of the most important reasons for the reluctance 
of traditional conservatives in the late nineteenth century to undertake reforms. 
Conservatives usually argued that it was the people’s faith, rather than advanced 
technology, which made a nation strong and prosperous. When Yen Fu introduced 
utilitarianism, his main target was this kind of thinking. By asserting utilitarian 
principles, he subjected all traditional ideas and institutions to the principle of utility. 
Yet, Yen Fu never completely rejected the notion that the existence of a shared faith 
among the people was a necessary condition for the very existence of a nation. 
Particularly in his later years. Yen Fu raised again and again the issue of the people’s 
faith. He argued that a society could not exist without a shared value sys tem.Like  a 
nucleus for an atom, shared values for a nation are a condensation point’. A system 
of shared values was called by him the spirit of a nation’."^ The spirit of a nation’, 
he wrote, is the foundation of the existence and development of a nation. Different 
nations have different national spirits due to different cultural traditions (ch'iao-hua). 
These cultural traditions have developed for several thousand years before they 
reached maturity. If a nation is able to preserve her national spirit, she will not perish 
even if she is subject to the control of other nations.’’^"* In comparison, if a nation 
cannot preserve her national spirit, she is bound to perish. Yen Fu quoted a famous 
phrase from Chuang Tzu to express his belief: 'Nothing is more sad than the death of
""Ibid., vol. 3, p. 623. 
" ‘See my last chapter. 
"^CYFW, vol. 2, p. 342. 
‘"Ibid.
‘"Ibid., p. 330.
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spirit....This is true for an individual, it is even truer for a nation.'*^^
James Pusey once noted that Yen Fu's thought was full of contradictions. 
Yen's discussions of the principle of righteousness and the principle of utility, more 
than anywhere else, testify to Pusey's point. The contradictions in Yen's ideas of 
righteousness and utility illustrated, firstly, the limitations of Yen's capacity for 
tackling profound metaphysical and philosophical issues. His discussions of the issues 
of righteousness and utility were practical in orientation. They lacked philosophical 
profoundness and logical coherence. He was more successful in raising questions than 
answering them. He was clearer about what he opposed than about what he proposed. 
He could see the weakness of Confucian moral philosophy. He understood the need to 
adopt some kind of consequentialist principle. In the meantime, he was aware that 
there must be some forms of moral rules besides calculation of profit of every act. 
However, he was unable to formulate a systematic answer for this issue.
Secondly, Yen's contradictions illustrated the difficulty modem Chinese 
intellectuals confronted in introducing modem Westem instrumental rationalism into 
Chinese thought. Although Yen Fu was one of the most Westemized intellectuals of 
his generation, and although he was more rationalistic in social and political thought 
than most of his contemporaries, he could not escape from the influence of Confucian 
morality. If we compare Yen's acceptance of Darwinism with his acceptance of 
utilitarianism, the deep-rooted moralistic outlook in Yen Fu's thought can be clearly 
seen. On the whole. Yen was much more consistent in his embrace of Darwinism than 
in his embrace of utilitarianism. Darwinism aroused Yen's sympathy because its 
moralistic and universalistic tendency appealed to Yen Fu's heart. By contrast, one 
can always detect a sense of reluctance in Yen Fu's acceptance of utilitarianism. He 
never felt at home in embracing utilitarianism. This was why he always tended to 
modify the principle of utility by other principles of morality.
This feature of Yen Fu's thought, to a great degree, illustrates one of the 
predicaments which has been confronting intellectuals in China since the late 
nineteenth century: how to introduce modem Westem instrumental rationalism and.
*''lbid.
"^James Pusey, China and Charles Darwin, p. 56.
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in the meantime, pursue the moral and spiritual goals of both the individual and the 
society. This predicament has been most acutely expressed by Wang Kuo-wei (1877- 
1927), a philosopher and writer. Caught between idealism and pragmatism, Wang 
ruefully remarked that what he really loved was no longer believable; what he 
believed to be true was utterly unlovable:
In general those philosophical theories that can be loved cannot be 
believed, and those that can be believed cannot be loved. I seek truth 
yet I love mistaken forms of it. Great metaphysics, rigorist ethics, and 
pure aesthetics - of these we are inordinately fond. However, in 
searching for what is believable, we turn instead to the positive theory 
of truth, the hedonistic theory of ethics, and empiricist theory of 
aesthetics. I know the latter are believable but I cannot love them, and 
I know the former are lovable but I cannot believe them.'^^
To be sure. Yen Fu was much more pragmatic than Wang Kuo-wei. Yet he 
might share Wang's remark that utilitarianism is 'believable', but far from lovable'.
"^See Joey Bonner, fVang Kuo-wei: an Intellectual Biography^ Cambridge, Mass. 
Harvard University Press, 1986, p. 95.
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Part Two
Towards a Liberal and Democratic Society
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In the last three chapters, I have shown that Yen Fu introduced Westem 
evolutionary theory and utilitarian ideas into China to promote change in China’s 
social and political systems. Yen’s purpose was to encourage China to follow the lead 
of the West and build a prosperous, strong and better organized country.
While Yen Fu’s arguments for change were novel in the mid-1890s when he 
began to publish his essays and translations, the idea of change was commonplace by 
the turn of the century. Traditional conservatism declined dramatically during the 
years following the Sino-Japanese war. The idea of effecting change by following 
Westem examples became accepted across nearly the entire spectrum of social strata 
in China. 'Even the most conservative elements in Chinese society, including those at 
court and in the bureaucracy were abandoning ... conservatism and tuming 
increasingly toward reform’.*
As traditional conservative opposition to change waned, the advocates of 
change began to split over the issues of the direction and the pace of China’s social 
and political development. Radicalism emerged in the early 1900s as the main 
advocate of change.^ The radicalism I refer here to was not a unified ideology, but a 
disposition shared by various advocates of change. This disposition contained at least 
two interrelated elements: 1) a belief that the problems of the old order cannot be 
solved, its evils not cured, within the framework of that order’, and that a 
fundamentally new order is required’; 2) a willingness to use extreme political means 
to bring this new order about.^
Radicalism appeared in various forms in the first two decades of this century. 
It first appeared in the ideology of nationalist revolutionaries who led the Revolution
*Michael Gasster, Chinese Intellectuals and the Revolution o f 19II: the Birth o f  
Modern Chinese Radicalisniy Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969, p. viii.
^On Chinese radicalism in the early decades of this century, see Michael Gasster, 
Chinese Intellectuals and the Revolution o f I9H \ Mary Backus Rankin, Early 
Chinese Revolutionaries: Radical Intellectuals in Shanghai and Chekiang, 1902- 
1911, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971.
I^ adopted this definition of radicalism from Michael Freeman, Edmund Burke and 
the Critique o f Political Radicalism, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980, p. 
3.
181
of 1911. It then developed into the intensified, Western-oriented intellectual ferment 
of the New Culture Movement, which began in 1915, and into the anti-imperialism of 
the May Fourth Movement of 1919. Left-wing movements, such as the Anarchist 
movement and the early Communist movement, were later manifestations in the 
1920s/
The form of radicalism Yen Fu confronted was mainly the one presented by 
the nationalist revolutionaries of the first two decades of the twentieth century. The 
nationalist revolutionary movement emerged in the early 1900s in terms of 
organization and ideology.^ Several factors contributed to the surge of the 
revolutionary movement. On the one hand, the failure of the 1898 reform and the 
humiliation of having Westem troops occupy Peking during the Boxer uprising 
stirred strong feelings of frustration and anger, especially among young intellectuals, 
towards the Ch’ing government. The government was viewed by many as 
incompetent and unwilling to undertake fundamental reforms to save China from 
foreign inroads. This frustration and anger quickly turned to radical sentiments. On 
the other hand, the development of modem schools and a flood of Chinese students 
studying abroad, particularly in Japan, brought up a new class of intelligentsia who 
were more and more radicalized through their access to Westem ideas and 
institutions.® From 1901, Chinese students in Japan started to organize various 
societies and publish joumals to propagate ideas in favour of the anti-Manchu 
revolution. This revolutionary enthusiasm quickly spread to mainland China. By 
1905, more than one hundred revolutionary publications appeared in Shanghai alone.^
'‘Mary Backus Rankin, Early Chinese Revolutionaries: Radical Intellectuals in 
Shanghai and Chekiang, 1902-1911, p. 6.
^Michael Gasster, Chinese Intellectuals and the Revolution o f 1911, p. 28.
^Chinese students were sent to Japan as early as in 1896. The number of the 
students reached its highest in 1905 and 1906 with estimate between 8,000 to 20,000. 
See Marius Jansen, 'Japan and the Chinese Revolution of 191T, in The Cambridge 
History o f China, vol. 11,pp. 348-53.
^Michael Gasster, Chinese Intellectuals and the Revolution o f 1911, p. 42; also see, 
Mary Backus Rankin, Early Chinese Revolutionaries: Radical Intellectuals in 
Shanghai and Chekiang, 1902-1911, pp. 48-72.
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In August 1905, under Sun Yat-sen's leadership, various revolutionary organizations 
were united to form 'the Revolutionary Alliance' {Tung-meng-hui) in Tokyo, which 
was 'China's first modem political party'/
Also during the early 1900s, revolutionary ideology began to take shape. This 
ideology was not systematic and coherent in any sense.^ Revolutionaries were more 
certain about what they wanted to destroy than what they wanted to create. The basic 
goals of the revolution were summed up by Sun Yat-sen as the Three People's 
Principles', namely 'min-tsu chu-f (people's national consciousness, or nationalism), 
'min-ch'mn chu-f (people's rights, or democracy) and 'min-sheng chu-f (people's 
livelihood, or socialism). The realization of these three goals, as Sun spelled them 
out, required a revolution with three dimensions: a national revolution to overthrow 
the mle of the Manchu minority, a political revolution to remove the monopoly of 
power by the monarch and to establish a republic, and a social revolution aimed to 
abolish the monopoly of wealth by the rich.*® The French and American revolutions 
provided the revolutionaries with the most valuable precedents. A more recent model 
was found in Russian nihilism, anarchism, and extreme populism.**
Yen Fu adopted what can be called a middle course' between the traditional 
conservative and the new radical positions. On the one hand, he challenged traditional 
political ideas and institutions. On the other hand, he was increasingly alarmed by the 
growing influence of radical ideas, and began to confront radicalism at the beginning 
of the century. In this struggle on two fronts. Yen outlined his vision of political 
change in China based largely on the British model. The core of this vision was to 
achieve a liberal, and, to some extent, democratic political system through piecemeal 
reform.
Yen Fu's political ideas have not yet received proper treatment by scholars
*Mary Clabaugh Wright, Introduction: the Rising Tide of Change', in China in 
Revolution: the First Phase, 1900-1913, ed, Mary Clabaugh Wright, p. 46.
"Ibid., pp. 47-8.
*®Michael Gasster, Chinese Intellectuals and the Revolution o f 1911, p. 107.
**Don C. Price, Russia and the Roots o f the Chinese Revolution, 1896-1911, 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974, pp. 193-212.
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either in China or in the West. Chinese scholars have often confused Yen Fu's 
criticism of radicalism with traditional conservatism, thus equating Yen's opposition 
to radicalism to his opposition to liberal and democratic reforms.*  ^Westem scholars, 
notably Schwartz, put undue weight on the influence of social Darwinism on Yen Fu 
and overemphasized the nationalistic concern of Yen's liberalism. They thus failed to 
understand Yen's serious effort to transplant Westem liberal and democratic systems 
to the Chinese soil, while also failing to discem any significant differences between 
Yen Fu and various forms of radicalism.
To address these shortcomings in the study of Yen Fu, the following three 
chapters provide a comprehensive account of Yen Fu's political ideas. They examine 
Yen Fu's ideas of liberty, law and democracy with a focus on Yen's theoretical 
reflections on traditional Chinese political ideas and institutions as well as his 
contemplation of modem Westem liberal and democratic ideas. They also examine 
how Yen's ideas of political reform fared in a rapidly changing era.
‘^ Most notably, Wang Shih, Yen Fu Chuang (Biography of Yen Fu); Chou Cheng- 
fu. Yen Fu ssu-hsiang shu-p'ing (A critical interpretation of Yen Fu's thought).
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Chapter V 
Liberty, Virtue and Law
In his first published essay of 1895 entitled 'On the Speed of World Change', 
Yen Fu claimed that the fundamental difference between traditional Chinese culture 
and Westem culture lay in their different positions on the issue of freedom:
The idea of freedom has been deeply feared by our sages and therefore 
has never been adopted as a doctrine. Westem people, by contrast, 
believe that man has some endowed rights, particularly the right of 
freedom. Every man is supposed to have freedom, and every nation 
too. They try hard to prevent these freedoms from being violated. 
Violation of a man's freedom is regarded as breaching the principles of 
heaven {t'ien-li) and the way of man (Jen-tao). ... Therefore, it is 
prohibited, even for a monarch, to violate a man's freedom. Their laws 
and punishment are aimed mainly at protecting the fireedom of the 
people.*
Many other differences between China and the modem West, Yen Fu 
suggested, could be understood from the perspective of their different attitudes 
towards freedom:
From the difference over the issue of freedom, there arises a whole 
host of other differences. To mention but a few:...while China highly 
values conformity, the West highly values diversity; while China has 
many taboos, the West encourages people to express their opinions and 
dissatisfactions; while China esteems a simple existence, the West 
favours the enjoyment of life; while China prizes moderation and
*CYFW, vol. 1, p. 3.
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self-restraint, the West honours self-assertion.^
A month later, in another essay. The Root of Strength', Yen Fu again 
highlighted the importance of respect for individual freedom in modem Westem 
social, economic, and political systems. He used the old Chinese 
'foundation-functional' {t'i-yung) dichotomy to suggest that the modem Westem 
political system was built on two important principles: freedom and democracy, of 
which freedom was the foundation and democracy the functional.^
Yen Fu was probably the first person in modem China who regarded respect 
for individual liberty as the comerstone of modem Westem culture and institutions. 
Before him, there had been numerous intellectuals who advocated leaming from the 
West on various grounds. Of the most discussed and admired aspects of the West 
were its democratic ideas and institutions. As we will show later, modem Chinese 
intellectuals generally were more receptive to Westem democratic ideas than to 
liberal values. Most intellectuals in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
envisioned a society with some democratic institutions. Yet few regarded individual 
liberty as an indispensable element of an ideal society. This phenomenon was 
probably related to the neglect of the interest of the individual within the Confucian 
tradition. As we have noted earlier, Confucianism generally emphasized kung (public) 
over ssu (private). Under the influence of this tradition, modem Chinese intellectuals 
generally demonstrated great sensitivity to Westem democracy and perceived it to be 
a mechanism for achieving wider involvement in public affairs. By contrast, they 
identified individual freedom with ssu  ^ which had associations with selfishness. 
Because he had lived in Britain and knew something of Westem liberalism. Yen Fu 
discemed the prominence of individual freedom in modem Westem society and thus 
emphasized the importance of liberty for an ideal society more than his intellectual 
predecessors and contemporaries.
Nevertheless, Yen Fu's conception of liberty as presented in his essays in 1895 
was quite mdimentary. He did not spell out clearly what he meant by 'freedom', nor
"Ibid.
’Ibid., p. 23.
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did he discuss how to transplant Westem liberal ideals into China's soil. It was not 
until his translation of Mill's On Liberty that his idea of liberty began to take shape. 
As we have shown earlier, Yen Fu started to translate Mill's work in 1899 and 
finished the initial draft in 1900. The manuscript was initially lost during the Boxer 
Rebellion when Yen Fu was forced to flee Tientsin to Shanghai, and was later found 
by a Westem friend. Yen published the translation in 1903 with a few minor changes, 
including the change of title from On Liberty to Ch'un-chi ch’uan-chieh lun (On the 
boundaries of the rights of society and of the individual).'*
The significance of Yen Fu's translation of Mill's work as well as his change 
of title has been the subject of controversy. Yen Fu's biographer Chou Chen-fii 
interpreted Yen's change of title to represent Yen's retreat from his early idea of 
liberty.^ Lin Tzai-Chueh went even further by suggesting that Yen Fu's link between 
liberty and control indicated that he was committed to a 'social Darwinian 
collectivism'.^ Schwartz, by contrast, emphasized the persistent nationalistic nature of 
Yen Fu's notion of freedom which was supposedly derived from Spencer's social 
Darwinism. Schwartz thus dismissed any important influence which Mill might have 
had on Yen Fu's idea of liberty.^
I would tend here to agree with the assertion by Chou and Lin that Yen Fu's 
translation of Mill's work, including his change of title, represented a significant 
change in his position on the issue of freedom. Yet I would argue that this change did 
not represent a retreat from the idea of liberty, but rather signified the maturity of 
Yen's thought about liberty. With the translation of Mill's work. Yen began to
'*Yen Fu, Ch'un-chi ch'uan-chieh lun (On the boundaries of the rights of society 
and of the individual, A translation of John Stuart Mill's On Liberty), p. viii.
^Chou Chen-fu, Yen Fu ssu-hsiang shu-p'ing (A critical interpretation of Yen Fu's 
thought), p. 199.
®Lin Tzai-chueh, Yen Fu ti tzu-yu kuan' (Yen Fu's understanding of freedom', in 
The Bulletin ofTung-hai University, Taipei, 1983, p. 100.
^Schwartz believed that Yen Fu's change of the title of his translation of On Liberty 
was nothing more than an abbreviation of his translation of chapter iv of the original, 
"of the limits of the authority of society over the individual'". (Schwartz, In Search o f  
Wealth and Power, p. 144).
187
apprehend some fundamental principles of modem Westem liberalism. Mill's On 
Liberty taught him that individual freedom was valuable both for the wellbeing of the 
individual and for society. More importantly, it equipped him with weapons to 
combat two extreme views about liberty: traditional conservatism and radicalism. Yen 
Fu regarded both as harmful to China's progress.
In the last ten years, more and more people in China are applying 
themselves to studying Westem politics. In consequence, the doctrine 
of freedom can often be heard among scholar-officials. The 
conservatives were frightened by the doctrine and regard it as the great 
scourge. The lovers of the new doctrine, on the other hand, cannot 
understand the meaning of liberty at all and think of it in terms of 
unbridled license and recklessness. With the view that both of these 
two extremes are wrong, I am publishing my earlier translation of 
Mill's book, with a change of title from On Liberty to On the 
Boundaries o f the Rights o f Society and o f the Individual. There are 
many theories on liberty not all of which are included in Mill's book. 
Nevertheless, only if we understand the boundaries of the rights of 
society and of the individual, can the doctrine of liberty be applied.*
In addition to Mill's work. Yen Fu also drew extensively from Adam Smith's 
The Wealth o f Nations and Montesquieu's The Spirit o f the Laws^ both of which he 
translated into Chinese in the 1900s. Smith's theories of private economy and a free 
market formed the basis of Yen's economic liberalism. The main influence of 
Montesquieu's theory on Yen Fu's idea of liberty was the former's idea of linking 
freedom with the law.
*CYFW, vol. 1, pp. 131-2.
188
nYen Fu's idea of liberty followed from his definition of 'liberty'. Because the 
notion of 'liberty' was alien to traditional Chinese political thought, great confusion 
over its meaning characterized Chinese intellectual thinking at the turn of the century. 
There was both great excitement about the idea of liberty in the Chinese intellectual 
world and little understanding of it. As Yen Fu observed, all of those things which 
brought about people's happiness have been called liberty, even those which are 
entirely unrelated to liberty.'^
Yen Fu believed that the ambiguous usage of 'liberty' would not only hinder a 
scientific examination of the issue of liberty, but, more importantly, would mislead 
others to go in the wrong direction in the name of liberty. Therefore he felt necessary 
to clarify the concept. The first step of any scientific discussions is to clarify the 
concept {cheng-ming) ' U s i n g  a Confucian phrase. Yen also wrote that if concept 
{ming) is not clarified {cheng)y people will not know where to put hand and foot.'"
In his political lectures' of 1906, Yen Fu spent two lectures almost 
exclusively on clarifying the concept of liberty. He complained that ideas which were 
not related to freedom had been discussed under the name of freedom. For instance, 
freedom had been used to refer to a situation in which a country was free from 
domination by other countries." The fight for a country's independence was 
incorrectly deemed a fight for freedom. Yen Fu suggested. To defend one's country 
should be properly called defending national independence rather than defending 
freedom." National independence might mean freedom for individuals, but it could
’Yen Fu, 'Political Lectures' (1906), CYFW, vol. 5, p. 1280. 
*®CYFW, p. 1247.
"ibid., p. 1282, for Confucius' remark, see The Analects, 13:3, trans. D.C. Lau, p. 
118.
"CYFW, vol. 5, p. 1289.
"Ibid., p. 1281.
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mean tyranny for them too.’'* Secondly, freedom had been used to refer to a situation 
in which the government had to be accountable to its people/^ This meaning, Yen Fu 
suggested, should be properly termed democracy. Thirdly, some claimed that freedom 
meant kung-tao (Justice or fairness), but Yen considered this meaning confusing.*^
Yen Fu held that the idea of freedom was exclusively about the individual - 
individual action according to his will. He used an old Chinese term tzu-yu to 
translate liberty' or 'freedom'.*^ He explained the meaning he hoped to convey by 
this term:
'Liberty' (tzu-yu) originates from the old word libertas which was the 
name of a deity. The word liberty' is often interchangeable with the 
word 'freedom'. It literally means to be without restriction and is the 
antonym of slavery', subjection', bondage' and 'necessity'.’*
To be sure, various forms of restraint confronted the individual's actions. The 
absence of any form of restraint thus might be referred to as freedom. Yen illustrated 
assorted meanings of freedom in the West by drawing examples from several British 
writers' conceptions:
’Ibid., pp. 1281-2.
’Ibid., p. 1289.
’"CYFW, vol. 1, p. 132.
’^ The term tzu-yu literally means to follow one's own inclination', (de Bary, The 
Liberal Tradition in China, Hongkong: The Chinese University Press, 1983, p. 43.) 
Grieder renders it to mean 'free-and-easy-do-what-you-will-ism'. (Jerome B. Grieder, 
Intellectuals and the State in Modern China, p. 241.) The origin of the term tzu-yu 
can be traced to Cheng Huan's (127-200 B.C.) notes to The Book o f Rites, where he 
first used tzu (self) and (act) together in his phrase one is afraid of advancing and 
retreating freely (tzu-yu)', see Ch’i-yuan (Dictionary of the origins of words, new 
edition, Peking: Commercial Press, 1979, vol.3, p. 2583.)
’*CYFW, vol. 1, p. 132; the terms liberty', 'freedom', 'slavery', 'subjection', 
necessity' and justice' were originally in English.
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When the French Revolution broke out,... a famous English writer, 
Coleridge, composed a poem to praise it. He claimed that real freedom 
is just like white clouds floating in the sky freely at will. He felt that 
the French Revolution had removed restrictions from people and 
enabled them to act freely like white clouds.... Another famous English 
writer, J. Ruskin, however, repudiated Coleridge's view. He pointed 
out that white clouds seem to float freely, but they in fact follow the 
laws of gravity and the laws of optics and thermodynamics. They are 
controlled strictly by those laws, and have no freedom at all. ... 
Another English writer, Shelley, wrote in 1820 about the condition of 
the English working people. He suggested that in a free country there 
should be no hungry people. He held that the meaning of freedom 
should include the right of people to enjoy a comfortable life.*^
It is noteworthy that the examples Yen Fu mentioned here in fact touched on 
some major controversies concerning the concept of freedom in modem Westem 
philosophy: freedom versus necessity, as well as negative freedom versus positive 
freedom.
Yen Fu maintained that with regard to freedom, political scientists ought not 
to concem themselves with whether the individual can have free will against 
necessity, or about whether he has sufficient resources to fulfil his will. Rather they 
should address the individual's freedom from restraints of others. He thus defined 
freedom as a state in which the individual can do whatever he wants to do without 
restrictions imposed by others.^ ® By the restrictions of others. Yen Fu referred mainly 
to those restraints imposed by the state and society on the individual.
If an individual could act freely without any restraints of others whatsoever, 
his freedom is called 'perfect freedom'.^' Perfect freedom implies a state of anarchy
'"CYFW, vol. 5, p. 1281. 
'«C'iTW, vol. 5, pp. 1279,1299.
^'Yen Fu, Ch'un-chi ch'uan-chieh lun (A translation of John Stuart Mill's On 
Liberty), p. vii.
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where no government exists/^ Yen pointed out that various philosophers both in 
China and in the West envisioned the ideal state as an anarchical state where people 
lived harmoniously and freely. However, such a state had never existed before. It 
would probably not exist in the future unless man’s intellectual and moral character 
was fundamentally changed.^  ^ Yen Fu remarked that even in the most civilized 
societies man’s moral character did not allow an anarchical society to work. Man was 
not always able to respect the liberty of others. Thus, 'i f  his liberty is without 
limitation, he and others will conflict with each other and society will became a 
battlefield.'^"*
As a student of utilitarianism. Yen Fu held that the purpose of a man’s life was 
to seek happiness both for himself and for others. Freedom did not necessarily lead to 
the happiness either of the individual or of soc i e tyTo  be sure, man values freedom 
and enjoys it. Yet, man values other good things too, such as social harmony, security 
and economic prosperitySometimes, freedom would enhance his overall happiness 
and the general happiness of the society; but sometimes it would harm them.^  ^
Individual and social wellbeing depended on the balance of freedom and other 
desirable values. This required the balance of individual freedom with the restraint on 
this freedom imposed by the state and the society. In this sense, the individual’s 
freedom in society was limited, where perfect freedom was not.^* He wrote:
Freedom is to do whatever one wants to do. Control is to subject an
individual’s behaviour to the demands of social welfare and to restrain
""CYFW, vol. 5, p. 1289. 
""CYFW, vol. 5, p. 1290. 
""Ibid.
""CYFW, vol. 5, p. 1288. 
""CYFW, vol. 5, p. 1279. 
""CYFW, vol. 5, p. 1288. 
""Ibid.
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the individual freedom for the sake of society. Thus, although freedom 
is the highest happiness of an individual, it must be restrained with 
controls in order to achieve the greatest happiness of the greatest 
number when the individual enters society. By controlling the 
individual totally without leaving room for his freedom, society cannot 
develop; by pursuing freedom without restriction, society will have no 
order. The task of the politician and political scientist is to balance 
these two aspects and to have them complement rather than conflict 
with each other.^’
Thus Yen Fu indicated that the issue of freedom was not whether the 
individual should be free, but rather about in what sphere he should and should not be 
free. The central issue of freedom was to draw a line of demarcation between the two 
spheres: one in which the individual could act freely and the other in which the 
individual was subject to social and state controls. This was the single most important 
idea Yen learned from Mill and reveals why Yen changed the title of Mill's work to 
On the Boundaries o f the Rights o f Society and o f the Individual. Yen wrote:
When a person enters society, all his actions can be divided into two 
parts: one subject to the will of others, the other subject to his own 
will. Under various political regimes, the balance of these two parts 
varies. Some people are more subject to the will of others, while others 
are more subject to their own wills. The latter are called free people; 
the former are not free.^ ®
This definition of liberty established Yen Fu's position as a liberal pioneer in 
modem China. Isaiah Berlin once remarked that the essence of modem English 
political philosophy regarding freedom lies in defining freedom in a negative sense. 
Following from this definition, 'a  frontier must be drawn between the area of private
""CYFW, vol. 5, p. 1279. 
'®Ibid.
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life and that of public authority'.^* This definition of freedom, as George G. Brenkert 
indicated, constitutes 'the heart and the life blood of liberal freedom'/^ Yen Fu’s 
definition of freedom as not subject to the restraints of others and particularly his 
distinction between the rights of the individual and those of government and society 
as the basis of freedom, touches upon the essence of modem English liberal thought.
m
Yen Fu's definition of freedom was the basis of his ideas of liberty. Based on 
this definition, he criticized traditional Chinese political systems and ideas on the one 
hand, while refuting radical ideas of liberty on the other.
Yen Fu primarily criticized China’s social and political systems. He 
maintained that throughout China’s history, the Chinese people had little political or 
social freedom in comparison with the modem West. There were two causes for this 
lack of freedom. First, there was a lack of distinction between the rights of the 
individual and those of the govemment. Secondly, life was dominated by traditional 
rites (JLi).
Yen Fu perceived the enormous scope of state power in China to be the main 
threat to the people’s freedom. His view was obviously influenced by some Westem 
liberal thinkers. Many Westem liberals of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
believed that one of the fundamental problems of China’s political system was the 
state’s enormous power.^  ^Montesquieu defined China’s political system as despotic, a 
system in which 'man is a creature that blindly submits to the absolute will of the 
sovereign.’^"* Yen Fu was certainly impressed by the Westem liberals’ criticism of the
^*Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty’ in Four Essays on Liberty^ Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1970, pp. 123-4.
^^George G. Brenkert, Political Freedom^ London: Routledge, 1991, p. 65.
” Karl Bunger, Forward’ to The Scope o f State Power in China  ^ ed. S. R. Schram, 
London: School of Oriental and African Studies Press, 1985, p. xxi.
^"^Montesquieu, The Spirit o f the Laws, trans. Thomas Nugent, New York: Hafher 
Press, 1949, vol. 1, Bk 111:10, p. 27.
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excessive state power in China, and he expressed similar views of his own:
The Westem and Chinese systems are very different. People's rights 
therefore differ greatly. A King in the West only performs the duty of 
sovereign. China's emperor, by contrast, acts not only as a sovereign, 
but also as a teacher. Chinese society, therefore, is patriarchal, or 
paternalistic. In the West the king as sovereign only takes care of 
military and legal affairs. Other things, like rites, religion, industry, 
agriculture, husbandry, commerce, education, and literature, are all left 
to people to do by themselves. China's political rulers, from emperor to 
local officials, all serve the duties relating to heaven, earth, mling, 
rites, and education.^^
Yen Fu often used the term 'patriarchal' or 'paternalistic' to describe China's 
political system. He perceived the emperor in China to act as the father in a family. 
The emperor had the right, or, perhaps, the duty to take care of every aspect of the 
people's lives. He functioned both as a monarch' (chun) and as a teacher' (shih): he 
was responsible for the administration of state affairs as well as for supervising 
people's thought and behaviour. Either through education, often by setting up models, 
or through punishment, the emperors told people how to think and how to behave.^ ® 
Under such a system, people could hardly have freedoms or rights. Their consciences 
and behaviour were all subject to the interference of the rulers:
Our China's system, even in its most successful times, is far from the 
way (tao) as defined by Westem thinkers. Chinese people, at their 
best, are the sons of a patemalistic govemment. Under this 
patemalistic govemment, how can people have autonomy? ... We 
cannot help but sigh with emotion when reading Mill's discussion 
about the boundaries between the rights of the individual and the
"'CYFW, vol. 4, p. 928. 
"^CYFW, vol. 4, pp. 910-1.
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state/^
In addition to the enormous state power in traditional China, Yen Fu argued 
that customs and rites (li) in China also hindered people's freedom enormously. Yen 
Fu might have been shocked when he read Mill’s characterization of China as 
representing the extreme case of 'the despotism of custom' in On Liberty:
Custom is there in all things, the formal appeal; justice and right mean 
conformity to custom; the argument of custom no one, unless some 
tyrant intoxicated with power, thinks of resisting. And we see the 
result. Those nations must once have had originality; they did not start 
out of the ground populous, lettered, and versed in many of the arts of 
life; they made themselves all this, and were then the greatest and most 
powerful nations of the world. What are they now? The subjects or 
dependents of tribes whose forefathers wandered in the forests when 
theirs had magnificent palaces and gorgeous temples, but over whom 
custom exercised only a divided rule with liberty and progress. A 
people, it appears, may be progressive for a certain length of time, and 
then stop.^*
Yen Fu did not provide much commentary in his translation of Mill's On 
Liberty. But he did comment briefly in his marginal summary of the paragraph just 
quoted that the following paragraph outlines the danger of custom.'^’ Yen also 
praised similar remarks of Montesquieu on China in his translation of The Spirit o f  
the Laws. Yen agreed with Montesquieu's statement that rites in China fimctioned to
^^Yen Fu, Fa-yi (A translation of Montesquieu's The Spirit o f the Laws), Bk IXX,
p. 18.
*^J.S. Mill, On Liberty, in Utilitarianism, on Liberty and Considerations on 
Representative Government, ed., H. B. Acton, London: Everyman's Library, 1972, p. 
139.
’^Yen Fu, Ch'un-chi ch'uan-chieh lun (A translation of John Stuart Mill's On 
Liberty), p. 26.
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combine religion, ceremony and custom, thus having a great negative influence on 
people’s freedom/® Yen compared the rites and customs of China with religion in the 
West in their influence on individual liberty:
In the West the most difficult area for freedom of speech is religion.
This is why Mill's discussions of freedom often take religion as an 
example. In China, our ethics, rites and sage’s teachings are similar to 
their religion and are even more intolerant of freedom of speech than 
religion in the West.^*
Yen Fu held tight state control and suppression by custom and rites on 
people’s freedom as responsible for the overall underdevelopment of the Chinese 
people’s moral and intellectual capacities. After this long history of suppression, 
people lost the motivation to pursue freedom, self-autonomy, and innovation. 'They 
are bound by tradition, confined by custom, and controlled by the sage’s teachings.’ 
'They do not think with their minds and only follow ancient ancestors. They consider 
it right to follow the ancients and wrong to differ from them.’^ ^
Yen Fu believed the people’s moral and intellectual development to be the 
fundamental causes of a strong, prosperous, and well-organized society. By blaming 
the lack of freedom for underdevelopment of the people’s moral and intellectual 
capacities. Yen Fu linked individual liberty with the rise and decline of a civilization. 
This linkage of liberty with the development of society bore great similarity to Mill’s 
discussions of freedom. Mill, following Tocqueville, perceived the danger of tyranny 
of the majority to be too ready submission’ and servility’ which would lead to 
Chinese stagnation’.'*^ Mill expressed this idea clearly in On Liberty:
'*®Yen Fu, Fa-yi (A translation of Montesquieu’s The Spirit o f the Laws), Bk IXX,
p. 18.
'**Yen Fu, Ch'un-chi ch'uan-chieh lun (A translation of John Stuart Mill’s On 
Liberty), p. viii.
'*^ Yen Fu, Fa-yi (A translation o f Montesquieu’s The Spirit o f  the Laws), Bk IXX,
p. 2.
'*^ John Robson, The Improvement o f Mankind, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
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We have a warning example in China - a nation of much talent, and, in 
some respects, even wisdom, ... They are remarkable, too, in the 
excellence of their apparatus for impressing, as far as possible, the best 
wisdom they possess upon every mind in the community, and securing 
that those who have appropriated most of it shall occupy the posts of 
honour and power. Surely the people who did this have discovered the 
secret of human progressiveness, and must have kept themselves 
steadily at the head of the movement of the world. On the contrary, 
they have become stationary - have remained so for thousands of 
years; and if they are ever to be farther improved, it must be by 
foreigners. They have succeeded beyond all hope in what English 
philanthropists are so industriously working at - in making a people all 
alike, all governing their thoughts and conduct by the same maxims 
and rules; and these are the fruits. The modem régime of public 
opinion is, in an unorganized form, what the Chinese educational and 
political systems are in an organized; and unless individuality shall be 
able successfully to assert itself against this yoke, Europe, 
notwithstanding its antecedents and its professed Christianity, will tend 
to become another China."*^
IV
In order to revitalize Chinese civilization and rebuild Chinese society. Yen Fu 
argued that there must be a fundamental reform of China's social, economic and 
political system based on the principle of liberty. The key to this reform was to define 
certain spheres for individual action without restraint from either the state or society. 
Yen Fu suggested that Mill's ideas of liberty provided the basic criterion for
1968,p. 111.
"‘"‘j. S. Mill, On Liberty, p. 140.
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drawing boundaries between the rights of the individual and those of the state and 
society. In one of his marginal comments to his translation of Mill's work, Yen 
praised Mill's famous 'one very simple principle' as presenting the fundamental 
principle of liberty by clarifying the boundaries between the rights of the individual 
and those of society'."*^  Mill's original text reads:
The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle, as 
entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual 
in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means used be 
physical force in the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of 
public opinion. That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind 
are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the 
liberty of action of any of their numbers, is self-protection. That the 
only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any 
member of civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to 
others. ... The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is 
amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which 
merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over 
himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign."*^
In theory. Yen Fu seemed to accept wholeheartedly Mill's principle as a 
general guideline for dealing with individual freedom in society. In his translation of 
On Liberty^ he added a short paragraph:
An individual's speech and action should not be subject to social
'‘^ Yen Fu, Ch'un-chi ch'uan-chieh lun (A translation of John Stuart Mill's On 
Liberty), p. 10.
'‘^ J. S. Mill, On Liberty, p. 78. The terms 'self-regarding' and other-regarding' will 
be used hereafter to refer to actions concerning only the actor and actions concerning 
others respectively. For discussions on Mill's distinction between these two actions, 
see J. C. Rees, A Re-reading of Mill On Liberty', Political Studies, vol. viii. No. 2, 
(1960); C. L. Ten, Mill On Liberty, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980.
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control unless his action concerns others and society. If his action does 
not concern others, he has full sovereignty over himself, his will and 
action. This sovereignty is as absolute as the sovereignty of an 
independent country
However, there were some subtle differences between Yen Fu and Mill. For 
Mill, the state and society were warranted in interfering with the individual's action 
only if the individual's action harmed others 'directly and in the first instance'.'** For 
Yen Fu, the individual could act freely only in the sphere that strictly concerned 
himself and nobody else. Even if the individual's action did not harm others or society 
directly, his actions might be of issue if they somehow concerned others or society. 
He wrote:
In the West, one can act freely so long one's action concerns only 
oneself. In such a case, nobody should interfere. However, when one's 
action concerns {she) society, everyone has the right to question it.'*’
This subtle difference in theory yielded some interesting differences in 
discussions of concrete areas in which the individual should have freedom. Like Mill, 
Yen Fu discussed three spheres in which the individual might act freely : 1) liberty 
of conscience in the most comprehensive sense'; 2) liberty of tastes and pursuits'; 3) 
freedom to unite, for any purpose not involving harm to others'.^ ®
Yen Fu agreed with Mill almost completely on liberty of conscience. Yen had 
a firm commitment to freedom of thought and speech throughout his lifetime. He 
maintained that 'the fundamental principle of jurisprudence is that law can be
'*^ Yen Fu, Ch'un-chi ch'uan-chieh lun (A translation of John Stuart Mill's On 
Liberty), p . 11; for Mill's original text, see. On Liberty, p. 78.
'**J.S. Mill, On Liberty, p. 80. Italics are mine.
'•’C'iTW, vol. 4, p. 994.
50Ibid., pp. 80-81.
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imposed only on actions.'^* Speech and thought were said not to be actions. Thus, 
speech and thought should be entirely resolved by the individual himself and rulers 
should not interfere with them. Tf a ruler puts control on thought and speech, his rule 
will degenerate into despotic rule, and the people will no longer have freedom.'^^
Yen Fu identified two possible barriers to be removed in order to protect 
people's freedom of thought and speech. The first was the suppression of freedom of 
thought and speech by political authorities which was historically well-established in 
China. The second barrier which Yen Fu noted with alarm was the intolerance of 
increasingly radicalized public opinion. Beginning in the early 1900s, Yen realized 
that the major threat to the freedom of thought, speech and press came not from the 
increasingly demoralized Ch'ing government, but from newly-emerged radical 
movements. He believed that because radicals upheld such popular principles as 
liberty, democracy, and nationalism they gained greater moral authority than the 
Ch'ing government. Their intolerance of dissident ideas could be devastating to 
freedom of thought and speech. Yen Fu once angrily criticized a renowned figure in 
the reform movement of 1898 who wanted to punish a conservative official for 
writing against reform. He asked, 'You are an ardent advocate of reform. I wonder 
whether your reform will simply change the present monarchy into a lawless 
despotism or whether you really want to change it into a freer and happier system?'^  ^
Yen Fu maintained that the essence of freedom was tolerance, including tolerance of 
conservative, even reactionary opinion. '^* In a free society, everyone pursued truth 
freely and loved truth regardless of whether it was expressed by friends or enemies.
Freedom of speech, properly speaking, is nothing but speaking 
honestly in pursuit of the truth. On the one hand, one should not be 
constrained by the ancient sages; on the other hand, one should not
"'Ibid., p. 271.
""Ibid.
""Ibid., p. 272.
""CYFW, vol. l,p . 119.
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bend to authorities. Even if one's enemy speaks the truth, one should 
not ignore it; even if one’s emperor or father speaks wrongly, one 
should not accept it. This is what freedom means. Aristotle once 
remarked, T love my teacher Plato more than others, but I love the 
truth more than Plato.'^^
Yen Fu justified freedom of speech by two different arguments. First, he 
argued that freedom of speech and the press could play a role in checking the abuses 
of power by the authorities and thereby protect people's interests. In his translation of 
Mill's chapter 'O f the Liberty of Thought and Discussion', Yen Fu changed Mill's 
opening sentences to express this view. Mill's original text reads: The time, it is to be 
hoped, is gone by, when any defence would be necessary of the "liberty of the press" 
as one of the securities against corrupt or tyrannical govemment.'^^ Yen Fu's 
translation reads:
In Britain, people no longer suffer from corruption of officials and the 
tyranny of the rulers. Is this not the consequence of the freedom of the 
press? The people there have been enjoying this freedom for a long 
time.... The idea of freedom of the press has become an established 
belief.^^
Secondly, Yen Fu concurred with Mill in taking freedom of thought to be the 
only way to reach the truth. Mill's philosophical basis for advocating freedom of 
thought is the assumption of human fallibility. Given that no one can rightfully claim 
to know anything for certain. Mill developed his instrumental argument for freedom 
of thought as a means to the discovery of truth. Following Mill's argument Yen Fu
^^Yen Fu, Ch'un-chi ch'mn-chieh lun (A translation of John Stuart Mill's On 
Liberty)^ p. ix.
^®J.S. Mill, On Liberty^ p. 83.
^^Yen Fu, Ch'un-chi ch'uan-chieh lun (A translation of John Stuart Mill's On 
Liberty), p. 16.
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also maintained that freedom of thought provided the only way to reach truth, and 
promoted the development of an individual's intellectual ability.
While Yen Fu was firmly committed to freedom of thought, speech, and press, 
he was unenthusiastic in accepting freedom of association for political purposes. He 
seemed to regard any political action as a concern not only of the individual, but also 
of society as a whole. Therefore, such actions should be regulated by the state. A 
notable example was his criticism of the party system.^*
One issue which best demonstrated the dilemma of Yen Fu's ideas about 
freedom was the issue of what Mill called 'liberty of taste'. To some extent. Yen Fu 
was committed to the value of liberty of taste'. He held that an individual had 
sovereignty over his will and behaviour so long as his behaviour did not involve 
others and society. Thus, Yen regarded difference in life styles' as a purely personal 
matter best left to the individual to decide. He wrote:
Where the individual should not act freely is in his actions concerning 
society. In the sphere of the individual's self-regarding actions (hsiao- 
chi chih tzu-yu) which do not concern others, the individual should act 
freely regardless of whether his actions are morally right. Law should 
prohibit those actions which harm others. It should not interfere with 
the individual's life style which only concerns the individual himself.
For instance, some women like to go to the temple to worship; some 
fnvolous youths like long hair, and different people like to wear 
different clothes. All of these actions involve people's life styles and 
thus belong in the self-regarding category. The ruler should not treat 
those actions in the same manner as he treats actions such as gambling 
or blackmail. He should not punish them.^’
^*CYFW, vol. 2, pp. 298-308. A more detailed discussion of Yen Fu's view on 
party system will be provided in the next chapter.
’^Yen Fu, Fa-yi (A translation o f Montesquieu's The Spirit o f  the Laws), Bk IXX,
p. 14-5.
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In the preceding, Yen Fu clearly stated that the individual freedom to choose a 
life style was above interference regardless of whether this life style was morally 
right. As a scholar with profound knowledge of traditional Chinese thought, Yen Fu 
certainly knew the Confucian position on individual behaviour. Confucianism 
endowed all human behaviour with certain moral implications. As Hsieh Yu-Wei 
observed, for Confucianism man's freedom of choice implied only 'the freedom to do 
good or the freedom to choose what is good’.^ Probably with this idea in mind. Yen 
Fu wrote:
So-called freedom usually means freedom to do good, rather than to do 
evil. However, in defining the concept of freedom, freedom must 
imply the freedom to do evil. Only by such a definition can the content 
of freedom be regarded as complete. Only if an individual chooses 
good or evil by himself, can his good action be rewarded and evil 
action be punished. Moreover, it is difficult to decide which is good 
and which is evil. It is often the case that what others regard as evil, 
the individual regards as good; when others regard something as good, 
he regards it as evil. This is why the individual's freedom in 
self-regarding action must be allowed and any interference must be 
avoided.^*
Clearly, Yen Fu departed from Confucianism and came close to certain 
important principles of modem Western liberalism. In particular, his notion that the 
choice of values was up to the individual himself was close to what Anthony 
Arblaster called the liberal conception of the moral life' - that values are not woven 
into the fabric of the universe.... The individual must choose his values for himself.
% sieh Yu-wei, The Status of the Individual in Chinese Ethics', in Charles A. 
Moore ed.. The Chinese Mind, Honolulu: University of Hawaii: East-West Centre 
Press, 1967, p. 310.
’^Yen Fu, Ch'un-chi ch'uan-chieh lun (A translation of John Stuart Mill's On 
Liberty), p. x.
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and construct his own morality
Yet Yen Fu was far from consistent on this issue. He was tom between 
upholding individual choice and promoting individual cultivation of excellence. This 
dilemma could be most clearly seen in his discussions of Chuang Tzu's notion of 
individual free choice.
As we have indicated above, Yen Fu held that the idea of freedom was largely 
absent from traditional Chinese thought. He made this remark mainly in referring to 
traditional Confucian thought. By contrast, he showed great interest in Taoist 
philosophy and praised Taoism as containing liberal' and 'democratic' ideas.^  ^ He 
found some ideas conceptualized by Chuang Tzu to be comparable to modem 
Westem liberal ideas. He suggested that Chuang Tzu believed that 'there is no 
objective standard for good or evil', and good or evil are only expressions of the 
individual's preferences.^ He praised the philosopher's belief that everything has its 
own proper nature and can be happy if allowed to exist in accordance with that 
nature.®^  He compared this idea to the ideas of individuality and individual free choice 
as found in Mill's work.
Yen Fu, however, expressed a fundamental disagreement with Chuang Tzu's 
idea. He called it an extreme form of individualism'.^ He rejected Chuang Tzu's 
ideas because they only recognized man's desire to be free and ignored man's
“ Anthony Arblaster, The Rise and Decline o f Western Liberalism, Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1984, p. 117.
“ For Yen Fu's discussions of the Taoist idea of freedom and democracy, see 
CYFW, vol.l, p. 34; vol. 5, p. 1279; Commentary Notes on Lao Tzu' (1905, CYFW, 
vol. 4, pp. 1075-1103); Commentary Notes on Chuang Tzu' (1916, CYFW, vol. 4, 
pp. 1104-48).
“ CYFW, vol. 4, p. 1104.
“ in the first chapter of Chuang Tzu, Chuang Tzu tells a story of big fishes and 
small birds. He argues that if all things follow their own nature and do according to 
their own capacity, all are what they ought to be and equally happy. Commenting on 
Chuang Tzu's idea. Yen Fu wrote that 'the great and small both find their happiness 
following their nature' (CYFW, vol. 4, p. 1105)
“ CYFW, vol. 4, p. 1126; the term individualism' was originally used by Yen Fu in 
English.
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responsibility to family, society and humanity at large. In one of his comments on 
Chuang Tzu's idea of living according to nature, Yen wrote:
Whenever I read Chuang Tzu's chapter The Human World', I cannot 
help but pity Chuang Tzu. I will admit that this chapter contains some 
sound ideas. But in the last analysis, it only discusses how a man 
should follow his nature to make a living and to enjoy a good and long 
life. We all know that man differs from other creatures because he has 
received special favour from the heaven and earth as well as from his 
parents. As the highest creature on the earth, man has some endowed 
duties in his life. He may even be obliged to sacrifice his life for some 
benevolent and righteous courses. ... How can a man who is useless to 
others, who cares only about his own life and avoids any risk be 
regarded as the perfect man?^^
Yen Fu apparently could not escape the Confucian idea that man has to 
cultivate himself, perform his duties towards society and choose the good way of life. 
This was probably the most important point over which Yen Fu differed from the 
mainstream of Westem liberalism. Yen's overemphasis on self-cultivation prevented 
him from appreciating fully the liberal notion that 'the individual must choose his 
values for himself, and construct his own morality.'
Yen Fu, however, did not believe that either the state or society should impose 
on the individual duties towards society. Rather he believed that individual should 
cultivate himself to highest excellence through free choice. In this sense, he perceived 
individual freedom of choice and individual cultivation as compatible. He argued that 
individual freedom of choice is essential to individual cultivation. He maintained that 
freedom of choice would provide the individual with the opportunity of developing 
his moral and intellectual capacities. 'Without liberty', he wrote in his Translator's 
Preface' to Mill's On Liberty, the choice between good and evil would not proceed 
from oneself and one could only speak in terms of fortune and misfortune and the
"^C'iTW, vol. 4, p. 1109.
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people's virtue thereby would not evolve.'^*
If Yen Fu hesitated to commit himself to the value of individual freedom of 
choice, he was firm in advocating economic liberalism. Both his experiences in 
Victorian Britain and his reading of Adam Smith's economic theory led him to put 
great faith in economic liberalism, a faith unparalleled among his contemporaries. He 
emphasized private ownership, a free market and minimum government intervention.
Yen Fu's adoption of economic liberalism was to address some important 
issues confronting Chinese elites in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: 
What is the best way of developing a modem economy? How should China deal with 
Westem economic invasions? How should China confront issues such as social 
equality? At the heart of these issue was the issue of the state's role in economic and 
social life.
Historically the Chinese govemment played a rather passive role in organizing 
the economy. In contrast with its dominant role in moral and ideological affairs, the 
Chinese govemment followed laissez-faire principles and had an aversion towards 
intervention in economic matters.^  ^ This situation had changed drastically by Yen's 
time. Beginning with the 'Self-strengthening' movement of the 1870s, various 
political movements as well as ideologies began to regard the state as a positive 
instmment for implementing China's modemization programs. There were several 
schools of thought or movements which emphasized the positive role of the state in 
this respect or in others.
First, beginning in the 1870s, the Ch'ing govemment put great effort in 
initiating modemization programs in order to increase what was generally called the
^*Yen Fu, Ch'un-chi ch'uan-chieh lun (A translation of John Stuart Mill's On 
Liberty), p. viii. The English translation follows Schwartz, p. 134.
’^Max Weber, The Religion o f China: Confiicianism and Taoism, p. 79; for a 
critique of Weber's view, see Mark Elvin, 'Why China Failed to Create an 
Endogenous Capitalism: A Critique of Max Weber' Explanation', working paper No. 
25, Universiteit Van Amsterdam, Antropolisch-Sociologisch Centrum, p. 14.
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wealth and strength of the nation. This effort was accelerated in the 1900s. The object 
was to build modem industry by direct governmental investment or govemment 
support in such forms as partial tax exemptions or the grant of monopolies over 
certain markets.^®
Secondly, in the early decades of the century, socialist ideas spread and gained 
currency. As Martin Bemal has shown, socialist ideas could be found in the majority 
of reform-minded or radical intellectuals around the tum of the century. Some of the 
most important political figures such as K’ang Yu-wei, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, Sun Yat-sen 
and his followers embraced socialist ideas of some form or another. There was a great 
concem among Chinese intellectuals over the issue of social equality, and the state 
was generally viewed as the instrument to achieve social equality.^*
Thirdly, as has been mentioned, a popular demand in the anti-foreign 
campaigns of the early decades of this century was for the state to take a positive role 
in protecting national sovereignty, particularly economic sovereignty. This was 
particularly true of the movement of 'reclaiming railway and mining rights from 
foreign powers' in the 1900s.^^
One of Yen Fu's purposes in translating Smith's The Wealth o f Nations was to 
respond to demands for the state to take on more positive roles. Utilizing his 
knowledge of Smith's work and his experience in Britain, Yen criticized official or 
semi-official enterprises, and advocated private enterprise. He championed the market 
economy and free foreign trade as against mercantilism and economic nationalism.
^°For a brief account of early modemization efforts of the Ch'ing govemment, see, 
Kuo Ting-yee, 'Self-strengthening: the Pursuit of Westem Technology', in The 
Cambridge History o f ChinOy vol. 10, ed. J.K. Fairbank, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1978, pp. 491-542.
‘^On the influences of socialist ideas on Chinese intellectuals at the tum of the 
century, see Martin Bemal, Chinese Socialism to 1907, London: Comell University 
Press, 1976.
^^The movement for reclaiming China's railway and mining rights from foreign 
powers was a widespread popular movement in the 1900s against the waves of 
China's concessions to foreign powers in controlling China's railways and mining 
industry in the wake of the Sino-Japanese war. For an account of the movement, see 
Lee En-han, China's Quest for Railway Autonomy, 1904-1911, Singapore: Singapore 
University Press, 1977, pp. 13-24.
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Yen also criticized socialist ideas.
Yen Fu's first target of criticism was the official or semi-official run 
enterprises which emerged during the Self-strengthening movement. Yen had a strong 
aversion to state-owned or managed enterprise. 'If  enterprises are managed or 
controlled by officials', wrote Yen, there will be numerous rules and regulations, red 
tape, high spending and low efficiency.'^^ In addition, he held that corruption would 
be inevitable in official or semi-official enterprises. Thus he argued that all business 
which can be managed by private enterprise should be left for the people themselves. 
The govemment should not intervene in them.'^ "*
Not only should govemment not run business itself, but it should not regulate 
the economy by controlling prices. Yen Fu was impressed by Smith's theory of 
market economy and praised it as the most penetrating ever found in history.^  ^As an 
ardent believer in scientific method', he interpreted Smith's theory of market force 
through the science of hydrodynamics:
Smith applied hydrodynamics to economics. He knows that the price 
of goods will move towards balance just as water moves towards a 
level.... To allow free competition, economic balance will be 
ultimately achieved just as water will ultimately move to a level. On 
the contrary, intervention (in the price of goods) is just like building a 
dam on a slope to stop running water from the mountain. This can only 
achieve some temporary... balance, rather than real balance.’®
Under the market system. Yen Fu suggested, each will pursue his own 
interest. He will try to produce goods of better quality and greater quantity to compete
’"CYFW, vol. 1., p. 105. 
’"Ibid.
’^Yen Fu, Yuan-fu (A Translation of Adam Smith's The Wealth o f Nations), vol. 1,
p. 54.
76Ibid.
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in the market. As a result, consumers will be able to obtain abundant, cheap goods 
easily, ranging from daily necessities to cultural and entertainment products.^^ By 
contrast, excessive govemment intervention. Yen Fu suggested, would hinder 
economic development by preventing the people's creativity from reaching full 
development. He insisted that 'the people's creativity is inversely proportional to the 
degree of state intervention.'^* He wrote:
Wealth can only be produced by people. To stimulate people to 
produce more, there must be a free environment with less control or 
intervention from the govemment. When the state intervenes less, 
people will develop their capacities to the fullest. They will choose 
proper businesses according to their resources. They will devote full 
energies to their productive activities thus making them unbelievably 
successful. However, if the economic policy makers want to 
consciously promote certain industries or to discourage other 
industries, they can only produce disorder and damage industry. Their 
regulations will inevitably violate people's freedom and thereby hinder 
productivity.^*
To be sure. Yen Fu by no means denied any role to govemment in economy. 
He asserted that the economic role of govemment should be limited to a very narrow 
sphere. Following Smith, he suggested that the function of the state should be 
confined only to those public works which were unlikely to be provided by the 
market because the profit could never repay the expense to any individual or small 
number of individuals'.*® Such functions included: 1) those things which cost more 
when they are run by the private sector and less by govemment, such as post and
vol. 2, p. 516.
"*Ibid., p. 516.
"*Ibid., p. 407.
*®Adam Smith, The Wealth ofNationSy IV.ix.51, vol. 2, p. 688.
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telecommunications; 2) those things which benefit society enormously but are 
unlikely to be undertaken by the private sector because they are less profitable, such 
as education, and 3) those things which people do not want to operate collectively or 
are unable to operate.**
As an ardent believer in limited govemment. Yen Fu was one of the few 
leading intellectuals at the tum of the century who was not influenced by socialist 
ideas. He rarely talked about social justice and equality. He openly rejected socialism 
(she-hui chu-yi) for its advocacy of public ownership.*^ He maintained that economic 
development depended on free competition and that socialism would end all 
competition.*^
Stimulated by Smith's criticism of the mercantile system. Yen Fu also ardently 
advocated free trade with foreign countries and vigorously opposed economic 
nationalism. In The Wealth o f Nations, Smith denounced what he called 'the 
commercial, or mercantile system'.*  ^One of the policies of this system was restraints 
upon the importation from foreign countries of such goods as can be produced at 
home'.*  ^Yen Fu was impressed by Smith's idea. He credited Smith's idea for the later 
success of the anti-Com Law campaign in Britain.*  ^He cited William Pitt as having 
said that one can serve as a prime minister only after reading Smith's book.'*^
In China's case. Yen Fu proposed a free trade policy and denounced all 
attempts to protect the domestic market. First, Yen held that protectionism might
**Yen Fu, Yuan-fu (A Translation of Adam Smith's The Wealth o f Nations), vol. 2, 
pp. 589-90; for Smith's discussions on the subject, see The Wealth o f Nations, V.i.c-g, 
pp. 723-814.
*"CYFW, vol. 2, pp. 338-9.
*'lbid., p. 339.
*^Adam Smith, The Wealth o f Nations, IV.i, vol. 1, p. 429.
*'lbid., IV.ii, p. 452.
*^Yen Fu, Yuan-fu (A Translation o f Adam Smith's The Wealth o f Nations), vol. 2,
p. 377.
*% d.,p .388.
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benefit China in the short term, but would be harmful in the long term. He believed 
that China was extremely undeveloped economically and its industry would be at a 
disadvantage if it competed with foreign industries. Yet, 'we have two advantages: 
we are a big country with abundant natural resources, and we have large number of 
hard-working people.'** With these two advantages, and with some capable persons 
leading the way, he continued, it would be not long before Chinese industries became 
even more competitive than those of Europe.*  ^ Secondly, he indicated that free 
foreign trade would benefit Chinese consumers and enable them to get access to an 
abundance of goods.’® Thirdly, he dismissed the idea of keeping foreign trade in 
balance. Following Smith's criticism of the mercantilist belief that wealth consists in 
money, or in gold and silver',’* Yen argued that a surplus in foreign trade did not 
translate into the wealth of the country. He did not share the anxiety of Chinese 
officials about the imbalance of foreign trade:
Since the 1840s, there has been a consensus that we should try to avoid 
imbalance in trade. So-called imbalance is nothing more than gold 
bullion outflow....Since Smith, it has become well known that gold is 
only one commodity... and nothing special. ... To regard gold as 
wealth, every country will fight for balance in foreign trade and pay 
too much attention to surplus or deficit. As a result, there will be many 
obstacles to achieving treaties on trade. Protectionism or even war may 
stem from trade disputes. Many people do not understand that the 
wealth or poverty of our country has nothing to do with trade 
balance.’^
**CYFW, vol. 4, p. 896. 
*’lbid.
’®Ibid., p. 895.
’*Adam Smith, The Wealth o f Nations, IV.i.l, vol. 1, p. 429.
’^Yen Fu, Yuan-fu (A Translation o f Adam Smith's The Wealth o f Nations), vol. 2,
p. 396.
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Yen Fu also opposed some political movements which exhibited economic 
nationalism, such as the movement in the 1900s for 'reclaiming railway and mining 
rights from foreign powers'. He argued that the development of the railway and 
mining industries was vital to the development of manufacturing and commerce in 
China. In the process of developing China's railway and mining industries, foreign 
involvement was necessary and desirable. First, he argued, the railway and mining 
industries required huge capital. As private capital was scare in China, the investment 
in the railway and mining industries could only come from either the Chinese 
govemment or foreign companies. Since Yen Fu opposed the idea of govemment 
investing in and managing industries, he could only encourage foreign investment in 
the railway and mining industries. In the meantime, Chinese private investors should 
also be encouraged to buy shares in these foreign owned companies.’  ^ In addition to 
the importance of capital. Yen Fu further argued that foreign investment in and 
management of the railway and mining industries could bring to China much needed 
advanced technology and management skills. He suggested that China has few 
experts in railway and mining industry', and therefore. It is only natural that we 
should encourage foreigners to set up companies. Surely as capital comes from 
foreign investment, foreigners will control the companies and make profits from 
them. Nevertheless, China will benefit even more than foreigners.'’"*
Yen Fu's opposition to the government's efforts to protect China's newly 
developed industry and his opposition to economic nationalism have been among the 
most controversial of his economic ideas. In Chinese scholarship, a common criticism 
of Yen's economic ideas has been that Yen Fu was too dogmatic in following Smith's 
free market theory and failed to take into account the differences between Victorian 
Britain and nineteenth century China.’  ^ Chinese scholars particularly criticized Yen
” CYFW, vol. 1, p. 105. 
’"Ibid., p. 106.
’^Hou Hou-chi and Wu Ch'i-ching, Chung-kuo chin-tai chin-chi ssu-hsiang shih (A 
history of modem Chinese economic thought), volume 2, Ha-erh-ping: jen-min, 1984, 
p. 519.
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Fu's idea of free foreign trade. Hou Hou-chi and Wu Ch'i-ching argued that Britain 
was the most advanced industrial nation in the nineteenth century and could benefit 
much from a free trade policy. China at that time was an extremely backward 
country. To pursue free trade without any protection would, in their opinion, destroy 
China's native industry and undermine any chance for China's economic 
independence.’®
It is interesting to note a very different criticism of Yen Fu by Schwartz. 
Schwartz argued that the major weakness of Yen Fu's economic program was that he 
distorted Smith's ideas and subjected 'Smith's economic principles to his own 
mercantilist purpose'.’  ^ Schwartz discerned the familiar preoccupation with the 
wealth and power of the state' throughout Yen Fu's translation of The Wealth o f  
Nations^^ He believed this to be the fundamental feature of mercantilism.
Schwartz seemed to be unaware of Yen Fu's own criticism of mercantilist 
economics (shang-tsung tzu chi-hsueh), made when he opposed the economic 
nationalist movement of the 1900s.”  Moreover, Schwartz seemed to have 
misunderstood some crucial ideas of mercantilism as well as some Chinese terms.
The term 'mercantilism' first acquired significance at the hands of Adam 
Smith.*®® In The Wealth o f Nations, Smith delivered his famous attack upon what he 
called the commercial or mercantile system in an argument about the balance of trade. 
The most influential work on the subject is Eli Heckscher's Mercantilism, which 
Schwartz quoted intensively. According to Heckscher, mercantilism would...have all 
economic activity subservient to the state's interest in power.'*®* In the mercantilist
’®Ibid., p. 523.
^Benjamin Schwartz, In Search o f Wealth and Power, p. 122.
” lbid.,p. 116.
” CYFW., vol. 1, p. 148. On Yen Fu's general criticism of nationalism, see Chapter 
III of this thesis.
*®®Mark Blaug, Economic Theory in Retrospect, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, third edition, 1978, p. 10.
101Eli Heckscher, Mercantilism, London: Allen & Unwin, 1935, p. 15.
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system, 'power is conceived as an end in itself.’^ ®^ What did Heckscher mean by state 
power as an end in itself? According to Heckscher, there is a fundamental difference 
between Smith's economic liberalism and various mercantilist theories. Smith's end is 
abundance and wealth, and state power is the means to wealth. 'Mercantilists usually 
believed the reverse.'^ ®^  Heckscher distinguished between the concepts of state', 
nation' and country'. According to Heckscher, it is natural for various economic 
theories to pursue the interests of one's own country' or 'nation'. 'The interests of the 
native country were the deciding factor in determining policy both under free trade 
and under mercantilism.'**^ By contrast, the collective entity' for mercantilists, was 
not a nation, unified by common race, speech and customs: the only decisive factor 
for them was the state.'*®^
The state must have one outstanding interest, an interest which is the 
basis for all its other activities. What distinguishes the state from all 
other social institutions is the fact that, by its very nature, it is a 
compulsory corporation or, at least in the last instance, has the final 
word on the exercise of force in society; it has the authority of 
authorities' (Kompetenz -Kompetenz), to borrow the terminology of 
that eminent German constitutional jurist, Jellineck.*®®
It is clear that by power of the state', Heckscher meant state power over 
society. This was the very idea that Yen Fu attacked vigorously as we have shown 
above.
To differentiate Yen Fu's ideas from mercantilism, we can further discuss 
mercantilist means for achieving its ends. Heckscher suggested that although the
*% id.,p. 16.
*®'lbid., p. 17.
*®^ Ibid., p. 14.
*®^ Ibid., p. 14.
*°"lbid., p. 15.
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difference between the ends of free trade and mercantilism was significant, 'the most 
important difference did not lie in the choice of ends but in opinions as to the best 
way of achieving those ends, i.e.. in the choice of means.'*®’ According to liberal 
economic theory, the means to achieve wealth and power in a nation is free trade. The 
means adopted by mercantilism, as Schumpeter stated, is 'export monopolism', 
exchange control', and pursuing the balance of trade';*®* or as Heckscher calls it a 
'fear of goods', a policy directed against imports instead of exports - in one word: 
protection.'*®’ From the discussion of Yen Fu's ideas on trade above it is clear that his 
approach is the opposite of mercantilism.
As we have shown above. Yen Fu's economic ideas were largely copied from 
Smith. In following Smith, particularly in subscribing to the doctrine of the minimal 
state. Yen Fu certainly established himself as the pioneer of economic liberalism in 
modem China. However, the times were unfavourable to economic liberalism. China 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries experienced serious social and 
economic crises. There was outcry about the need to address some urgent social and 
economic issues, such as the development of a national economy as well as minimum 
economic security for the vast poor population. Because Yen was hostile to the 
positive role of state in the economy, he was apparently impotent to address credibly 
these issues other than leaving them to be resolved in an extremely undeveloped 
market.**® This probably explained why Yen had little influence on economic policies
*®’Eli Heckscher, 'Mercantilism', in D C. Coleman, ed. Revisions in Mercantilism^ 
London: Methuen, 1969, p. 21.
*®*J.A. Schumpeter, History o f Economic Analysis, Oxford University Press, 1954, 
pp. 338-62.
*®®Heckscher, Mercantilism', p. 27.
**®Some economic historians, notably Feuerwerker, have suggested that during the 
initial spurt of industrialization in backward' countries, the state budget or an 
efficient banking system were necessary to the support of industry. He argued that 
one of the reasons for the failure of the late Ch'ing modemization programme was the 
inability of govemment to support industry. The Chinese govemment failed to 
promote a modem banking system' and also failed to invest in economic 
development from its own budget'. (Albert Feuerwerker, 'Economic Trends in the 
Late Ching Empire: 1870-191T, in The Cambridge History o f China, vol. 11, p. 59.)
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in his time.
VI
In his discussion of liberty, Yen Fu took pains to distinguish his ideas of 
liberty from the ideas of liberty held by radicals. As we have mentioned before, one 
of the motives of Yen’s translation of Mill's On Liberty was to teach radical youth that 
the Westem idea of freedom had its own built-in limits and could not be applied in 'a  
stupid and destructive fashion’. By 'stupid and destmctive fashion’, he referred to 
application of ideas of liberty held by various radical ideologies. Even before the 
publication of his translation of Mill’s work. Yen had expressed his worry that 
radicalism might lead China down a dangerous revolutionary path. In his essay, 
'Dialogue between Host and Guest’ {chu-keping-yU 1902), he denounced radicals for 
their simplistic understanding of Westem ideas and systems and for demanding rapid 
changes. He was particularly annoyed by the misconception of the idea of liberty and 
the violent means of pursuing liberty as expressed by a fashionable radical slogan: to 
water the tree of liberty by blood’. He wrote:
A handful of ignorant people advocate watering the tree of freedom by 
blood! They will not be able to achieve their goal [freedom], they can 
only seriously harm our nation. ... In the past, Britain...and 
France...had revolutions. ... The revolutions brought about great 
tragedy for their people. The people suffered and moaned from 
revolutions for hundreds of years."*
The idea of watering the tree of freedom’ was one of the most influential 
political mottos in radical writings of the early part of the century. The earliest 
expression of such an idea was found in a short poem, 'Rousseau’, published in 1901 
in the Hsin-min ts'ung-pao (New citizen joumal). It reads:
111CYFW, vol. 1, p. 120.
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There was a Frenchman named Rousseau,
Who advocated the new doctrine of social contract;
He called on people to kill,
To destroy authorities of monarchies.
To open the road of equality by force.
To water the plant of freedom by blood;
The day that [Rousseau's] words come true.
Will be the day of world revolution."^
Yen Fu was extremely irritated by this idea. He believed the slogan of 
'watering the tree of freedom by blood' was faulty not only in its militancy, but in its 
misconception of freedom. Because the motto of watering the plant of freedom by 
blood' was propagated by radicals under the name of Rousseau, Yen Fu continually 
tried to undermine Rousseau's ideas of liberty.
Rousseau was probably the Westem political thinker with the greatest 
influence on radicalism in China at the tum of the century.’"  His name was 
mentioned in China as early as the 1880s in works by foreign missionaries and 
Chinese diplomats."'* After the Sino-Japanese war of 1894, some of Rousseau's works 
began to be translated into Chinese partly inspired by Yen Fu's propagation of 
Westem ideas.*" By 1903, the year which has been regarded as the tuming point of
"^Quoted in Hsiung Yuen-tzu, Chung-kuo chin-tai min-chu ssu-hsiang shih (A 
history of democratic thought in modem China), Shanghai: jen-min, 1986, p. 322.
"^Rousseau's influence on the modem Chinese revolution has not yet been 
explored fully either in Chinese or in Westem scholarship. For a very brief account of 
Rousseau's influences on Chinese intellectuals in the late 1890s and the early part of 
this century, see Marianna Bastid-Bmguiére, The Influence of Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau on Chinese Political Thought before the 1911 Revolution,' in Zhang 
Zhilian, ed. China and the French Revolution, Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1988, pp. 29- 
36.
"'‘Hsiung Yuen-tzu, Chung-kuo chin-tai min-chu ssu-hsiang shih (A history of 
democratic thought in modem China), pp. 303-5.
"^In 1898, a Chinese translation of Book I of the Social Contract by a Japanese 
scholar was published in China. From December 1900 to May 1901, another 
translation of Book I of the Social Contract by Yang Ting-tung was published in
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the movement towards radical revolution,"^ Rousseau had become the most 
influential Westem thinker among radical Chinese intellectuals, with the Social 
Contract taken by radical revolutionaries as their bible/" Tsou Jung (1885-1905), an 
ardent revolutionary, proudly called himself 'the second Rousseau'. He declared, 'I 
only wished to learn what Rousseau had done and did not care what happened to my 
writing.'"* Ch'en T'ien-hua (1875-1905), another famous young radical, described 
Rousseau as a God-sent sage dispatched to save the people of the whole world. He 
suggested that Rousseau's ideas had stimulated the French people to undertake the 
great revolution and to achieve happiness and freedom.*"
Even less radical intellectuals such as Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, considered Rousseau's 
ideas the best medicine for China's illness. Liang wrote:
Among the dozens of modem European thinkers who can be regarded 
as sages in curing social and political problems, I believe that 
Rousseau's Social Contract is the most suitable prescription for 
China's disease.... Oh! the Social Contractl Come to the East please!
We depend on you to help us to achieve a society of great peace.
installments in Yi-shu hui-pien (Collected translations), a joumal published by a 
group of Chinese students in Japan. In 1902, Yang Ting-Tung translated the whole of 
the Social Contract from Japanese and published it in China.
**®Martin Bemal, Chinese Socialism to 1907, p. 99; Michael Gasster, Chinese 
Intellectuals and the Revolution o f 1911: the Birth o f Modern Chinese Radicalism, p. 
28.
*‘^ Marianna Bastid-Bmguiére, 'The Influence of Jean-Jacques Rousseau on 
Chinese Political Thought before the 1911 Revolution,' in Zhang Zhilian, ed. China 
and the French Revolution, p. 30.
***Schiffrin, Herald, Sun Yat-Sen and the Origins o f the Chinese Revolution, 
Berkeley: University of Califomia Press, 1968, p. 273.
**®Ch'en T'ien-hua, Ch’en T’ien-hua chi (Collected writings of Ch'en T'ien-hua), 
Shanghai: Hunan: jen-min, 1982, p. 50.
*^ ®Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, 'Tzu-yu shu: p'o-huai chu-yi' (On liberty: destmctionism), in 
Yin-ping-shih ho-chi, (Collected Works of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao), vol. ii, pp. 25-6.
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Behind this enthusiastic applause for Rousseau was a very simplistic 
understanding of Rousseau's ideas, particularly his idea of liberty, among Chinese 
radicals. Unlike some contemporary Westem liberal critics who find Rousseau hostile 
to real freedom,*^* modem Chinese radicals generally perceived Rousseau to be the 
greatest advocate of freedom among modem Westem political thinkers. The most 
frequent quotation of Rousseau in the writings of radicals was his statement that 'Man 
was bom free, and he is everywhere in chains.'*^  ^Chinese radicals generally failed to 
see Rousseau's distinction between natural liberty and civil liberty - liberty within 
society. They thus failed to attend the central issue Rousseau tried to address in his 
Social Contract^ namely how men could be at once free and members of a political 
society.*^ "* The issue of freedom became wonderfully simple for Chinese radicals. For 
them liberty was an essential gift of Nature, which maoi possessed by virtue of their 
humanity alone. Only evil govemment would restrict people's natural liberty. The 
people should overthrow such a govemment by revolution in order to restore their 
natural liberty. As Tsou Jung argued, 'Everyone must know the significance of 
freedom and equality. There is no one who is not free at birth, there is no one who is
*^ *See J. L. Talmon, The Origins o f Totalitarian Democracy, London, 1955, pp. 
38-50.
*^ J^.J. Rousseau, The Social Contract, translated by Maurice Cranston, 
Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1968, p. 49.
‘^ ^On Rousseau's ideas of natural liberty and civil liberty, see Robert Wokler, 
Rousseau's Two Concepts of Liberty', in Lives, Liberties and Public Good, New 
Essays in Political Theory for Maurice Cranston, ed. George Feaver and Frederick 
Rosen, New York: St., Martin's Press, 1987, pp. 68-78.
*^ '*Rousseau states that his purpose in the Social Contract is to consider if, in 
political society, there can be any legitimate and sure principles of govemment, 
taking men as they are, and laws as they might be.' (J.J. Rousseau, the Social 
Contract, trans. Maurice Cranston, p. 49.) Cranston noted that the i/'here is cmcial. 
'Rousseau is not offering a plan for reform, nor is he writing the Idnd of history of 
sociology he provides in his Discours sur Tinégalité....ln the Social Contract 
Rousseau is dealing, in the hypothetical mood, with abstract problems which seem to 
him to emerge from philosophical reflection on the actual nature of man and the 
possible order of laws and governments.' ('Introduction' to the Social Contract, op. 
cit., p. 27.)
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not equal.'‘^  ^ 'Demons necessarily obstruct these natural rights of our people.*^ ® We 
must sweep them aside and regain these rights, for revolution has as its objectives to 
remove suffering and to seek happiness.'*^  ^Chinese radicals generally did not bother 
to consider the possible conflicts between men's desires to be free and the need to live 
in a political society. 'They were naively optimistic that once the revolution occurred 
it would bring a new era of national independence and individual liberty.'*^*
Like Chinese radicals, Yen Fu's knowledge of Rousseau seemed to be 
confined to the Social Contract, Yen made no attempt to conceal his dislike of 
Rousseau's ideas from the very beginning of his intellectual career. His earliest 
criticism of Rousseau can be found in his essay The Dialogue between Host and 
Guest' of 1902 where he mentioned that Rousseau's Social Contract was not 
representative of the mainstream of modem Westem ideas and had lately been 
criticized by many Westem th inkers.O ne year later, in his introduction to Mill's On 
Liberty, Yen Fu singled out for criticism Rousseau's idea that man is bom free.*^ ® In 
his 'Political Lectures' delivered in 1906, Yen Fu criticized Rousseau's political 
theory for being 'deductive'. Yen's synonym for unscientific'.'^^ In an essay of 1913, 
Yen Fu accused Rousseau of being responsible for the horror of the French 
Revolution."^ In 1914, he published an essay entitled 'A critical Review of 
Rousseau's Social Contract' (min-yueh p'ing-yi) which represented his most
"^Tsou Yung, The Revolutionary Army {ke-ming chun), translated into English by 
John Lust, Paris: Mouton & Co., 1968, p. 101.
"^'Demons', a Buddhist term for evil spirits which obstruct the true path. Tsou here 
referred to the Ch'ing govemment.
"^Tsou Yung, The Revolutionary Army (ke-ming chun), p. 99.
"*Mary Rankin, Early Chinese Revolutionaries, p. 18.
""C'iTW, vol. 1, p. 120.
"''Yen Fu, Ch'un-chi ch'uan-chieh lun (A translation of John Stuart Mill's On 
Liberty), p. vii.
"'CYFW, vol. 5, p. 1243.
'^^CYFW, vol. 2, p. 308.
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comprehensive criticism of Rousseau.
Yen Fu’s critique of Rousseau focused on the notion that man is bom free 
because Yen identified this notion with Chinese radicalism. Like the radicals, Yen did 
not discern Rousseau’s distinction between natural liberty and civil liberty. Rather he 
understood Rousseau as upholding the idea that man was bom free and should be free 
in society. To repudiate this idea, Yen Fu adopted two different arguments. On the 
one hand, he pointed out that man was not bom free. On the other hand, he tried to 
show that it was unscientific to conclude from man’s innate freedom that man should 
have freedom in society.
Yen Fu’s knowledge of British utilitarianism and evolutionary theory assisted 
him greatly in his efforts to show the fallacy of the idea of man’s innate freedom. 
Bentham, in his Anarchical Fallacies^ criticized the article of the French Declaration 
of Rights stating that 'men (all men) are bom free and remain free, and equal in 
respect of rights’, to be 'full of error’ and ambiguity’. Bentham argued:
All men are bom free? All men remain free? No, not a single man, not 
a single man that ever was, or is, or will be. All men, on the contrary, 
are bom in subjection, and the most absolute subjection - the 
subjection of a helpless child to the parents on whom he depends every 
moment for his existence.*^^
Yen Fu might not have read Bentham’s criticism of the idea that all men are bom 
free’. Yet his acceptance of some basic utilitarian principles certainly confirmed his 
position on the issue. His main criticism of Rousseau’s idea of natural liberty was 
derived directly from nineteenth-century English evolutionary theory, particularly 
from T. H. Huxley’s critique of Rousseau. We have already examined Yen Fu’s 
translation and commentaries on Huxley’s Evolution and Ethics. Yen Fu’s knowledge 
of Huxley, however, was not confined to that treatise alone. He recorded that he read 
Huxley’s other essays including 'On the Natural Inequality of Men’ and 'Government:
‘” Bhikhu Parekh, ed., Bentham's Political Thought, London: Croom Helm, 1973,
p. 262.
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Anarchy or Regimentation'/^'* He specifically mentioned that he read Huxley's 
criticism of Rousseau's ideas of freedom and equality/^^
Huxley's criticism of Rousseau was found mainly in his essay 'On the Natural 
Inequality of Men'. This essay was a response to what Huxley called 'the revived 
Rousseauism' in Britain as represented by John Morley's work. Convinced that 
Rousseauism would lead people in the wrong direction, Huxley felt that he had a duty 
to do something towards the counteraction of the fallacious guidance' proffered to 
the British p e o p le .T h e  main target of Huxley's criticism of Rousseau was the 
latter's 'famous phrase' that all men are bom free and equal'. Huxley accused 
Rousseau of using 'a priori method' and fallacious assumptions' regardless of fact.*^  ^
Yen Fu probably knew of Huxley's criticism of Rousseau before 1909, the 
date he recorded in his diary because some of his criticisms of Rousseau before that 
date seemed to have also been taken from Huxley. In his introduction to On Liberty in 
1903, he wrote:
Rousseau states that man is bom free in the opening paragraph of the 
Social Contract. This idea has been repudiated by later sages. They 
pointed out that a new-bom infant acts like an animal. It cannot even 
know if it is hungry or full. How can it be said to be free?*^ *
As we will see shortly, the later sages he referred to probably included 
Huxley. Yen Fu's major criticism of Rousseau, A Critical Review of Rousseau's
*^ '*Yen's dairy (March 1909), in CYFW, vol. 5, p. 1490; those essays by Huxley 
are available in Huxley's Collected Essays, volume 1, London: Macmillan, 1898.
*^^C'iTW, vol. 5, p. 1490.
*^ ®Thomas Huxley, 'On the Natural Inequality of Men', in Huxley, Collected 
Essays, vol. 1, pp. 295-6.
""Ibid., p. 298.
"*Yen Fu, Ch'un-chi ch'uan-chieh lun (A translation of John Stuart Mill's On 
Liberty) p. viii.
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Social Contract, in 1914 drew heavily on Huxley's 'On the Natural Inequality of 
Men'. It is virtually an abridged translation of Huxley's essay with some of Yen's 
comments on China's situation. Following Huxley, Yen disputed Rousseau's claim of 
man being bom free as contrary to the fact. Yen quoted an entire paragraph from 
Huxley's essay which reads:
I have seen a considerable number of new-bom infants. Without 
wishing to speak of them with the least disrespect - a thing no man can 
do, without, as the proverb says, 'fouling his own nest' - I fail to 
understand how they can be affirmed to have any political qualities at 
all. How can it be said that these little mortals who have not even the 
capacity to kick to any definite end, nor indeed to do anything but 
vaguely squall, are equal politically, except as all zeros may be said to 
be equal? How can little creatures be said to be 'free' of whom not one 
would live for four and twenty hours if it were not imprisoned by 
kindly hands and coerced into applying its foolish wandering mouth to 
the bread it could never find for itself?'^^
With Huxley, Yen Fu recognized that Rousseau's idea of man being bom free 
might not refer to some actual condition of some of mankind now or in the past, but 
might refer to a purely hypothetical condition.Rousseau's theory might be 
understood to claim that all men ought be free and equal, and freedom and equality 
therefore ought to be regarded as the basis of law and as demanding an immutable 
morality.*"** Yen Fu disputed Rousseau's idea even in this sense.
He argued that it is wrong to deduce any political principle solely from what 
ought to be' and overlook 'what has been', 'what is', and 'what can be'.*"*^  In
*^^Thomas Huxley, 'On the Natural Inequality of Men', in Collected Essays, vol. 1, 
pp. 305-6; for Yen Fu's statement, see CYFW, vol. 2, p. 336.
*""CYFW, vol. 2, pp. 336-7.
*"**CYFW, vol. 2, p. 337.
*42cyfw, vol. 2, p. 337; for Huxley's similar remarks, see his Collected Essays,
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discussing moral and political theories, he claimed, one should avoid absolute 
speculation and make political judgement on the basis of examining
'historical fact’ and the current circumstances’.*'*^
The historical fact’ and the current circumstances’ Yen Fu referred to were 
closely related to his idea of social evolution. As a believer in evolutionary social 
theory. Yen considered the social and political order to be the product of a long 
period of a natural evolutionary process.’*'*^ Since different societies followed 
different paths of evolution, the present situation’ in these societies varied. Yen did 
not believe that every society could establish a system which guaranteed individual 
liberty in the same manner. He maintained that the scope of individual liberty was 
largely dependent on the degree of social evolution. The higher a society evolves, the 
wider is the scope of people’s freedom.’*'*^ The degree of social evolution was related 
to the degree of moral and intellectual development of individuals who compose a 
society. Yen suggested that the higher degree of freedom in the West was founded on 
a higher degree of civilization of the p e o p l e . I t  is harmful, he believed, simply to 
copy the Western system regardless of the different level of the people’s moral and 
intellectual development.*'**
vol. 1, p. 312.
*'*^ CYFW, vol. 3, p. 648. Yen Fu’s criticism of Rousseau’s idea of freedom as based 
on abstract speculation’ is quite similar to Edmund Burke’s criticism of Rousseau’s 
ideas of freedom. Yen seemed have not read Burke’s works. Yet he mentioned that he 
read Henry T. Buckle’s The History o f Civilization in England which contains 
discussions of Burke’s ideas. (CYFW, vol 5, p. 1249). For Burke’s criticism of 
Rousseau’s idea of freedom, see Annie Marion Osborn, Rousseau and Burke: a Study 
o f the Idea o f Liberty in Eighteenth-century Political Thought, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1940, pp. 1-26.
*'*"CYFW, vol. 2, p. 337.
*'*"CYFW, vol. 5, p. 1290.
*'*^ Yen Fu, Ch'un-chi ch'uan-chieh lun (A translation of John Stuart Mill’s On 
Liberty), p. vii.
*'*"CYFW, vol. l ,p. 120.
*'**CYFW, vol. 3, p. 648.
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Yen Fu here faced a theoretical dilemma: on the one hand, he justified 
individual freedom mainly by its enhancement of the people's moral and intellectual 
capabilities. On the other hand, he regarded the same moral and intellectual 
capabilities as the precondition for the achievement of individual liberty. His dilemma 
was: Without individual freedom and individual choice, how can the individual 
develop his moral and intellectual capabilities? Without a high degree of moral and 
intellectual capability, how can a liberal system be maintained? This dilemma has 
puzzled several generations of Chinese liberals since Yen Fu. When Hu Shih, another 
famous modem Chinese liberal returned from America in 1910, he faced the same
A
difficulty: 'Without a good society, how can we have a good government? Without a 
good government, how can we have a good society?'*'*^
Yen Fu was fully aware of this dilemma. When he emphasized moral and 
intellectual development as the precondition of individual liberty, he did not deny that 
the Chinese people, even in a lower degree of moral and intellectual development, 
should enjoy certain basic freedoms. His real intention here was not to argue about 
the condition of liberty theoretically, but to argue about the means of achieving 
liberty. By raising the issue of the conditions of liberty, he argued that freedom ought 
to be achieved through piecemeal reform, rather than revolution. He wrote in a letter 
to a renowned reformer, Hu Li-yuan, in 1909:
You said in your letter that freedom is the ultimate goal of mankind, 
the principal rule for any society and the criterion of judging other 
doctrines. This is a very sensible view. I too believe that mankind 
should regard freedom as one of its highest goals, but I believe that the 
means (tu-su) of reaching this goal could be different because the 
evolutionary degrees that various societies have reached are 
different.
‘"‘^ Quoted in Chou Min-chih, Hu Shih and Intellectual Choice in Modem China, 
Ann Arbour: University of Michigan Press, 1984, p. 120.
''"CYFW, vol. 3, p. 594.
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Yen was afraid that if freedom were treated as the absolute principle, it would 
encourage radicalism. He often spoke of the destructive results which the doctrine of 
absolute freedom might bring about. The doctrine of extreme freedom and equality 
can spread like a storm, ... it will destroy millions of lives.'‘^ * He repeatedly quoted 
from Madame Roland's famous remark made during the French Revolution, 
'Freedom, freedom! How many evils are done in your name?'*^^
vn
In his criticism of the radical motto watering the tree of freedom by blood'. 
Yen Fu also dismissed the idea that a revolution overthrowing the old regime and 
establishing democracy could bring freedom to the people. The basis of Yen Fu's 
dismissal of such an idea was his definition of freedom which implied that the 
determining factor of the degree of individual freedom was the scope of governmental 
power, rather than the form of government. Regardless of what form of government 
pertained, democratic or tyrannical, if the scope of governmental power was great, the 
people under this government would lose their freedom. Yen Fu compared the effects 
of the two kinds of government on freedom:
Supposing there is a benevolent paternalistic government which 
dictates to people the time of sowing and harvesting, fixes the profit 
rate of commerce, regulates industry, decides the proper way for 
intellectuals to behave, and leads people like animals by the halter so 
that they need not think for themselves. Such a government will be 
regarded as a God-like parent in China. Chinese people will consider 
themselves to be enjoying a golden age. Western people, however, 
would believe that this government is actually destroying their 
freedom. The people under this government would be no different
‘"‘CYFW, vol. 3, p. 608. 
'""CYFW, vol.3, pp. 645, 690.
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from slaves. Therefore, in Western language, 'paternalistic’ 
government' does not have good connotations.*^^
In contrast to paternalistic government, the people could enjoy more freedom 
under a very harsh government, although their freedom was not secure. Yen Fu took 
another example:
During of our Yuan and Ming dynasties (1279-1644), Russia was 
controlled by the Mongols. Historians have described the Mongols’ 
rule as being of a harshness and inhumanity unparalleled in history.
The Russian people, however, enjoyed great freedom at that time.
They lived and worked even without knowing what the government 
was. The Mongols chose some cities to live separately from Russians.
When they needed something, they went out to plunder wealth. When 
they had sufficient living material they just left people alone. ... 
Although such a government is extremely inhumane, people can still 
have their freedom under it.*^ "*
Yen Fu was of course not suggesting that the way the Mongols ran Russia was 
an ideal way of ordering a society. As we shall see, he held that freedom must be 
protected by law. What Yen Fu did suggest was that the scope of state power, more 
than any other factor, determined the degree of freedom enjoyed by the people. In 
terms of protecting individual freedom. Yen remarked, democracy did not fare any 
better than other form of government. Democracy meant only that sovereign power 
was held by the people. It did not indicate how great the government’s power would 
be. In fact. Yen Fu believed, following Tocqueville, that a democratic government 
could be more dangerous to individual freedom than an authoritarian government:
Between a democratic government which wields great power and an
*” CYFW, vol. 5,1287. 
*""C'^W, vol. 5, p. 1283.
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authoritarian government with limited power, which is better? which is 
more harmful? ... Tocqueville, a great French politician ... maintained 
that an authoritarian government seems to be imperious, but it is in 
fact fearful of the people. ... By contrast, a democratic government 
better understands the people's wishes and is often supported by the 
majority. It will therefore be more aggressive and dare to assert more 
control over people.
Thus, Yen Fu argued that the efforts of radicals to overthrow the Ch'ing 
government and to build a democratic system in order to achieve individual freedom 
were wrong-headed. The only way to protect the people's freedom in China was to 
reform gradually current social and political systems by implementing comprehensive 
legal reform and establishing the rule of law. Through a legal system, a line of 
demarcation between the rights of the individual and that of the government and 
society could be codified.
Yen Fu's emphasis on the importance of a proper legal system for freedom 
stemmed from his experience in Britain and his reading of Montesquieu's The Spirit 
o f the Laws. In his introductory biography of Montesquieu, he remarked that 
Montesquieu 'spent over two years in London observing English legal institutions and 
proclaimed that only the people of England could be called free.'^ ^® Yen Fu shared 
Montesquieu's belief that freedom could only be secured by a legal system like that in 
operation in Britain. Yen Fu praised Montesquieu's well-known idea that liberty is a 
right of doing whatever the law permits' as the most profound idea in Montesquieu's 
discussion of political l ib e r ty .T h i s  idea, he suggested, defined the essence of 
liberty'."*
155Ibid., p. 1286.
"^Yen Fu, Fa-yi (A translation of Montesquieu's The Spirit o f the Laws), vol. 1, pp. 
vii-viii.
"^Montesquieu, The Spirit o f the Laws, Bk XI:3, p. 150; Yen Fu, Fa-yi, vol. 1, p. 
219.
158Yen Fu, Fa-yi, vol. 1, p. 219.
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It was not novel at the turn of the century to advocate legal reform based on 
Western or Japanese models. In fact, in the decade of the 1900s, the Ch'ing 
government made great efforts to modernize China's legal system and create a 
constitutional framework. It appointed Sen Chia-pen, a well-known legal scholar, as 
imperial commissioner in charge of law reform.*^’
By comparison with Sen Chia-pen, Yen Fu was hardly a major player in the 
legal reform of the late Ch'ing period. His main interests were in social, political and 
cultural issues. He did not discuss in detail the reform of the penal code, civil law or 
commercial law as did Sen Chia-pen. Nevertheless, Yen Fu's awareness of the 
importance of law in protecting individual freedom, his experience in Britain and his 
knowledge of Western legal theories obtained mainly from Montesquieu allowed him 
to raise some important issues such as the difference between the traditional Chinese 
legal system and the Western one and the relationship between law and liberty. These 
issues were hardly discussed by his contemporaries.
Yen Fu had a much stronger awareness than his contemporaries of the main 
differences between the Chinese legal system and modem Western ones. First, he had 
a clear idea of the difference between 'the mle of law' in the modem West and the 
mle of virtuous men' in traditional China. As Schwartz observed, he drew a stark and 
striking contrast at one point between a state in which the administration of justice 
depends on a universal, impersonal system of laws' and a state in which the 
administration of justice depends mainly on the virtue of judges.*^ Yen regarded all 
law in China to be simply a matter of the higher mling the lower'. People's lives, 
property and freedom were not protected by a comprehensive legal system, but 
depended entirely on the mlers' benevolence. The Westem legal system. Yen Fu 
remarked, was entirely different from the Chinese one:
*^’For an account of the late Ch'ing legal reform, see Joseph Kai Huan Cheng, 
Chinese Law in Transition: The Late Ch'ing Law Reform, 1901-1911, Ph.D thesis. 
Brown University, 1976.
’^ Benjamin Schwartz, In Search o f Wealth and Power, p. 153.
*^ *Yen Fu, Fa-yi (A translation of Montesquieu's The Spirit o f  the Laws), vol. 1, p. 
258.
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The most irreconcilable difference between the political systems of the 
East and the West is over the matter of law. The Westem legal system 
originated from ancient Greece and Rome, and improved gradually 
over a long period. To mention some advantages of this system: ...
Law is a special subject of learning; ...lawyers make up a 
profession;...there is a jury system;...the selection and removal of 
jurors is undertaken by courts; ...only judges have the power to 
administer justice;...the judges have higher salaries than other 
professions. Due to these practices, there has been no cormption in 
their administration of justice and no torture in their interrogation.
Their punishments of crimes are balanced and lighter than ours. In 
consequence, their people are happy. While they enjoy freedom, they 
also keep law in their minds. They enjoy the fruits of their hard work 
and do not infringe upon others' rights or cheat others. How can one 
say such people are not fbrtunate?^^^
Secondly, Yen Fu considered the nature of Chinese law to be essentially 
punitive. In Confucianism, law was the means of punishment or reward in enforcing 
morality; in Legalism, law was the means of punishment or reward by which the 
mlers could effectively run the country. Neither of the two schools had developed the 
idea of individual legal rights. Neither subjected the mler to the restraint of law. 
Therefore, law in traditional China was designed only to regulate or punish people. 
The emperor was above the law and could do whatever he wanted without any 
restraint under law.
This type of law. Yen Fu believed, was not the law in the modem Westem sense. 
It could do nothing to protect an individual's freedom. 'The govemment can do 
whatever it wants to do in dealing with people. People's time, labour, property and 
families are all controlled by the command of the mlers. If people hope to escape
*^ ^Yen Fu, Yuan-fu (A Translation of Adam Smith's The Wealth o f Nations), vol. 2, 
p. 901.
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from the tyranny of the rulers they can only appeal to rebellion. There exists no law 
by which people can fight against tyrannical rulers.'^^^
The law China needed to protect the people's freedom was not the means of 
punishment by which the rulers controlled the people. Rather it should be a code to 
define the proper boundaries of individual rights and the power of political authority. 
In this sense, law was similar to a contract.*^ Such a law could be used by the people 
as a weapon to fight for their rights against the tyranny of the authority. In this 
respect, Yen Fu probably shared Montesquieu's idea that 'political liberty consists in 
security, or, at least, in the opinion that we enjoy security.'*^
The preceding exploration of Yen Fu's ideas of liberty has clearly indicated 
that Yen Fu was committed to some basic ideas of what Hayek called British 
liberalism. The foundation of Yen's idea of liberty was his definition of liberty in a 
negative sense. Following from such a definition, he insisted that a frontier must be 
drawn between the area of private life and public authority. He advocated a limited 
governmental role both in moral and in economic spheres. He considered the rule of 
law to be essential for protecting individual freedom. He argued for gradual change 
rather than radical change. There were, to be sure, differences between Yen Fu's idea 
of liberty and those of British liberals. Particularly, on the issue of individual freedom 
of choice. Yen Fu was influenced by Confucian tradition which emphasized the 
individual's duties towards society rather than individual rights in society. As a result. 
Yen Fu did not go so far as to embrace individualism firmly. Nevertheless, Yen Fu's 
overall idea of liberty departed significantly from the Chinese political tradition and 
was close to Westem thought, particularly that of the British liberals in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries. This established him as one of the leading liberal thinkers in 
modem China.
163CYFW, vol. 5, p. 1284.
164CYFW, vol. 5, p. 1284.
165CYFW, vol. 5, p. 1284.
‘^ Montesquieu, The Spirit o f the Laws^ Bk XII: 1, p. 183.
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Chapter VI 
Dilemma of Democracy
Complementing his vision of a liberal society, Yen Fu paid great attention to 
the reform of China's political institutions. He was one of the intellectual pioneers of 
modem China in propagating Westem democratic values and challenging despotism 
in traditional China.
Unlike his idea of freedom, which drew little from traditional Chinese 
thought. Yen's ideas of democracy bore significant influence from traditional Chinese 
thought. His discussion of democracy, to a great degree, addressed an age-old debate 
in China on the origin, nature and ends of govemment.
There was a deep-rooted belief in traditional Chinese culture that govemment 
should be somehow reflective of the people's interests and wills. The earliest 
expression of this belief could be traced to an ancient religious faith in 'the Will of 
Heaven' {t'ien-yi). From the very beginning of Chinese civilization, the conception of 
an almighty Heaven occupied a central place in Chinese religion and culture.* As 
Marcel Granet observed. Heaven appeared as a sovereign power, basically unique 
and omnipotent; it was endowed with the essential attributes of a supreme God.'^ The 
secular mlers, whether kings or emperors, were regarded as Heaven's agents who 
were endowed with powers to carry out the will of Heaven.^ As Heaven did not grant 
its mandate to any royal lineage permanently, any mler who claimed the right to mle 
had to demonstrate his possession of the mandate of Heaven' (t'ien-ming). One way 
of doing this was to obtain the people's acceptance. A popular belief dating from the 
early period of Chinese civilization related the will of Heaven with the will of the 
people. As the Book o f Documents (shu-ching) stated: Heaven hears as the people
*Marcel Granet, The Religion o f the Chinese People (1922), trans. Maurice 
Freedman, New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1975, p. 64.
"Ibid., p. 72. 
"Ibid., p. 65.
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hear. Heaven sees as the people see.' 'Heaven follows what the people want.''*
This faith in the link between the will of Heaven and the will of the people 
later developed into two important doctrines in classical Confucian works. The first 
was Mencius' notion of the primacy of the people. Mencius asserted that the ruler was 
empowered by Heaven for the benefit of the people. Thus the ruler should not only 
treat the people's welfare as the end of government, but also treat the will of the 
people as the last authority of the country.^ The second was the notion that 
govemment was public property {kung-chan). It thus should be run by men of talent, 
virtue, and ability.®
These Confucian ideals, however, were never realized in China except that it 
was said to have existed in the fictitious three dynasties' of antiquity. The ideas of 
Legalism, a rival school to Confucianism in the period of Warring states, by contrast, 
were applied to shape China's political system. Unlike the Confucian emphasis on the 
importance of the people, the Legalists advocated the absolute authority of rulers. As 
Han Fei-tzu (C. 280-233 B.C.), the most important thinker in the Legalist school 
stated, the monarch had absolute authority over his people and commanded absolute 
obedience from them.^ No matter how the monarch behaved, people had no rights of 
disobedience or rebellion because the monarch derived his authority from his position 
as a monarch, rather than from his moral virtue.* The Legalist idea of despotic 
monarchy constituted the foundation of the political system of the Ch'in Dynasty 
(221-208 B.C.), the first unified empire in Chinese history. From the Ch'in to the
'‘Quoted from Sebastian de Grazia ed.. Masters o f Chinese Political Thought: from 
the Beginnings to the Han Dynasty^ New York: the Viking Press, 1973, p. 17 
(translation revised).
^Mencius, Mencius, trans. D. C. Lau, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1970, p. 
196.
®The earliest expression of this ideal was in the Li-yun, a chapter of The Book o f  
Rites (Li-chi). Li-yun was long attributed to Confucius himself, but is now believed to 
have been written long after Confucius in the third or fourth century B. C.
^Hsiao Kung-chuan, Chung-kuo cheng-chi ssu-hsiang shih (A history of Chinese 
political thought), vol. 1, Taipei: Lien-ching, 1982, vol. 1, p. 245.
*lbid., p. 247.
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collapse of the Ch'ing dynasty in 1911, the Chinese political system could be, to 
varying degrees, called despotic government.^
During this long period of despotic rule, the tension between the Confucian 
ideal of popular sovereignty and the reality of despotic rule never ceased among 
Confucian intellectuals. To be sure, many Confucian scholars bowed to reality and 
accommodated themselves to the despotic system. Nevertheless, this tension 
motivated many other intellectuals to criticize the prevailing despotism and seek 
solutions which would effect a 'return' to the 'Golden Age'.*®
The most important criticism of despotism developed before China's contact 
with the West occurred during the late Ming and early Ch'ing period. After centuries 
of ruthless rule under the Yuan and Ming dynasties characterized as despotism at its 
height' in Chinese history,** serious reflection on and criticism of the despotic 
political system emerged. Huang Tsung-hsi (1610-1695 A.D), Tang Tseng (1630- 
1704 A.D.), Ku Yen-wu (1613-1682 A.D.) and Wang Fu-chih (1619-1692) were 
among the most important figures in this intellectual movement. They vigorously 
criticized the despotic system focusing on the concentration of power in the imperial 
institutions and in the person of emperor. Huang Tsung-hsi, in particular, directly 
challenged the monarchial system and asserted that the monarch was only a guest' 
while the people were hosts' in the country.*  ^The essence of political discussions of 
the late Ming and early Ch'ing scholars was their intention to return' to the classical 
doctrine of the primacy of the people'. Their efforts followed the classical tradition 
of the Pre-Ch'in period on the one hand, and initiated modem intellectual trends on
®F. W. Mote, The Growth of Chinese Despotism', in Oriens Extremus, 1960, p. 9.
*®Ching, Yao-chi, Chung-kuo min-pen ssu-hsiang fa-chan shih (Historical 
development of the idea of the primary of the people in China), Taipei: The National 
Political University, 1964, Chapter 4-6.
**F. W. Mote, The Growth of Chinese Despotism', p. 18.
*^Huang Tsung-hsi, Ming-i tai-fang lu (A plan for the prince), Shanghai: Chung- 
hua, 1955, pp. 1-3, also see de Bary, 'Chinese Despotism and the Confucian Ideal: A 
Seventeenth Century View', in Chinese Thought and Institutions^ ed. John K. 
Fairbank, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957, pp. 170-2.
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the other’.
More extensive and widespread reflection on and criticism of the traditional 
political system emerged again in the late Ch'ing period. This reflection and criticism 
of the traditional political system differed from that of the late Ming and early Ch’ing 
period in that it was given great impetus by China’s contact with the West. Beginning 
in the 1840s, a growing number of intellectuals became aware of the existence of 
different political systems in the West. Influential Confucian scholars such as Wei 
Yuan (1794-1856), Hsu Chi-yu (1795-1873), Wang T’ao (1828-1897), Cheng Kuan- 
ying (1842-1923), Ho Kai (1859-1914), Hu Li-yuan (1847-1916) 'had been 
thoroughly inseminated with the demand for changes of the governmental structure 
generally, and more particularly for the creation of a parliamentary system’.*^  They 
saw the democratic system in the West as a new way of achieving the Confucian ideal 
of 'harmony between the rulers and the ruled’.
The political ideas of Yen Fu must be understood within the framework of this 
continued effort among Chinese intellectuals to search for a new, or, at least, 
renewed, political order. There was a stronger intellectual resonance between Yen 
Fu's idea of democracy and the Confucian tradition than Chinese or Westem scholars 
have recognized thus far. As we will show shortly. Yen Fu on the one hand 
consciously accepted certain basic Confucian ideas, such as Mencius’s idea of the 
primacy of the people',*  ^while on the other hand, he perhaps unconsciously brought 
certain traditional values to his interpretation and propagation of Westem democratic 
ideas.
More than those of his intellectual predecessors, however. Yen Fu’s idea of 
political institutions bore the influence of modem Westem democratic ideas and 
systems. He had first-hand experience in Britain and he possessed knowledge of the
‘^ Hsiao Kung-chuan, A History o f Chinese Political Thought, vol. 2, p. 557.
‘"'Lloyd E. Eastman, 'Political Reformism in China before the Sino-Japanese War’, 
in The Journal o f Asian Studies, vol. xxvii (Aug. 1968), p. 698. For a general account 
of the ideas of political reform in Late Ch’ing China, see Liao Sheng-hsiung, The 
Quest for Constitutionalism in Late Ch’ing China: the Pioneering Phase’, Ph.D Thesis, 
the Florida State University, 1978.
"C'iTW, vol. 3, p. 33.
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structure and workings of the British system. More importantly, he had a better 
understanding than his contemporaries of the principles underlying democratic 
systems in the West and was better equipped with knowledge of modem democratic 
theories.
As has been noted, Yen Fu drew greatly from Montesquieu’s The Spirit o f the 
Laws, particularly the latter’s criticism of despotism. In addition to Montesquieu, J.S. 
Mill and Tocqueville seemed to have influenced Yen Fu’s idea of political 
institutions. Yen Fu’s translation of Mill’s On Liberty and System o f Logic were well 
known. There is some evidence that Yen Fu might have read Mill’s main work on 
democracy - Considerations on Representative Government}^ As will be shown later, 
some important ideas in Yen Fu's discussion of govemment bear strong similarities to 
those found in Mill. Yen certainly read Tocqueville’s Democracy in America which 
was among the books in Yen Fu’s library. He referred to Tocqueville frequently 
when arguing that democracy could promote public spirit among the people. He also 
quoted Tocqueville’s conception of 'the tyranny of the majority’ to support his 
somewhat lukewarm position on democratic reform in China.**
*®In his 1913 essay 'On Party’ (shuo-tang), when Yen traced the origin and 
development of Westem political parties, he mentioned that the emergence of 
political parties in the West was a rather new phenomenon. It was not even discussed 
by Mill in his book of 1860 on representative government.’ (CYFW, vol. 2, p. 300. 
Mill’s Considerations on Representative Govemment was in fact published in 1861.) 
In the same essay. Yen Fu also stated that in recent debates on parliamentary reform 
in Britain, some argued against one person, one vote’ and recommended that the 
educated have more than one vote. This might refer to Mill’s plural voting proposal in 
his Considerations on Representative Govemment in which the rich and highly- 
educated citizens could have one or more extra votes.
*^Most of Yen Fu’s personal library has been lost. A small portion of his collections 
is now in the library of Nanking University, China. Among those books is de 
Tocqueville’s Democracy in America (trans. George Lawrence, New York: the 
Colonial Press, 1900).
18CYFW, vol. 1, p. 147; vol. 5, p. 1286.
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nAs with his other discussions of social and political issues, Yen Fu insisted 
that the issue of democracy must be examined by 'scientific’ methods. As a start, he 
called for a classification of political constitutions. There were inconsistencies, 
however, in Yen Fu’s own classifications of constitutions, which have caused much 
confusion and controversy among scholars of Yen Fu. Yen esteemed democracy in 
his early writings and held critical views of it later. By the same token, he denounced 
monarchy earlier and spoke favourably of it later. These changes have been 
interpreted as manifestations of Yen Fu’s shift of position on the issue of democracy.^® 
While there is truth in this argument, I would argue that Yen’s shift of position on the 
issue of democracy was not as drastic as it may have appeared. To be sure, his idea 
about the best form of govemment, particularly for China, shifted in response to 
increasingly influential radicalism. Nevertheless, his basic ideas remained by and 
large unchanged. The perception that he changed his position drastically was caused 
by Yen’s inconsistencies in using the concepts of democracy, monarchy and 
despotism over time.
Before 1902 when he started to translate Montesquieu’s The Spirit o f the Laws^ 
Yen Fu’s classification of govemment followed Aristotle closely. In his letter to Liang 
Ch’i-ch’ao in 1897, Yen challenged Liang’s remark that China had a democracy in 
ancient times. He pointed out that democracy was entirely absent from China’s history 
and was a creation of the West both as an institution and as a concept. He told Liang 
that the European govemmental forms are classified into three: monarchy is the 
system in which the monarch mles over people; aristocracy is the system in which the 
nobles govem cooperatively; democracy is the system in which the supreme power is 
vested in the people. Democracy is also called kung-chan or he chungf^
*’Chou Chen-fu, Yen Fu ssu-hsiang shu-p'ing (A critical interpretation of Yen Fu’s 
thought), pp. 235-8; Wang Shih, Yen Fu Chuang (Biography of Yen Fu), pp. 115-23.
"®Ibid.
‘^The Chinese phrase kung-chan literally means public property’ and he-chung 
means putting the people together.’ Yen Fu’s letter to Liang is apparently no longer 
extant. The quotation above is from Liang’s reply letter to Yen in 1897, in CYFW,
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Of the three types of regime Aristotle defined, Yen Fu never took aristocracy 
seriously. Indeed he hardly referred to any system as an aristocracy either in Chinese 
history or in the West. Monarchy in Yen Fu's writings then referred to the system in 
which the monarch had absolute power. Certainly the traditional Chinese political 
system exemplified this category. He denounced the Chinese 'monarchies' since the 
Ch'in Dynasty as the greatest piracy in stealing the sovereignty of the country from 
the people' ,and asserted that the decline of our yellow race can be attributed to the 
monarchical system'.^^
For Yen Fu in this period, democracy did not necessarily mean that the people 
ruled, but simply that they had a voice in govemmental affairs. When Yen remarked 
that in the West 'freedom is regarded as foundation {t’i) and democracy as functional 
(yun^'^^ and when he admired democracy in the West for creating great harmony 
between the ruler and the ruled,^  ^he mainly had the British system in mind. However, 
the British political system in the late nineteenth century was a constitutional 
monarchy rather than a democracy in the twentieth-century sense. Yen Fu's 
endorsement of democracy in this period was far from embracing a democratic 
system in the contemporary sense. It only meant that he preferred a system in which 
the people had a voice in political affairs.
Yen Fu's classification of governments changed after he began to translate 
Montesquieu's The Spirit o f the Laws in 1902. In his Biography of Montesquieu' 
published in 1904, Yen spoke highly of Montesquieu's classification of constitutions 
into democracy, monarchy and despotism. Aware that Montesquieu's classification 
was based on Aristotle's,^^ he suggested that the former represented a scientific 
advance over the latter:
vol. 5, p. 1568.
^^C'iTW, vol. 1, p. 35.
^^Ibid., vol. 5, p. 1568.
'^‘Ibid., vol. 1, p. 11.
"'Ibid., p. 31.
"%id.
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Aristotle's classification is based entirely on the number of sovereign 
people and does not catch the key issue of govemment. Therefore it 
has been rejected by scholars lately. Montesquieu's classification, in 
contrast, is less concerned with the number of sovereign people. It 
instead examines the different principles and natures of various types 
of govemment. It is therefore more plausible.^^
What impressed Yen Fu about Montesquieu's classification was Montesquieu's 
distinction between monarchy and despotism based on their different natures and 
principles. The notion of despotism had been a political term in Westem political 
thought ever since it was used by Aristotle and other Greek philosophers.^* 
Nevertheless it was due to Montesquieu's innovation that the concept was placed at 
the centre of political theory in the second half of the eighteenth century and 
subsequently gained its significance. Not surprisingly, the concept of despotism is 
regarded as Montesquieu's 'greatest innovation in the classifications of government'.^’ 
Montesquieu's analysis of despotism depended to a considerable extent upon 
empirical assertions about the nature and principle of despotism as found in the 
Orient, including China.^ ® This certainly served Yen Fu's purpose of understanding 
the difference between traditional Chinese govemment, which he called monarchy in 
his early writings, and constitutional monarchy in the West. From Montesquieu, Yen 
Fu understood that although the number of sovereign people was an important 
indicator of the nature of a govemment, the structure and principles of a govemment 
characterized its nature even more clearly. Monarchy and despotism, he wrote, were
^ I^bid., vol. 2, p. 239.
^*For the origin and development of the term, see R. Koebner, 'Despot and 
Despotism: Vicissitudes of A Political Term', in Journal o f the Warburg and 
Courtauld Institutes, vol. 14 (1951), pp. 275-302.
’^M. Richter, The Political Theory o f Montesquieu, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1977, p. 71.
"%id.
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both regimes ruled by one man in form, but their structure and principles were utterly 
different.^* In despotism, no law existed; the despot could do whatever as he pleased. 
In a monarchy, the monarch must obey the law; he could not act at will.^  ^The real 
difference between monarchy and despotism was. Yen Fu concluded, that the former 
was a lawful govemment and the latter was a lawless one.
After beginning his translation of The Spirit o f  the Laws, Yen Fu in most cases 
followed Montesquieu in his use of the concepts of despotism, monarchy and 
democracy. He always sharply contrasted despotism on the one the hand with more 
benign forms of govemment including monarchy and democracy on the other. He 
held that the apparent similarity between monarchy and despotism was deceptive. 
Monarchy was much closer to democracy in nature than to despotism. While 
monarchy and democracy differed in the number of persons who held sovereign 
powers, both of them had laws which bound mler and mled alike in contrast to 
despotism which was a lawless govemment. Therefore both democracy and monarchy 
were constitutional governments and possessed the essence of democracy.^^
m
Among the three forms of govemment, according to Montesquieu, Yen Fu 
was highly critical of the despotic form. He criticized despotism both by denouncing 
the traditional Chinese political system as despotic, and by condemning despotic ideas 
in traditional Chinese thought. He argued that the Chinese political system from the 
Ch'in Dynasty (221-208 BC), the first unified empire, 'has been despotic as described 
in The Spirit o f the Lawsf* The concept of despotism he used to define the traditional
' ’CYFW, vol. 2, p. 239.
'"Ibid.
"Ibid., p. 240.
''’Yen Fu, Fa-yi (A translation of Montesquieu's Ihe Spirit o f the Laws), Shanghai: 
Commercial Press, 1931, Book V, p. 29.
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Chinese political system was not, however, entirely the same as Montesquieu’s 
original concept/^ He qualified Montesquieu's conception of despotism significantly 
to suit the Chinese case. Unlike Montesquieu, he did not regard terror as a distinctive 
characteristic of despotism. He expressed doubt that there had ever existed for long 
anywhere, either in Asia or in Europe, a political system based on terror.^  ^Even the 
most tyrannical rulers in the history of China or elsewhere in Asia, he argued, had to 
claim a certain moral basis of legitimate authority transcending their own individual 
wills and the machinery of terror.^  ^ Force, coercion and terror alone could never 
maintain a govemment for a long time. Any mler, no matter how despotic he was, 
had to gain a certain support from the ruled, for the sheer 'force’ of one despot could 
not overrun the 'force’ of millions.^*
Yen Fu further argued that the characteristic of paternalism was of equal, if 
not greater, significance than the characteristic of terror in Chinese politics. There had 
been no lack of virtuous and benevolent mlers in China’s political history. The mlers 
who based their mle solely, or mainly, on terror were the exception, rather than the 
mle. The distinctive characteristic of despotic govemment, for Yen Fu, did not lie in 
the way despots mled, but in the nature or stmcture of its govemment. The reason he 
called China’s political system despotic was not because mlers were never benevolent, 
but because no system had ever been developed to prevent a mler from using terror 
when he wished to do so. He distinguished a benevolent system’ from benevolent
^^ In The Spirit o f  the Laws, Montesquieu defines despotism, like the two other 
types of govemment, in terms of its nature (or stmcture), and principles (or operative 
passions). The nature of despotism is that the despot exercises virtually complete 
power over subjects. The basic principle of despotic govemment is fear. It requires 
that all subjects be so obsessed by fear that they obey completely and passively. 
(Montesquieu, The Spirit o f the Laws, Bk 11:5, p. 18; Bk III:9&10, pp. 26-8)
^^Yen Fu, Fa-yi (A translation of Montesquieu’s The Spirit o f the Laws), Bk V, p. 
38.
""Ibid.
""CYFW, vol. 5, p. 1308.
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rulers'/^ The former, he claimed, was more important than the latter. 'A  country's 
peace and its people's rights are best protected by good systems, not by virtuous 
persons.''*® In the most prosperous times in China's history, he asserted, China had 
only benevolent emperors, rather than a benevolent system. Thus, 'when a tyrannical 
ruler came to power, the previous paternalistic govemment would suddenly become a 
tyrannical govemment as cmel as a wolf.'""
Yen Fu discussed several aspects of despotic stmcture in traditional China: 1) 
the emperor, rather than the people, held sovereign power; 2) the mler was not 
accountable to his subjects; 3) the mler was not subject to any fundamental laws; and 
4) no institutional checks of any form balanced the absolute power of the emperor.
The cardinal characteristic of the Chinese despotic system which Yen Fu 
criticized was that the emperor held sovereign power over the country and treated the 
whole country like his own property. 'Since the Ch'in', he claimed, there has existed 
no nation or no country, but only one family [the royal family]. When one family rose 
to power, millions of people all became its slaves.... When this family was 
overthrown, the whole govemment would be destroyed too. Our people would be 
transferred to another family just as slaves are transferred to another master.'"*^  
Following Montesquieu, he indicated that the people under the despotic system are 
absolutely equal in the sense that they are all slaves of the despot.''*  ^ In this sense, he 
compared the status of the Chinese people under despotic mlers with that of slaves in 
ancient Greece and Rome. The difference between the social status of the Chinese 
people and slaves in those ancient societies was, for Yen Fu, not greater than the 
difference between the slaves in Sparta and those in Athens.'*'*
’^Yen Fu, Fa-yi (A translation of Montesquieu's The Spirit o f the Laws), Bk. XI, p. 
45.
'*®Ibid.
'**Ibid.
""Ibid., BkV, p. 29.
'*'lbid.,BkVI, p. 6.
44Ibid., BkXV, p. 19.
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As Yen Fu saw it, the power which the despot wielded in China was much 
greater than merely sovereign power in the modem sense in that every power of the 
country legally belonged to the despot. Nothing legally belonged to the people. He 
wrote:
There is a fundamental difference between the Chinese and the 
Westem political systems. In the West people hold the sovereign 
power and the power of govemment is entmsted by the people. ... In 
our Chinese politics, all powers, no matter how small they are, belong 
to govemment. When the mlers exercise powers, they seem to exercise 
their own inherent powers. ... The people never think that they have 
the right to question the decisions of the mlers."*^
Because the emperor held sovereign power, he need not be accountable to his 
subjects. Yen Fu drew a sharp contrast between democracy in which govemment was 
accountable to the people and despotism in which the mler was not accountable to his 
subjects. The Westem political system even in ancient times had certain elements of 
democracy. In his letter to Liang Ch’i-chao, Yen Fu suggested that democracy existed 
in ancient Greece and Rome. 'Although the democratic systems then were not perfect, 
they were nevertheless the initial forms of modem democracy. The seed of 
democracy in the West was planted in the period as early as our Hsia and Shang 
period.''*®
Yen Fu did not discuss the democratic element in Greece and Rome in detail. 
Nevertheless, he did speak highly of the Greek and Roman election systems. He 
remarked that in the heyday of the Roman republic, the majority of officials were 
elected by the people.'*^
Even in the medieval West, Yen Fu still found certain elements of
"'CYFW, vol. 4, p. 930.
"®CYFW, vol. 5, p. 1586. Hsia (2183-1752 B.C.?) and Shang (1751-1112 B.C.) 
were two earliest dynasties in Chinese history.
"^CYFW., vol. 4, p. 932.
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accountability which the traditional Chinese political system lacked. This 
accountability, he suggested, was derived from the idea and practice of the 
inviolability of individual property rights. In his commentary note to Jenks’ A Short 
History o f Politics^ he wrote:
The foundation of the people's power in European races is much 
stronger than it is in our race. Even in the dark age of the medieval 
period when European rulers were extremely tyrannical, the rulers still 
knew that property was owned by the people. When the ruler wanted 
to tax people, it was not sufficient for him to pretend to set up officials 
to serve the people or develop an army to protect the people. He had to 
ask the consent of the people before taxing them. He therefore had to 
call together all the people [to get their consent] which was sometimes 
inconvenient and costly. ... Without their consent, the ruler could not 
increase taxes and could not get money. If we use the same standard to 
search our nation's history, and study the prosperous periods recorded 
in our history, could you find any sages who ever said that the 
monarch could not levy taxes unless agreed to by the people? We need 
not mention Han Yu's 'On the Way' which asserts that the people 
should be severely punished if they do not pay taxes.'**
Based on their tradition of the accountability of the rulers to the people. Yen 
Fu continued, the modem West gradually developed democratic systems in which 
the mler has to keep his promise to the people and honour his contract with the 
people. If he fails to do so, the people can hold him responsible.''*’ By contrast, due to 
the lack of accountability of Chinese mlers, China had not developed any system
"*Ibid., p. 927. 
'*’lbid.
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equivalent to the parliamentary system in the West either in past or modem times.^ ® 
Nor had China ever developed any system similar to elections as in the West/^
Another characteristic of the despotic system in China discussed by Yen Fu 
was the lack of a universal legal system which bound mler and mled alike. The mler 
was not subject to any fundamental laws. Yen Fu accepted Montesquieu's conception 
that 'in despotic governments there are no laws; the judge himself is his own mle'.^  ^
He certainly knew that legal systems had existed in China for thousands of years. He 
refused, however, to identify traditional Chinese laws with laws in Montesquieu's 
sense.
What Montesquieu regards as law is the system of fundamental mles 
for governing a country. Although such law is not necessarily adopted 
by consent of the people, it is essential that when such law is enacted, 
the actions of both mlers and mled must be subject to its control. If 
law is only the means of punishing and controlling people; if the 
monarch is above the law and he can change it at will, if he is not 
subject to the control of law, then the system, although it has law, will 
still be a despotic system.^^
The point Yen Fu tried to make here is similar to some ideas in Karl 
Wittfogel's controversial work. Oriental Despotism. Wittfogel argued that the 
existence of certain kinds of 'written constitutions' in the Orient was by no means 
identical to the development of a constitutionally' restricted govemment.
®^In his letter to Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, Yen Fu criticized Liang's remark that China had 
a parliament in ancient times. Yen said that China had never had any system similar 
to parliament. (CYFW, vol. 5, p. 1568).
'*CYFW, vol. 4, p. 928.
^^Montesquieu, The Spirit o f the Laws, Bk VI:3, p. 75.
^^Yen Fu, Fa-yi (A translation of Montesquieu's The Spirit o f the Laws), vol. 1, p. 
26.
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Even a highly systematized law code does not bind the autocratic 
lawgivers by restrictions other than those inherent in all self-imposed 
norms. The ruler who exercises complete administrative, judicial, 
military, and fiscal authority may use this power to make whatever 
laws he and his aides deem
Moreover, Yen Fu held that there were no institutional checks to the ruler in 
the traditional Chinese political system. Yen Fu was certainly impressed by 
Montesquieu’s comment to this effect when he translated The Spirit o f the Laws:
Here they have no limitations or restrictions, no mediums, terms, 
equivalents, or remonstrances; no change to propose. Man is a creature 
that blindly submits to the absolute will of the sovereign.^^
In his translation of The Spirit o f  the Laws, Yen Fu emphasized this passage 
because it contained the idea of a despotic system as a system of total power. In this 
system, the emperor held absolute power over other institutions. No divisions of 
power in any form and no checks on the power of the despot from any other sources 
ever existed. By the same token. Yen Fu also appreciated Montesquieu’s idea of the 
division of powers in govemment. In one of his commentary notes to The Spirit o f the 
Laws, Yen Fu wrote, Montesquieu argues that in a constitutional monarchy there is a 
division of powers, and in despotism, powers are concentrated in one body. This is a 
very sound argument.’^® Yen Fu used the example of China to confirm Montesquieu's 
argument:
The weakness of our Chinese system is that from the Son of the
'^‘Karl Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study o f Total Power, New 
York: Vintage Books, reprint, 1981, p. 101.
^^Montesquieu, The Spirit o f the Laws, Bk III: 10, p. 27.
^^Yen Fu, Fa-yi (A translation of Montesquieu’s The Spirit o f the Laws), Bk XXV, 
p. 13.
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Heaven to the local officials, all combined judicial, legislative and 
administrative powers in the same body. This is why there is no justice 
in our criminal cases.^^
In his essay on Jenks' A History o f Politics^ Yen Fu even regarded the division 
of powers as one of the criteria of evolution in a political system:
To evaluate the evolutionary stage of a political system, it is essential 
to examine the degree of division of powers in the system. In civilized 
Westem countries, political powers are divided into three branches: 
judicial, legislative and administrative. Parliaments are responsible for 
initiating and passing laws. Administrators from the monarch to the 
local level are responsible for implementing those laws. If someone 
violates laws, the cases are dealt with neither by the legislative power, 
nor by the executive power, but by the judicial power. When judges 
carry out their duties, they are not interfered with by legislative or 
administrative powers....This is the general mle of those civilized 
countries, Britain in particular. This is why there is no injustice in 
Britain.... In the Oriental countries, by contrast, not only do the 
emperors have absolute power, but also officials at every level 
concentrate in themselves the three powers. Consequently there is no 
justice in many legal cases.^*
IV
The causal explanation Yen Fu offered for the despotic system in China was 
purely cultural. He did not have a materialist approach to history, for instance, 
resembling Montesquieu's geographical explanation of despotism or Jenks' 
explanation of legal and political institutions by referring to the forces of production.
""Ibid., BkVI, p. 10. 
"'CYFW, vol. 1, p. 147.
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Despotic ideas in traditional China, for Yen Fu, were by and large responsible for the 
despotic system. Those ideas falsely legitimated the system, enabling it to exist for a 
long time.
Yen Fu did not regard all traditional Chinese political ideas as despotic. He 
distinguished two major traditions in Chinese political thought. First, he perceived 
classical Confucianism as containing elements comparable to modem Westem 
democratic ideas. Secondly, he regarded the Legalists in the Pre-Ch’in and the main 
stream of Confucianism after Ch’in as largely oriented towards despotism. Thus his 
criticism of Chinese despotic ideas was concentrated on the Legalists and on some 
Neo-Confucians who adopted the Legalist idea of the absolute authority of the 
emperor. He wrote some highly critical commentary notes to the works of such 
Legalist theorists in the Pre-Ch’in period as Sheng Pu-hai, Li Ssu, Shang Yang, and 
Han Fei-tzu.^’ He also chose a dozen Neo-Confucian scholars as the objects of 
criticism. Among them were Han Yu (768-824 A.D.), Liu Tsung-yuan (773-819 
A.D.), Su Shih and Wang An-shih. His criticism of these theorists was focused 
mainly on their accounts of the origin of government, the relationship between mler 
and mled, and the end of politics.
Yen Fu considered the account of the origin of govemment important because 
it related closely to the issue of the sources of political authority. In his essay In 
Repudiation of Han Yu’ (1895), he attacked vigorously the idea of the origin of 
govemment found in Han Yu, a famous T’ang writer. He also wrote some 
commentary notes to repudiate Liu Tsung-yuan, a T’ang scholar, and Su Shih, a Sung 
Confucian, for their accounts on the origin of govemment.
The accounts of the origin of govemment by Han, Liu and Su bore great 
similarities. First, they identified the existence of a state of nature before the 
emergence of civilization and political institutions. In this state, men endured great 
hardship to survive. Secondly, they all considered the emergence of what they called 
the sages to be the determining factor of the origins of civilization and political
’^Yen Fu,Fa-y/ (A translation of Montesquieu’s The Spirit o f  the Laws)^ Bk II, pp. 
16-7; Yen Fu also wrote some thoughtful commentary notes on Li Ssu’s Tu-tse-shu 
(On the enforcement of duties). He denounced Li as 'the most extreme advocate of 
despotism’. (CYFW, vol. 4, p. 1195).
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institutions. The crudest expressions of these views is found in Han Yu's essay Yuan- 
tao (The original way). Yen quoted the following passage from Han's essay:
In ancient times, men suffered acutely. Then the sages appeared to 
teach them how to live together and sustain themselves. They became 
their lulers and teachers. They drove away noxious insects, serpents, 
and wild beasts, and settled the people in the Middle Land. They 
clothed them when they were cold and fed them when they were 
hungry. ... They built them dwellings and trained artisans to supply 
them with tools, merchants to exchange their goods, doctors to prevent 
their early death. They established rites of mourning, burial, and 
sacrifice to nurture their feelings of love, and ceremonies to teach them 
the proper precedence of social relations. They created music for them 
to express their feelings. They established government for them to 
overcome their laziness. They set up legal systems for them to remove 
violence. They invented weights and measures for them to prevent 
cheating with each other. They built cities and armies to prevent 
invasion.... had it not been for the sages, the human race would long 
since have perished.^
In a similar manner, Liu Tsung-yuan traced the origin of government to a state 
of nature in ancient times. Tn ancient times', wrote Liu in his essay Feng-chien-lun 
(On feudalism), 'thousands of things grew. The world was full of thistles and thorns, 
as well as wild animals. Men could not fight them for they did not have fur and claws 
to defend themselves.... Men had to use material tools to feed themselves and defend 
themselves. There would be fights among men for material goods. To stop the fights, 
there had to be someone who had the authority to judge. Some wise man, whom 
many people liked to trust, would tell the people what was right and what was wrong, 
and used punishment to prevent wrong doing. This was the origin of the monarch and
^Han Yu, Han Yu chi (Collected works of Han Yu), ed. Tung T'i-te, Peking: jen- 
min wen-hsueh, 1980, pp. 217-8; Yen Fu quoted in CWW, vol. 1, pp. 32-3.
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law.'"*
Su Shih's account of the origin of government also supposed the existence of a 
primitive stage before the emergence of political authority. In the primitive stage of 
mankind, there was no distinction between nobles and commoners. People did not 
know how to plant and weave. Then the sages rose to become monarch or officials. 
They taught the people to plant and weave, and to establish social and legal systems."^
Yen Fu's criticisms of these Chinese thinkers' accounts of the origin of 
government focused primarily on the empirical dimension. Based on his knowledge 
of nineteenth century Western evolutionary theories. Yen Fu simply dismissed their 
accounts as historically inaccurate. He argued that political authority was the result of 
a natural evolutionary process rather than the conscious choice of men."  ^ The origin 
of political authority could be traced to the emergence of the family, which was the 
earliest form of group life among human beings."^ After a stage of communal 
marriage, a system of monogamy developed."" From monogamy there arose a 
patriarchal political system. From the patriarchal system issued the modem state. 
During the development from the family to the modem state. Yen Fu further pointed 
out, the division of labour in society increased."" In society as a social organism, 
different parts performed different functions. Government arose to organize these 
different parts of society as a kind of community rather than simply as a gathering of 
individuals."’ Govemment functioned as the central part of a society just as the head 
is the central part of human body."* As society evolved from a lower stage to a higher
62 
63 
64Ti_:
“ Yen Fu quoted, CYFW, vol.4, p. 1180. 
’Yen Fu quoted, CYFW., vol. 4, p. 1184. 
'CYFW, vol. 5, p. 1252.
'Ibid., vol. 2, p. 310.
“ Ibid., pp. 310-311.
“ Ibid., p. 314.
“ Ibid., vol. 5, p. 1256.
“ Ibid.
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stage, the division of labour within govemment developed. Different institutions and 
officials were established in govemment, and meanwhile, governmental institutions 
were established from central to local levels.®^  Yen Fu quoted a paragraph from the I  
Ching to describe the whole process of social and governmental evolution: 'Due to 
the distinction between male and female, the relation of husband and wife emerged; 
following the relation of husband and wife, the relation of father and son appeared; 
following the relation of father and son, kings and officials emerged. Then a 
distinction between nobles and commoners appeared and consequently morality and 
propriety emerged.’’®
In the same way that Yen Fu dismissed the accounts of the origin of 
govemment by these Chinese thinkers, he also rebuked the theories of social contract 
found in modem Westem political theories. He traced the origin of the idea of the 
social contract to Greek and Roman philosophy.’  ^ He argued that this idea did not 
develop into a systematic theory until modem times with Hobbes, Locke, and 
Rousseau as the main advocates. In Leviathan^ Yen Fu wrote, Hobbes portrayed the 
state of nature as a state of war in which everyone fought against each other. In order 
to escape from this state, people made a contract among themselves, agreeing to hand 
their rights over to a third party, usually a monarch, in order to maintain social 
order.’^  Locke’s theory, as Yen Fu saw it, differed from Hobbes’ in that Locke 
described the state of nature as peaceful and free. Nevertheless, according to Locke, 
there were many inconveniences in the state of nature. Therefore, people agreed to 
establish a govemment and to hand over some of their powers to the govemment.’  ^
Yen stated that following Hobbes and Locke, Rousseau developed a similar, yet more 
radical theory of the social contract. Rousseau reduced all political authority to the
""Ibid., p. 1256. 
’®Ibid., vol. 2, p. 310.
’'Ibid., p. 334. 
’^ Ibid.
’"Ibid., p. 335.
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acquiescence of the people and based on this a theory of popular sovereignty7"*
Yen Fu suggested that the social contract theories of Hobbes, Locke, and 
Rousseau resembled those of Han Yu, Liu Tsun-yuan, and Su Shih insofar as their 
accounts were not in accordance with historical reality/^ 'They were not aware that a 
patriarchal society preceded the modem state as Edward Jenks thoroughly 
discussed.'^^
Despite his comparison of modem Westem theories of social contract with 
accounts of the origin of govemment of several Chinese thinkers. Yen Fu’s main 
targets of criticism were the theories of the Chinese scholars rather than those of the 
Westem thinkers. He felt that the accounts of Han Yu, Liu Tsung-yuan, and Su Shih 
of the role of the sages and common people in the origin of govemment were 
unacceptable. The argument that a primitive period of human history preceded the 
emergence of govemment in these Chinese thinkers was not very different from the 
natural state’ which Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau postulated. The difference was that 
modem Westem thinkers attributed the origin of govemment to a kind of social 
contract among equals, while Chinese thinkers described the origin of govemment as 
a process of salvation and education of the common people by the sages. Hobbes, for 
example, asserted that men by nature are equal. 'Nature hath made men so equal, in 
the faculties of the body, and minds.’^  ^ By contrast, the accounts of the Chinese 
scholars aggrandized the ability of the sages. The sages were endowed with super­
human properties which enabled them to play divine roles in helping ordinary men. 
Therefore they were entitled to enjoy a prominent position as guardians of society. 
Ordinary people were described as not only lacking any capacity in social and 
political affairs, but also lacking the ability of self-protection and self-realization. 
Their lives and interests could only be protected and served by the sages. In retum.
""Ibid., p. 339.
""Ibid., vol. 5, p. 1261. 
""Ibid.
""Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan^ ed. C. B. Macpherson, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1968, Chap. 13, p. 98; Yen Fu’s discussion of Hobbes’ idea is found in CYFW, vol. 2, 
p. 334.
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they served the sages with total submission and obedience. Yen Fu was offended by 
these accounts of the sages as 'superhuman'.^* He ridiculed Han Yu angrily: if the 
people could not survive without sages because they did not have wings, fur, scales 
and fins to protect themselves against the heat and cold, and they did not have claws 
and fangs with which to procure their food, did the sages come equipped with fur or 
claws and fangs? Did they not suffer from cold and illness and all the vicissitudes of 
other mortals? If they were human like all the others, where did they acquire their 
peculiar wisdom? If mankind had to wait for the sages to teach them the barest 
rudiments of living, would they not have perished long before the sages arrived?^’
When Yen Fu criticized the accounts of the origin of govemment by Han Yu, 
Liu Tsung-yuan, and Su Shih, his main purpose was to repudiate their conclusions. 
This was particularly true of his repudiation of Han Yu. A forbearer of Neo- 
Confucianism, Han Yu followed Confucian tradition in its moral aspects, but departed 
from classical Confucianism in his political philosophy. Han completely lacked any 
conception of the role of the people in politics. Instead he embraced the theory of the 
absolute authority of the emperor found mainly in Legalism.*® Based on his fictitious 
account of the origin of govemment, Han Yu developed a theory of the relationship 
between mlers and the mled. As their mling positions were derived originally from 
their enabling people to escape the state of nature, the mlers were entitled to demand 
obedience from the people.
The emperor is the one who gives orders. The officials are those who 
carry out these orders. The people are those who produce grain and 
cloth, make tools and do business in the market in order to serve the 
emperor. If the emperor does not give orders, he fails to perform his 
duty. If officials do not carry out the orders of the emperor, they fail to
"*CYFW, vol. 1, p. 33.
’^Ibid., the English translation is from Schwartz, p. 65. 
80/'CYFW, vol. 2, p. 434.
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perform their duties. If the people do not produce grain, cloth and tools 
to serve the emperor, they fail to perform their duties and therefore 
should be severely punished.**
Han Yu's idea of the absolute authority of the emperor offended Yen Fu. Yen 
angrily accused Han as 'only recognizing the existence of one person [the emperor] 
and ignoring the existence of millions of people'.*  ^If Han's theory was accepted. Yen 
asked, 'how do tyrannical rulers such as Chien, Tsou and Ch'in differ from virtuous 
rulers like Yao and Shun?'*^
Related to the idea of the absolute authority of the despot was one which 
treated the despot, rather than the people, as the end of politics. The most blunt 
statement in this regard which Yen Fu chose to repudiate was the famous remark of 
Li Ssu (280-208 B.C.), a Legalist minister in the Ch'in dynasty. The Second Emperor 
of the Ch'in once asked Li Ssu: I want to give uninhibited expression to my will and 
indulge my desires to the broadest extent. I hope long to enjoy the fruits of empire, 
and to suffer no harm. Why should I not do this?' In his reply, 'On the Enforcement 
of Duties', Li put forward the clearest and most extreme statement on the theory of 
despotism in all of the two thousand years of Chinese imperial history:
To possess the empire, and yet not throw off all restraints, is called 
making shackles for oneself of the empire. There is no reason for that 
to happen other than [a ruler's] failure to supervise [his underlings] and 
hold them responsible; when however his responsibilities must extend 
to belabouring his own body in service to the people of his empire in 
the manner of [the Sage Kings] Yao and Yu, [the empire] indeed is to 
be called his shackles.*^
**Han Yu, Han Yu chi (Collected works of Han Yu), pp. 217-8; Yen Fu quoted in 
CYFW, vol. 1, p. 33.
*"C'iTW, vol. 1, p. 33.
*'lbid.
*^Quoted in Hsiao Kung-ch'uan, A History o f Chinese Political Thought, vol. 1,
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The essence of Li Ssu's argument was that the empire was the property of the 
emperor. Therefore, the emperor should 'devote himself solely to using the empire 
for his own interests'. He should not belabour his body and weary his spirit by his 
personal services to the common people’.*^
In China's history, there was no shortage of theories arguing for the absolute 
authority of the emperor. There were, however, not many scholars or politicians who 
expressed as crudely as did Li Ssu the point that the whole purpose of politics was to 
serve the emperor rather than the people. It was not surprising then that Yen Fu chose 
Li's remarks as the target of his criticism. In his commentary note to Li's 'On the 
Enforcement of Duties', Yen denounced Li's remarks as the most extreme idea of 
despotism'.*^ He compared Li's idea with those of Machiavelli and Nietzsche in the 
sense that they praised tyrannical authorities and emphasized the enforcement of the 
ruler's orders'.*^
In criticizing the despotic ideas of Legalists and some Neo-Confiicians as well 
as the traditional Chinese despotic political system. Yen Fu retrieved certain elements 
from classical Confucianism. The most obvious example was his use of Mencius' idea 
of 'the primacy of the people'.
Yen Fu thought that two elements in Mencius' doctrine of the primacy of the 
people' were comparable with modem Westem democratic ideas: the idea of popular 
sovereignty and the idea of the people as the end of politics. By repudiating Han Yu's 
The Original Way', Yen Fu reiterated Mencius' statement that the people are of 
supreme importance; the alters to the gods of earth and grain come next; last comes
trans. F. W. Mote, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979, p. 439.
''Ibid.
'"CYFW, vol. 5, p. 1195.
"Ibid., p. 1196.
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the ruler.'** He suggested that Mencius' account of the relationship between ruler and 
ruled was the best expression of popular sovereignty ever found in history in either 
China or the West.*’ To some extent, he found it comparable with the theories of 
popular sovereignty found in Locke and Rousseau.’® Although Yen Fu criticized the 
theories of social contract of Locke and Rousseau as ahistorical, he nevertheless 
honoured the doctrine of popular sovereignty as being drawn from such theories. He 
praised Rousseau's theory of govemment for containing several basic principles of 
modem democracy such as separating sovereign from administrative power, insisting 
that sovereign power belonged to the people, and conceiving the govemment as an 
executive body designed to carry out the will of the sovereign power.’*
Yen Fu also suggested that Mencius' idea of the primacy of the people implied 
that the people should be treated as the end of politics in sharp contrast with the 
Legalist conception of the emperor as the end of politics. Following Mencius, Yen Fu 
used the division of labour to argue for the intrinsic worthiness of the people over the 
mler. He stated that a society could not function unless the people were engaged in 
different kinds of work. Like a farmer or craftsman, the emperor's function was to 
serve the people.’  ^ In this sense, the position of emperor did not have any special 
sacredness. It was only one of the jobs in society's division of labour. The end of 
politics was to serve the welfare of the people and most importantly to protect lives 
and properties.’^
In restating Mencius' idea of popular sovereignty. Yen Fu followed some 
scholars of the late Ming and early Ch'ing period. In fact there was a striking
**Ibid., vol. 1, p. 33. 
*’lbid., vol. 2, p. 241.
’®Ibid.
’‘Ibid.
’^ For Mencius' discussions of the people as the end of politics based on his idea of 
the division of labour, see Mencius^ (trans. D.C. Lau, p. 42); for Yen Fu's discussions, 
see CYFW, vol. 1, pp. 32-6.
’^CYFW, vol. 1, p. 35.
257
similarity between Yen Fu's Repudiation of Han Yu' and Huang Tsung-hsi's Ming-i 
tai-fang Lu (A plan for the prince). Both Huang and Yen criticized the traditional 
despotic system for the absolute authority of the despot. Both reasserted Mencius' 
ideas of popular sovereignty and the people as the end of politics.^^
Yen Fu, however, went further than either Mencius or the liberal thinkers of 
the late Ming and early Ch'ing period. While praising Mencius' idea of popular 
sovereignty. Yen Fu stopped short of identifying Mencius' ideas with modem 
democratic ideas in the West. He considered the main difference to be their 
treatments of the people's actual role in politics. Although Mencius emphasized the 
importance of the people and urged the mlers to treat the people's welfare as the end 
of govemment, he never had any notion that the people should play an actual role in 
political affairs. Moreover, he never thought that the powers of the mlers should be 
checked or limited. He never mentioned that the mlers should be accountable to their 
subjects. Yen Fu wrote: 'There is a fundamental difference between Chinese and 
Westem political ideas. The Westem thinkers believe that the mlers should be elected 
by the mled. This idea was completely absent from the minds of any of our ancient 
sages.'’  ^ Without institutions such as elections, the idea of popular sovereignty in 
Confucianism could only serve as a moral check to mlers. It could at best nurture 
some benevolent mlers, rather than establish a system in which no mler could seize 
despotic power.’^
This was why Yen Fu claimed that the Confucian ideal of popular sovereignty 
was never realized in the history of China. Yen Fu argued that the golden ages of the 
three emperors in the ancient times praised by Confucians had not existed.’  ^All of the 
four thousand years of political development in China could only be described as
’'‘Huang Tsung-hsi, Ming-i tai-fang Lu  ^(A plan for the prince), esp. Chapter 1, 'On 
the Origin of the Prince'.
’"CYFW, vol. 4, p. 932.
’^Yen Fu, Fa-yi (A translation of Montesquieu's The Spirit o f  the Laws), Bk III, p. 
17.
97iTbid, p. 9.
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'circles of order and disorder'.^* If there happened to be a benevolent ruler, there was 
peace and prosperity for a certain time. Many rulers, however, were tyrannical and 
corrupt. The system contained nothing to prevent them from gaining power.
By raising the issue of the ordinary people’s role in politics. Yen Fu touched 
upon a key issue in modem democratic theory: the issue of citizenship and 
participation. The idea of citizenship, as Dennis F. Thompson sees it, is closely 
related vdth the idea of participation. Thompson distinguishes between two different 
concepts: responsiveness’ and participation’. 'To say that a system is democratic is 
to imply not only that the system is responsive to the interests of most of the citizens 
but also that the citizens share in governing (if only by selecting in a competitive 
system who shall govern between elections).’’^
By Thompson’s definition, Mencius’ idea of popular sovereignty can be 
justifiably called responsive’, but not participatory’. The people in Mencius’ theory 
are still 'subjects’ of the ruler rather than citizens’, no matter how benevolent the 
ruler is. The idea of the citizen is essential to any democratic system. From the 
ancient Greek city-state to modem democracy in the nation-state, 'what citizenship 
entitled a man to was membership) that is, some minimum share of political activity 
or participation in public business.’’®®
Yen Fu’s criticism of Mencius’ idea of popular sovereignty as lacking any 
notion of participation represented a significant departure from traditional Chinese 
political beliefs. He not only regarded the people as the sovereign power of a nation, 
as Mencius had, but also granted people certain rights of participation. He recognized 
the people’s actual role in political affairs to be essential to a modem political system.
Nevertheless, on this issue of participation. Yen Fu did not go so far as to 
identify with any major school of modem Westem democratic theories. His position 
was somewhere between Mencius’ idea of the primacy of the people and what has
''Ibid., BK VIII, p. 28.
"Dennis F. Thompson, The Democratic Citizen, Cambridge University Press, 
1970, pp. 2-3.
’®®George H. Sabine, A History o f Political Theory, third edition, London: George 
G. Harrap & Co. Ltd., 1963, p. 5.
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been generally understood as democratic theory. In his accounts of the relationship 
between the ruler and the ruled, there were strong elements of elitism. Yen accepted 
in principle that the people were the sovereigns of a country, and accepted the 
possibility that in the future people could govern themselves directly without a 
monarch. However, for a country like China, the people were not yet ready to govern 
themselves. They had to accept a monarch as a necessary evil, though they should 
choose, if possible, a virtuous man as their monarch. There should be an agreement 
between the people and the monarch and the people should tell the monarch:
We are busy working on agriculture, textiles, industry and commerce.
If we defend our life and property by ourselves, our work will be 
jeopardized. We therefore choose you to concentrate on undertaking 
the task of protection for us. We will offer some part of our earnings in 
agriculture, textiles, industry and commerce to you so that both you 
and we can benefit.
The monarch must say to the people:
I, as a humble person, am entrusted with the leadership of the people.
This is because the people are not yet able to govern themselves. The 
reason for their inability of self-rule is that their moral, intellectual and 
physical capacities are not high enough. I will work hard to promote 
the advance of the people’s moral, intellectual and physical 
capacities...until the people will not cheat and harm each other. When 
the people reach the level of self-rule, I will retum all powers to 
them.*®^
In this agreement, according to Yen Fu, the people were the sovereign part.
'"'CYFW, vol. 1, p. 34. 
'“ Ibid., p. 35.
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'Without the people paying taxes, there would be no monarch at all.’*®^ The monarch 
was a kind of trustee. He and his officials must perform their duties vigorously. 'If  
the monarch fails to prevent violence and harm in a society, he should be removed. If 
officials fail to carry out the orders of the monarch to prevent violence and harm, they 
should be punished.'**^
Yen Fu’s ideas of democracy are reminiscent of Schumpeter's elitist idea of 
democracy. The people’s role in politics is not to participate in decision-making since 
common people are not competent enough to make decisions on political issues which 
require special knowledge. The main role for the common people in democratic 
politics is to choose leadership through elections and entrust the leadership to make 
political decisions.*®^
Elitist though it was. Yen Fu’s idea of democracy was a major break with 
Chinese political tradition in several senses. First, the relation between ruler and the 
ruled changed significantly. The ruler was treated as the people’s trustee’. He had to 
be chosen’ by the people. Secondly, there was an agreement between the people and 
monarch to spell out clearly what the monarch’s duties would be. Thirdly, if the 
monarch failed to perform his duties as the people commanded, he would be 
punished. Finally, the position of monarchy would be temporary and would be 
abolished once the people could establish self-rule. All these indicated that the status 
of the people began the transition from subjects of the ruler to citizens in the modem 
sense.
VI
Why was democracy more desirable than other forms of govemment? Why 
should China change its age-old political system by adopting parliamentary and 
constitutional forms from the West? In short, what was the theoretical basis of Yen
'"'Ibid., p. 33. 
'"^Ibid.
'"^See Joseph A Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, New York: 
Harper Torchbooks, reprint, 1975, pp. 269-83.
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Fu's justification of democracy and criticism of despotism? The answer offered by 
Schwartz was that Yen Fu justified democracy on social Darwinist grounds. By social 
Darwinist grounds, Schwartz meant that Yen Fu regarded democracy as having the 
instrumental value of nurturing the individuals' sense of nationalism and willingness 
to sacrifice for the sake of the state.
Schwartz's interpretation is misleading in two respects. On the one hand, he 
misinterpreted Yen Fu's utilitarian argument as social Darwinist. On the other hand, 
he failed to observe some important arguments which went beyond immediate 
considerations of the wealth and power of the Chinese state.
To be sure. Yen Fu by and large did not perceive democracy itself as having 
an intrinsic value. His argument for democracy was instrumental and external. This 
instrumental argument, however, had little to do with social Darwinism, and it was 
essentially a utilitarian argument. As Alan Ryan sees it, there are two different 
democratic theories in terms of their arguments for democracy. One is a rights-based 
theory of democracy', and the other is a utilitarian argument for democracy. 'A rights- 
based theory of democracy must be concerned above all else with questions of 
legitimacy and authority rather than with consequentialist questions. That is, a 
defense of democratic institutions in terms of rights must claim that a democratic 
govemment is uniquely legitimate rather than that a democratic govemment is more 
likely than any kind of govemment to maximize utility.'*®^  The utilitarian argument 
for democracy, by contrast, is essentially an extemal argument because there is no 
attempt to give democracy an intrinsic value. Democracy is justified by its 
instrumental value in maximizing utility.
By Ryan's standards. Yen Fu's argument for democracy was basically 
utilitarian in the sense that he appraised democracy mainly by its instmmental value, 
rather than its intrinsic value. His basic argument was that democracy, more than any
'^Benjamin Schwartz, In Search o f Wealth and Power, pp. 66-9.
‘®^ Alan Ryan, 'Mill and Rousseau: Utility and Rights', in Democratic Theory and 
Practice, ed. by Graeme Duncan, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, p. 
42.
'"'Ibid.
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other form of government, could promote the development of certain moral and 
intellectual properties of individuals which were essential for the development of the 
society.
One should bear in mind that Yen's discussion of democracy was only one 
part of his general analysis of the differences between China and the West and his 
overall solution for China's crises. As discussed above, based on Spencer's theory of 
social organism and some Confucian ideas Yen perceived the principal difference 
between China and the West, and thereby China's fundamental weakness to lie in the 
levels of the individuals' moral, intellectual and physical development. Small wonder 
that his main criterion for judging a political system would be its impact on 
individuals' moral and intellectual development.
Moreover, Yen Fu's association of democracy and the development of the 
people's moral and intellectual capacities could be partially attributed to his reading of 
such Westem works as Montesquieu's The Spirit o f the Laws, Tocqueville's 
Democracy in America, and John Stuart Mill's Considerations on Representative 
Government. These works, in different ways, expressed deep concern for the 
improvement of mankind morally and intellectually, and linked the social, legal and 
political systems with what Montesquieu called 'the general spirit, the morals, and 
customs of a nation'.*®’ Montesquieu claimed that laws are the most important factors 
in shaping the character of a nation.**® Tocqueville considered the greatest advantage 
of democracy to be its educational function for the people. He held that democracy, 
more than any other form of govemment, could nurture a habit of involvement in 
public affairs, teach the notion of political rights, instill the mle of law, and draw men 
into a concem for social problems and responsibilities.*** Mill's most formidable 
defence of democracy was that it provided the opportunity to improve mankind. For 
Mill, the most important point of excellence which any form of govemment can
*®’Montesquieu, The Spirit o f the Laws, Bk XIX (title), p. 292.
**®Ibid., BkXIX:27, p. 307.
***Jack Lively, The Social and Political Thought o f Alexis de Tocqueville, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1962, p. 110.
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possess is to promote the virtue and intelligence of the people themselves.'"^ 
Democratic govemment, more than any other form of govemment, could foster the 
development of a vigorous, public-spirited 'national character'.*"
Yen Fu did not acknowledge his debt to Westem thinkers for the idea of the 
educational function of democracy. Nevertheless, certain intellectual links are evident 
in his writings. First, he held that democracy, more than any other form of 
govemment, could nurture the public spirit' {kung-hsin) of the people. He argued that 
men by nature were self-interested. Without participation in public affairs, men's 
concems could only be limited to their private interests. 'The best govemance of the 
sages lies in the fact that they can channel men's self-considerations into public- 
considerations.'**"* The best way to do so was to let people participate in public affairs 
through democratic processes. Yen Fu claimed that Westem democratic political 
systems had successfully channelled people's self-considerations into public- 
considerations'.**^ In the West, people held the sovereign power of the country. They 
elected parliament, which passed laws. They elected executive officials to carry out 
the laws. Therefore, in the West, people had strong sentiments of public spirit. They 
had a strong sense of the mle of law as well as of political obligation. They obeyed 
govemment not because they thought themselves inferior to their mlers, but because 
the govemment was elected by themselves.**  ^ Moreover, Westem people regarded 
national affairs as their own affairs. When people are asked to perform public duties.
**^ J. S. Mill, Considerations on Representative Government^ p. 207.
** '^National character' is defined by Mill as including: 1) a sense of citizenship; 2) a 
broadness of conceptions' and sentiments', which extend citizens' thoughts and 
feelings beyond the satisfaction of daily wants'; and 3) an understanding of the 
general interest and stimulation of public-regarding attitudes. (Dennis F. Thompson, 
John Stuart Mill and Representative Government^ Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1976, pp. 37-8.)
**'*CYFW, vol. l,p .31. 
**'lbid.,p. 2. 
**"lbid.,p.31.
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they regard it as the same as working on their own land or house.'"^ This was 
particularly true with tax-collection. Because people participated in political decision­
making, they were willing to pay high taxes if they felt it was needed. The taxes paid 
by people are agreed upon by the people and in its last result, collected by the people. 
There is therefore no dissatisfaction among the people even if taxes are very heavy.'"* 
'Public spirit' for Yen Fu was often related to the sentiment of patriotism. 
Yen's position on patriotism was not always consistent. As we have shown before, he 
explicitly criticized nationalism as well as patriotism. On some other occasions, 
however, he openly praised patriotism. On balance, it seems that he was in opposition 
to nationalism as manifest in any kind of anti-foreign sentiment. Yet he preferred that 
people love their countries. He regarded democracy as the best means of nurturing 
patriotism in the people. In the same way that Tocqueville was impressed by 
American patriotism. Yen Fu was impressed by the general level of patriotic feeling 
in the West."^ 'When I heard the British talk about Britain, the French talk about 
France, or citizens of other countries talk about their motherland, I found that they 
mentioned their countries with the same feelings as we mentioned our parents. They 
seemed to have a deep and inexhaustible love for their countries.'"®
While the greatest advantage of democracy was its promotion of public spirit 
and sentiments of patriotism among the people, the most intolerable evil of 
despotism, for Yen Fu, was its damage to people's morality and public spirit. He 
presented several different yet related arguments. First, he argued that despotic rulers 
would try hard to fool the people. The despotic rulers of China since the Ch'in 
dynasty, he wrote, were in fact the biggest thieves who had stolen sovereign power 
from the people.
"'Ibid.
"*Ibid., vol. 4, p. 975.
" ’In his Democracy in America^ Tocqueville described democracy as nurturing 
very strong patriotic sentiments among the American people. This patriotism 'is 
engendered by enlightenment, grows by aid of laws and the exercise of rights, and in 
the end becomes, in a sense, mingled with personal interest.' (p. 235.)
120CYFW, vol. 1, p. 31.
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Since they steal sovereign power, they have been consistently worried 
that the people would find it one day. They therefore set up numerous 
rules and laws. The essence of those rules and laws was to destroy the 
moral, intellectual and physical capacities of the people. The rulers 
know that the people are the sovereign of the nation. They realize that 
only by making people passive and foolish, by preventing people from 
becoming enlightened, and by keeping people unable to fight for their 
own interests, can they keep the stolen sovereign power for good.*^ *
Secondly, under despotic govemment the status of the people were no 
different from that of slaves. In this condition, they could not be expected to develop 
public spirit and patriotic sentiments. 'Since the rulers treat people as their slaves, 
people also treat themselves as slaves. Slaves obey or respect their masters because 
they are forced to do so, rather than voluntarily. In their hearts, slaves do not love 
their rulers nor appreciate their relation with the mlers.'*^  ^By the same token, people 
under despotic rale did not share any sense of responsibility for the destiny of their 
country.
To be sure. Yen Fu did not deny that there were rulers in Chinese history who, 
following classical Confucian teachings, cared for the welfare of the people and 
responded to their needs. Such rulers treated people not as slaves, but as children. 
Nevertheless, in cultivating the people's public spirit, he remarked, they fared no 
better than tyrannical rulers. Even under such paternalistic rulers, the people still had 
no voice in public affairs. They were still subjects of the ruler, rather than citizens of 
a country. Since the Ch'in dynasty, he wrote, ordinary people had been prohibited 
from discussing legal and political affairs. Before the Sung and Yuan dynasties, 
however, the gentry could comment on political affairs, a practice finally banned in 
the Ming dynasty. The Ch'ing dynasty was worse still in that it even banned academic 
activities which related to current affairs. 'People's mouths are tightly controlled.
*^ *Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 35-6. 
‘'"Ibid., p. 31.
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Discussions of political affairs are regarded as illegal and vicious.' This was why, Yen 
stated, the people’s intellectual and moral capacities were continually declining.
Why should the virtue of public spirit and patriotism be cultivated? Yen Fu 
presented two different arguments. On the one hand, he regarded these virtues as 
necessary for China's survival and development in the face of international 
competition. On the other hand, the virtues were essential to achieving a harmonious 
society. Yen Fu was consistently concerned for China's survival in the face of serious 
national crises. The educational functions of democracy were more closely related to 
nationalism than for Westem thinkers such as Montesquieu, Tocqueville and Mill. 
The patriotic sentiments of people in the West, according to Yen Fu, explained the 
strength of their nations. 'When people are required to fight against national enemies, 
they regard it as no different from defending their own family.' They loved their 
countries because they regarded the countries as their own p rop e r ty . ' I n  a truly 
democratic country, ...when people fight for their country, they in fact fight for 
themselves. They fight to protect their own property and fight against their own 
enemies.' This explained why people in Westem democratic countries would fight to 
the death to defend their countries.
This phenomenon, as Yen Fu saw it, confirmed the traditional Confucian 
doctrine of the importance of winning the people's hearts. In his memorandum to the 
Ch'ing emperor in 1898, he urged the emperor to open some channels immediately 
for the people's participation in politics in order to win the people's hearts. He quoted 
Mencius' famous remark that Heaven's favourable weather is less important that 
Earth's advantageous terrain, and Earth's advantageous terrain is less important than 
human u n i t y . H e  quoted from Chia Yi (200-168 A.D), a Han Confucian, that only 
by winning the hearts of the people, could the empire be secured. He also quoted Su 
Shih (1036-1101) that 'it is the fundamental principle of govemance to win the
*^ I^bid., vol. 4, p. 907. 
‘^ '‘ibid., vol. 1, p. 31.
'""Ibid., p. 73.
'"%id., vol. 1, p. 72; Mencius, trans. D. C. Lau, p. 85.
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people's hearts'. Asserting that no country will be in danger where the ruler does not 
lose the people's hearts', he indicated politely yet unmistakably that the internal and 
extemal crisis China faced at the time could be partially explained by the ruler's loss 
of the people's hearts. The reasons for this, he suggested, were the existence of a great 
gap between the mler and the people and the lack of communication between them.*^  ^
To win popular support was important for Yen Fu because a society needed a 
strong 'point of solidarity' (chih-tien). Yen Fu's concept of a point of solidarity' 
apparently stemmed from Walter Bagehot's similar idea in his Physics and Politics 
which Yen claimed to have read.‘^ * Yen explained this concept as follows:
According to physical principles, certain materials are solid and hard 
to break. The reason is that these materials have strong points of 
solidarity and a powerful force of gravitation. Just as a magnet attracts 
iron, the point of solidarity, through its force of gravitation, attracts 
other elements of this material and forms an entity with other 
elements. The point of solidarity and other elements exist by mutual 
attraction and they therefore can resist the invasion of extemal forces 
and maintain their existence.
While Yen used examples from natural science, his language was clearly 
metaphorical. What he meant was that a nation, as an entity, must have a point of 
solidarity. This was the belief shared by the people that the country was their 
common property (kung-chan). Yen maintained that the point of solidarity of China 
had lost its force of attraction. The mlers had lost the peoples' hearts and the people 
did not identify themselves as members of the nation. The people as members of the 
community do not know what attraction this community has; the soldiers join the
'""CYFW, vol. 1, p. 72.
'"*Yen mentioned once that he read and even translated some parts of Bagehot's 
book. (CYFW, vol. 5, p. 1346) Nevertheless, no evidence corroborates his claim that 
he translated Bagehot's book.
'""CYFW, vol. l ,p . 74.
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armies without knowing for whom they fight.'* °^
In a letter to a friend, Yen Fu expressed his idea of 'the point of solidarity' 
even more clearly:
After two thousand years of rule in which the rulers are honoured and 
the people are undignified, the peoples' consciousness has been 
suppressed. ...People's sympathetic feelings and patriotic sentiments 
have been eliminated completely.... Therefore, today's China is just 
like a piece of meat. When a piece of meat is attached to a body, it is 
alive and it has many strong points of solidarity which have a force of 
attraction for every cell. Now this piece of meat has become rotten. It 
has no point of solidarity to attract cells. If this rotten meat confronts 
foreign forces which are just like sharp knives, how can this meat not 
be cut into mince."'
Yen Fu also related solidarity' in society with an age-old Confucian ideal: 
harmony in society. Traditional Chinese philosophy, and Confucianism in particular, 
perceived society to be a harmonious unity. According to Confucianism, society 
consisted of a large number of small social units (the family, the village, the guild, 
etc.). The welfare of the social organism as a whole depends upon harmonious co­
operation among all of its units and of the individuals who comprise these units.'"^ 
Every individual in society had certain obligations to perform. The ruler should rule 
benevolently, his ministers should be loyal yet at the same time ready to offer their 
frank criticism; farmers should produce the maximum amount of products. In other 
words, society should be like a magnified family, the members of which, though
""Ibid.
"'Ibid., vol. 3, p. 521.
'^^Derk Bodde, Harmony and Conflict in Chinese Philosophy', in Studies in 
Chinese Thought, ed. Arthur F. Wright, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953, 
p. 46.
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differing in their status and functions, all work in harmony for the common good.’’^  ^
Because of this characteristic of Confucian thought, H. G. Greel saw 
Confucianism as having elements of cooperative democracy. Greel called Confucius 
'a  forerunner of democracy'. 'He had an appreciation of some of the basic principles 
underlying successful cooperation between men that has seldom been surpassed, and 
not frequently equalled, by other philosophers. He did not merely approve of the 
cooperative state; he was passionately devoted to its realization.’*^"*
While Greel's claim-of Confucianism democratic may be disputed, his ^  
observation that Confucianism encouraged cooperation is nevertheless very insightful. 
Moreover, his idea of relating the Confucian conception of cooperation and the 
modem concept of democracy is not as awkward as it seems. In modem China, the 
ideal of a cooperative and harmonious society inspired many Chinese to embrace 
Westem ideas of democracy. Before Yen Fu, some reform-minded scholars of the late 
nineteenth century, such as Cheng Kuan-ying, Wang T'ao, Ho Kai, Ch'en Chih and 
T'ang Chen, had praised Westem democratic systems for promoting harmony 
between the mler and the mled as well as between different social groups. Cheng 
Kuan-ying, the first person in modem China to propose the establishment of a 
constitutional monarchy, argued that the establishment of a parliament would promote 
harmony between the mler and the mled.*^  ^ Wang T'ao praised the British 
parliamentary system and claimed that the real strength of England lies in the fact 
that there is a sympathetic understanding between the goveming and the govemed, a 
close relationship between the mler and the people.'*^  ^Ho K'ai highly recommended 
the British parliamentary system believing that this system in fact would restore an 
idealized Chinese past. He and his contemporary reformers, such as Ch'en Chih, T'ang
*""lbid., p. 47.
*^"*H. G. Creel, Confucius and the Chinese Way y New York: Harper & Row 
Publishers, 1960 (first edition 1949), p. 288.
*^^Hsiung Yuen-tzu, Chung-kuo chin-tai min-chu ssu-hsiang shih (A history of 
democratic thought in modem China), p. 122.
*^ P^aul A. Cohen, Between Tradition and Modernity: Wang T'ao and Reform in 
Late Ch'ing China, p. 225.
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Chen and Ch’en Ch'iu all claimed that 'parliamentary institutions would enable China 
to realize the classical ideals of social and political harmony by causing..."emperor 
and people to be as one body", and "superior and inferior to be of one mind".'*^^
It is interesting to note that Yen Fu's reformist predecessors in the Late Ch’ing 
all correlated some sort of democratic reform with returning to the classics.’ As Ho 
K’ai said clearly, only if we can retum to the past \fu-ku\ can we accomplish what the 
times require of us.’‘^ * To be sure, this returning to the past did not simply mean the 
rediscovery of classical Confucianism. Under the name of the Chinese past, Westem 
democratic institutions were recommended. However, those institutions were adopted 
largely as a means of actualizing traditional Confucian conceptions of the ideal polity.
Unlike his predecessors. Yen Fu did not claim to retum to the classics in 
advocating democratic reform. He was more Westemized than his predecessors. His 
democratic ideas, including his justification of democratic reform, bore obvious 
influences from Westem thinkers as discussed above. Nevertheless, like his 
predecessors, the traditional ideal of a harmonious and cooperative society strongly 
motivated him to embrace democratic values. The most impressive success of 
democracy in the West, for him, was that the gap between the mlers and the mled is 
very narrow.’ The monarch and the people...are just like members of one family.' 
They were equal in the sense that they all shared the powers and responsibilities of 
the country. 'When the country faces problems, they will worry together. When the 
country has difficulties, they will fight to overcome them together.’ Yen Fu saw the 
realization of the Confucian ideal of a harmonious society in the Westem 
democracies.
‘^ ^Lloyd E. Eastman, 'Political Reformism in China before the Sino-Japanese War' 
in The Journal o f Asian Studies^ vol. xxvii (Aug., 1968), p. 705. Eastman, however, 
overlooked the influences of the traditional Confucian ideas on those thinkers when 
he stated that 'these appeals to tradition as a sanction for the adoption of a 
parliamentary system were, of course, specious’, (ibid.)
"^Jung-fang Tsai, Comprador Ideologist in Modern China: Ho K'ai (Ho Ch'i, 
1859-1914) and Hu Li-yuan (1847-1916), Ph.D thesis of University of Califomian, 
Los Angles, 1975, p. 55.
""C'n^W, vol. l ,p . 11.
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Yen Fu’s understanding of the merits of Westem democracy contrasts sharply 
with interpretations of democracy by Westem thinkers. Modem Westem ideas and the 
practice of democracy can be regarded as what Jane J. Mansbridge calls 'adversary 
democracy’. A s  Mansbridge sees it, the main stream of modem Westem liberal and 
democratic thinkers, such as Hobbes, Locke, the British utilitarians, and the American 
founding fathers all legitimate self-interest as the comerstone of political life, and 
regard democracy as a mechanism for representing conflicting self-interest rather 
than trying to reconcile them or make them subordinate to a larger common good’.*"** 
This view of adversary democracy is best represented by contemporary pluralist 
theories of democracy which perceive democracy to be a mechanism of competition 
between different interests in society. For the pluralist, political decisions in Westem 
democracies are reached, and should be reached, as a result of numerous groups 
exerting pressure at different levels of the system.
This difference between Yen Fu’s understanding of democracy and that of 
many Westem scholars has some theoretical implications. First, it indicates that Yen 
Fu’s conceptio^ of democracy as well as citizenship lacks certain elements 
fundamental to modem Westem liberal democracy. Yen’s idea of democracy was 
much closer to ancient Greek democratic ideas than to modem democratic ideas. As 
Thompson suggests, there are distinctions between the Greek idea of citizenship and 
the modem liberal-democratic idea of citizenship. 'Modem citizenship suggests that 
citizens are in their political activities to express not only the public but also the
'^‘“Mansbridge divides democracy into two types. The unitary’ democracy is 
consensual, based on common interest and equal respect’. 'Adversary’ democracy, in 
contrast, 'assumes that citizens’ interests are in constant conflict’. Its logic is that 
every citizens' interests are as legitimate as every other’s, that each shall count for 
one, and none for more than one.’ Modem Westem democracy which is built on the 
large-scale nation-state and the market economy is a full-fledged system of adversary 
democracy’. (Jane J. Mansbridge, Beyond Adversary Democracy, Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1983, pp. 3, 6, 15.)
‘'“Ibid., p. 16.
‘'‘^ David Truman, The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public 
Opinion, New York: Knopf, 1951, esp. Chapter 16, Group Politics and 
Representative Democracy’.
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personal interests of individual and groups.'*'*  ^This means that modem democracy is 
liberal and pluralistic in nature. As discussed in the last chapter, Yen Fu was a liberal 
in the sense that he endorsed Mill's idea that certain areas should be left to the 
individual without any interference from govemment. He agreed with Mill that 
individuals should have freedom of action so long their actions do not harm others 
and society. However, in the area of politics which concems not only individuals or 
groups but also society as a whole. Yen Fu demanded that individual actors consider 
the common interests of society only. This idea, in fact, made his idea of democracy 
extremely impracticable and vulnerable. It is difficult to imagine any working 
democracies in which the participants have no consideration of self or group interests. 
These high demands for democracy could explain partially Yen Fu's disillusion with 
democratic govemment in the wake of the 1911 revolution. In Yen Fu's eyes, the 
drama of so-called democracy was only the shameless pursuit of self-interest by 
corrupt pol i t i c ians .On the other hand. Yen Fu's perception of democracy as a 
mechanism of social harmony perhaps reveals some aspects of democracy which have 
been neglected by Westem liberal democrats. Democracy, as Yen Fu sees it, is not 
only an arena of competition for different interests, but is also a platform for 
enhancing common interests. Yen Fu certainly believed in the existence of common 
interests. He also believed that common interests can not be naturally realized by 
individuals' pursuit of their myriad self-interests. Social unity requires that individuals 
consciously pursue common interests.
VU
While Yen Fu praised democracy, he nevertheless did not claim democracy to 
be a universally applicable form of govemment. 'Democracy is the best form of 
govemment. If there should be a day when the five continents achieve perfection in 
politics, democracy must prevail. Democracy, however, is difficult to achieve.*'^^
‘'’^ Dennis F. Thompson, The Democratic Citizen^ p. 2.
‘^ 'CYFW, vol. 2, pp. 299-300.
*'‘^ Yen Fu, Fa-yi (A translation of Montesquieu's The Spirit o f  the Laws), Bk VIII,
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Certain preconditions had to be met before a democratic govemment could be 
established and maintained.
In his discussions of the conditions for democracy, Yen Fu paid little attention 
to the social, economic or institutional conditions required for democracy. The only 
time he broached the topic of the relation between democracy and those 'materialistic* 
factors was in his blunt denunciation of Montesquieu's remark that 'the natural 
property of small states [is] to be govemed as a republic, of middling ones to be 
subject to a monarch, and of large empires to be swayed by a despotic prince.**^ ® Yen 
used the example of democracy in America to show that a large country could 
establish and maintain democracy too.*^ ^
Yen Fu's discussions of conditions required for democracy were entirely 
focused on the cultural dimension. In this regard, his approach can be compared with 
that of students of political culture in contemporary political science which defines 
the social conditions in which democracy can be maintained in terms of a cultural 
basis. According to this approach, the particular pattem or pattems of attitudes and 
values must be present in either the whole population or a particular influential 
segment of it if a democratic polity is to be sustained.'^*
Nevertheless, this apparent similarity between Yen Fu and Westem students of 
political culture is superficial. Westem students of political culture usually see
p. 3.
‘'‘^ Montesquieu, The Spirit o f the Laws, Bk VIII:20, p. 122.
‘'‘^ Yen Fu, Fa-yi (A translation of Montesquieu's The Spirit o f  the Laws)y Bk VIII, 
p. 23.
‘'’*The most extended attempt until now to identify a democratic political culture 
has been made by Almond and Verba. They believe that a particular pattem of culture 
which they call civic culture' is necessary in creating and maintaining a stable and 
effective democracy. (Gabriel A. Almond & Sidney Verba, The Civic CulturCy 
Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1963; Almond & Verba, ed.. The Civic Culture 
Revisitedy Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1980.)
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political cultures of various nations as relatively stable phenomena.*^’ As a result they 
tend to see the influences of different cultures on political systems in a more or less 
deterministic way.* °^ Yen Fu, however, was deeply influenced by evolutionary 
theories of the nineteenth century. Although he sometimes interpreted differences 
between social and political developments in China and those in the West in terms of 
general differences between their cultures, he basically saw these differences as 
generated by their different evolutionary levels. Moreover, when Yen discussed 
cultural elements in democratic transition, he argued as a voluntarist rather than as a 
determinist. He did not see any fundamental incompatibility between Chinese or other 
cultures and democracy. The significant cultural conditions for him were whether the 
particular level of cultural development was ready for democracy. His whole 
emphasis was on educational processes to raise the level of cultural development in 
order to establish and maintain democracy.
In this sense. Yen Fu was closer to some social and political theorists of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries than contemporary political scientists. When 
Montesquieu, Tocqueville and Mill raised the issue of the relationship between law 
and 'the general spirit of a nation', they emphasized that laws and political systems of 
a nation have to be in accordance with its 'general spirit'. It is necessary people's 
minds should be prepared for the reception of the best laws', claimed Montesquieu.*** 
They identified what they regarded as the cultural conditions necessary for 
democratic systems. For Montesquieu, virtue was necessary for the establishment and 
maintenance of democratic government.**^ For Tocqueville, mores should be 
considered 'one of the great general causes responsible for the maintenance of a
‘"‘^ As Lucian Pye suggests, culture...is a remarkably durable and persistent factor 
in human affairs'. (Lucian W. Pye, Asian Power and Politics: the Cultural 
Dimensions o f Authority, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985, p. 20.)
**®For instance, in his analysis of Chinese culture, Lucian Pye sees some deeply- 
rooted psychological sentiments which are incompatible with political modernization. 
( op cit., p. 183.)
***Montesquieu, The Spirit o f  the Laws, Bk XIX:2, p. 292.
**"lbid., Bk 111:3, pp. 20-2.
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democratic republic in the United States’. F o r  Mill, political machinery 'has to be 
worked by men, and even by ordinary men’.'^ '* Therefore, the level of men’s moral 
and intellectual development is a vital determinant of the forms of a particular 
country’s government.
These ideas of Montesquieu, Tocqueville and Mill confirmed Yen’s general 
belief in the importance of individual moral and intellectual qualities in the 
management of society, a belief deriving largely from Confucianism and Spencer’s 
theory of social organism. Yen Fu had little doubt that the forms of political systems 
and laws must be based on the character of the people. In his preface to a Chinese 
translation of Ito Hirobumi’s Commentaries on the Constitution o f  the Empire o f  
Japan, Yen clearly expressed this belief:
There are many different theories about political institutions. 
Nevertheless the essence of those theories is identical: The political 
systems are set up for people. They therefore will work only if they 
match the developmental level of their people. If the developmental 
level of the people is in a lower stage, even an excellent political 
system and good laws are bound to fail. When the time has come, 
when people become more civilized, even if some rulers want to 
pursue their interests at the expense of the interests of the 
people,...they are bound to be driven away by their people.'”
The developmental level of the people which Yen Fu referred to was mainly 
the level of moral and intellectual development of the people, and moral development 
in particular. Yen Fu did not systematically illustrate what kinds of moral and 
intellectual capacities were required for democracy. His discussion of the issue was 
hopelessly vague and simplistic. Nevertheless, from his praise of the people in
‘^ Tocqueville, Democracy in America, p. 287.
'” J.S. Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, p. 190.
‘” lto Hirobumi, Commentaries on the Constitution o f the Empire o f  Japan (1898), 
Chinese translation by Shen Hung (1901). Yen’s preface is in CYFW, vol. 1, pp. 96-7.
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Western democracies and his complaints about the Chinese, we can glean some of his 
main concerns.
In his discussion of the Ch'ing court’s efforts to establish a constitutional 
monarchy, Yen Fu emphasized that certain conditions were necessary for such a 
government. He asserted.
If a constitutional government is to be established, there must first 
exist a particular kind of constitutional monarch and a particular kind 
of constitutional people. By constitutional monarch I mean a monarch 
who regards himself as a public servant of the people. He considers 
only the long-term interests of the people above his own or his family's 
interests. By constitutional people I mean a people with public 
considerations and patriotic feeling. They also possess a certain basic 
knowledge. All these are impossible without civic education.'^®
In raising the issue of a 'constitutional people’. Yen Fu again had an ideal type 
of citizen in mind. His emphasis on the people’s public spirit as a pre-condition for 
democracy, or even constitutional monarchy, suggests that he regarded what Mill 
termed a sense of citizenship as necessary for establishing a democratic system.**^
Yen Fu's idea of citizenship, however, meant more than Mill’s conception. As 
discussed above. Yen Fu did not see democracy as a mechanism for the competition 
of different interests. Rather, he saw democracy as a mechanism for harmonizing 
ruler and the ruled as well as the different parts of society. The realization of harmony 
should not be through competition and compromise; it should be achieved by various 
groups in society understanding their common interests. Democracy, for Yen Fu, was 
a platform upon which all participants positively and sincerely considered the public 
interest, and searched earnestly for the best way of pursuing the public interest. 
Through the democratic process, the best solution or the combination of the best parts
‘'^CYFW, vol. 2, pp. 245-6.
*^ F^or an account of Mill’s 'sense of citizenship’, see Dennis F. Thompson, John 
Stuart Mill and Representative Government^ pp. 37-9.
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of all solutions would be adopted. In this democratic process, there were no losers, 
only winners. It was not surprising that such a democracy would require that the 
participants had a high level of public spirit and knowledge. The peoples’ minds must 
be raised beyond self-interest before they were qualified to be democratic citizens.
Yen Fu did not realize that his discussion of the conditions for democracy and 
his cultural explanation of the viability of democracy raised a potentially difficult 
dilemma. On the one hand, democracy was justified by its promoting a sense of 
citizenship. On the other hand, democracy could not be established and maintained 
until a sense of citizenship had been developed in the people. The focus of his 
discussions of conditions for democracy was practical rather than theoretical. What he 
wanted to achieve by raising the issue of the conditions for democracy was to 
advocate an evolutionary, rather than revolutionary approach to democratic transition. 
His emphasis on a cultural interpretation of political systems prevented him from 
embracing a revolutionary means for establishing a better system. Since the level of 
the people’s moral and intellectual development could not be enhanced in a short 
period, any attempts to achieve democracy by revolution could only be in vain. What 
a revolution could achieve, for Yen Fu, was only destructive. The most important 
task, however, was to construct a new system.’^ * A new system could only be 
established and maintained by gradual reform. In this regard, Britain provided a most 
successful example. Two hundred years ago. Yen Fu wrote, the British political 
system was a monarchical system in which the monarch held the real power. One 
hundred years ago, real power was transferred to the aristocracy. Fifty years ago, the 
rich began to grasp power. Only in recent times had the British system become 
democratic in the sense that most male adults had the right to vote.* ’^ The 
representative system in Britain, Yen Fu concluded, was the result of slow 
evolution.*^®
Since the forms of government must match the level of the people’s moral and
'""CYFW, vol. 1, p. 123. 
'""Ibid., vol. 2, p. 241.
160Ibid., vol. 1, p. 226.
278
i )■
intellectual development, the ideally best form of government was not necessarily the 
best form of government practically. The practically best form of government was 
that which best suited the moral and intellectual level of the people. In Yen Fu's mind, 
there was a spectrum of governmental form. The best was the democratic republic, 
which could be established only when a people's moral and intellectual development 
had reached a high level. Next came constitutional monarchy which was essentially 
democratic, yet required lower degrees of moral and intellectual development of the 
people than did the democratic republic. If the peoples' moral and intellectual 
development was even lower than constitutional monarchy required, an enlightened 
despotism wa acceptable .Even a purely despotic government which Yen Fu 
criticized vigorously was acceptable in certain situations. First, when a society fell 
into a situation of anarchy or civil war in which people's lives were in danger, 
despotism was acceptable to protect people's l ives.Secondly,  despotic government 
was acceptable when there was a danger of the tyranny of the majority. Influenced 
probably by Tocqueville and Mill, Yen Fu regarded the tyranny of the majority as 
more harmful to the people than the tyranny of a despot.*®^
'"'Ibid., vol. 2, p. 241.
'62CYFW, vol. 5, p. 1305; also. Yen Fu, Fa-yi (A translation of Montesquieu's The 
Spirit o f  the Laws), Bk III, p. 18.
'"'CYFW, vol. 2, p. 337.
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Chapter VII 
Pragmatism in Democratic Transition
I
Yen Fu's dilemma of democracy can be seen most clearly from his political 
position in two important contexts. The first was the constitutional movement of the 
1900s. The second was the Revolution of 1911 and the republic which followed. The 
emergence of a widespread popular demand for constitutionalism in China began in 
1905 following the Russo-Japanese war. Yen Fu was one of a number of intellectuals 
who had advocated the establishment of a parliament and the promulgation of a 
constitution. With the Russo-Japanese war, the demands for constitutionalism spread 
beyond this small circle of intellectuals to include influential officials, members of 
the gentry class, and, to a certain degree, ordinary people. The outcome of this war 
gave great impetus to constitutionalism, since the war was widely considered to be a 
victory of constitutionalism over autocracy. In the wake of the war, demands became 
louder that China should adopt constitutionalism in order to become strong and 
wealthy.
Yen Fu played a very active role in seeing the Russo-Japanese war as a victory 
of constitutionalism over autocracy. On September 3 1905, while the war was still in 
progress. Yen Fu, predicted Russia's defeat in an essay, 'On the Root of Russia's 
Defeat' (yuan-pai) published in the Journal o f  Diplomacy {waUchiao pao). As 
suggested in its title, the essay examined the causes of the defeat of apparent mighty 
power, Russia, by the presumably weaker Japan. In this essay. Yen vividly described 
serious corruption in the Russian government and the low morale of its army. He 
interpreted these weaknesses as inevitable results of the despotic system in Russia. He 
asserted that Russia's defeat in the Far East had deep roots, and symbolized the dead 
end of despotism'. ‘ No country with a such a corrupt and despotic government, he 
maintained, could conduct such an external war successfully.^ In another essay of that
‘CYFW, vol. l ,p .  164.
^Ibid., p. 160.
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time, Yen Fu expressed this point even more clearly. He claimed that the Russo- 
Japanese war was not simply a war between Russia and Japan, but a war between 
despotism and constitutionalism'.^
The victory of constitutionalism over despotism in the Russo-Japanese war, 
Yen Fu further argued, unmistakably demonstrated the direction of historical 
evolution. Both the West and China had suffered autocratic rule. Unlike China, the 
West had developed constitutionalism in the last hundreds years which brought it not 
only social stability and justice but also national wealth and strength.^ Japan had 
followed the lead of the West by installing a constitutional government, and thus 
made great success in its efforts at modernization. Constitutionalism represented the 
future of human evolution and despotism represented the past. Therefore, the contest 
between despotism and constitutionalism could only result in the victory of 
constitutionalism over despotism. He wrote:
In the process of political development, the system of constitutionalism 
usually emerges following the decline of despotism. We should 
therefore recognize that constitutionalism represents the evolutionary 
future of mankind. In a world demanding the coexistence of various 
nations, only those nations which follow the law of historical evolution 
will survive. Nations which fail to do so will be eliminated through 
competition.^
Yen Fu wasted no time in drawing lessons from Russia's defeat to support his 
argument for constitutionalism in China. He saw the Russo-Japanese war as the most 
important event of the early twentieth century indicating that humanity had entered a
^Yen Fu, Lun kuo-chia yü wei li-hsien tzu-chien yu k'e-hsing tzu yao-cheng' 
(Some feasible reform policies should be adopted before introducing
constitutionalism) (1906), reprinted in Tang-an yu li-shih (Archives and history), 
1990, No. 3. pp. 1-2.
"Ibid., p. 2.
^Ibid.
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new era, an era of the growth of constitutionalism beyond Europe and North America 
to the whole world. The result of the war, Yen Fu suggested, would not only arouse 
the Russian people to fight for constitutionalism, but would also inspire the Chinese 
people to adopt it.^
To be sure. Yen Fu still faced the problem of how to reconcile the desirability 
of constitutionalism with conditions necessary to achieve it. Nevertheless, he believed 
that the people could learn to be citizens of a constitutional government only through 
practicing constitutionalism. He proposed to adopt some measures of constitutional 
reform first. As the people’s moral and intellectual capacities progressed, 
constitutional reform could be further deepened. He wrote:
No matter the inadequacies of the Chinese people’s intellectual level, 
and no matter how complicated our old system is, we must adopt 
constitutionalism to survive. Of course, I am aware that our situation is 
different [from that of the West] and the level of our people’s moral 
and intellectual development is lower [than that in the West]. 
Nevertheless, only by starting the process of constitutional reform 
now, can we break through the obstacles and overcome the difficulties 
of constitutionalism. Then we will be able to learn from our mistakes 
daily, and within twenty or thirty years we will be as advanced as the 
West. On the other hand, if we stick to our tradition, we will remain 
trapped in an outdated system and experience endless crises while 
Western society becomes more and more advanced and enlightened.
After twenty or thirty years, when we again talk about 
constitutionalism, nothing will have changed, and the people’s moral 
and intellectual levels will be as low as at present. We will not only 
waste several decades time, but we will fall behind the West. The 
reform will be all the more difficult.^
"Ibid.
Tbid.
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Yen fu’s argument for constitutionalism after the Russo-Japanese war was 
bolstered by widespread demands for constitutionalism by various political forces. 
Popular demands finally forced the Ch'ing court to consider seriously the possibility 
of constitutionalism. The Ch'ing government expressed its willingness to pursue 
constitutional reform in 1905. In December, 1905, the government sent five ministers 
to Japan, England, the United States, Germany and France to observe their 
governments and examine the possibilities for constitutionalism in China. The 
mission returned in July, 1906, and every member recommended some sort of 
constitutionalism.® In September, 1906, the Kuang-hsu Emperor, under the direction 
of the empress dowager, ordered high-ranking officials to begin preparations for 
constitutionalism. In 1908, the government announced that the constitution would be 
promulgated and the first elections for parliament would take place in 1916, and that 
the parliament would be convened in 1917. The date of promulgating a constitution 
was later moved forward to 1913 under popular pressure.’
During the period of preparation for constitutionalism, the Ch'ing government 
convened the first meeting of the Provincial Assemblies {tzu-i chii) in 1909, and of 
the National Assembly (tzu-cheng yuan) in 1910 as channels for attending to public 
opinion. Elections for the Provincial Assemblies took place in 1909, with very strict 
educational and property qualifications on voting rights and candidacy.*® The 
National Assembly was to consist of one hundred imperial nominees and one hundred 
representatives elected by the Provincial assemblies. As one of the ten 'most 
outstanding scholars' (sho-hsueh-t'ung-ju) Yen Fu was among the imperial 
nominees." Both the Provincial Assemblies and the National Assembly were
®Chuzo Ichiko, 'Political and Institutional Reform, 1901-11', in The Cambridge 
History o f China, vol. 11,pp. 388-9.
’Ibid., pp. 396-7.
*®A detailed account of the manner in which the elections were conducted appears 
in Chang P'eng-yuan, Li-hsien-p'ai yü hsin-hai ko-ming (The constitutionalists and 
the 1911 Revolution), Taipei: Commercial Press, 1969, pp. 12-40.
"Among the imperial nominees, forty-eight were imperial clan members, thirty- 
two officials in active service, ten most outstanding scholars and ten highest-level 
taxpayers. (Chuzo Ichiko, Political and Institutional Reform, 1901-11', p. 400.)
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designed as consultative rather than legislative bodies.
The Ch'ing government's measures for constitutional reform met with 
suspicion and anger by two major opposition groups, the revolutionaries and the 
constitutionalists. The revolutionaries were determined to overthrow the 'alien' rule of 
Ch'ing by violent revolution. They regarded the Ch'ing government's measures of 
promoting social and political reform, including the promotion of constitutionalism, 
to be simply deceptive. The constitutionalists, although generally favouring the 
adoption of a constitutional monarchy by peaceful means, were unhappy about the 
government's measures to promote constitutionalism. The constitutionalists then 
adopted a more confrontational position towards the Ch'ing government's proposal for 
constitutional reform.'^
The main complaints of the constitutionalists regarding the Ch'ing 
government's measures for constitutional reform focused on two issues. Firstly, the 
constitutionalists criticized the principles of constitutionalism declared by the Ch'ing 
government which followed the model of the Japanese constitution promulgated in 
the Meiji era in endowing the emperor with not only sovereign power but also a 
commanding role in administrative, legislative and judicial processes. The 
constitutionalists complained that the government put too much power in the hands of 
the emperor and reduced parliament to a mere consultative body. They demanded that 
the new constitution should follow the principle of the separation of three powers, 
legislative, executive, and judicial, with the parliament possessing supreme power." 
In their proposal, the cabinet should be responsible to the parliament rather than to the 
emperor. Secondly, the constitutionalists demanded a much shorter preparation period
Constitutionalists' refers to some loosely organized groups favouring the 
adoption of a constitutional monarchy by peaceful means. 'Such groups might include 
government officials who memorialized in favour of the adoption of a constitution, a 
news editor who wrote articles discussing the way to establish a constitution, or a 
merchant who occasionally joined in the petitions for the convening of a parliament.' 
The constitutionalists' confrontations with the Ch'ing government contributed greatly 
to the success of the 1911 Revolution. (Chang P'eng-yuan, The Constitutionalists', in 
Mary C. Wright ed., China in Revolution: the First Phase, 1900-1913, New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1968, p. 143.)
"ibid., p. 163.
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for constitutional government.
Yen Fu’s response to the measures of the Ch’ing government in introducing 
constitutionalism was more accommodative and less antagonistic than that of the 
constitutionalists, not to mention the revolutionaries. Immediately after the Ch’ing 
government stated its intention to introduce constitutionalism in 1905, Yen Fu 
published several essays on the issue of constitutional reform.'^ He was excited by the 
government’s intention to begin constitutional reform. He praised its decision as 'a  
great event’ in China’s political development. 'The government’, he wrote, has 
changed its previous position and has begun to consider constitutionalism in order to 
save the country from declining. Is this not to the good fortune of our people?’** 
These essays were intended to provide advice to the government in its efforts at 
constitutional reform on the one hand, and on the other to counterbalance what Yen 
saw as radical tendencies of both revolutionaries and constitutionalists.
Yen Fu stated that the essence of constitutional reform was to introduce 
certain fundamental elements from Western constitutional systems in order to 
tiansform the Chinese despotic system into a constitutional monarchy.** There were 
many elements in Western constitutional systems and the constitutional structures 
greatly varied. Nevertheless, he suggested that two elements were most important in 
defining a constitutional government and distinguishing it from despotism. These 
elements were the rule of constitutional law, and the system of parliament.
As we have shown. Yen Fu believed the primary distinction between 
despotism and constitutional government to centre upon constitutional law which 
bound ruler and ruled alike. He identified the traditional Chinese political system as
*'*Those essays include: Cheng-chih chiang-i’ (Lectures on politics), February 
1906; Lun Ying-kuo hsien-cheng liang-ch’uan wei-ch’ang fen-li’ (The British 
Constitution does not divide powers of legislation and administration), September 3 - 
October 22 1906; 'Hsii-lung Ying-kuo hsien-cheng liang-ch’uan wei-ch’ang fen-li’ 
(Further examination that the British Constitution does not divide powers of 
legislation and administration), October - December 1906; Hsien-fa ta-yi’ (The 
Essence of Constitution), December 17 1906. See CYFW vol. 1 & 2 for these essays.
**CYFW, vol. 5, p. 1242.
**Ibid., vol. 2, p. 240.
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despotic primarily because no universal laws bound both rulers and ruled. The 
emperor was above the law. Law only bound the people and not the rulers.’'^  
Therefore, Yen saw the promulgation of a constitution as the vital step to transform 
Chinese political system from a despotism to a constitutional monarchy. He wrote:
What we called constitutionalism involves enacting laws. By law, I do 
not mean criminal laws. We have had criminal laws for a long time, 
without constitutionalism. Constitutionalism means enacting laws by 
which we the people can protect ourselves from tyranny of our rulers. 
Without such laws, or in other words, without constitutionalism, the 
benevolence or tyranny of a ruler will be entirely beyond our control.’*
By promulgating a constitutional law in China and thereby imposing 
constitutional restrictions on the power and the authority of the emperor, he believed 
that China would take a great step away from despotism. Its significance would not be 
diminished even though the emperor would initially hold greater power than that held 
by monarchs in the West. After all, he argued, 'the powers of the sovereign and the 
people may vary in different nations.'*’ The most important thing was that the 
emperor and the people be under the rule of law.^ ® Then the emperor would 
understand the law and know the limits of his power. He would understand that he 
must not break the law.'^‘
Constitutionalism also meant introducing democratic elements into the 
Chinese political system. Yen Fu wrote:
Although constitutionalism has many meanings, it means first and
‘Tbid.
**Ibid., vol. 5, p. 1284. 
‘Tbid., p. 1258.
"Tbid., vol.2, p.240. 
"‘Ibid., vol. l ,p . 236.
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foremost adopting democratic principles. In this way, the Chinese 
people will have a voice in and therefore care for the business of the
government.^^
The adoption of democratic principles, for Yen Fu, did not mean replacing the 
imperial system by a republic. It meant setting up a parliament within the existing 
system. Through the establishment of a parliament, the Chinese imperial system 
would be able to transform itself into a system of constitutional monarchy, 
democratic in nature. Yen Fu's overall plan for a parliamentary system in China was 
less ambitious than that of the constitutionalists. First, he was convinced that the level 
of moral and intellectual developments of the Chinese people was not as advanced as 
that of the West, and he therefore proposed a strict restriction on popular voting rights 
in parliamentary elections. He opposed the introduction of universal suffrage in 
parliamentary elections during this early period. Even Britain, he argued, had not yet 
achieved universal suffrage. 'Women do not have voting rights. There are also 
numerous requirements for men to qualify for voting rights.’^  ^ In the initial stage of 
political reform in China, he suggested, only a certain proportion of the people should 
have the right for vote. The most important qualification for the right to vote should 
be literacy. '^* This limitation, he believed, would not belittle the significance of the 
reform. After all, a certain proportion of the people had the right to vote. Gradually 
this right would extend to everyone.
Aside from the right to vote. Yen Fu argued for limitations on popular 
participation in politics. The only sphere of active popular involvement in politics 
was to be parliamentary elections. After an election people should not interfere in the 
activities of their parliamentary representatives. Probably stimulated by his reading of 
J. S. Mill's Considerations on Representative Government^ Yen Fu distinguished the 
representative (tai-piao) from the delegate (ch'ai-shih)}^ Member of parliament
^^Ibid., vol. 5, p. 1268. 
''Ibid, p. 1299.
'"Ibid., pp. 1303-4.
"Ibid., vol. 1, p.230; the earliest distinction between representative and delegate
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should act as a representative rather than a delegate of his constituency. In parliament, 
'he should act according to his own judgment and wisdom. His constituency has no 
right to force him to accept its opinion in parliamentary activities.'^^
The function of parliament, for Yen Fu, should not be identical to that of the 
West. It should suit Chinese realities. He was highly critical of constitutionalist 
demands for a strict separation into three powers, thereby imitating some Western 
systems. Yen took pains to demonstrate that the British constitution, which he 
regarded as the best in the world, did not completely separate the powers of 
legislation, administration and justice.^^ In China, the primary purpose for 
establishing a parliament was to impose institutional restraints on the power of the 
sovereign, rather than setting up an opposing body which might be destructive of the 
imperial system.^* To prevent parliament from becoming a destructive body, its role 
in challenging the sovereign power would be limited. Parliament to Yen was both a 
legislative body and a consultative body. The most important function of parliament 
was to express public opinion. Through a parliament, the emperor could understand 
the people's wishes better. In addition, parliament would cooperate with the emperor 
in legislation and nominations of various offices.^’
In Yen Fu's proposal, the emperor still held the dominant power. The emperor 
represented the sovereign power of the country. He also acted as the head of the 
administration. In sharp contrast to the constitutionalists, Yen Fu argued that the 
cabinet should be responsible to the emperor rather than to the parliament, as in the
was made by Edmund Burke, but Yen Fu seemed to be unfamiliar with Burke’s 
works. His distinction between representative and delegate was most likely taken 
from J.S. Mill, Consideration on Representative Government, pp. 341-2.
""CYFW, vol.l,p.231.
""Yen Fu, The British Constitution does not divide powers of legislation and 
administration', (CYFW, vol. 1, pp. 218-30); Further examination that the British 
Constitution does not divide powers of legislation and administration', (CYFW, vol. 
1, pp. 230-6.)
""CYFW, vol. l,p .236.
""Ibid., vol. 5, p. 1313.
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early period of the British constitutional monarchy.^® Finally, the emperor should also 
play a significant role in legislation and in the judiciary.
Yen Fu was more accommodative than the constitutionalists to the idea that a 
period of preparation was necessary before introducing constitutionalism. He was one 
of the activists who in the wake of the Russo-Japanese war demanded immediate 
constitutional reform, but after the government spelled out its intention to introduce 
constitutional government and began to move in that direction. Yen Fu was more or 
less placated. In a letter to the minister of education in 1909, he expressed his 
sympathy with the government's decision that several years were needed to install the 
parliamentary system.^* This was not only because the Chinese people were not quite 
ready for a parliamentary system, he wrote, but also because certain technical work 
needed to be done before a parliamentary system could be realized. For instance, 
there was the need to draw accurate maps of the provinces and to have reliable 
statistics on the population before holding a parliamentary election.^^ As long as the 
government honoured its promise, a few years was a reasonable time to wait. During 
this transitional period, the government should actively prepare for the parliamentary 
election and speed up other reforms, such as monetary reform, educational reform, 
and the reform of the criminal law.”
There is no doubt that Yen Fu's position on constitutionalism was much closer 
to the Ch'ing court's position than to that of the constitutionalists. Yen sincerely 
wished to persuade constitutionalists to give the government more time to deliver 
what it had promised and not to push the country down the revolutionary path.
Yen was disappointed that his arguments fell on deaf ears both in the 
government and among the constitutionalists. On the one hand, he was painfully 
aware that the government was far from enthusiastic in pursuing constitutionalism.
% id ., vol. 1, p. 220.
” lbid., vol. 3, pp. 592-3.
” Yen Fu, Lun kuo-chia yü wei li-hsien tzu-chien yu k'e-hsing tzu yao-cheng’ 
(Some feasible reform policies should be adopted before introducing 
constitutionalism), pp. 4-5.
” lbid.
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Although he avoided criticizing government policies publicly, he complained 
privately that 'the situation in the capital...is still as corrupt as three years ago. So- 
called constitutional reform is nothing but a public relations trick aimed at deceiving 
the people.’^ '* On the other hand, he increasingly discerned a radical tendency among 
the constitutionalists. He was particularly annoyed at the radical ideas of Liang Ch’i- 
ch'ao and was alarmed by their powerful influence on society. For Yen Fu, the 
constitutionalists under Liang's influence were pursuing a destructive course rather 
than wholeheartedly striving for a constitutional monarchy. Yen later bitterly 
complained of Liang's writings as the most influential and yet most irresponsible of 
the late Ch'ing period. Under the influence of Liang's 'fascinating pen’, he wrote, 
those simple-minded youngsters, radicalized overseas students and even old 
buieaucrats tiy to follow the fashion and rouse all to pursue the revolutionary 
course.'^^ He held the Ch'ing government, Liang, and Liang's followers responsible 
for the abortive efforts of constitutional reform which resulted in the collapse of the 
Ch'ing empire. The collapse of the rule of the Ch'ing, he later wrote, resulted from 
the inaction of the Ch'ing court and destructive actions of K'ang Yu-wei, Liang Ch'i- 
ch'ao and their followers. Those two elements put together inevitably produced a 
catastrophe for China.'^^
U
The breakout of revolution in October, 1911 shattered Yen Fu's hopes for a 
peaceful reforai of China's social and political systems. His immediate reaction to 
revolution was shock and dismay. In a long letter to G. E. Morrison, the Peking 
correspondent of The Times in London, dated November 9, Yen Fu offered his views 
on the causes and the possible consequences of the Revolution.^^ He was worried that
'^‘See his letter to his wife in 1907, CYFW, vol. 3, p. 739.
''CYFW, vol. 3, p. 645.
'"Ibid., p. 645.
'^This letter was printed anonymously in The Times of 28 November 1911, 
prefaced by the following remarks of Morrison's: I forward to you for publication a
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the revolution would result in civil war or the disintegration of China. He expressed a 
deep pessimism about China's future in the wake of the revolution:
One thing to be sure, according to my humble opinion, is that if they 
[the revolutionists] be impulsive and go too far China will hence enter 
a miserable stage herself, and be the cause of disturbance to the world 
at large. To say straightforwardly, China, as she is, is unfit for a totally 
different new form of government such as the Republic of America.
Her people's temperament and their environments will at least require 
30 years of differentiation and assimilation before they are fit to do so. 
Republic has been strongly advocated by some harebrained 
revolutionists such as Sun Yat Sen himself and others; but it is 
opposed by everybody who possesses some commonsense. By the law 
of Evolution of Civilization, the best, therefore, is to have a form of 
government one grade higher, that is, to remain a Monarchy, but 
limited, with suitable constitutions. Try to make its structure more 
flexible than before, so that it may adapt and progress.^*
At the time Yen wrote the above remark, he was about to leave for Wu- 
ch'ang, the city where the revolution initially started, as a member of the North 
Delegation sent by the Ch'ing government. This group was to negotiate with the 
revolutionaries to seek a peaceful solution to the revolution.^’ Yen reportedly tried
document of human interest. It is a letter written by a learned scholar, who has, 
largely self-taught, acquired an unusual knowledge of English. The writer is one of 
the learned scholars in China, a man whose name is a household word. He has taken a 
leading part in the introduction of Western education into China. He has studied in 
England, and has translated into scholarly Chinese the most popular of modem British 
philosophical works. I send you this letter unaltered, in all its quaint and original 
English.' For this letter and other letters of Yen Fu to Morrison, see Lo Hui-min ed., 
The Correspondence o f G. E. Morrison^ Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1976, vol. 1, pp. 652-7; 768.
*^Lo Hui-min ed.. The Correspondence o f G. E. Morrison, p. 656.
’^On Yen Fu's participation in the North Delegation, see Yen Fu's dairy during this 
period (CYFW, vol. 5, pp. 1511-3), and Huang Cheng, 'Yen Fu yü hsin-hai ko-ming
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hard to persuade the revolutionaries to accept the solution of instituting a 
constitutional monarchy which preserved the Ch’ing empei^r.’*® Yen was disappointed 
that the revolutionaries rejected any settlement short of a republic. Nevertheless, he 
was pleased that the Revolution finally had a negotiated settlement: the Ch’ing 
monarch abdicated in February 1912 and Yuan Shih-k’ai, the prime minister of the 
Ch'ing government, became the first president of the republic.
The peaceful settlement gave Yen Fu some hope for political transition in 
China. For a short period, Yen seemed comfortable with China’s becoming a republic. 
He even withdrew some of his doubts about the impracticality of a republic in China. 
Upon the eve of the establishment of the new republic, he wrote a poem in which he 
compared the situation to that of an ardent lover eagerly listening for the sounds 
signalling the arrival of her beloved.'** He began to weigh the possibility that China's 
decade-long struggle for political reform might have reached an end and that the time 
might have arrived for the country to make some efforts at developing its economy 
and solving the urgent problem of poverty. During the period of late 1912 and early 
1913, Yen published several essays devoted to the issue of p o v e r t y H e  urged that 
this issue should be put at the top of the agenda of the government. He suggested that 
the establishment of the republic provided the best opportunity yet available in China 
to solve the poverty problem. For the first time, the people held sovereign power in 
the country. Previously government economic policies were focused on how the state 
could increase its revenue by collecting more taxes from the people, and the state had 
been indifferent to the problem of poverty.
nan-pei ho-t’an pu-i’ (Examination of Yen Fu's participation in the negotiation 
between the North and the South in the wake of the Revolution of 1911), in Nanking 
ta-hsueh hsueh-pao (Bulletin of Nanking University), 1980, No, 3, pp. 56-9;
'"CYFW, vol. 3, pp. 502-3; 556; vol. 5, p. 1513.
"CYFW, vol. 2, p. 380.
"Yen Fu, Yuan p’ing’ (The root of poverty), December, 1912; 'Lun Chung-kuo 
ch’iu-p’ing i-chung ho-chung shih-yeh’ (What should be done to solve China's 
problem of poverty), January, 1913; Ch’iu p’ing' (On poverty relief), April, 1913.
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The situation now is entirely different. Why? This is because the 
country is presently owned by our five nationalities, and four hundred 
fifty million people. ... Thus, when we talk about solving the problem 
of poverty, we mean improving the people's wellbeing. We know that 
when people become poor, the country will be poor. This is the 
fundamental difference between the present and the past.^^
Yen Fu's optimism did not last long. The fragility of the newly-emerged 
democratic system was clearly demonstrated by the fierce power struggles between 
the parliament which was dominated by the Nationalist Party (KMT), mainly former 
revolutionaries, and the president Yuan Shih-k'ai. There was a deep distrust between 
the two sides and eventually they turned to military means to suppress their 
opponents. Yuan began by assassinating the chairman of the Nationalist Party, Song 
chiao-jen, on March 20 1913. As a response, military forces under the control of the 
KMT launched a military campaign against Yuan in what was then called the Second 
Revolution. Yuan defeated the revolutionary army, and then dissolved the KMT and 
the parliament. Thus the first republic quickly turned into Yuan's dictatorship.^
Yen Fu watched the unfolding events with dismay. These events appeared to 
verify his previous views on the impracticability of a democratic republic in China. 
He was concerned that the situation of China was degenerating into total anarchy or 
full-scale civil war which would entirely destroy the economic basis of the country.
Yen Fu perceived the breakdown of social and political order to have 
stemmed from the collapse of central political authority. He pointed out that in 
overthrowing the emperor, China had lost her powerful monarchical symbol of 
political integration with a history of two thousand years. In exchange, unscrupulous 
militarists and revolutionaries occupied a central stage in Chinese politics. He saw an
''CYFW, vol. 2, p. 292.
"On struggles between Yuan Shih-k'ai and the revolutionaries in the early period 
of the republic, see Ernest P. Young, 'Politics in the aftermath of Revolution: the Era 
of Yuan Shih-k'ai, 1912-16', in The Cambridge Histoty o f Chinas vol. 12, pp. 213-46; 
Li Chien-nung, The Political History o f China, 1840-1928, trans. Teng Ssu-yu & 
Jeremy Ingalls, New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1956, pp. 274-303.
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authoritarian government led by a strong man, a 'Chinese Bonaparte’ in his words, as 
the only hope for maintaining social stability/^ This view motivated him to support 
Yuan Shih-k'ai, first for his dictatorship, and later for his efforts to restore the 
monarchical system.
During Yuan's struggle with the revolutionaries within a democratic 
framework. Yen Fu was wholeheartedly behind Yuan Shih-k'ai. This can clearly be 
seen from his two essays published in early 1913: 'On Political Party' (shuo-tang) and 
'Members of the Parliament should have Gentlemanly Manners' {lun kuo-hui i-yuan 
hsu-you shih-chun-tzu chih fen). In these essays. Yen blamed the parliament for 
confrontations between the legislative body and the president. He particularly 
attacked the party system as it developed in parliament. He assailed the various 
parties for pursuing their own interests at the expense of the interest of the society.^®
Yen argued that political parties by nature were bad because they judged
evei'ything according to the party's own interest rather thari the general interest of the
country, the wellbeing of the people, or any other moral principle.^^ He cited Spencer
as having said that political parties pursued only their own interest and thereby were
biased in political judgment.'** Of course, he recognized that democratic systems
required a party system in order to function properly. In this sense, he wrote, the
?
party system is a necessary evil to sustain democracy.'^’ However, he added that only 
the particular kind of party system which had evolved in Western democracies, and 
not every party system, would be helpful for democracy.^®
'*^ The phrase a Chinese Bonaparte' is used by Yen Fu in his letter to Morrison. In 
Lo Hui-min ed.. The Correspondence o f G. E. Morrison^ p. 656.
''^Yen Fu's On political party' was published in installments in PHng-pao^ Peking, 
in the period of March 6 and May 4, 1913. (CYFW, vol. 2, pp. 298-308); his 
'Member of the Parliament should have Gentlemanly manners' was published in 
P ’ing-pao, May 21,1913. (CYFW. vol. 2, pp. 324-6.)
'*'CYFW, vol. 2, p. 299.
'**Ibid.
"’Ibid., p. 300.
% id .,p p . 300-1.
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Yen said that political parties in Western democracies had some distinctive 
features. First of all, the Western party system was built upon the higher moral and 
intellectual state of their people. Parties were organized not for personal gain, but for 
the general wellbeing of the country and its people. Parties advanced differing views 
of the best way of achieving the general good. For example, there were contests in 
Britain between the party favouring protectionism in com trade and the party 
favouring free trade. There was competition between liberals and socialists in various 
Western countries. All these parties. Yen wrote, shared a common feature: they held 
some well-grounded doctrines and beliefs. They also attempted to reach a 
compromise and thus complemented each other.^*
China’s political parties. Yen continued, differed from those of the West. This 
stemmed from China's hasty adoption of a democratic republic directly from 
despotism, bypassing the natural stage of constitutional monarchy. 'After the 
breakout of the Wu-ch’ang uprising, we changed our political system of thousands of 
years into a so-called republic within only a half-year. Without some of the necessary 
pre-conditions, our new political system works like a tramcar runs on a rugged and 
rough mountain path.'^  ^Manifesting the impracticability of a republic, political parties 
in China by and large lacked features of the modem political party. 'We have such 
parties as Tung-meng, Kuo-ming, Kung-ho, and Tung-i. ...Few of them have 
demonstrated the slightest resemblance of a real political party, and few will be able 
to foster political progress of our country. Eighty to ninety percent of these so-called 
parties are nothing but cliques pursuing their own selfish interests.'^^
Yen Fu's views as expressed in these essays were strikingly similar to those of 
Yuan Shih-k'ai. One of the persistent accusations Yuan made of his opponents was 
that his opponents organized parties only to pursue their ojvn interests. Yuan wamed 
that if the parties continue to maintain their own selfish ways and quarrel with each 
other without regard to the law, the proclaimed republic will cease to exist.'*  ^Yen Fu
' ‘Ibid., p. 301.
'"Ibid., p.299.
"Ibid.
''‘Emest P. Young, Politics in the aftermath of Revolution: the Era of Yuan Shih-
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played significant roles in Yuan’s advisory body, so that Yuan’s statements were very 
likely influenced by Yen Fu.
Yen Fu wavered in his support of Yuan Shih-k’ai during Yuan’s struggles with 
the parliament, when Yen learned to his dismay that President Yuan had arranged the 
assassination of the chairman of the KMT. Yen had not imagined Yuan’s use of such 
means to destroy his political opponents. He feared that the country would inevitably 
collapse into a period of endless bloodshed.*^ For this and other reasons, he expressed 
dissatisfaction with Yuan Shih-k'ai:
While the president is one of the most capable politicians in our time, 
he is at best an old-style bureaucrat. By comparison with leaders of the 
great powers. Yuan lacked scientific knowledge and a world 
perspective. Moreover, he was accustomed to asking others to obey 
him and has no intention of obeying others. His administration of 
government affairs has many defects.^®
Yet even after the assassination. Yen Fu preferred Yuan Shih-k’ai to the 
revolutionaries. Yen’s dislike of the revolutionaries ran so deep that he seemed 
prepared to accept any necessary evils to the revolutionaries. Yen bitterly denounced 
the KMT’s Second Revolution. He compared the revolutionaries with Robespierre and 
thought that they posed a greater threat to the country than other political forces.*  ^
However, Yen never clearly indicated why the revolutionary parties represented 
greater danger than Yuan Shih-k’ai’s dictatorship. Sometimes he seemed to suggest 
that the revolutionaries would impose a new type of lawless despotic rule - 'merely a 
shift of despotic power from the Emperor to the ... National Assembly or ... the
k’ai, 1912-16', p. 226.
''CYFW, vol. 3, p. 609.
'"Ibid., p. 624.
'"Ibid., p. 610.
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Senate.'^* He feared what he called the tyranny of the majority» At times, he suggested 
that the dominance of the revolutionaries would lead China into total anarchy. Yen 
considered Yuan Shih-k'ai to be the last hope for preventing the revolutionaries from 
harming the country.
Yen Fu's hostility to the revolutionaries and his faith in Yuan Shih-k'ai led to 
his lukewarm support of Yuan Shih-k'ai's restoration of thé monarchy. Yuan's efforts 
began in 1915, initiated by a famous memorandum from Yuan's American political 
advisor, Frank J. Goodnow on difference between a monarchy and a republic.*’ The 
central theme of Goodnow's memorandum was that The determination in a given 
country of the form of government established therein has seldom if ever been the 
result of the conscious choice of the people of that country or even the choice of its 
most intelligent classes.'^
The establishment on the one hand of a monarchy o  ^on the other hand 
of a republic has in almost all instances been due to influences almost 
beyond human control. The former history of the country, its 
traditions, its social and economic conditions all have either favoured 
the form of government which has been adopted or, in case the form of 
government at first adopted has not been in harmony therewith, have 
soon brought it about that that form is replaced by one which is better 
suited to the country's needs.^*
*®Yen Fu, 'Letter to G. E. Morrison', in Lo Hui-min ed.. The Correspondence o f  G. 
E. Morrison, vol. 1, p. 655.
*’Frank J. Goodnow was a professor of political science at Columbia University in 
the United States and the first president of the American Political Science Association 
before he was invited by the Yuan Shih-kai government to serve as a constitutional 
advisor (from 1913-1917) to assist China's effort to draft a constitution. He became 
known for his 'memorandum to the president', conventionally known as 
'memorandum on republic and monarchy'. {Peking Daily News, August 20,1915.)
^^Frank J. Goodnow, Memorandum to the President', reprinted in State 
Department of the United States ed.. Foreign Relations o f  the United States, 1915, 
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1924, p. 53.
61Ibid.
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In the case of China, Goodnow continued, because the intelligence of the great 
mass of its people was low owing to its lack of schools, and since the Chinese had not 
much experiences of participation in the work of government, 'it is of course not 
susceptible of doubt that a monarchy is better suited than a republic to China.*®^  
Although the belief that a monarchy was better suited to China's situation predated 
Goodnow's memorandum, it was not until after the memorandiun that the movement 
for restoring the monarchy gained momentum.^^ In less than a week, six men took 
Goodnow's opinion as the basis for the Peace Planning Society {ch'ou-an hui) which 
came to be the most important organization in favour of the restoration of 
monarchical system.
Yen Fu was among these six men. According to his account, Yang Tu, the 
central figure of the Peace Planning Society, used his name without his full 
authorization.^ According to Yen, Yang Tu initially suggested that the society would 
be purely an academic association. It would focus on theoretical discussions about 
which constitutional form would best suit China's situation. Nevertheless, Yen 
quickly discovered that the society was an agency for Yuan Shih-k'ai's plan of 
restoring monarchy with himself as emperor. Yen Fu then tried to distance himself 
from the society, but was dissuaded by Yang Tu. Yang told Yen that it was the 
president's own idea to use Yen's name and warned Yen that he would be in trouble if 
he attempted to withdraw his name.^  ^ Yen claimed that he watched helplessly as his 
name was used in every declaration and appeal of the Peace Planning Society urging 
the change of China's constitution from a republic to monarchy.
There is one point to be made about Yen's account of events. His reluctance to
"'Ibid.
"^Li Chien-nung, The Political History o f  China, pp. 309-11.
"^CYFW, vol. 3, pp. 627, 631,636-7. On Yang Tu's political views in the 
movement of restoring monarchical system in mid-1910s, see Liu Ch'ing-po ed., 
Yang Tu chi (Collection of Yang Tu's works), Changsha: jen-ming, 1986, esp. pp. 
566-607.
65CYFW, vol. 3, p. 636.
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participate in the activities of the Peace Planning Society was not because he had 
different opinions from the society on the desirability of a constitutional monarchy, 
but because he was not happy about the means the society adopted to achieve its goal. 
As has been shown above, Yen Fu did not believe a republic to be a realistic choice 
for China before the Revolution of 1911. The experiences of several years of a 
democratic republic confirmed his distrust of republics. As early as 1913, Yen began 
to voice criticism of a republic. He wrote, 'a  republic is not suitable to our race' 
(September 1913).^'Our country needs a monarchy.... This is something that a three- 
year old child would know!'^^
Yet, Yen Fu was no political ideologue. He was aware that any fundamental 
political change either from monarchy to a republic or vice versa could cause a major 
disturbance and should be carried out with great caution. 'China has a political 
tradition of four thousand years and a population of more than four million. Any 
change of its frmdamental political system should not be done rashly or recklessly. 
Rash change might bring great catastrophe to the people and yield bloodshed.'** 
Moreover, Yen was unsure if Yuan Shih-k'ai was the person to whom the country 
should entrust the responsibility of monarch. Although Yen considered Yuan Shih- 
k'ai one of the most capable politicians of the time, he was well aware of the 
President's political ambition and lack of moral character. He characterized Yuan's 
confrontation with the revolutionaries as fighting over legality on the surface and 
essentially for his own power'.*’ After Yuan assumed the office of the presidency, 
Yen wrote, he had been preoccupied with suppressing political opponents and had not 
developed any policies to address China's urgent problems.^® Yen was also 
disappointed with Yuan's methods of restoring the monarchy. He considered Yuan's 
campaign for the restoration of monarchy an insult to the people. He regretted that
**Ibid., p. 611. 
*"lbid., p. 627.
**Ibid., pp. 632-3. 
*’lbid., p. 633. 
"®lbid., p. 638.
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Yuan did not allow the people to discuss and hold a plebiscite on the issue of a 
monarchy versus a republic. He genuinely thought that the people would choose a 
monarchy over a republic if offered the chance to vote.^‘ He seemed unaware of the 
paradoxical character of his argument: if the people were not enlightened enough to 
sustain a republic and needed a monarch, how could the same people know to choose 
the 'better' system of a constitutional monarchy over a republic? If the people could 
have the sense to choose monarchy, why could they not sustain a republic?
On the whole. Yen seemed unenthusiastic about the restoration of monarchy, 
although he preferred a monarchy to a republic. This was the result of his 
differentiating between what one should do and what one could do. His philosophy 
was to work within the current system and this philosophy prevented his advocacy of 
any political ideology. He always tried to improve the situation in a pragmatic way.
This philosophy explains why, after the failure of Yuan’s efforts of restoration, 
Yen Fu rose to defend Yuan when many others declined to do so. Yen Fu saw Yuan 
as the last barrier preventing China from entering a full-scale civil war. Against 
majority opinion, he argued that Yuan should not be removed from the presidency 
because no one else had Yuan's capacity for controlling the army and thus 
maintaining social order. If Yuan was impeached, various army factions would seek 
military solutions in their favour, and a full scale civil war would be inevitable. Yen 
warned that the country should not go to such extremes to solve its problems.
A country about to perish manifests this by going to extremes in 
everything. Everyone is talking about saving the country, but in fact 
they are making things worse. There will be a day in the future when 
we look back and greatly regret our extreme actions today. But then it 
will be too late.^^
Yen Fu's warning soon proved to be accurate. Following Yuan's death in 
1916, China entered an era of warlords. Social and political order totally collapsed.
"'Ibid., p. 629. 
""Ibid., pp. 641-2.
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People suffered civil war and famine for decades. Yen spent his last few years in deep 
despair and depression. He could do nothing other than complain about militarists and 
revolutionaries who brought catastrophe to the country. 'Since the revolution', he 
wrote in 1918, two forces have been dominant in our national politics: militarists and 
revolutionaries. ... They should all be damned for their evil actions.'”  Yen 
characterized the warlords as unrighteous men controlling killing machines'.”  The 
revolutionaries, Yen wrote, were worse still. Before they came to power, they would 
mobilize the masses by propagating attractive ideas like freedom and democracy. 
'When they come to power, they appoint their followers to every responsible 
position', and harshly suppress their opponents.”
Yen could see little hope that his country would return to peace. In a letter 
wiitten in 1920, several months before his death, he wrote: I have been thinking 
things over and realized that we do not have any chance for peace and order in the 
next twenty or thirty years. As I approach my last days and consider the current 
situation, I feel deeply sad for my country.'”  In his last, desperate years. Yen Fu 
became somewhat nostalgic. He stated that the situation during the Ch'ing period was 
better than that of Yuan Shih-k'ai's presidency, which in turn was better than the 
current situation.^^ He was almost ready to accept any form of government which 
could stop the civil war. Yet even in this desperate time Yen Fu would not accept a 
totalitarian system as the alternative. In sharp contrast to the general excitement 
among radical intellectuals over the October Revolution in Russia, Yen Fu was 
unimpressed by the Marxist-Leninist experiment in Russia. In a letter dated 
September 1919, he made one of his few comments on the Russian communists:
The radical parties of the Eastern Europe differ completely both in
” lbid., p. 686. 
” lbid.
” lbid.
” lbid.
” lbid., pp. 635-6.
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theory and practice from previous revolutions of the last hundred 
years. These radical parties hate freedom and equality, thinking them 
to be dying doctrines. They are committed to destroying the rich and 
achieving equal property. They are harsh and ruthless. I cannot bear to 
read the reports of their behaviour in Odessa as shown in our 
newspapers. Their ruthlessness has surpassed that of German soldiers 
in Belgium. I beg you to think how such wolves could be tolerated by 
the world.... I am certain that they are not going to last long.’*
Yen seemed to be suggesting that the nationalist revolutionaries were better 
when compared with the Russian revolutionaries.
Having examined Yen Fu's idea of democracy and his views of some 
important political events of his time, what can be said about his conception of 
democracy? Was he a believer in democracy? Or was he an old style authoritarian as 
Chinese scholars have generally believed?
In comparison to his commitment to liberty. Yen Fu's commitment to 
democracy was less strong. He accepted democracy as the theoretically best form of 
government. He denounced Chinese despotism and admired modem Western 
democratic systems. In practice, he was well aware that the choice of constitutional 
form was often beyond man's control. In a country like China without a tradition of a 
constitutional system, not to mention democracy, it would take at least several 
decades to transform the despotic system to a more democratic one. Yen preferred a 
gradual transition to a quick one. His conception of a transitional process was from 
despotism to constitutional monarchy, and from constitutional monarchy to a 
republic. Moreover, Yen did not consider democracy as something of intrinsic value. 
He had a high regard for other values too. For example, he regarded ending the civil 
wai' as more uigent than promoting democracy.
Barrington More once remarked that 'the contradiction between politics and 
morality, never far below the surface in so-called normal times, reasserted itself with
78CYFW, vol. 3, p. 704.
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particular vehemence in times of revolutionary change.'^’ Such a contradiction was 
evident in Yen Fu's case. Yen faced revolution, civil war and poverty, and seemed 
prepared to accept alternatives to democracy. His position regarding democracy was, 
to use his own phrase, 'not to follow any fixed principle, but try to achieve the best 
possible consequences.'®® Yen Fu's political opinions are reminiscent of de 
Tocqueville. During the Revolution of 1848, Tocqueville held a political position 
close to the group of writers known as the doctrinaires, of whom Royer-Collard and 
Guizot were the leaders. 'This group', as Jack Lively observed:
...did not evolve any coherent system of political ideology, indeed one 
of their most consistent claims was that political possibilities, the 
demands of circumstances, should be far more important in deciding 
policies than any views (either retrospective or visionary, reactionary 
or radical) on how society ought to be constructed.**
As with Tocqueville, Yen Fu never abandoned his dream of a more liberal and 
democratic society, however remote the possibility.
’^Barrington More, Jr., Reflections on the Causes o f Human Misery, London: Allen 
Lane, the Penguin Press, 1972, p. 38.
*®CYFW, vol. 3, p. 615.
**Jack Lively, The Social and Political Thought o f Alexis de Tocqueville, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1962, p. 206.
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Conclusion
This thesis has focused on Yen Fii’s ideas on some important issues 
confronting modem Chinese intellectuals, particularly issues of whether China should 
make fundamental changes, what kinds of changes should be sought and how these 
changes should proceed. Yen Fu was the first in China to systematically introduce 
modem Westem social and political theories and one of the main figures in the 
generation of intellectuals which has been called the 'real transformers of values and 
bearers of new ideas from the West'.' This point, combined with his profound 
influence on succeeding intellectual development, allow us to relate the intellectual 
role Yen Fu played to the larger context of the intellectual transition from traditional 
to modem China.
One of the most important roles Yen Fu played in modem Chinese thought 
was his challenge to the traditional conservatism and his argument for fundamental 
changes through the application of Westem ideas and institutions. He fulfilled these 
tasks primarily by his introduction of Darwinism into Chinese thought.
In contrast to the received interpretation of Yen Fu's adoption of Darwinism 
which emphasizes the influence of social Darwinism as a catalyst for his 
preoccupation with the wealth and power of Chinese nation-state, I have argued that 
Yen Fu did not accept the ethic implicit in social Darwinism - the ethic of justifying 
ruthless stmggle within society or between different societies. He accepted 
Darwinism as a body of theory best revealing the law underlying social development. 
Thus his argument for change was based less on the necessity of enhancing state 
power in order to compete successfully in the stmggle for existence than on the 
necessity of following the law of universal evolution.
For more than half a century before Yen Fu's introduction of Westem social
'Benjamin Schwartz, Introduction', Reflections on the May Fourth Movement: A 
Symposium^ ed. Schwartz, Cambridge, Mass.: East Asian Research Center, Harvard 
University, 1972, pp. 2,4.
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and political theories, Chinese reformers had argued for change mainly based on the 
necessity of enhancing the nation’s wealth and strength in order to drive out 
foreigners. Such arguments nevertheless proved unable to overcome traditional 
conservatism which rejected learning from the West on the basis that the West was 
less civilized than China. Conservatives regarded nurturing the people’s minds with 
Confucian moral doctrines as essential not only for building a harmonious society, but 
also for sustaining the survival of the Chinese as a people. They believed that moral 
superiority was more important than military superiority in determining the fate of a 
people. They cited numerous instances in China’s history in which barbarous peoples 
invaded and defeated China militarily yet were finally assimilated into Chinese 
culture because China had a superior civilization.
Yen Fu’s introduction of Westem evolutionary theory fatally undermined the 
traditional conservatism. Through evolutionary theory, he described the human world, 
together with the natural world, as conforming to universal laws. He interpreted social 
development everywhere as evolving through different stages which are universal to 
human societies. He showed that it was historically imperative for every society to 
move to a higher stage of social evolution or perish.
The most significant implication of Yen Fu’s argument for change based on 
evolutionary theory was the establishment of moral superiority of the modem 
Western civilization over the Chinese. He classified the modem West as lying in the 
highest stage of social evolution and China as being in an outdated patriarchal stage. 
This classification greatly weakened the Sino-centric perceptions of Chinese elites. 
Through this classification. Yen Fu transformed the focus of the long debate 
regarding learning from the West from an issue of China vs. the West into an issue of 
tradition vs. modernity. He represented the modem West as the symbol of modemity 
and moral excellence and the apogee of the evolutionary potential of humanity. He 
simultaneously redefined traditional Chinese culture, customs, and institutions as 
patriarchal.^ Thus he was the earliest advocate of Westemization and anti­
traditionalism in China which fully developed during the New Cultural Movement 
between 1915 and 1927.
'CYFW, vol. l ,p.  136.
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My interpretation of Yen Fu's justification of change differs from Schwartz's 
in several respects. In the first instance, my research argues that Yen Fu's intellectual 
concerns were much greater than merely nationalistic concerns. Yen Fu accepted 
modem Western social and political ideas not simply as effective means of achieving 
wealth and power for China, but as universally valid idea^, as valid for China as for 
the West. Yen Fu drew both from traditional Chinese thought and from modem 
Westem thought not only to address national crises of his time but to address an age- 
old issue of Confucian tradition: how to establish a prosperous and harmonious 
society. ^
Secondly, my interpretation enables one to understand the continuity of 
modem Chinese intellectual discourse with traditional thought. In examining Yen Fu's 
interpretation of Darwinism, I have shown that underlying his rejection of Confucian 
orthodoxy was a core of Confucian logic. Like traditional Confucians, Yen Fu 
subscribed to the notion that the prosperity of a society depended on morally and 
intellectually cultivated individuals; he believed that the fortune of a country related 
to its ability to follow destiny. He also stressed voluntarist human action as the 
primary factor of social change. His idealized model of the modem West exhibited 
some fundamental Confucian virtues: intellectual excellence, moral perfection, social 
harmony and public-mindness. All of these reflected the influence of Confucian 
tradition. However, Yen Fu differed from traditional Confucians in shifting the ideal 
society from its Confucian context in a lost Golden age to the modem West. He 
considered the West, rather than China, to possess superior moral principles, higher 
intellectual development, and more cultivated people. The West, rather than China, 
seemed to have become t ’ien's favourite.
Thirdly, my interpretation provides a better understanding of one paradox 
among Chinese intellectuals of Yen Fu's time. Intellectuals like Yen Fu were 
politically nationalistic, and yet held almost iconoclastic attitudes towards the heritage 
of the Chinese past; they were culturally 'pro-Westem' during a period of Westem 
imperialist encroachments on China.^ My interpretation suggests that for a short
^Charlotte Furth, 'Intellectual Change: from the Reform Movement to the May 
Fourth Movement, 1895 - 1920', in Cambridge History o f China, vol. 12, ed. John K. 
Fairbank, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, p. 346.
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period in modem China, from the 1890s to the breakout of the First World War, the 
mainstream of Chinese intellectuals displayed sentiments which were both anti- 
traditional and pro-Westem. These sentiments stemmed mainly from the Chinese 
intellectuals' belief that the West represented the future of human evolution. 
Following the First World War, pro-Westem sentiments waned while anti- 
traditionalism continued to dominate Chinese thought.
U
In addition to evolutionary theory, Yen Fu was also instmmental in 
introducing modern rationalism into Chinese thinking. I have argued that he regarded 
the core of Confucian morality - the principle of righteousness - as responsible for the 
absence of an idea of progress in China. Therefore, Yen Fu tumed to utilitarian ideas 
derived from both Legalism in China and British utilitarianism. Yen Fu's 
utilitarianism exceeded Chinese Legalist concems about the wealth and power of the 
state. He believed that social and political policies should be judged according to the 
standard of the greatest happiness of the greatest number, while the Chinese Legalist 
utilitarianism refeiTed mainly to the interest of the state or the mler.
While conceding Yen's inconsistency and reluctance to fully embrace 
utilitarianism either as a personal morality or as a basis of public policy, it was argued 
that he nevertheless accepted the view that the consequentialist principle should be at 
least one of the criteria for judging social and political issues. Even this limited 
acceptance of utilitarianism played a significant role in Yen Fu's thought. His 
acceptance of the consequentialist principle was one of the most significant 
differences separating him both from traditional conservatives and from his more 
radical contemporaries. It modified his utopianist tendency which was derived from 
both Darwinism and Confucianism. It gave Yen Fu some measure of rationalism. 
Based on this rationalism, he was able to make choices in his social and political 
discussions, rather than merely follow traditional dogmatism or dogmatism from the 
West.
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mThe second part of this thesis outlined Yen Fu's political ideas, focusing upon 
his ideas of liberty and democracy. My intention was to address two different 
criticisms of Yen Fu's political ideas. One was presented by Schwartz, who dismissed 
Yen Fu's liberal and democratic ideas as little more than appropriating Westem liberal 
and democratic ideas as means to a statist goal. The other was presented by Chinese 
students of modem history, which portrayed Yen Fu's thought as changing from 
liberal to conservative and finally to reactionary.
By examining Yen Fu's ideas of liberty, law, democracy and his position in 
some major political events of modern China, it was argued that his political ideas 
were consistent on the whole, though he changed some of his views in response to 
changing situations. The essence of Yen Fu's ideas of liberty and democracy was 
close to what Hayek called British liberalism. Yen Fu was one of a few leading 
intellectuals in modem China who realized the importance of individual liberty for 
building a better society. The liberty he advocated was what Berlin called negative 
liberty. Yen Fu had a very moderate aim in advocating liberty: to define a sphere - a 
small one initially - in which the individual could act freely without interference from 
the state or society; to establish the rule of law in order to prevent the tyrannical 
power of the state; and to limit state power both in the sphere of moral education and 
in the sphere of economic activity. Yen Fu's model of the achievement of this liberty 
was Victorian Britain.
In comparison with his commitment to liberty. Yen Fu's commitment to 
democracy was less steady. He embraced the ideal of democracy, but he emphasized 
the conditions for establishing a democratic system. His primary concem was to 
transform China's political system from what he perceived to be a despotism to a 
constitutional monarchy leaving the possibility of building a republic to the future.
Yen Fu's ideas of liberty and democracy were unique in his time. On the one 
hand, he criticized traditional Chinese political ideas and systems for neglecting 
individual interests and individual freedom, for lacking the notion of the rule of law, 
and for excluding popular participation in the political process. On the other hand. 
Yen Fu was one of the few leading intellectuals of his time to discern the danger of
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radicalism. He criticized the radicalism he found among the revolutionaries of 1911.
Yen Fu's ideas differed from the radicals in defining both the goals of China's 
social, economic, political and cultural changes and the means of reaching them. His 
model was nineteenth-century Britain. Radicals of Yen Fu’s time were influenced by 
the French Enlightenment thinkers, Rousseau in particular, by the French Revolution 
and American Revolution, and by the Russian Populists. They placed greater 
emphasis than Yen Fu on the ideals of democracy, social equality, and particularly on 
the role of state in enhancing social welfare. Radicals also saw revolution against the 
old regime as the precondition for significant improvement. In contrast. Yen Fu did 
not see the destruction of the political centre as a way of reconstructing society. He 
considered society to be a social organism having the individual as its determining 
component. He emphasized that a good society could only be achieved by enhancing 
man's moral and intellectual capacities, rather than through a revolution. Thus, Yen 
Fu consistently looked for ways in the existing political structure to reform society. 
Although Yen Fu never felt satisfied with existing rulers, either the Ch'ing emperor or 
the Yuan Shih-k'ai presidency, he nevertheless hoped to persuade rulers to undertake 
gradual and managed reforms in order to improve society.
Yen Fu's criticism of various radical ideas seems to warrant the appellation of 
conservatism, as some Chinese scholars have attributed to him. His conservatism, 
however, differed from that of traditional conservatives who were 'prophets of the 
past'. He did not oppose all changes, but simply radical change. In this sense, he 
exhibited some similarities to modem Westem conservatives.^ Indeed, his harsh 
criticism of the revolutionaries of the I9I0s is reminiscent of Burke. Like Burke, Yen 
conceived society as having been built through centuries of human endeavour and
''Noel O'Sullivan defined conservatism as an ideology characterized 'by opposition 
to the idea of total or radical change, and not by the absurd idea of opposition to 
change as such, or by any commitment to preserving all existing institutions'. (Noël 
O'Sullivan, Conservatism, London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1976, p. 9.) Michael 
Oakeshott stated that, to be a conservative, he will find small and slow changes more 
tolerable than large and sudden', and he will accommodate himself more readily to 
changes which do not offend expectation than to the destraction of what seems to 
have no ground of dissolution within itself. (Michael Oakeshott, On being 
Conservative', in his Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays, New York: Basic 
Books Publishing Co., Inc., 1962, p. 170.
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thus something to be improved gradually/ Yen also expressed a fundamental 'hatred 
of the Enlightenment and especially of Rousseau'/
Underlying Yen Fu's conservative liberalism was his utilitarian justification of 
liberty and democracy. Against those who considered Yen Fu's commitment to liberty 
and democracy to be only half-hearted, I have argued that his utilitarian position 
aimed for a middle course between extreme positions. Several studies of modem 
Chinese intellectual history have considered any justification of individual freedom 
and democracy on grounds other than regarding them as ends in themselves to lean 
potentially towards authoritarianism, or worse still, totalitarianism.^ A full response to 
this argument is beyond the scope of this thesis because it would require an 
examination of the merits and the weaknesses of utilitarian liberalism itself, a subject 
which has dominated Westem moral and political philosophy in recent decades. 
Nevertheless, in Yen Fu's case, it may be suggested that utilitarianism served Yen Fu 
well in his advocacy of a middle way regarding the issues of liberty, democracy and 
revolution. Utilitarianism provided him with weapons for criticizing both Chinese 
despotism and the newly emerged radicalism. On the one hand. Yen denounced 
Chinese despotism as a system destmctive of the moral and intellectual capacities of 
the Chinese people and thus as being responsible for the decline of Chinese 
civilization. On the other hand, he showed that radical revolution would lead the 
country and its people to disastrous consequences.
^Michael Freeman, Edmund Burke and the Critique o f Political Radicalism, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980, p. 3.
^Ibid.
^Notably, Benjamin Schwartz, In Search o f Wealth and Power, pp. 237-46; Chang 
Hao, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and Intellectual Transition in China, pp. 189-206; Lin Yu- 
sheng, 'Radical Iconoclasm in the May Fourth Period and the Future of Chinese 
liberalism' in Reflections on the May Fourth Movement: A Symposium, ed. Benjamin 
Schwartz, Cambridge, Mass.: East Asian Research Centre, Harvard University, 1972, 
pp. 23-6.
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IV
This thesis has not directly addressed the issue of why Yen Fu's vision of 
liberalism and democracy failed in modem China, although this issue has concerned 
students of modem Chinese intellectual history for decades. This is because, firstly, I 
do not consider Yen Fu's efforts in introducing liberal and democratic ideas into 
China to have failed simply because his vision of a liberal and democratic system was 
not realized. Yen played a significant role in enlightening Chinese intellectuals by 
introducing Westem liberal and democratic ideas. Secondly, the issue of the fate of 
liberalism in modem China is quite complex and is mostly beyond the scope of a 
study of Yen Fu. Nevertheless, I have touched upon some issues which have been 
often examined in answering why Yen's vision of liberalism failed in modem China.
I have examined how traditional Chinese thought might have effected Yen 
Fu's commitment to Westem liberal and democratic values. It was argued that certain 
traditional ideas facilitated or prepared Yen Fu's appreciation of Westem liberal and 
democratic ideals. This was particularly the case in Yen Fu's acceptance of modem 
Westem democracy as a means to fulfil the Confucian ideal of kung (govemment as ! 
public property) and social harmony. On the other hand, the influence of Chinese 
tradition led Yen to ignore or reject certain Westem liberal and democratic ideals. He 
was not impressed by what he called the extreme form of individualism. Following 
the Confucian tradition, he emphasized the individual's responsibility towards society 
and the necessity of self-cultivation and individual excellence. Furthermore, he 
regarded Westem democracy as a mechanism for achieving social harmony rather 
than a battlefield for pluralist interest groups.
Yen Fu's interpretation of Westem liberal and democratic ideals within the 
perspective of traditional Chinese ideas was not a distortion, but rather an intellectual 
reflection from a different perspective. This different perspective may shed light on 
the quality of Westem liberal and democratic principles themselves.
The principal weakness of Yen Fu's version of liberalism lies neither in his 
utilitarian defence nor in his Confucian interpretation of liberal and democratic 
principles, but in the 'scientific' philosophy of evolution which he adopted from 
Spencer and others in order to promote leaming from the West. To be sure, I have
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shown that Yen Fu did not treat the law of social evolution very seriously. He adopted 
the law of evolution mainly as means of demonstrating the moral superiority of the 
modem West. Nevertheless, the theoretical implications of Yen Fu’s evolutionary 
ideas exceeded the argument for leaming from the West. His introduction of the ideas 
of evolution and progress had a profound influence on modem Chinese thought.* 
Following Yen Fu’s propagation of Westem evolutionary theories, the idea of 
universal, progressive evolution captured the best minds of modem China. As Sun 
Lung-kee noted, it became the most important task since the late nineteenth century 
for Chinese intellectuals to understand the 'epoch’ (shih-tai) they confronted, to 
understand the law of historical evolution, and to follow the historical law towards an 
ideal society. A persistent topic in intellectual discussions during the early part of this 
century in China was the law of social evolution.’ Political factions ranging from 
nationalists, liberals, anarchists and socialists justified their political doctrines by 
appealing to the notion of the law of social evolution.
Before the First World War, the historical trend was generally understood to 
be represented by the Westem democracies. This consensus changed dramatically in 
the wake of the First World War. The significance of intellectual change following 
the outbreak of war has not been explored adequately and it is beyond the scope of 
this thesis to provide a full account of those changes. Nevertheless, I have briefly 
described the sharp change in intellectual climate in the wake of the war. After the 
outbreak of the first World War, a consensus emerged among Chinese intellectual 
elites about the decay of modem Westem civilization, as demonstrated by the war. 
While Yen Fu and some veteran reformers wanted to reconsider Confucianism to find 
answers for China’s future, the majority of intellectuals were ready to continue to seek 
a realization of the ideal society. The Soviet Union immediately replaced the Westem
*Leo Ou-fan Lee, ”In search of Modemity: Some Reflection on a New Mode of 
Consciousness in Twentieth-Century Chinese history and Literature,” in Paul A. 
Cohen ed.. Ideas Across Cultures: Essays on Chinese Thought in Honour o f  Benjamin 
/. Schwartz, Harvard University Press, 1990, pp. 112-122.
’Leo Ou-fan Lee, 'In Search of Modemity: Some Reflections on a New Mode of 
Consciousness in Twentieth-Century Chinese History and Literature’, pp. 110-22; Sun 
Lung-kee, Chinese Intellectuals’ Notion of "Epoch” (Shih-tai) in the Post May- 
Fourth Era’, in Chinese Studies in History, Winter, 1986-1987, pp. 44-74.
312
model as the apogee of the evolutionary potential of mankind. The spread of Marxism 
in China in the early 1920s was accompanied by a massive debate about China's 
social history and the future of human development. In this debate, Chinese Marxists 
successfully argued that China had undergone a stage of slavery before entering a 
feudal stage. They claimed that these stages confirmed that the Marxist periodization 
of history was more 'scientific' than other evolutionary theories.'® Moreover, they 
argued that the emergence of the Soviet Union and the Communist movement in 
Europe and the decay of morals in capitalism after the first World War indicated that 
Communism was more 'modem', and more representative of the future. In this sense, 
Yen Fu's intioduction of Westem evolutionism paved (he way for the spread of 
Marxism in China.
'®Arif Dirlik, Revolution and History, chapter 5, 'Kuo Mo-jo and Slavery in 
Chinese History', pp. 137-79.
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